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Experiments To Generate New Data About School Choice

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Experiments and School Choice Data

Behavioral/experimental economics is poised to enter a new phase in its relatively brief intellectual history, moving beyond empirical tests of standard behavioral assumptions in the social sciences to the problem of designing improved institutions that are tuned to fit real-world behavior. For this reason and others, it is worthwhile to analyze the potential value that new experiments could provide to the school choice debates by generating new data to settle longstanding questions.

Insofar as behavioral/experimental economics succeeds in delivering results that lead to improved real-world institutions, these improvements will likely rest on two key methodological innovations. First, instead of using standard assumptions about consumers and suppliers responding continuously and optimally to small changes in the costs and benefits they face, simpler behavioral models can produce improved predictions about how non-omniscient individuals with real-world limitations will respond to changes in the institutional environment—for example, following the default, imitating how others within close physical proximity are behaving, or satisficing by aiming simply to do at least as well as a threshold-level of performance, resulting in large regions of the cost/benefit space where there is no behavioral response at all to small changes in costs. The second reason why behavioral/experimental economics can make new contributions to institutional design is its methodological embrace of experimentation and the creation of new empirical data that illuminate substantive problems in economics.

From the standpoint of anyone trying to make our analyses of debates over school choice more of an empirical science and more relevant to the real world, Merrifield's call for experiments in the field of school choice is very much welcome. His call for more experiments is based on the widely shared premise that existing data about institutional change provide, at best, a grossly insufficient empirical record upon which to base high stakes decisions about the reform of educational institutions. Merrifield's proposals for new forms of data collection are all the more welcome given that he is not an experimental economist. His argument for how we benefit by producing a much stronger empirical record should be widely appealing to researchers working in a number of subfields in the social sciences.

Interestingly, the substance of his argument can be directly translated into the methodological language of experimental economics. I attempt to make this translation here. Hopefully, my backward translation—from Merrifield's arguments explicated in natural language into the jargon of experimental economics—provides additional illumination regarding which approaches deserve to have the widest support. Additionally, I hope that it provides an evaluative framework for analyzing other claims about which institutional reforms should take priority.

Merrifield proposes mostly real-world experiments—what experimental economists call “field experiments,” to distinguish them from “laboratory experiments.” Thus, Merrifield’s proposal calls for data collection on the schools that real families actually choose, their educational expenditures, and changes in supply conditions. As far as supply conditions go, perhaps the most important outcomes to be studied are changes in the menu, or choice set, of schooling options available after laws have been changed to encourage new organizations (mostly private companies, one presumes) to offer new kinds of educational services.

Re-stated in the jargon of experimental economics, the essence of the argument is as follows. The designers of existing field experiments, which aimed to provide increased school choice, erred in the calibration of treatment variables. The treatment variables (i.e., the variables controlled by those designing experiments) used in school choice field experiments have, so far, been set at levels that are virtually indistinguishable from those of the control runs of the experiment.

Thus, it is little surprise that the resulting data generally show little behavioral response to the treatment variables in school choice experiments, such as voucher systems, privatization initiatives, and charter schools. A key reason why the existing data are poor is that insufficient variation in the treatment variable reduces the precision of any estimated effects of treatment variables on the dependent variables of interest, say, test scores.

To see why, recall that, in a bivariate regression, the estimated standard error of the β coefficient is proportional to (the square root of) the sum of squared residuals divided by the sample variance of the X variable, where X is interpreted as the treatment variable that experimentalists control. Running experiments where the different values of X are clustered too close to each other produces very small sample variance of X and, consequently, a large standard error on the estimated value of β attempting to measure the effect of institutional change on expected levels of performance. Note that if X measures the institutional features of different school systems, then this variable is probably a multi-dimensional vector rather than a single number indexing a one-dimensional spectrum. Multidimensionality of X only exacerbates the problem of insufficient variation in X with respect to our goal of learning about regularities in the relationship mapping X into expected levels of school performance.

A second reason why timid choices of values of X that fail to cover a wide enough range hurt the quality of resulting data (in a possibly multi-dimensional space representing different institutional configurations governing the provision of educational services) is reduced capacity for out-of-sample extrapolation. If experimental data cover only a tiny range in institutional space, then the estimated relationships based on those data will not allow for reliable predictions about as-yet only imagined institutional configurations. As any introductory textbook on linear regression explains, a small range of variation in the independent variable provides little reliable information when extrapolating from measured relationships between, say, institutions and school cost or school performance, to more radical proposals for institutional reform that entail bolder shifts in the supply and demand conditions of school services.

Couched in antiseptic terms that draw on nothing more controversial than regression analysis 101, the premise that existing school choice data provide an insufficient basis for the real policy analysis and reform measures that our scientific discipline needs—not to mention the citizen voters of our country—should enjoy widespread support among economists of nearly every political or ideological stripe. Designing new experiments that produce data capable of revealing more precisely estimated effects, and giving a basis for prediction over a much wider range of shifts away from the institutional status quo, would seem to be a clear scientific priority. One hopes that stakeholders on many fronts will realize the tremendous value of generating new data to inform school reform and come together to join forces in designing a variety of new experiments whose data will provide positive externalities enjoyed by researchers, policy makers, educators and families of school-age children alike.

Which experiments? Which X' to try next?

The next question concerns which direction to shift X . We know that the status quo, X_0 , does not perform well. We know that existing data are insufficient for estimating a regression coefficient, β , measuring the change in expected school performance (or cost) when X is shifted. The question remains, then: how to choose X' .

The question, “Which X' ?” is a symbolic translation of the question, “Which alternative institutional arrangements should be designed into our next rounds of school choice experiments?” Since real families and school children are involved, there is a deep ethical obligation to choose an X' that will have a very good chance at producing improved levels of performance. Without this imperative to make our experiments as valuable as possible for the people taking part in them, an alternative research program might be proposed in which we shift one element of the vector X at a time to radically inferior positions—just so that we might produce new statistical information about the performance response of schools to different kinds of institutional deficiencies. Of course such a proposal is ethically offensive and scientifically absurd. It serves, however, to underscore how important it is that, when we choose new experimental values of X to cover a wider range of variation, we look for values of X' with a high likelihood—based necessarily on theory, since there is no direct empirical evidence about worlds in which X' prevails—of improving the average performance metric. Range of variation is not enough. The level of performance matters, perhaps more than anything else.

But it is precisely in our discussion of which alternative institutional arrangements to pursue that we are likely to get bogged down in debate, possibly consuming so much energy and leading to so much distraction that no new experiments are ever conducted. In fact, these two distinct objectives—of raising performance, and of accumulating more data by varying institutional variables more—probably accounts for some of the gridlock that has stood in the way of school choice debates advancing. As mentioned above, because the extant data are poor, we have only theory and a small amount of suggestive empirics, open to multiple interpretations, to use as we debate what the high-priority choices of X' to use in forthcoming school choice experiments should be.

On the question of which experiments would be most fruitful to run, I want to call cautionary attention to the use of efficient market theory in guiding these experimental design choices. My concerns are twofold, relating to the two following quotes.

Merrifield writes, “[W]e can discover a cost effective menu of schooling options, and each item’s minimum cost, through market accountability experiments.” He also writes, “The entry-price system combination has a great economy-wide track record because it harnesses highly dispersed knowledge about schooling practices, and exploits self-interest through opportunities to compete.”

I want to take up these points separately, first focusing on cost-minimization (e.g., finding the efficient frontier in the school services production set) and then on market mechanisms more generally in the context of deciding which school choice experiments should take priority.

Cost minimization?

Given the choice between the current school system (which many observers agree is broken according to various measures of performance) versus a high-performing system that is 20% inefficient, which would you choose? I do not think *efficiency* in the zero to 20% range is anywhere as significant a priority for most parents—nor should it be—than the *level* of performance, that is, the quality of teaching and education that their children receive. I, for one, would be happy to pay 20% too much in order to find for my children a few teachers who are intellectually alive, not bullied by someone else’s curriculum planning, not numbed through years of uninspired teacher training, and committed to boldly pursuing objectives that coincide with ones that matter to me.

As education researchers and economists, estimating the cost-minimizing envelope of school services production technology (e.g., using data envelopment analysis, or DEA) is an intellectually interesting problem. And perhaps from a system administrator point of view, managing the efficiency of a well-functioning system is laudable and socially useful. But if most classrooms are currently failing to produce the outcomes we want, then who cares if some districts produce identically failing outcomes whose costs are 20% cheaper?

Cost-minimization as an overall goal in education seems almost irrelevant in the current context, in large part, because quality is so difficult for both experts and non-experts to observe. What we want is quality-controlled cost minimization. If we insist on cost-minimization without minding quality, insisting that schools procuring supplies always choose the lowest bidder, we could very well end up with, not the most efficient, but the lowest quality products in our schools. I am not at all sure I would want my school district to automatically go with cost-minimizing bids, say for school food, playground equipment, or scientific tools like microscopes. The quality dimension seems missing when Merrifield writes, “School districts can competitively contract out school management to gauge the minimum cost of existing approaches to schooling.” How can they conduct meaningful cost comparisons without undertaking very costly expert assessments of quality? It is doubtful that any company or individual has collected enough data points to estimate an efficiency frontier for producing computer operating systems, or mobile phone systems, or commercial airplanes. These

industries get along fine, in part thanks to their pricing power which means that they operate on the strict interior of their production sets rather right along the efficient frontier.

Merrifield acknowledges how difficult it is to identify a single amount of money that would provide for an “adequate education.” He is surely right that this is indeed a difficult task. What is almost certain, however, is that this amount is less than infinity. Rather than a vision of extreme scarcity, I would suggest that we might benefit by focusing instead on the abundant resources we already enjoy and then work then to better apply them. We have an abundance of resources like experienced adults with time on their hands who could be employed to deliver better education to our children—if only we could find better institutional arrangements to coordinate those abundant resources and the children who need better educational services. I would urge us to stay focused on imagining new institutional forms that can deliver much improved services rather than getting hung up on the less important problem of estimating cost envelopes when quality is very difficult to observe and precisely measure.

Are Market-Oriented Values of *X*’ the Institutional Experiments We Should Run First?

Are real-world markets good at inducing the kind of competition that most of us would like to see in our nation’s school system? Merrifield apparently thinks so. He writes, “General experience indicates that innovation and cost-cutting are among the first things to falter when the pressure to let up.” Thinking of CEO salaries (does anyone think that competitive pressure is what determines them?) or lavish spending on status goods for top managers that surely defy principles of cost-cutting, one can easily point to systematic departures from cost minimization among Fortune-500 firms operating in ostensibly “competitive” environments.

Whereas “competition” in economics means price taking, the word “competitive” in the real business world refers to a company that has accumulated enough pricing power and financial or political resources to insulate itself from price pressure. A firm that sells at a price near marginal cost is viewed as weak and likely to die—not competitive and efficient.

Merrifield acknowledges that winners in private markets do not always exemplify the traits of competition that we want to see in the school system: “History shows that industry leaders eventually become unable to adequately adjust to change.” This, to me, then begs the question of why something we call “the market” should naturally be our first choice when looking for ideas about new institutional systems to deliver schooling services to our children? One can be 100% in favor of competition and yet deeply suspicious that *laissez faire* approaches to the allocation of educational services will achieve any gains from competition.

Merrifield at times implies that we have a theoretical basis and, at times, implies we have an empirical record to support his claim that “markets” have a “mostly strong track record outside K-12 education” and should therefore be attempted in K-12 education. Giving the claim the benefit of the doubt and ignoring the myriad counterexamples that so easily come to mind, one only has to recall that introductory micro principles textbooks routinely list conditions for gauging how optimistic we should be about the performance of market mechanisms—on the basis of theory rather than data.

Criteria favoring market institutions that are frequently cited in undergraduate economics textbooks are homogeneity of the good, ease with which quality can be assessed, symmetry of information about quality of the good, absence of externalities, and eventual diminishing marginal returns technology (e.g., the good is not a so-called natural monopoly for which economies of scale would naturally favor a single producer). Nearly all of these criteria would seem to raise questions—not necessarily damningly negative *a priori* conclusions, but rather genuine questions—about the effectiveness of de-centralized markets for allocating educational services.

Even for a *laissez faire* skeptic like me, re-examining this list of conditions that favor markets re-sensitizes and re-focuses the sometimes nuanced but hugely important task of finding institutions that promote competition. It is important distinguish *laissez faire* as an institutional configuration from the actual degree of competitiveness and efficiency it produces. *Laissez faire* can lead to an absence of competition. And there are many dimensions along which our institutions can encourage or discourage product differentiation and competition, implying that two institutional schemes, which should be thought of as vectors, say X_1 and X_2 , may not be easy to order in terms of which is more market oriented or more *laissez faire*.

“Market Forces” is ambiguous

Merrifield writes that his essay “identifies the challenges and opportunities that can be addressed through policy experiments that harness market forces.” But what are market forces? Is there a scalar valued index of “market-ness” that can order all policy ideas on a single-dimensional spectrum? I think not.

Signals amiss

Merrifield writes, “A likely high price for a significant innovation drives much business enterprise.” These high prices, however, are in many cases the result of an institutional intervention—patent laws—that intentionally shut down price competition for a decade or more for particular products, while perhaps stimulating a different kind of competition for acquiring new patents. Price signals in a more de-centralized economic world without patent laws would surely send different signals. Which institutional setting—patent law or no patent law—is more of a “market system?” The question of price signals motivating innovators to make big bets necessary to transform our educational system implies that price controls and protected monopolies could, at least following the logical principle of patent law, be part of the solution.

Merrifield refers to the virtues of market price signals: “Market price signals drive continuous improvement, cost reduction, and product evolution...by identifying the reward for topping the existing cost and quality standards reflected in competitive prices.” But price competition is rare in many important industries and, when it takes place among firms with market power (which is nearly always the case), competition can lead to the suppression of innovation (e.g., shelving patents), hiding of valuable information, and negative externalities like pollution.

In the context of educational services, all these potential problems are real possibilities. Especially worrying among these potential problems is intellectual pollution. One can imagine a form of pollution occurring as firms who set educational curriculum create as a by-product

children socialized with a muted, numbed, or missing appreciation of non-materialist definitions of happiness in the canon of Western thought--and beyond. If market mechanisms (whatever is meant by this vague term) produce educational curricula geared to growing the economy as measured by GDP, would skills, sensibilities, and training in aesthetic de-coding based on world views aiming for more than increased quantities of consumption of goods and services traded in private markets financed by labor income have any room in the curriculum? For example, the most famous philosophers of ancient Greece disparaged acquisitiveness and identified high-quality social relations, and the leisure time needed to produce them, as indispensable inputs for achieving happiness. Do we really want institutions that let such ideas die?

Just like some market-oriented economists tend to blame poor people for being poor—that is, they were too lazy, they made the wrong decisions, they made friends with the wrong kids on the school playground—it sounds, at times, as if Merrifield wants to blame bad performing schools on educators themselves rather than on parents or, more culpable still, I think, those who designed the institutions that govern our school system. Merrifield quotes Albert Shanker, former President of the American Federation of Teachers, saying essentially that teachers are to blame. I would much rather blame administrators, managers, principals, and others with anti-freedom anti-thinking bureaucratic impulses. Rather, we need to channel competition into a subset of the multi-dimensional set of factors that determine educational quality and focus on the ones that respond positively to competition.

The personal politics of many leading economists who developed models of market economies are instructive in de-coding what the word “market” means when describing different institutional configurations for organizing a nation’s school system. When we read the Fundamental Welfare Theorem of Economics stating that “Under conditions A, B, and C, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient,” many evangelical free marketeers in the economics profession seem only to see the last phrase, “competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient,” and ignore the hypothesis of the statement.

Others among us read the statement of the theorem and are drawn to how stringent the conditions are. Nobel Prize winning economists like Hurwicz, Ken Arrow, or Joe Stiglitz, for example, advocate real-world institutions that channel competition in particular directions and impose strict regulation in others. These economists emphasize that the gap between “Under conditions A, B, and C” and the real world is far too great to expect the conclusion of the theorem to hold without further institutional modification.

With regard to risk-assessment technologies, the recent financial market crisis would seem to imply that inferior innovations can displace incumbents whose technology is superior. Thus, innovation does not always imply progress or monotonically increasing consumer welfare. Did AIG’s financial market innovations (i.e., new insurance products and new financial derivatives that obscured risk rather than efficiently re-allocating it) constitute a superior technology? For comparison, recall that Merrifield writes: “Possible increased profit through innovation always drives some market entry and replacement of marginal incumbent producers.”

Despite these reservations, I say, yes, let us try some of the projects envisaged by Merrifield. Seeing that markets are highly heterogeneous and malleable—and imperfect—gives us a larger set of potential policy tools, not a smaller one. If there is inertia, for example, then inertia can in theory be productively harnessed to help lock in at an institutional configuration that is performing well. There would seem to be many good-enough routes to envisioning and then achieving meaningful improvements.

One specific that Merrifield writes on which I think is a terrific idea is coupon credits: “coupons that families can use later to finance higher education and or tuition at chartered schools that offer premium services. The coupon amount is debited from the per pupil public funding paid to the school. Credits, as opposed to cash rebates, avoid some potential for fraud.”

Inequality

A few countries have, quite admirably in my view, created educational systems in which nearly all children can expect to receive a rather good education. In the U.S., however, despite being the richest country in the world, families’ wealth and income dramatically condition their babies’ expected quality of education. This inequality of educational opportunity is a defining characteristic of life in different US neighborhoods, in different school systems, in families with different incomes. These differences are powerfully correlated with access to education, health, and virtually all basic services that comprise the material quality of life. Because inequality is a defining feature of life in the U.S., educational reforms will naturally be evaluated, in part, on the basis of how they affect inequality.

Merrifield accepts increased inequality as a by-product of allowing for more diversity and encouraging innovation in educational services. He argues that high-services schools with rich customers will innovate and produce technological spillovers that eventually will benefit all. Merrifield writes: “So, through well-implemented good ideas, as well as bankruptcy for purveyors of the rest, entrepreneurial initiative gradually increases the quality and diversity of well-known services, and drives down tuition levels (the co-payment amount) until it is difficult for a newcomer to make a normal rate of return on investment by entering the schooling market.”

As a counter-example to this claim that markets ineluctably make consumers better off, think about US agricultural production since the beginning of the 20th century. If one shops at major grocery stores in the U.S. for tomatoes, for example, certainly agribusiness has managed to reduce unit costs and produce a large quantity of tomatoes for low cost, providing a benefit along the cost dimension. But the quality of these tomatoes in terms of flavor (as anyone who shops for produce in Italy—or India or Mexico—quickly discovers) is lower than that of tomatoes sold elsewhere using much older technology and, almost without doubt, lower than the quality of tomatoes produced in the U.S. 100 years ago. Competition and technological innovation that make fat profits do not necessarily leave most consumers with more choice, with higher quality, or generally better off.

Merrifield is right that deregulation of what schools are allowed to charge would provide positive data and welfare improving outcomes for many. But I think perhaps he overstates the case in saying that this de-regulation would hurt no one: “As schools of choice, chartered schools that

seek a co-payment must offer superior services to be competitive with schools that cost less. Opening the school system to especially costly specialized services helps some families, hurts no one, and yields much valuable data. It increases school funding without raising taxes.”

Some of those who do not receive these superior services will, no doubt, be put at a competitive disadvantage. Perhaps the American education system is already so unequal that allowing for temporarily more inequality in order to raise overall performance levels is a worthwhile tradeoff—perhaps. I think this is what Merrifield is arguing for. I only wish that his essay acknowledged the oftentimes dramatically experienced costs of inequality in the lives of many Americans, and the possibility of increasing inequality as a negative side-effect of otherwise desirable policy ideas.

Diversity in the Supply of Educational Services

In advocating the need for more diversity in educational supply (i.e., a richer variety of teaching styles, combinations of services, and objectives sought after as primary performance metrics), my intuition tells me that Merrifield is absolutely right. An organic educational system, like a rich environment with great bio-diversity, should not be a monoculture, avoiding the monoculture’s vulnerability to episodes in which a single pathological element in the mix can lead to extinction. As a consumer of educational services, it might be nice to have a longer menu of choices with very different kinds of educations offered. (On the other hand, long menus might also be confusing and gut-wrenching to parents, for example, having to choose between many expensive high-services options versus low-cost low-services options for one’s child.) It is important to acknowledge, however, that diversity of educational supply is almost necessarily in conflict with another goal frequently put forward, which is standardization and the gains achieved by having common metrics of performance, common language, and common content.

Time Horizons and Transition Costs

I have written before (Berg, forthcoming) on the importance of going beyond comparisons of two equilibria to consider costs along the transition path to the new equilibrium. In the case of school choice, I think it should be an ethical requirement that we seriously attempt to account for transition costs, especially for those who will be worse off, for example, by taking part in experimental educational supply systems that prove to be inferior even to the status quo. In his current essay, I appreciate very much that Merrifield mentions the transition cost issue.

A closely related issue is the time horizon over which we can expect predicted gains to be fully achieved. Merrifield writes, “For useful insights, the latter approach will require a long time horizon.” It would be nice to speculate in more detail about how long. I am guessing that we are talking about something on the order of a decade or more, especially in light of transition times required in privatization experiments in Eastern Europe, for example. To accelerate the time horizon and minimize transition costs, introducing competition experiments within the public school system may have a lot to speak in its favor.

Merrifield puts forward a very interesting idea regarding multi-year bidding: “Those terms set the bar for the bidding on schools in later years, as well as for the renewal of contracts. Staggering (some multi-year contracts awarded or renewed each year) accelerates the critical

‘top-this’ process.” I think Merrifield is right and I would be happy to see multi-year bidding institutions be put in place. This further conclusion, however, is almost surely too simple: “Competitive pressures will gradually reveal and improve the cost, specialization, and quality possibilities.”

Regarding the time dimension in school choice analysis, Merrifield very usefully reminds us that our notions of satisfactory or adequate school performance are, and perhaps should be, dynamical concepts—they change with the times. For example, we expect more math skills than we did a century ago. These disparate points under the theme of the time dimension in school choice should be kept in mind, especially as we undertake before/after event studies or cross sectional analyses of existing test score data.

Experimental Controls

From an experimental point of view, using an entire district as a control is a problem. For this purpose, randomized trials are much better. With randomized trials, there is no room for measured gains from school reform to be attributed to pre-existing differences in treatment versus control populations used in the study. Perhaps Merrifield could modify this claim or elaborate on the benefits of his proposed control when he writes, “The districts without voucher programs serve as the ideal control group for the effects on the district that offers vouchers.”

Equilibrium and Innovation Do Not Follow from a Single Self-Consistent Model

The perfect competition and Walrasian equilibrium framework all but rules out any role for innovators. Descriptive models of economic systems built on equilibrium assume that all unilateral improvements have been completely exhausted as a defining feature of equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, since no one can do any better, there can be no beneficial innovations. All unilateral deviations from the status quo make the individual worse off.

Thus, to speak in the same breath about market competition and innovation (i.e., the process that nearly all of us agree will be critical in discovering and implementing continuous improvements) entails more than a minor contradiction. The possibility of continuous improvements implies a model of markets in which equilibrium is *not* the norm, and the standard conclusions about price competition leading to cost reductions may *not* hold.

Conclusion

Merrifield’s emphasis on expanding parents’ range of choice about where to send their kids to school for the purpose of generating valuable new data, and the potential for school systems to learn from each other, is right on target: “That K-12 school systems might greatly benefit from one or the other is a major premise of this essay’s discussion of needed insightful school choice experiments.”

At times, it seems that Merrifield thinks of cost minimization and innovation as synonyms. It is true that innovations in technology can lead to cost reductions. But innovations that render older techniques obsolete can actually lead to higher prices. Think of medical technology, for example. Today’s technology, presumably in the eyes of most contemporary observers, produces higher quality healthcare outcomes than the technology of centuries past. But

technological innovation has not led to broad price reductions in the provision of medical services.

Merrifield also usefully lists (and has previously documented in fine detail) the failings of past attempts to introduce more competition to the supply of educational services: “The typical key restrictions in charter and voucher laws include limits on the number of new independent schools, caps on total enrollment, open admission requirements, curriculum content rules, and price control through voucher and charter school co-payment bans.”

Merrifield is right about sometimes cynical policies that serve political imperatives but do not address real educational needs: “Indeed, the political process often funds ineffective programs, and bad economic policy is sometimes good politics.” But the same is true in private business. Sometimes low-quality production is good business even when it is bad for consumers. Think, for example, about recent items in the news about toxic imports of pet food and housing construction that sickened many consumers. Or the famous quote from an Archer Daniels Midland executive caught on FBI cameras in the act of collusive price-fixing: the executive laughed as alleged competitors agreed on a lower limit on prices that “competitor is our friend and the customer is our enemy.”

One can view this as an evolutionary step along a path in which badly behaving companies go bankrupt and new companies improve quality as an investment in their reputations. But in these cases, the bankruptcies have not in fact materialized and the evolutionary interpretation seems further from reality than the view I put forward above: namely, that, just as referees are needed to make professional sports competition interesting, so too we need strong regulation (e.g., random health inspections and detailed product labeling requirements) to achieve competition in the dimensions that make consumers better off (e.g., raising quality rather than dangerous quality-lowering cost cutting).

Thus, for me, there is much to disagree with in Merrifield’s assertion that “priorities are easy to discern from a price system.” The priority of families' health, and that of their pets, was not easy to discern in the prices of imported goods that contained difficult-to-detect poison. Price information is, of course, sometimes valuable. But in many cases, price information is woefully incomplete, because product quality is multi-dimensional and very difficult for consumers to directly observe.

Proponents of de-centralized de-regulated mechanisms for allocating educational services should keep in mind severe asymmetries in information (e.g., school managers who are on the premises of educational facilities most of the day, versus parents who do not see what happens in the classroom most of the time). They should keep in mind the difficulty for parents to quickly and cheaply assess product quality. And they should keep in mind the large gap between private versus social marginal benefit resulting from positive externalities that occur when parents increase the quality of the educational services they procure for their children.

I keep coming back to my earlier concern that Merrifield assumes that markets will provide a desirable menu of educational choice. This is a substantive question and should not

automatically be assumed. Merrifield writes: “Do they trust parents to define the appropriate menu of schooling options through their choices, and if so, are the district leaders willing to subvert the district administration’s self-interest in sustaining public school enrollments?” The question is not whether parents create the choice sets. It is whether the institutions of public education, private education, or a mixed platform, would provide the best choice sets according to various performance and consumer choice metrics.

Merrifield’s bold premise is right on target and deserves wholehearted support from reformers of every political stripe, when he writes: “I will discuss both approaches. True, the discussion of new institutions will appear radical or just irrelevant because of assumed political infeasibility. But it is the duty of social scientists to present them anyway.” Amen to that.

Too often economists adopt a narrowly Popperian view of their scientific research program, aspiring only to whittle down the list of possibly true theories by occasionally falsifying one with data analysis. As Merrifield points out, scientists should also be in the business of creating new ideas. Institutional design for the provision of educational services is an area long overdue for creative synthesis of new ideas, and Merrifield is undoubtedly a leading voice advancing us down this path. Let the new experiments and data generation begin!

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