Csóka, Péter and Pintér, Miklós (2010): On the impossibility of fair risk allocation.
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Abstract
Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | On the impossibility of fair risk allocation |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Coherent Measures of Risk, Risk Allocation Games, Totally Balanced Games, Exact Games, Shapley value, Solution core |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General |
Item ID: | 26515 |
Depositing User: | Miklos Pinter |
Date Deposited: | 08 Nov 2010 13:12 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 18:25 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/26515 |