Kamal, Mona (2010): الإطار النظرى للتنسيق بين السياستين المالية والنقدية.
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This study aims to bring into view the importance of the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies through reviewing the theoretical framework for such coordination. This includes: the interaction between the two policies, the evolution of this issue in the economic literature, the determinants of the coordination, the institutional coordinating arrangements and the operating mechanisms for the effectiveness of this coordination.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||الإطار النظرى للتنسيق بين السياستين المالية والنقدية|
|English Title:||The Theoretical Framework for the Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Polices|
|Keywords:||The Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Polices;Public Debt Management|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination|
|Depositing User:||Mona Kamal|
|Date Deposited:||22. Nov 2010 06:21|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 11:40|
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