Immigration, integration and terrorism: is there a clash of cultures?

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Abstract

We test whether immigrants are more prone to support terror than natives because of lower opportunity costs, using the international World Values Survey data. We show that, in general, economically, politically and socially non-integrated persons are more likely to accept using violence for achieving political goals, consistent with the economic model of crime. We also find evidence for the destructive effects of a 'clash of cultures': Immigrants in OECD countries who originate from more culturally distanced countries in Africa and Asia appear more likely to view using violence for political goals as justified. Most importantly, we find no evidence that the clash-of-cultures effect is driven by Islam religion, which appears irrelevant to terror support.

As robustness test we relate individual attitude to real-life behavior: using country panels of transnational terrorist attacks in OECD countries, we show that the population attitudes towards violence and terror determine the occurrence of terror incidents, as does the share of immigrants in the population. A further analysis shows a positive association of immigrants from Africa and Asia with transnational terror, while the majority religion Islam of the sending country does not appear to play a role. Again, we find that culture defined by geographic proximity dominates culture defined by religion.

JEL codes: K42, H56, O15, D74, Z1

Key words: terror, terrorism, violence, conflict, immigration, culture, integration, crime

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1. Introduction

Terrorist groups rely on networks of local supporters for the planning and carrying-out of their terror attacks – a strong local support lowers terrorists' direct and opportunity costs of carrying out their plans.[1] Thus, an increase in such local support should trigger more terror attacks. Supporting terrorists, however, is an illegal activity, usually generating a non-monetary benefit – both Schnellenbach (2006) and Bernholz (2004) provide economic rationales why persons with certain preferences may choose to support terror groups rather than getting actively engaged in terror activities themselves; both Schnellenbach (2006) and Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue that supporters of terror groups behave more as 'rational' actors in the traditional sense than their leaders do, implying that economic incentives have a stronger impact on the first group than on the latter. The economics of terrorism literature, which can be applied in analogy to the decision to engage in support for terror, suggests that the rational choice to provide support depends also on the opportunity costs of doing so – such as forgone legal employment and political participation (e.g. Lichbach, 1987, Sandler and Enders 2004).[2] Compared to natives, immigrants often face discrimination in the labor market and lack the political rights to influence policy outcomes, lowering their opportunity costs of engaging in terrorism-related activities. Consequently, we conclude from economic calculus that immigrants may be more likely than natives to support terrorist groups.[3]

This international study provides an empirical test of whether immigrants are more likely than natives to be supporters of terrorist groups; as main novelty, we discuss whether immigrant's cultural background matters, differentiating between religion and geographic origin.[4] We exploit

[1] The ultimate goals of terrorists are of a political nature. Intermediate goals include media attention, and the destabilization of polity and economy in the target country (e.g. Dreher and Fischer 2010, Frey and Lüchinger 2003, 2004).

[2] Earliest treatments of terrorists as rational decision-makers include Landes (1978) for hijacker's choice and Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) for modeling negotiations between terrorists and democratic governments in target countries.

[3] Support may be both direct and indirect: Indirect through e.g. providing terrorists with otherwise foregone income, or direct through e.g. giving them with mental support and helping them hide. Often, such support is provided within a framework of small religious or political groups (e.g. the Hamburg group of which two members attacked the Twin Towers in New York) – which is one of the reasons why particularly minority denominations or extreme political ideologies are more likely to be under suspect of supporting, or committing, terror.

[4] MacCulloch and Pezzini (2010) provide an analysis of the determinants of individual support for a radical, revolutionary societal change versus a simple political reform, using the same survey as in this paper. However, not

the third wave of the World Values Survey (1994-1999) on 55'000 persons in more than 45 countries, which includes a question on whether the respondent views using violence for achieving political goals as justified, which we view as appropriate approximation. This paper presents strong evidence for OECD countries that immigrants particularly from 'Africa' and 'Asia' are more prone than natives to accept violence as political means, consistent with the clash-of-cultures hypothesis based on Huntington (1996). Contradicting common-view expectations, religious denominations, such as being a Muslim, do not appear to matter. On the other hand, the 'clash' appears diminished for persons who are better integrated through a longer residence. Country panel analyses of the macro-determinants of transnational terror incidences in OECD countries are corroborative: they reveal a terror-increasing influence of immigrants from Africa and parts of Asia, which, however, is not triggered by the majority religion of immigrants' countries of origin.

Section 2 introduces the economic calculus that explains why immigrants may choose to support violence and terror, section 3 presents the testable main hypothesis, while section 4 describes the data and the methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the individual-level analysis for the effects of integration into society (of immigrants, but also in general) on the propensity of viewing violence as justified political means, also differentiating between the effects of regional culture and religion. As robustness analysis, section 6 tests the relation between these self-report attitudes with real-life behavior. Finally, section 7 brings the individual-level analysis of section 5 to the country level: for a panel of OECD countries we analyze whether immigration triggers transnational terror, and whether immigrants' culture defined by geographic region of origin or religion plays a relevant role for this association. Section 8 concludes and discusses the potential for future research.

2. Integration of immigrants and the propensity to support terror and violence

Integration of immigrants into their host society can take place in various realms – with respect to labor market, political participation, but also values and attitudes ('culture'). Better integration

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only is this attitude much less likely to measure support for terror, but also does their study not take account for immigration status and single religions.

increases individual's choice set and raises the number of economic and political opportunities that aid improve on her socio-economic condition. Thus, integrating immigrants increases their opportunity costs of illegal activities, which, according to the economic model of crime (Becker 1968), should decrease their propensity compared to that of natives to support (illegal) terror activities.[5]

The importance of political opportunity costs for explaining the occurrence of terror attacks is stressed by Frey and Lüchinger (2004), Li (2005), and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006). These authors suggest that preferences in the population that are not responded by government institutions cause grievance and discontent. Such non-response lets people seek alternative, illegal ways of expressing their preferences and pushing their needs, e.g. by engaging in terrorist activities, or, as Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue, by supporting terror groups. Compared to natives, immigrants often lack political rights and participation possibilities in politics, lowering their political opportunity costs and making them more likely to support terror.

Economic opportunity costs are equally important for individual's decision to support terror (e.g. Frey and Lüchinger 2003), which are equally determined by her degree of integration into the society. Similarly, Neumayer and Plümper (2009) argue that 'terrorism serves terrorists': by damaging the target country's economy they ease the recruitment of new supporters. Immigrants may, at first, face unemployment and discrimination in the labor market, decreasing their economic opportunity costs of illegal activities compared to natives'. Thus, insufficient economic integration may increase immigrants' propensity to support terror groups. However, as residence in their host countries continues, they may become economically better integrated, increasing their opportunity costs of supporting terrorists up to native's level.

Finally, the psychological costs of committing a crime may play a decisive role – one possible economic interpretation of the 'clash-of-civilizations'-hypothesis by Huntington (1996). He suggests that violence and terror between members of two groups emerges because of the tensions

[5] For a theoretical economic model according to which through raising opportunity costs extreme nihilists cannot be prevented from committing acts of terror, see Schnellenbach (2006). Nevertheless, moderate nihilists may well respond to changing incentives. Bernholz (2004) provides as alternative explanation for why terrorists may possibly not respond to economic, political or social incentives lexicographic preferences ('supreme values').

generated in case both groups are shaped by two greatly differing cultures - they 'clash'.[6] Economically speaking, antagonistic group identities and value systems lower the psychological costs of using violence against members of the other group.[7] According to his theory, such 'clash of cultures' may aid terror groups to recruit members and, as we argue, supporters. This development is aggravated when one group (or both) is(are) universalistic and missionary in their ideals, claiming cultural or morale superiority, as in the case of (religious or political) fundamentalists who intend to build a new 'better' world order. Thus, we expect such psychological costs to be decreasing in the cultural distance and dissimilarity between the two groups, for example in the distance between immigrants' values and traditions to that of natives' culture. Differentiating by world regions and religion, Huntington (1996) predicted a general rise in conflicts between Western countries and 'the rest', with highest conflict intensities between the 'West', on the one hand, and 'Islam' and 'Sinic' cultures, on the other (, p.245).

Most economic country-level studies of terror have focused on testing predictions from the traditional economics of terrorism-literature, which relates institutional, economic and societal states to terrorists' costs and benefits of committing terror attacks, and thus to the occurrence of terror events as the outcome of their rational choice. For example, in support of the political opportunity costs argument Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) have shown that well-working political institutions and decentralized governance structures reduce terror (see also Li 2005, Piazza 2006, Dreher and Fischer 2010). The empirical evidence for the effects of economic opportunity costs is scant and inconsistent (Piazza 2006), possibly because aggregate GDP and income inequality reflect individual economic circumstances only imperfectly. We are also not aware of any convincing empirical test of the Huntington-hypothesis. Neumayer and Plümper (2009), one of the few studies that find a significant impact of 'Islam', use a world panel on transnational terror events 1969 - 2005, to test dyads of 'Islam terrorists', 'Non-Islam terrorists' and 'Western victims'. They find that both the dyads 'Islam'-'West' and 'rest of the world'-'West' trigger more attacks. Failing to differentiate by culture among the group 'rest of the world', their finding is best interpreted as an indication that 'Western' persons are more likely to be victimized by terrorists

[6] According to Huntington (1996), other forms of 'clashes' include economic wars and military interventions. He thinks of terrorism as form of conflict to which the 'West' is particularly vulnerable.

[7] Even if those groups were similar in their view on the use of violence, it is the dissimilarity in their values and attitudes in general that drives down the psychological costs of acting with violence against non-members.

than ‘non-Western’ people. That the religion of the attacker may be an important determinant of terrorist activity has already been suggested by Krueger and Malečková (2003): they show in a world panel of transnational terror attacks 1997-2002, arranged by perpetrator’s country of origin, that terrorists originating from Muslim, but also from Christian and Hindi countries are more ‘active’ compared to those with no religion: they commit significantly more terror attacks.[8] However, both studies lack to directly test a ‘clash-of-cultures’ as they fail to differentiate out the diverse cultures of the perpetrators *and* to match them with differing cultures of their target countries – for example, Krueger and Malečková (2003) implicitly assume that a Muslim potential terrorist behaves in an identical way in all parts of the world likewise. Furthermore, they fail to discuss which dimension of culture dominates – culture defined by geographic proximity or based on religion. In sum, all these aggregate-level analyses suggest that both receiving and sending countries’ culture, political institutions and economy play a role for the emergence of terror. However, no study so far has investigated into one of the underlying mechanism at the individual level, namely people’s grievance, opportunity costs and their resulting support for terror. We ask in this study to what extent political, economic or cultural integration into society impacts this attitude, and whether support for terror transmits into the space of actual terror events.

3. Main hypothesis

This paper argues that, compared to natives, immigrants are more likely to support terror. This likelihood of showing such attitude is the higher, the less successful their economical, political, and cultural integration into their host society is.

Hypothesis: The propensity of immigrants to support terror is higher than for natives. This propensity decreases in the integration into their host society.

[8] For more studies in political science and sociology that fail in finding ‚clashes-of-cultures’, particularly ‚Islam’, see also Neumayer and Plümper (2009).

As discussed in the theory section (section 2), the relation between economic, political, and social integration and terror-support is of a generic nature - thus, it may hold for any member of society, be it an immigrant or a native. For example, the experience of involuntary unemployment as form of labor market disintegration should increase the propensity of any member to support violence and terror, compared to an employed. Thus, in this paper we start by testing a generalized version of the hypothesis above, treating 'immigrant' as a special case in the course of this analysis:

Hypothesis (generalized): The propensity to support terror is higher for societally less integrated persons than for the better integrated ones. This propensity decreases in the degree of integration into society.

4. Data and methodology

4.1. Dependent variable: terror and violence propensity

Enders and Sandler (2002) define terrorism as "the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality" for achieving political objectives; such definition implies that viewing exerting violence for achieving political purposes as justified may be a prerequisite and first step to become an active supporter of terrorist groups. We thus approximate the propensity to support terror with a measure of the propensity to use violence for political goals, obtained from the 3rd wave of the Word Values Survey 1994-1999 (WVS) that provides information on attitudes and values of about 55'000 persons in more than 45 countries (see Table A1 of the Appendix for a list of included countries). For each country, a representative sample of the population of about 1000-1500 persons is collected. The following question serves as our dependent variable: "Here is one statement. How strongly do you agree or disagree with it?, 'Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.' " The possible four answers range from 'strongly agree' (1), 'agree' (2), to 'disagree' (3), and 'strongly disagree' (4). Thus, higher values indicate a higher propensity to support terror.[9]

[9] The remaining waves of the WVS did not include this question in their surveys.

Aggregated to the population level as percentage shares of people responding either (3) or (4), we view this attitude as an approximation of a terror-sympathizing environment. As we argue in section 2, such terror-sympathizing environment may aid terrorists in carrying out their attacks or provide them with a pool of potential recruits – decreasing their costs of committing an attack (Schnellenbach 2006, Bernholz 2004). Thus, as rational terrorists weigh the expected costs against the expected benefits of an additional attack (Dreher and Fischer 2010), *ceteris paribus,* the optimal number of attacks should increase in people's support for terror. To support this conjecture, the second part of this paper provides separate tests which link the level of violence-acceptance in society with the occurrence of actual terror attacks.

However, the validity of this attitude measure may be put into question. For example, one may claim that the vague broadness of 'violence' and the imprecision with respect to 'political goals' make question "do you agree to using violence for achieving political goals" a kitchen-sink attitude measure with little information on their opinion on the actions of *private* persons (in contrast to that of governments) against the government or other private persons. However, we believe that the embedding of this question into a section that exclusively asks about people's vertical relation with their governing authorities frames respondents' associations and interpretations: The WVS contains a section on 'Politics and Society', located between the section 'Work', 'Family', and 'Religion and Morale'. The 'Politics and Society' section includes questions that deal with peoples' attitudes and relations to their governments and politicians. For example, this section asks about policy goals the government should pursue (e.g. 'more emphasis on family life'), people's confidence in government institutions (parliament, police, justice system), their voting behavior, their past political actions (strikes, signing petitions, etc.). In the third wave, this section also includes our measure of attitude towards accepting violence. This framing on vertical citizen-government relations restricts 'violence' to violence exerted by residents only, and rather excludes violence exerted by governments, such as activities of war. Similarly, respondents may associate 'political goals' with goals pursued by citizens and residents - their own political goals or those of their peers. Thus, even though this 'acceptance-of-violence-for-political-goals-question' may be, when viewed in isolation, open to many interpretations, its embedding into the actual survey as one last item in the 'Politics and Society'-section clearly restricts its application to a ruled-ruler relation - with violence exerted by citizens against other citizens or the government as

such. However, to support our interpretation and validity of this variable, in the second part of this paper we present analogous results for a much smaller sample that uses a direct measure of support-for-terrorism. In addition, we relate this support-for-terror attitude to individual self-report behavior of having committed violence against persons for achieving political goals.

4.2. Focal variable: Generalized integration measures

For measuring integration in the social, political and economic dimensions we use the following variables from the WVS. First, to account for social integration we use dichotomous indices of self-assessed geographical identification with (alternatively) one's local commune, region, country, continent, or the world, or 'having no identity', based on the WVS question "to which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?". We also employ a dichotomous index of social network based on the question "how important are friends in your life": persons replying 'very important' and 'rather important' are believed to enjoy the benefits from integration into society through personal private relations. Second, political integration is approximated by individual self-positioning on a 10-point scale: persons with extreme leftist or conservative opinions are more likely to find their preferences not represented by the parties in the political system. Both social and political integration may also take place through engagement in groups and organizations that pursue certain political goals (e.g. environmental groups, churches, parties). Based on eight questions on active or passive engagement in such groups, we employ a dichotomous index of 'active involvement' that accounts for this integration aspect.[10] Finally, economic integration is accounted for by labor market integration. We use the occupational status variable of the WVS that provides information whether the respondent is full-time employed, half-time employed, a student, a houseman/housewife, unemployed, retired or 'other'. Among these, the involuntarily disintegrated (and thus with the largest grievance) is the group of unemployed, while both housewives and retired are probably rather voluntarily out of the labor market and thus to a lesser extent susceptible for terror support.[11]

[10] This definition excludes 'passive' members who only pay membership fees.
[11] The distinction between voluntary and involuntary disintegration can be made based on aspiration theory.

4.3. Measures of immigrants' integration

We also employ some measures of integration that are available for the group of immigrants only - in the full sample, there are about 3'500 immigrants. First, we extract the information 'having been born in the country' [of residence], which gives rise to a dichotomous measure of immigrant status. Thus, our measure 'born in this country' excludes all persons having been born abroad, irrespective of whether they have already gained citizenship in their host country or not (such information is not available in the WVS). Native persons can easily be believed to be better integrated in many dimensions than immigrants (social networks, culture, politics, and labor market). Second, we employ five dichotomous measures of duration of residence in the country, expecting that the extent of economic and social integration increases with it. Possibly, the likelihood of having gained citizenship equally increases in duration of residence. The underlying variable of residence period includes the six categories ' < 2 years', '3-5 years', '6-10 years', '11-15 years', and ' > 15 years'. Furthermore, we use the information in the WVS on immigrant's region of origin ('Europe', 'USA/Canada', 'Asia', 'Africa', 'Oceania', and 'other') – information on single sending countries is not available - to objectively measure their cultural distance to their host country, differentiating between 'World' and the subsample of 'OECD' host countries.[12] In line with Huntington (1996), we expect the cultural distance and resulting conflict intensity between European and North-American sending countries to 'OECD' receiving countries to be the lowest.

4.4. Control variables

The third wave of the WVS also includes socio-economic information on both natives and immigrants. The vector of individual-level controls includes gender, age, education, marital status, and number of children. Since a better education generates a higher income, and may cause information advantages in general, higher education may lead to a better economic and social integration into society. With respect to marital status, one may argue that singles are not as much integrated as married persons, particularly in more conservative and traditional societies. Some empirical models control also for individual religion (Catholic, Protestant, Christian-Orthodox,

[12] Regions of origin are employed as coded in the original data. The grouping into 'OECD countries' is roughly equivalent to various definition of 'Western' countries in studies of sociology and political science.

Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other), which reduces the regression sample by about 20%.[13] Descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables are described in Table A2 of the Appendix.

Table 1a describes for the world sample the distribution of violence-propensity across immigrants, defined as foreign-country born persons, and natives. This *prima facie*-look reveals no difference in attitudes between both population groups – an interpretation which is statistically supported: in both groups, about 20% find that using violence for political goals is justified. For the sample of OECD countries (Table 1b), immigrants show a higher propensity to support terror than natives (18% versus 15.30%, difference significant at the 5 percent level).[14] There is a clear need to differentiate immigrants by the degree of their integration in the political, economic and social dimension and to use a multivariate approach.

Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here

4.5. Empirical models

Using the cross-sectional WVS data, we estimate the following linear relation for the general effects of integration into society on terror support:

$$acceptance_{is} = f(integration_{is}, X_{is}, FE_s),$$

where $acceptance_{is}$ denotes the acceptance of individual i in country s to use violence to pursue political goals, $integration_{is}$ the measure of i's integration into country s, X_{is} a vector of individual socio-demographic controls described above, and FE_s a set of country–specific fixed effects that account for differences across countries with respect to the macroeconomy and majority culture (e.g. Fischer 2010).

[13] Religious denomination and income are not included in the baseline models due to the large number of missing observations.

[14] Test statistics based on a two-sided T-test on the equality of means across two samples, assuming unequal variances.

To analyze integration effects for immigrants, the models employ interaction terms between measures of integration and 'immigrant status':

$$acceptance_{is} = f(integration_{is}, integration_{is} * immigrant_{is}, X_{is}, FE_s),$$

These empirical models of terror support are estimated with OLS, which preserves direction of influence and relative quantitative effects of the determinants even when the dependent variable is ordinal (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Using OLS has the advantage over estimating ordered probit that coefficients are easily interpretable as marginal effects and that interaction terms allow direct calculation of total marginal effects. Standard errors are corrected for heterogeneity and intragroup correlation through clustering at the country level.

5. Results

5.1. Integration into society and violence propensity

As first step, Table 2 provides a general test how integration into society (of immigrants and natives likewise) affects their propensity to support terror. Model 1 tests the baseline specification that also includes measures of political and economic integration, while models 2, 3, and 4 add additional integration measures. Model 1 focuses on the baseline effects of employment status and political ideology, model 2 adds measures of geographical group identification, while models 3 and 4 estimate the additional effects of active membership and of having friends, respectively. Models 5 to 8 repeat this exercise for a subsample of OECD countries. For interpreting coefficients, note that positive values indicate a higher propensity to support terror ('does *not* accept that using violence is *not* justified' = violence is justified).

All models in the world sample in Table 2 show that those with extremist leftist or conservative political views are more likely to accept using violence to achieve political goals, compared to persons with a centrist view. These effects disappear in the subsample of OECD countries which suggests that persons with an extremist political view are well integrated in the existing political

system; their political preferences appear reflected in their country's party system. In contrast, both in the world and OECD sample interviewees without a political self-positioning appear to reject supporting terror, possibly reflecting a general disinterest in politics. For OECD countries, moderate-leftists equally appear to disagree with using violence for political goals.

As regards economic integration, reflected by labor market integration, we find for both the world and OECD countries that housewives and unemployed – persons with little labor market integration and, hence, low economic opportunity costs of criminal activity – tend to support terror compared to the full-time employed (reference group); for institutionally well-developed OECD countries, the same is observable for self-employed. Possibly, in OECD countries self-employed are disadvantaged (and economically 'discriminated') insofar as they are either excluded from certain welfare benefits and schemes, or that they have to contribute much more in order to obtain the same benefit as a dependently employed or a civil servant.[15]

Model 2, which tests geographic identity effects, shows that having a national identity reduces support for terror, while having no geographical identity increases it, compared to when having a 'world identity'. Obviously, feeling geographically 'homeless', namely not feeling integrated into any country (creating a 'no identity'), decreases the psychological costs of terror-support (that may harm persons in the country one lives in). In contrast, the analysis for OECD countries (model 6) reveals only a statistically weak 'no geographic identity'-effect.

Having a social network does decrease one's propensity to accept using violence, as models 3 and 4 (7 and 8 for OECD countries) show. In the world sample, only having friends appears to make respondents prefer peaceful ways of achieving political goals, while organizational networks play no role. In contrast, in OECD countries, the stronger propensity-lowering effect is exerted by people's active engagement in organizations and parties, while friends appear to matter little. This finding is in line with Li (2005), as in institutionally well-developed and democratic countries political grievances are less likely for persons actively involved in the political decision-making process compared to those with no political engagement.

[15] The results of the baseline models 1 and 5 are robust to the inclusion of further repressors in the remaining models of Table 2.

The results for the remaining control variables (see Table A3) show that, as expected, male respondents are more likely to accept violence as political means. The likelihood increases in age for adults but decreases for older adults again. Terror support declines with education, but is higher for the separated (compared to the married), while it appears to be uncorrelated with the number of children.

Taken together, consistent with the economic theory of crime (Becker 1968), Table 2 suggests that political, social and economic disintegration increases the propensity to support terror, both around the world and in OECD countries. Consistent with Li (2005), Table 2 also suggests that well-working democratic institutions and multi-party systems in OECD countries help to avoid grievances of political extremists or the actively engaged.

Insert Table 2 about here

5.2. Integration of immigrants: residence, employment and political ideology

As second step, we test our main hypothesis whether immigrants show a stronger propensity to support terror or not; furthermore, we also analyze the effects of integration into society for this group, expecting that disintegration effects are larger for immigrants than for the native population. We test this conjecture by adding an interaction terms between 'immigrant status' and the various integration measures employed in the full population in Table 2. An insignificant interaction term coefficient would then indicate that the disintegration effects for the support of terrorism are identical for immigrants and natives likewise. We test this conjecture of differential effects by immigration status for both the world sample (Table 3) and for OECD countries (Table 4); both tables test immigrant status as such (model 1), duration of residence (model 2), and the presence of immigrant-specific effects for political ideology (model 4), employment status (model 5), and having friends (model 3). Section 5.3. is then devoted to the role of political and social engagement separately, while section 5.4. analyzes differential impacts of geographic origin and geographic identity.

Models 1 and 2 add to the empirical baseline model immigrant status and the duration of residence, which is available for immigrants only. In OECD countries, the negative coefficient on 'born in this country' indicates that immigrants have a higher propensity to support for terror (at the 5 percent level of significance) – a result that is not evident in the world sample. However, with those staying less than two years in their host country as reference group, we find no statistical evidence that duration of residence matters, both in the world and the OECD samples.[16]

The remaining models show that most effects of societal disintegration are of similar magnitude for immigrants and natives likewise - only a few interaction terms turn out significant: For example, having friends and political ideology appears to influence the propensity to support terror of both immigrants and natives the same way (models 3 and 4).[17] Equally, the propensity-increasing effect of unemployment and self-employment are not heterogeneous between the two groups.[18] In contrast, in both OECD countries and the world sample, native housewives are more likely to support terror than housewives of immigrants (OECD: 0.278-0.163 versus -0.163). Immigrant housewives appear even explicitly to reject using terror, particularly in OECD countries (-0.163).

Overall, Tables 3 and 4 corroborate our main hypothesis for the sample of OECD countries: immigrants do show a higher propensity for terror-support. However, we find in many cases that social and economic disintegration in other dimensions does not appear to exert heterogeneous effects between immigrants and natives. We do not, however, completely reject as explanation for the insignificant interaction terms that the major distinction might have to be made not between immigrants and natives as such, but between native and long-term residence immigrants, on the one hand, and short-duration residing immigrants, on the other, which we test in section 5.6.

[16] The series of coefficients (0.044, -0.011, -.0.59, -0.048) may suggest that longer residence, does, possibly, have a positive integrating effect. Further research is needed.

[17] In model 4 of Table 3, the interaction term on 'leftist-extreme ideology' and 'born in this country' is almost significant at the 1ß percent level. This finding suggests that the propensity of extreme leftists to accept violence is larger among immigrants than among natives (0.171 versus 0.171-0.092).

[18] The coefficient on the interaction terms for 'unemployed*born' rather indicates that unemployed natives experience stronger grievances than unemployed immigrants; the opposite is observable for the self-employed. Again, further research is needed.

Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here

5.3. Integration of immigrants: Social and political engagement

Table 2 has already indicated that for OECD countries active membership in clubs and organizations lowers the propensity to accept using violence for political goals, possibly because such engagement can be used for expressing political preferences and influence policy-making (Li, 2005). That social capital and (formal and informal) networks play an important role in the functioning of a democratic and civil society has been postulated by Putnam (1993) for Italian local communes, and empirically shown by Guiso et al. (2008). Table 5 tests whether active membership (and the number thereof) reduces the propensity to support terror for immigrants and natives likewise. Models 1 through 5 are for the full world sample, while those from 6 to 10 are estimated for the subsample of OECD countries.

Making a binary distinction of those with an active membership from those without any does not yield statistically convincing results: membership in social networks does not exert any effect on the probability to support terror, be it by immigrants or natives (models 1 and 6). Employing a continuous measure of the number of active memberships, ranging from 0 to a maximum of 9, yields for OECD countries a support-decreasing effect (until membership number 4), at a decreasing rate (models 7 and 8). The irrelevance observed in the world sample (models 2 and 3) may well reflect again, consistent with Li (2005), the institutional underdevelopment in most of these countries. This social network effect is, however, strongly heterogeneous across the two population groups ‘natives’ and ‘immigrants’, as indicated by the significant interaction terms: assuming linearity in the number of active memberships, model 4 reveals for the world sample a ‘zero’-effect for natives (e.g. 0.030 + -0.025 = 0.005), but a strong propensity-increasing one for immigrants; for OECD countries, we observe qualitatively the same (model 9).

More informative and, possibly convincing, findings are obtained when assuming non-linearity in the number of memberships (models 5 and 10), giving a better fit to the underlying data: For

immigrants in the world (model 5), the propensity effect is zero for low numbers of active memberships, while the very active ones appear to turn their social and political engagement into support for terror – a finding consistent with so-called theories of political radicalization (e.g. McCauley and Moskalenko 2008); for natives around the world, political engagement is not related to terror support. For OECD countries (model 10), the picture is somewhat different: for both natives and immigrants, the support for terror declines in the number of active memberships. For immigrants, we observe a propensity-lowering effect (-0.064*num. + 0.021*num.^2), at a decreasing rate. For the natives, the propensity-lowering effect is less steep, and occurs rather at a constant rate (-0.064+0.038 = -0.026* num.; 0.021-0.017 = 0.004 * num.^2).

Overall, Table 5 shows for OECD countries that active engagement in social networks and political organizations decreases people's support for violence. In the rest of the world, active engagement in possibly 'toothless' organizations does not appear to really matter, either to natives or to immigrants. This finding is consistent with the political opportunity costs argument developed by Li (2005). In OECD countries, the propensity-lowering effect is larger for immigrants than for natives. Obviously, integration in terms of social and political engagement does reduce the need for immigrants and natives to choose supporting terror for expressing their social and political preferences.

Insert Table 5 about here

5.4. Integration of Immigrants: Geographic identity and the 'clash of cultures'

Integration of immigrants occurs not only regarding the labor market and the social and political dimensions, but also with respect to the cultural sphere. This section investigates two aspects of cultural integration of immigrants: first, Table 6 tests whether having a certain geographic identity exerts differential effects on terror support by immigration status. Second, it analyzes whether the world region of origin (which is only available for immigrants) impacts the propensity to accept violence. We proceed then with an analysis for a subsample of OECD countries, attempting to find

evidence for the so-called 'clash-of-cultures' between the 'Western world' and other regions (Huntington, 1996): We measure individual immigrants' cultural distance to Western OECD countries by adding to the model dichotomous measures of their geographic region of origin, as provided and coded in the WVS ('Asia', 'Africa', etc.).[19] By using this measure of immigrants' geographic origin we implicitly assume that neighboring countries share similar cultures (e.g. Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt). While Huntington (1996) predicted 'clashes' between various cultural regions, this empirical set-up restricts the analysis to those affecting the 'Western' regions. Table 6 presents the results.

Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 clearly show that having no geographical identity increases the propensity to support terror in OECD countries – but for the natives only (e.g. 0.350 - 0.117). Immigrants with no geographical identity rather tend to reject the use of violence (-0.117, coefficient insignificant). Compared to Table 2, differentiating between immigrants and natives lets the importance of having a national identity disappear.

Model 3 reveals a strong culture-of-origin-effects in the world sample: people who emigrated from the USA or Canada into the remaining, mostly 'non-Western' world are less likely than natives to accept violence as political means, as the negative coefficient indicates (at the 5 percent level) - possibly an effect of having been raised in countries with strong 'Western-style democracies' that teach to, in respect for other's life and health, seek peaceful ways of influencing policy outcomes. We also find weak propensity-increasing effects for emigrants from Africa and Asia - an effect driven by those emigrating into culturally distanced OECD countries (see model 4). These findings are largely robust to controlling for individual denomination.

As second step, model 4 tests the 'clash-of-cultures' hypothesis by analyzing whether there exist region-of-origin effects in the subsample of OECD host countries.[20] We chose the subsample of OECD countries because they share certain common characteristics, which lets them appear as culturally quite homogenous (while the rest of the world in model 3 is rather diverse in culture): compared to the 'rest of the world', OECD countries are more likely to have stable democracies

[19] This approach is identical to adding dyads of immigrant origin and 'Western country' to the world sample.
[20] The OECD countries in the regression sample include Australia, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, and the USA.

and well-working government institutions, be open economies shaped by well-functioning labor markets institutions, and share 'democratic' values in general. They all belong, in the terminology of Huntington (1996), to the 'Western' culture. Based on his intensity-of-conflict predictions (, p.245), we expect the cultural distance experienced by people emigrating from other 'Western' OECD countries to be zero, but the culture gap for those from the African ('Islam') and Asian ('Sinic') regions to be the largest. Again, we predict terror support to increase in cultural distance.

Insert Table 6 about here

Model 4 of Table 6 is consistent with the Huntington-hypothesis insofar that great differences between immigrants' individual cultures and that of their OECD host countries increases immigrants' support for terror. On the one hand, we observe that immigrants from the USA/Canada and Europe are not different in accepting using violence for political goals compared to natives – this is an indication that value systems of people from Northern America and Europe are comparable to those of natives in the remaining OECD countries, thus, they experience no cultural 'clash', which produces no conflict. Interestingly, now we find a strong propensity-lowering effect for immigrants from Latin America – a result of a Catholic tradition to obey god-given government authorities? A result equally consistent with Huntington (1996), who predicted a low conflict intensity between people from the 'Latin' regions and the 'Western' region. On the other hand, model 4 indicates large cultural distances for immigrants originating from countries in Africa, Asia or Oceania, with the latter also including the regions Polynesia and Micronesia.[21] The positive coefficients indicate that in OECD host countries their propensity to accept violence is larger than that of the natives – clash-of-culture effects for regions predicted to generate high conflict intensity. All cultural origin-influences are robust to controlling for individual denomination - some are even increased in statistical significance (see Table 7). The fact that these cultural effects persist when individual religion is controlled for supports the view of a 'clash-of-

[21] Note that the finding for ‚Oceania' is reverted when actual share of immigrants are related to actual number of transnational terror incidences (see Table 14) – possibly an effect of the heterogeneous composition of this region, that also includes Australia and New Zealand.

cultures' effect that is distinct from a 'clash-of-religions' effect. Overall, the findings of model 4 are consistent with the Huntington-hypothesis of a clash-of-cultures.

5.5. The role of religion

One may argue that 'culture' is not only geographically defined (as implicitly assumed in section 5.4.), but also through values and attitudes that are transmitted through individual's religion. Indeed, much public discussion on the effects of failed integration of immigrants is along the line of religion rather than geographic origin – Huntington (1996) is a good example for grouping countries into a culture he calls 'Islam' and developing religion-based arguments for a high conflict intensity between 'Islam' and the 'Western' world. Possibly, some religions may rank peacefulness above every other goal, while others may justify the use of violence under certain circumstances (e.g. for self-defense, for fighting 'holy' wars, for missions, etc.). According to Huntington (1996), we should expect religions that are universalistic and missionary in their ideals to raise people's support for terror in general, but even more in Western OECD countries. In this section we test whether the propensity to support terror is influenced by religious values, approximated by self-reported religious affiliation, both worldwide and for Western OECD countries only. OECD countries are not only similar in their 'Western' values and attitudes (as discussed in section 5.4.), but also with respect to their majority religion, which are almost all 'Western-type'-Christian (Catholic or Protestant). In the light of section 5.4., the analysis for OECD countries will aid us judging whether the 'clash-of-geographic-cultures'-effect of Table 6 persists in the presence of controls for religion – or whether it simply approximates a 'clash-of-religions'. Put simply, this last analysis provides an answer to the question whether e.g. Serbian immigrants in OECD countries differ in their behavior from natives because they follow a certain religion (Christian-Orthodox or Muslim) that differs from the majority religion of their host countries or because they come from a geographic region with a differing culture (Balkan region). The results are presented in Table 7.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 add religious denominations to the baseline model of Table 2, which excludes measures of immigrant's geographic origin. Column 1 estimates this new model for a

world sample, while column 2 carries out the identical analysis for the subsample of OECD host countries. According to the estimates in both columns, most religious denominations (Catholic, Christian-Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, and the reference category Protestant) play no role for the propensity to support violence for political goals, both across the world and in OECD countries.[22] We should emphasize that, contrasting common expectations, being 'Muslim' exerts no significant impact in the world sample (column 1); in contrast, in OECD countries Muslims show a larger propensity to support terror compared to the (native and immigrant) Protestants, our reference category. This positive Muslim-effect is consistent with the Huntington's conflict-intensity-predictions between the 'West' and 'Islam'. It is also congruent with experiences of the general public in many OECD countries with already very young Muslim immigrants and second-generation pupils being among those with the highest number of self-report committed violent crimes (for Germany, see Baier et al. 2009, Baier and Pfeiffer 2007).[23] The weakly significant positive effect for 'Hindu ' in the OECD sample is equally consistent with the original Huntington-hypothesis, while the insignificance of Christian-Orthodox is not. Overall, models 1 and 2 Table 7 show that most denominations play only a negligible role for explaining the propensity to support violence for political goals. However, not controlling for geographic origin, Muslims in OECD countries show a significantly larger support for terror.[24]

Insert Table 7 about here

Model 3 of Table 7 adds controls for immigrants' region of origins, that lets us test the 'clash of cultures' versus the 'clash of religions'-hypothesis. To emphasize the most important finding (given the ongoing public discussions), we find no evidence any more that Muslims have a higher

[22] The positive significant coefficient on 'other' is not easily interpretable given its rather kitchen-sink nature, pooling minor religious denominations and having no denomination.

[23] In their 2007 survey, p.26, they report shares of pupils who have admitted to have committed at least one infringement of German criminal law that involves an act of violence (e.g. assault, robbery); pupils with a Turkish and Southeast-European cultural background show a prevalence rate that is double in size than that of their German contemporaries.

[24] The low number of observations for certain religious denominations across immigrants makes a separate analysis of religion effects by duration of residence or region-of-origin unreliable.

propensity to support terror than Protestants. The estimates also reveal that the propensity-increasing effect of being a Hindu is now dominated by the region-of-origin effect. On the contrary, column 3 shows that the clash-of-cultures effect defined by regions (see section 5.4.) persists when individual denomination is accounted for. These findings are robust to excluding Turkey from the sample (not reported). Overall, model 3 suggests that culture defined by geographic region dominates culture defined by religion.

Taken altogether, we find that the clash-of-cultures is not triggered by a clash-of-religions: religious denomination does not matter to individual support for terror. We rather observe that people with differing religions but originating from the same geographic region share common values and attitudes.[25]

5.6. Does integration of immigrants prevent the clash of cultures?

Section 5.4. has shown that culture as defined by geographic origin plays an important role for immigrants' support for terror, which, as section 5.5. suggests, persists when differing religion-based value systems are accounted for in the empirical model. To policy-makers, an important question is whether a better integration of immigrants mitigates the clash-of-culture-impact on the host society. We test this conjecture by adding interaction terms between the region-of-origin effects and integration measures in the sample of OECD countries. Table 8 tests integration of immigrants into the labor market (model 1), with respect to social engagement (model 4) and the duration of residence (models 2 and 3). We have chosen such measures of integration that leave a sufficiently large number of observations in the comparison groups; in general, immigrants who have recently moved to their host countries (<5 years) or who are unemployed appear rather underrepresented; about 50% of the immigrants in the sample stayed 15 years and longer in their host countries. In principle, given the low number of immigrants from certain geographic regions the findings have to be viewed rather as first attempt than a final analysis.

[25] Table 7 assumes religion to be homogeneous across natives and immigrants, e.g., that Catholics from Latin America are comparable in their values and attitudes to Catholics residing in OECD countries. Differentiating by religion of foreign-born and immigrant population preserves the Muslim-no-effect for immigrating Muslims.

Table 8 presents the results of this analysis – with the strongest 'clash-of-cultures'-reducing effects for a long duration of residence, and some for integration in the labor market. Column 1 uses 'employment, full-time or part-time' as measure of labor market integration, column 2 and 3 measures of residence duration, and column 4 the number of active social engagements. Column 1 shows that for people from Oceania employment does reduce the clash-of-cultures effect - the clash-of-culture effect is propensity increasing for the unemployed in this group (1.195), but roughly zero for the employed 'Oceanians' (1.195 – 0.936), compared to natives. For immigrants from the USA and Canada we observe the opposite, namely that the non-employed strictly reject to use violence (-0.448), while the employed are roughly similar in their attitude to natives (0.672 - 0.448). Employment does not appear to lead to cultural integration of those belonging to the group of 'others'. For the remaining groups of immigrants from Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America, employment equally does not appear to influence the impact of region of origin, as the insignificant interaction terms indicate. However, the now-observable insignificant effect of certain regions of origins (when compared to section 5.4.) suggests that also for people from Africa and Asia employment has an important effect on their terror propensity. In sum, with natives as the reference group, employment in the host country appears to let immigrants' attitudes adapt toward that of the natives, in case their attitudes were different as non-employed.

Insert Table 8 about here

Integration of immigrants measured by duration of residence does appear to mitigate the clash of cultures: with at least 15 years of residence, *all* cultural groups experience a propensity-lowering effect (column 2), as indicated by the negative interaction terms (significant at the 5 or 1 percent levels, respectively).[26] In contrast, no integration effects are observable for a residence duration exceeding 6 years (column 3). The long-term-residence effect of 15 years even overcompensates any support-increasing region-of-origin impact (the non-interacted values in the first half of Table 8): immigrants who reside for a very long time in their host countries come to reject violence for

[26] Roughly 50% of all immigrants in the OECD subsample stay longer than 15 years in their host country, also when split by region of origin, except for Oceania.

political goals even more strongly than the natives, the comparison group. Finally, we cannot observe that immigrants' political and social activities in organizations and political groups lower the effects of a clash-of-cultures (column 4); rather, it appears that increased political engagement of immigrants from Latin America and Oceania go in hand with an increased acceptance to use violence for political goals – possibly an indication of immigrants developing extremist political views as their political engagement intensifies.

In sum, while the previous analyses reveal that a 'clash of cultures' increases immigrants' propensity to support terror in OECD countries, Table 8 suggest that a very long residence in the OECD host country mitigates and even overcompensates such effect.[27] Similarly, we observe that a successful integration into the local labor market makes immigrants in their attitudes similar to natives.

6. Attitude versus real-life behavior: linking micro surveys to macro phenomena

6.1. Acceptance of violence for political goals = support for terrorism?

Possibly, our previous analyses suffer from the shortcoming that they operationalize the support for terror by measuring the propensity to accept using violence for political purposes, assuming that the latter broader category constitutes a prerequisite for, or simply sufficiently encompasses, becoming a supporter of terrorist groups. However, as discussed in the data description section (section 4) 'violence' as well as 'political goals' are not defined in the survey and may not only cover illegal terrorist attacks, but also acts of wars that are legitimized by the UN security council. Thus, one may argue that our attitude measure used so far does not capture support for terror.

We remedy this shortcoming by employing the variable 'support for terrorism'. This measure of terror-support is extracted from the first wave of the WVS, the only wave that includes the question "Terrorism is everyday news. In Principle, most people are against it, but there is still

[27] Discussing causality, however, we cannot exclude as explanation the self-selection of the clash-of-culture-affected into further emigration from their former host countries or, possibly, the return to their home countries. We discuss the restrictions of this empirical study in the conclusion.

room for differences of opinion. Which of these statements do you tend to agree with ? (A) There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified. (B) Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned" Possible answers are a) Agree with A b) agree with B and c) neither. We code this acceptance-of-terror question in analogy to the acceptance-of-violence, so that higher values indicate greater acceptance (-1 for answer b), 0 for answer c), and 1 for answer a)). There are, however, shortcomings when using the first wave of the WVS: its low number of observations (about 25'000 in 20 mainly OECD countries), its origination from the early eighties (1981-1984), and its missing information on immigration status and region of origin. The first wave also includes the religious denomination information and a vector of socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, occupational status, marital status).[28] Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A4 of the Appendix.

To test whether our measure of acceptance-of-violence-for-political-goals (wave 3) approximates support-for-terror (wave 1) we compare whether religious denomination, our focal determinant, behaves similarly for both measures. To ensure comparability, we construct dichotomous measures of terror support from both attitude variables; we also restrict all regressions to the subsample of OECD countries. Models 1 and 4 of Table 9 employ the full set of religious denominations, while the remaining models exclude those with an insufficient number of observations.

Table 9 presents the marginal effects for the association of religious denomination with the acceptance of violence for political goals (models 1-3) and the acceptance of terrorism (models 4 and 5), both estimated with probit with standard errors adjusted to clustering at the country level. All regressions show that religious denomination exerts a similar impact on either measure of terrorism-support. In OECD countries, excluding measures of regions of origin, both Muslims and Buddhists are more likely than Protestants (reference category) to accept violence for political goals and to support terrorism likewise. In contrast, believers of all other major denominations have a comparable attitude to that of Protestants. Exclusion of 'Buddhists' from the regression sample does not alter these findings. Note that all models do not include controls for regional origin which, as Table 7 indicates, we expect to dominate the religion effect:

[28] The first wave measures education in completed years as compared to highest degree obtained. In the regression sample of 13'000 surveyed persons, 44% are Protestants, 53% are Catholic, 0.19% are Hindu, 0.24% Jewish, 0.17% Muslims, and 1.92% of another, unknown denomination.

Also for the remaining explanatory variables do we observe similar effects across the two types of terror-support-measures (not reported): both attitudes are hyperbolic in age, strongly positive in being male, and rather accepted by extreme left-wingers. We do, however, observe some differences for extreme conservatives, housewives, and unemployed across the two samples. Differential effects for political ideology may result from the different types of terrorism in the early eighties compared to that of the late nineties. The non-support of the unemployed and housewives for terror in the eighties may be rooted in the rather rosy labor market condition during that time (with unemployed and housewives expecting fast re-integration) compared to that of the nineties (with high rates of long-term unemployed).[29]

Overall, Table 9 suggests that propensity to accept violence for political goals and propensity to view terrorism justified are comparable measures of the latent construct 'support for terror', particularly with respect to the effects of religious denomination.

Insert Table 9 about here

6.2. Self-report support for terror and committing violent acts against persons

A general shortcoming of attitude measures is that their relevance for actual behavior can always be put into question. Does people's self-report propensity to accept violence constitute an attitude that approximates interviewee's real-life behavior? Committing acts of terror involves damaging persons - conflicting with basic human rights. Doing so may trigger high psychological and economic opportunity costs, preventing many sympathizers to get actively involved – whereas reporting a supportive attitude in surveys comes at small costs for the interviewee. This lets our measure of reported terror-support appear a simple lip service with little real-life consequences. Why our data do not allow observing (self-report) active support of terror groups, we can validate

[29] We also observe a difference in the impact of having a high education (indifferent in wave 1 but strongly rejecting violence in wave 3), possibly caused by using dissimilar measures – years in wave 1 and degree in wave 3.

the attitude measure by relating it to a question on committing violent behavior against persons for political purposes.[30]

To validate our attitude 'support for terror', we investigate a) whether there is association between this measure and self-report behavior 'having done violent actions against persons for achieving political goals'. We also test b) whether religious affiliation affects actual behavior the same way it affects attitude. We measure actual behavior by a dichotomous measure that indicates whether in her past the interviewee has committed violent acts for political goals against persons, or not. This measure is based on the following question, from the first wave of the WVS: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political actions that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done these things, whether you would do it, might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do any of them: "Using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police." Answers include 'have done [in the past]' 'might do [in the future]' and 'would never do'. Omitting those 400 of 15'000 persons responding to the second category, we use the first answer for measuring 'having a violent past' versus 'having no violent past *and* not sympathizing with use of violence in the near future'. Our analysis relates this actual behavior to the attitude of terror support, a dichotomous measure which omits the small number of undecided in the intermediate category, equally obtained from the first wave. Table A4 of the Appendix reports descriptive statistics of the variables in the first wave of the WVS.

The simple Spearman rank correlation between the attitude 'support for terror' and the activity of 'violent acts' against persons is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (0.06). Table 10 regresses religious affiliation but also a dichotomous measure of terror support on the dichotomous index of violent past as political activity; reported are the marginal effects of the probit estimates for OECD countries, with standard errors adjusted to clustering at the country level. Models 1 - 3 include controls only for gender and age, while models 4 - 6 include the full set of control

[30] In a sense, this section tests whether a pro-terror attitude makes one a potential recruit by terrorist groups, in line with radicalization theories (e.g. McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). However, as discussed in section 2, terrorists may well profit from a sympathizing attitude, which lowers their direct and opportunity costs of committing terror attacks. For example, sympathizers may contribute by giving small donations. The WVS lacks questions on actual supporting behavior. We test the relation between population attitude and terror incidences in section 6.3.

variables (education, marital status, occupational status). For reasons of comparison, significant control variables are also reported.

Table 10 shows that persons who find terrorism justified are also likely to use violence against persons for political goals. In model 2 (5), changing from 'non-support' to 'support' is associated with an increase in the probability of actually committing violent acts against persons by 0.9 (0.6) percentage points. This attitude effect for actual behavior is substantial, and comparable in size to that of the socio-demographic determinants in the control vector: In model 5, the attitude effect is about as large as the positive gender effect, and the positive unemployment effect, and larger than the positive effect of 'being single' (0.003).

Table 10 also shows that the effect of religious affiliation on actually committing violent acts is analogous to the effect for terrorism-support of Table 9. Being 'Muslim' in Western-culture OECD countries shows a significant positive association with committing violent acts against persons as political activity, while the remaining denominations have a propensity equally large compared to Protestants, the reference group.[31] (Note that Table 10 does not include regional-culture measures which are not available in the first wave).

Insert Table 10 about here

Overall, Table 10 provides empirical evidence for Western-culture OECD countries that people's attitude towards terrorism at least partly reflects actual politically motivated violence against persons – many of those who report to be in support for terror have actually already made the next step of exerting politically motivated violence against persons themselves. Speaking with the model of Schnellenbach (2006), Table 10 separates moderate from extreme nihilists in the WVS micro survey. Most importantly, the attitude measure is validated not only as the self-report attitude is a decisive determinant of actual behavior, but also as religion does affect attitude and behavior in identical ways.

[31] The varying number of denominations is caused by perfect prediction in some models 2 and 3.

6.3. Acceptance of violence and occurrence of terror

While these micro-level findings of the WVS suggest that there is a strong relation between individual attitude 'support for terror' and actual individual behavior, it is not clear whether such relation holds also at the aggregate level, relating attitudes in the population to real-life macro-economic and social phenomena. As discussed in the theory section (section 2), the hypotheses developed by Li (2005) and Kurild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) suggest that people's discontent with government policies should increase their propensity to support terror networks or, possibly as final step, even start actively engaging in terror activities themselves. Schnellenbach (2006) has argued that terrorist's costs of committing terror acts decline as local support for her activities increases in the population. Thus, even if increased terror support in the population does not turn people into new terrorists at large, it makes the 'terror-production-process' by the already existing terrorists less costly. Thus, we expect the number of terror attacks to increase in people's propensity to support terror.

This section tests whether in target countries population attitude towards terror affects the occurrence of transnational terror events. Using the RAND-MIPT data set on terror incidences from 1970-2000, we extract the number of transnational terror attacks in target countries from 1995-2000. We match these data with the target country's population share supporting terror, observed between 1994 and 2000, constructed for each of the 45 countries in wave 3 of the WVS. These cross-sectional data on a maximum of 45 countries are then augmented with a vector of control variables (GDP, population, civil liberties, voting in line with the USA at the UN, economic growth), based on previous empirical research on the socio-economic causes of terror (e.g. Dreher and Fischer 2010, Dreher and Gassebner 2008, Piazza 2006).[32] We employ three different measures of terror attacks: the number of transnational terror events in the current year (model 1), the average count of terror attacks between 1995 and 2000 (model 2), and averaged terror rates (defined analogously to crime rates) in the population (model 3); the models are estimated with the negative binomial estimator (model 1) or using OLS (models 2 and 3).[33] Table A5 of the Appendix provides descriptive statistics. The share in the population that accepts using

[32] The low number of observations does not allow the inclusion of decentralization measures. Because of the low number of observations in the sample period, an analogous empirical analysis for domestic terror was not feasible.

[33] Using averages of terror events smoothes out yearly fluctuations that might otherwise disguise systematic relations between the explanatory variables and the explanand. However, using the negative binomial estimator has the advantage of taking account of the count-structure of terror events and the overrepresentation of zero attacks.

violence for political goals ranges from about 1% up to 56% in the sample; the average number of events between 1995 and 2000 varies from 0 to about 80, with mean of 1. The results are presented in Table 11.

Table 11 shows that the population support for terror affects the occurrence of transnational terror events: All models suggest that the number of terror events in a country increases in people's propensity to accept the use of violence for political purposes. The significant coefficient on the squared term indicates an effect at a decreasing rate. The non-linearity implies that for some countries in the sample the association may even become negative (beyond the turning point of the population attitude-terror relation); possibly, a wide-spread attitude that supports terror leads to an underreporting of terror attacks.

Insert Table 11 about here

Most control variables in Table 11 show the expected direction of influence (e.g. Piazza 2006): In tendency, terror events increase in population size and in economic growth, but are lowered if the country undertook a recent institutional change to become more democratic. No effects are observable for GDP per capita, the level of democracy and voting in line with the US. The few differences compared to the previous literature with respect to voting behavior in the UN can easily be explained by the much smaller number of countries, many of them OECD countries, and the missing time dimension in the sample.

As robustness test, Table 12 presents the results when the 'terrorism is justified'-question of the first wave of the WVS is employed in place of the terror-support-measure of wave 3. This gives rise to a cross-section of a maximum of 12 OECD countries. We construct the dependent variables of transnational terror events measures for the time period 1980 to 1985 in exact analogy to the previous analysis. We account for the very small sample size by reducing the number of control variables to a minimum, including only GDP, population size and political rights. Between 1980 and 1985, the population share of those who view terrorism as justified under certain

circumstances varies from 12% to 29%, while the average terror count varies from 0.17 to 32. In Table 12, models 1 and 4 use the original count variable and estimate a negative binomial regression, while the remaining models that use averaged transnational terror counts or rates, respectively, are estimated with OLS.

Table 12 clearly supports that the number of terror events increases in the share of the population viewing terrorism as justified political means. The significant coefficient on the squared term in models 1 and 2 indicate a decreasing marginal effect, mirroring the finding of Table 11. This non-linearity is corroborated when in models 4 and 5 an outlying country is excluded and the attitude measure is employed in its log form. Note that the statistical insignificances in models 3 and 6 pertain to all explanatory variables in the regression, not only the determinant of interest. The control variables show the expected influences: a positive effect of population, a decreasing effect of political rights, and an insignificant coefficient on national income.

Insert Table 12 about here

Overall, Tables 11 and 12 show that a favorable population attitudes towards using violence for political goals or even using terror under certain circumstances, our alternative measures of terror support, are positively related with actual terror incidences: Corroborating the individual-level findings of section 6.1.and 6.2., also the country-level do we find that attitude and outcome of behavior strongly correlate. These findings are consistent with economic models of terror and crime discussed in section 2 that view terrorists' costs lowered as the level of local support for their activities increases.

6.4. Summary of robustness tests

The empirical analyses in section 6 show convincingly that following relations hold:

1. the individual attitudes 'support for terrorism' and 'acceptance of using violence to achieve political goals' are strongly related and overlapping concepts
2. at the individual level, such attitude is a strong predictor of actual behavior (committing acts of violence against persons as political means) and
3. at the country level, both attitudes as population characteristics are decisive determinants of the occurrence of transnational terror events, even when political and economic factors are controlled for.

Overall, these robustness and validity tests suggest that the 'clash-of-culture' effect observed in section 5 does not only impact actual individual support for terror, but, through all transmission channels at the country-level, should also affect the occurrence of terror attacks. Since this 'clash-of-culture' effect increases the individual propensity to support terror, we should, in turn, observe that the population attitude changes in the share of immigrants that originate from such culturally-distanced countries. Consequently, we expect that the more immigrants from culturally-distanced regions with a strong conflict potential live in a certain country, the more terror attacks should occur in this country. The next section provides an empirical analysis of this conjecture for 'Western' OECD countries.

7. Outlook: Immigration and the occurrence of terror attacks in OECD countries

For OECD countries our individual-level analyses of sections 5 and 6 suggest that immigrants are, in general, more likely to support terror - a finding consistent with economic models of illegal activities (e.g. Becker 1986), as well as politico-economic models of terror choice (Li 2005), according to which immigrants who are socially, economically and politically less integrated than natives. For OECD countries, the micro-level analyses also indicate that immigrants from Africa and Asia have a higher propensity to support terror than the native population or immigrants from most of the other world regions, irrespective of their religious denomination. We interpret this

finding as being generally in line with the clash-of-civilizations-hypothesis (Huntington 1996), even though we reject his hypothesis of a 'Muslim-culture'-clash with the Western world. Bringing these micro results to the aggregate level, in general, a rising share of immigrants should be positively associated with the occurrence of terrorism in OECD countries, as their favorable attitude and local support lowers terrorists' cost of committing terror attacks. Furthermore, we expect immigrants from Africa and Asia to show a stronger influence on terror incidence than immigrants from other world regions, an impact that is independent from their religious values – a question we pursue as second step. This final section of the paper provides a tentative empirical answer to these questions, calling for more in-depth research in the future.

7.1. Immigration and terror: a country panel analysis

As first step we analyze the relation between immigration, viewing immigrants as one homogenous group, and the occurrence of terror in OECD countries. We combine a country panel of transnational terror events 1970-2004, obtained from the RAND-MIPT database (see Table 11), with annual data on the share of immigrants in the population (stock) in 26 OECD countries, 1992-2006, retrieved from the CESifo DICE database. In the following, we estimate the following linear relation

$$terror_{it} = f(immigrants_{it-1}, X_{it-1}, FE_i, T_t),$$

where the dependent variable, the number of transnational terror incidences in country *i* at time *t* ($terror_{it}$), is a function of the share of immigrants in the population ($immigrants_{it-1}$), a couple of control variables (X_{it-1}) that are obtained from the literature on transnational terrorism (Piazza 2006, Dreher and Fischer 2010), country fixed effects (FE_i), and a non-linear time trend that accounts for the time dimension (T_t). The control variables are the same as in Tables 10 and 11.[34] Following the empirical literature, we lag all explanatory variables by one period. The country fixed effects account for time-invariant traits such as governance structure and national culture, and recording behavior. Given that we account for such unobserved heterogeneity across countries

[34] Given the sample of OECD countries, we exclude the variable 'voting in line with the US in the UN' commonly employed in world samples (e.g. Dreher and Fischer, 2010).

and that the set of explanatory variables is lagged by one period, we have some confidence in identifying a causal relationship between immigration and transnational terror incidences.[35]

We follow the international definition of 'immigrant' as a person originally not born in her current country of residence.[36] The definition in the CESifo DICE database includes all types of legal immigrants, irrespective through which program they entered the country – be it through a work permit, through family reunion programs, through a successful asylum application, or rescue programs for persons from regions of civil war, as in the case of Ex-Yugoslavia. In our panel of 26 countries from 1993 to 2004 (189 observations), the maximum number of terror events is 13, while its mean is roughly 1 with a standard deviation of 1.9. The share of immigrants varies between 1.9% and 33% in the resident population. Further descriptive statistics are presented in Table A6.[37] For all samples, Table 13 tests a linear and a non-linear relation between the (lagged) population share of immigrants and the occurrence of transnational terror events in 26 OECD countries. Having identified Spain as statistical outlier, columns 1 through 3 exclude Spain from the regression sample, while columns 4 through 6 present the full sample estimates.

Overall, Table 13 clearly shows for all non-linear specifications that the share of immigrants is positively associated with the number of transnational terror incidents in OECD countries – which, given the econometric set-up, we interpret as causal relation. In the reduced sample that excludes Spain, models 1 and 2 show a positive impact of immigrant shares, but at a decreasing rate. This finding is corroborated in model 3 that employs the logarithmic transformation of our variable of interest. In the full sample, the evidence for the non-linear effect appears less strong, with an increase less steep and a curvature less pronounced (models 5 and 6). This positive impact of immigrants on the number of terror incidences is consistent with our hypothesis of an integration effect on the propensity to support terror and our previous findings from our individual-level analyses.

[35] Inclusion of country fixed effects substantially mitigates biases through endogeneity and omitted variables. See also the discussion in Dreher and Fischer (2010) and Fischer (2010).
[36] Thus, the group of 'immigrants' includes also naturalized immigrants, who have obtained the legal right to vote and run for office. However, due to language restrictions integration of passport-holding immigrants into the economic, social and political dimension may still not be comparable to that of natives.
[37] Due to data availability restrictions an analogous analysis for foreign-passport-holders in place of immigrants was not deemed to produce robust results.

Insert Table 13 about here

7.2. The clash-of-cultures and terror: a country panel analysis

As second step we differentiate now the stock of immigrants of Table 13 by their cultural background, measured by certain characteristics of their country of origin. Since OECD host countries are attractive to immigrants because of their wealth, their political stability and high standard of living, many immigrants originate from poorer or politically unstable countries around the world. These include immigrants from former colonies (India, Pakistan, South America), countries with a recent episodes of civil war and violent conflict (e.g. Ex-Yugoslavian countries), or poorer and overpopulated countries bordering the EU (e.g. Northern Africa). In the WVS wave 3 data but also according to actual immigration data, half of the immigrant stock originates from OECD countries (USA, Canada and Europe) (see also below). For our country-level analysis, we employ the International Migration Database, obtained from OECD statistics, which contains information on the country of origin for stocks of immigrant persons (in thousands), for each OECD host country and year between 1991 and 2007.[38] In analogy to the micro analysis of section 5, we account for cultural background by, first, geographic region of origin, assuming that neighboring countries share certain values, traditions, history and institutions. Second, we also group the sending countries by the majority religion. In particular, we distinguish between the geographic regions Africa, Asia, Europe, Northern America, and Oceania, which includes not only Australia and New Zealand but also the regions Micronesia and Polynesia. Latin America and the Caribbean constitute one joint geographic region.[39] By using geographic definitions we avoid including only countries along lines of majority religion or geo-political features. As regards

[38] Spain is excluded as extreme outlier from the regression samples of Tables 13 and 14. Unfortunately, these data contain many missing country-year observations, particularly for the period 1990-1996, but are, currently, the best available. Missing information on immigrants have been filled with the number of foreign-passport holders, where possible. This procedure is in analogy to the UN version of the International Migration Database, which pools both types of migrants.

[39] In some analyses we split Africa further into the geographic regions Northern Africa and remaining Africa, and the region Asia into Western Asia and remaining countries in Asia. Note that the geographically defined regions are not identical to the region definitions used by international organizations. By using this geographic definition we avoid including only countries along lines of majority religion or geo-political features.

religious denomination, we group countries by the majority religions (population share > 50%) Buddhism, Catholicism, Christian-Orthodox, Hinduism (two countries), Islam, Judaism (one country), Protestantism, and 'other'; in the actual empirical analysis, Hinduism and Judaism are counted among the group of 'other'. For each group of immigrants we calculate their share in the resident population. In our unbalanced panel of 24 OECD countries from 1991 to 2004 we observe that transnational terror events vary between 0 and 31 attacks, with a mean of 2 events and a standard deviation of 4. The largest sample mean of immigrant shares in the resident population are observed for those originating from Europe (5.6%), followed by those from Asian countries (1.8%). In terms of religion, most immigrants are either Protestants or Catholics (1.8% and 1.9%, respectively), closely followed by Muslims (1.5%).[40] The relatively large share of Muslims and still considerable shares of immigrants from African countries (0.5%) as well as from Western Asia (0.7%) and remaining Asia (1.5%) makes us confident in being able to identify separate effects of majority religion and region of origin, particularly for Muslim immigrants from Africa and Asia. Table A7 of the Appendix provides further descriptive statistics.

Table 14 estimates regressions on transnational terror attacks from 1991 to 2004, dividing immigrants into groups by regional origin (models 1 and 2) and religious background (model 3). Models 4 and 5 present the findings from a general-to-specific-analysis which pools the religious and regional origin measures into one model; thus models 4 and 5 test whether the dominating influence of 'culture' on transnational terror is exerted by geographic region of origin or majority religion in the country of origin. As in Tables 10 through 13, all models control for the commonly employed determinants of transnational terror in OECD countries, unobserved country heterogeneity, and a common non-linear time trend.

Model 1 employs very broad definitions of geographic regions, approximating continental plates. These are Africa, Asia, Europe, Northern America, Oceania, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The population share of immigrants from Africa is positively associated with transnational terror attacks, while those from Oceania and the Caribbean-South-American region show a negative relation. Immigrants from other parts of the world do not appear to play any decisive role for

[40] The mean share of immigrants with 'no religion' , 'any other religion', 'Hindu' or 'Jew' amounts to 2.5%. Due to the heterogeneity of this group, estimates have to be interpreted with caution.

terror. As argued before, the empirical set-up allows us to interpret these findings as causal, albeit with caution: in this light, immigrants from Africa appear to trigger more transnational terror incidences, while immigrants from Oceania and the Caribbean appear to reduce them.

That immigrants from specific non-democratic countries, with possibly a history of violent conflict, and from religious states have a higher likelihood of supporting terrorism against Western-culture countries, compared to immigrants originating from other parts of the world, is a major public concern in OECD countries.[41] Most of these 'suspicious' countries are located in Northern Africa and West Asia. Model 2 tests this conjecture by splitting the group of African and Asian immigrants into those from Northern African countries and those from remaining African countries, and those originating from Western Asia and the rest of Asia. The geographic group of Northern African countries includes Morocco, Djibouti, Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Sudan, Chad, and Tunisia. The geographic group of Western Asian countries is formed by Georgia, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The results of model 2 are only partly consistent with this conjecture: While the terror-increasing effect in model 1 is triggered by those from Northern African countries (at the 1 percent level of significance), a terror-rising impact of immigrants from Asia is observed for those who come from all Asian countries except for Western Asia - a geographic region 'Asia' that excludes the Arabic peninsula.[42]

Model 3 tests the influence of culture defined by majority religion in the sending country; the majority religion is thought to shape the values and traditions in a country. Excluding any geographic origin variable, immigrants from a Muslim country show a positive relation with the occurrence of transnational terror – with a statistically strong effect (at the 1 percent level). Terror-lowering effects are observed for immigrants who come from predominantly Catholic countries, and for those from countries with one of the minor world religions (Hinduism, Judaism, and other religions); please note that by construction many OECD countries are part of this particular group.

[41] Dreher and Gassebner (2010) report that persons emigrating from countries with a higher number of terror incidences 'cause' transnational terror in the receiving countries.

[42] The 'remaining Asia' effect is consistent with Huntington's conflict intensity predictions between ‚Sinic' and ‚West', while the insignificant effect for 'Western Asia' (the first subsample of his ‚Islam' category) contradicts his conjectures. On the other hand, the strong effect on 'Northern Africa' (the second subsample of his ‚Islam' category) is, again, supportive of his idea.

Immigrants from countries which are shaped by Christian-Orthodoxism, Buddhism, or Protestantism do not exert any influence on the number of transnational terror incidences in OECD countries.

In order to test whether immigrants' culture by either region or religion dominates for explaining transnational terror, model 4 pools the (almost) significant determinants of both models 1 and 2 into one combined model.[43] Because of the low number of host countries in the cross-section it was advisable to select the variables for the final combined model based on a general-to-specific (GTS) selection procedure: Starting from the most complete specification, variables with lowest z-statistics were eliminated from the model in a step-by-step procedure. In addition, we used the Akaike-information criterion to observe the improvements in explanatory quality; the GTS was completed when the Akaike-value could not be improved on further. The estimates of the final specification are reported in column 4 of Table 14, with column 5 splitting the 'Origin: Asia'-group again into 'Western Asia' and 'Remaining Asia'.[44]

Insert Table 14 about here

For the question whether Muslim immigrants or immigrants from Northern Africa and Asia in general bring about transnational terror in OECD host countries, models 4 and 5 show clearly the dominance of geographic-origin over the religion-origin: the coefficient on 'Origin: Islam' is insignificant, while the geographic origins 'Northern Africa', 'Remaining Africa' and 'Remaining Asia' matter. Contrasting expectations, people from 'Western Asia' show, again, no influence on terror. As one may expect, the correlation between population shares 'coming from an Islamic country' and originating from certain world regions is considerably strong for Western Asia (0.75) and Northern Africa (0.67) – both correlations not too strong to impede a separate identification of

[43] Given the rather low number of host countries and years in this panel and considerable correlation between some measures of religion and regional origin (e.g. Buddhism and Asia, Protestantism and Oceania), a joint inclusion of all cultural variables made the model incalculable.

[44] Estimates from a specific-to-general selection procedure are presented in Table A8 of the Appendix. The specification of the final model, however, is strongly path-dependent, and thus to some degree arbitrary.

region and religion effects.[45] Wald-Tests of both religious and geographic factor estimates in models 4 and 5 show that 'Origin: Islam' does not matter even if jointly taken into account with those geographic regions for which these high correlations exist. In specific, there is no joint significance for 'Islam' with 'Western Asia' or 'remaining Asia'.[46] In model 4, the Wald-test shows no joint significance for the geographic factor 'remaining Africa' with 'Origin: Islam'. Similarly, for the pair 'Northern Africa' and 'Islam' we observe that 'Islam' does contribute to its joint significance, albeit not enough to raise its statistical significance above the 5% threshold already observed for the geographic origin factor in isolation.[47] Expressed more simply, having a Muslim religion plays some role for immigrants from Northern African countries, as it adds to the geographic origin effect, but not decisively; statistically spoken, the contribution of 'being from a Muslim country' to the effect of 'coming from Northern Africa' is negligible. Overall, these tests of joint significance in models 4 and 5 show that it is not the immigrants' religion 'Islam', but their home culture defined by geographic proximity that matters for transnational terror.

For all other groups of immigrants by regional or religious origin, we find either that they exert a terror-lowering impact or that they do not matter to the occurrence of transnational terror: As expected, immigrants originating from Europe, USA or Canada do not appear to influence the occurrence of transnational terror attacks. In contrast, immigrants from the region 'Oceania' show a terror-decreasing impact. These findings were already obtained in models 1 and 2, but now these relations hold when the cultural dimension 'religion' is accounted for in models 4 and 5. The public security-increasing effects of religions 'Catholicism' and 'Other religion' in model 3 are now equally preserved when we account for culture defined by geography.[48] Overall, the only case where we observe a 'switch' from a previous religion effect in model 3 to a geographic effect in the complete models 4 and 5 is for the population share of immigrants coming from a country where the majority religion is Islam.

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[45] Correlation coefficients are rather small for the regions of origin remaining Africa (0.31) remaining Asia (0.18), and Europe (0.26).

[46] In model 5, the statistics of the Wald-tests of joint significances are as follows: Chi^2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Western Asia, Origin: Remaining Asia) = 3.99, p-value = 0.2629, (Origin: Islam, Origin: Remaining Asia) = 3.99, p-value = 0.1363, (Origin: Islam, Origin: Western Asia) = 2.96, p-value = 0.2274.

[47] In model 4, the statistics of the Wald-tests of joint significances are as follows: Chi^2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Northern Africa, Origin: Remaining Africa) = 8.58, p-value = 0.0354, Chi^2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Northern Africa) = 8.17, p-value = 0.0168, Chi^2 (Origin: Islam, Origin: Remaining Africa) = 4.17, p-value = 0.1241.

[48] The GTS revealed that the strongly significant negative effect of ‚Caribbean and South America' in models 1 and 2 was driven by the cultural dimension 'Catholicism'.

In sum, the country panel analyses of the impact of immigration on transnational terror in OECD countries are in large consistent with our previous cross-sectional individual-level results: Immigrants do exert a terror-increasing effect. This impact on terror incidences appears driven by immigrants from Africa, particularly Northern Africa, and Asia - but not Western Asia – again, the country-level findings match that of the individual-level analysis perfectly. Both approaches find then that the geographic-origin effects dominate the 'Islam'-effect: it is not the religion which drives these results. This finding contradicts the Huntington-hypothesis that it is the missionary and universalistic religious values of 'Islam' that impede a successful integration into a Western host country. Rather, our findings suggest that there are general cultural traits that relate to these geographic regions that are causal for why immigrants from those regions may support terror, triggering terror attacks. We discuss such possible explanation further in the conclusion.[49]

8. Conclusion

This paper tests whether immigrants are more likely than natives to be supporters of terrorist groups and, through lowering terrorists' costs, increase the number of terror incidences in their host country. Using the World Values Survey on 55'000 persons in more than 45 countries (1994-1999) we find that individual's social, economic, and political disintegration increases the propensity to support terror. In particular, for OECD host countries we find that immigrants do show a higher propensity to accept using violence for political goal than natives. Differentiating by region of origin, we find strong evidence that persons who emigrated from Africa, Asia and Oceania into culturally distant OECD countries are more prone to accept violence. Interestingly, these effects are orthogonal to individual religion – being a Muslim plays no role for explaining this individual support for terror. We also present some evidence that integration in labor markets and a longer residence may reduce the clash-of-cultures-effect on terror support.

[49] Since the panel data include also several years after the 9/11-attacks, we can be assured that we have found a general relation between integration and terror acceptance.

In a second part of the paper we employ country panels of transnational terror attacks in 30 OECD countries (1991-2004), and show not only that population's support for terror is positively associated with terror, but also that the share of immigrant population increases the occurrence of terror attacks. Consistent with the micro-level analysis, immigrants particularly from Asia (but not Western Asia) and Africa appear to trigger terror events, while immigrants from Oceania do not exert such effect. Corroborating our survey-based findings, originating from a Muslim culture does not appear to matter.

These results are largely consistent with economic and sociological theories of the supply of crime, terror and violence. Immigrants face lower political, economic and social opportunity costs of supporting terrorism, and, in case of a great cultural distance to their host countries, even lower psychological costs of doing so. The empirical results also support the view that geographic origin and religion constitute two distinct dimensions of 'culture'; given the public discussions about 'a threat by Islamism', our study rather shows that many problems with integrating immigrants are rooted in cultural-geographic distance rather than denominational differences. These micro- and macro-level findings contradict the traditional Huntington-Hypothesis (1996) that rests on the universalist and missionary values of the religion 'Islam'; rather, they are both in support of a broader interpretation of his conjecture which we discuss below. However, we cannot exclude alternative explanations to a simple 'clash-of-cultures'-conjecture. Nannestad (2004) has shown that non-Western immigrants[50] are less integrated in the Danish labor market than immigrants from Western cultures – thus, labor market discrimination (in host countries) may well increase in the culture gap between immigrants and natives, because of incomparability of signaling languages and work attitudes; a large culture gap may also be an obstacle to immigrants' successful political and social participation. As a consequence, the opportunity costs of crime may be lower for immigrants from culturally-distanced countries than that for those from culturally close regions. Another alternative explanation for our finding is that the act of migration itself (and the experiences made therein) changes people's preferences, depending on their region of origin. Often, immigrants from countries in civil war or ruled by unstable regimes undergo periods of social and emotional suffering and economic hardship before they finally arrive in their final destination; psychologically spoken, such experiences could change immigrants' discount factor,

[50] In his study, the Non-Western countries include Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, Lebanon (Palestine), and Somalia.

making them less 'patient' and willing to await the return on their investment in the far-away future. Overall, our findings may not support the existence of a 'clash-of-cultures' as such, but simply suggest that immigrants develop, depending on their regions of origin, differing degrees of frustration and discontent that are finally expressed through acts of violence (e.g. Li 2005).

Our analysis leaves the question open what 'geographic origin' as cultural factor does reflect - values of 'machismo' developed over long centuries, possibly a recent history of civil war and fights for independence, or the current experience of non-functioning political institutions ? – all these experiences and traditions 'clash' with Western values and help shaping preferences and attitudes that are incompatible with 'Western' societies. In African and Asian countries, terrorism and violent conflict may possibly be commonly accepted means by which 'politics' is done – an attitude which is then quasi 'imported' into OECD countries by immigrants from those regions. In support of such region-specific cultural traits, a recent survey by Baier et al. (2009) on violence propensity among pupils in Germany has revealed that children whose parents originate particularly from (pooled) Northern Africa and Arabic peninsula, Albania/Yugoslavia, and Turkey accept social norms that justify violence by males against other persons under certain circumstances (defense of honor, protection of family members, violence against wife, etc.) (p.72).[51] Possibly, it is such attitudes on 'manliness' and implicitly 'acceptable ways of problem-solving' that are deeply rooted in certain world regions which may constitute the underlying real cause for why certain groups of immigrants show such high propensity to support terror.

Certain shortcomings due to data restrictions do not yet allow to draw final policy recommendations for the fight against terror and integration policies: On the one hand, our cross-sectional analysis suggests that civic engagement eases the integration of immigrants in general into their host society– we remain, however, ignorant which factors help narrowing this cultural gap between immigrants from Asia and Africa and natives. Even though we have some indication that employment and a long duration of residence may aid, more in-depth research with national household panels constructing channels of causality is needed to analyze the differing mechanisms of integration by immigrants' cultural origins. Further research should also analyze to what extent

[51] Among the male pupils from these three regions, 24.9%, 21.8%, and 23.5%, respectively, agreed to such social norm of manliness. In contrast, only 4,9% of the native German pupils accepted such norm.

second-generation immigrants, who have been born in their host countries, are similar to their parents in their propensity to support terror. Finally, there is a strong need to investigate into the determinants of geographically-bound attitudes – are these shaped by recent experiences of conflict or do they constitute long-lasting cultural values? Without such in-depth knowledge, no policy advice on how to integrate people from such regions can be given.

Overall, while this study is possibly one of the first empirical contributions to reveal the terror-increasing impact of immigration from cultural-geographically distanced regions, it constitutes only a very first small step of empirical research that still awaits further investigation. In particular, we need more in-depth analyses on mediating factors of the differing 'geographic-region-of-origin'-effects, the economic, social and political causes for why geographic origin of immigrants matters, and the reasons for the irrelevance of religion. Moreover, we are in need of more information on the dynamics of a successful integration before we can derive any policy conclusion. The public debate remains open.

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Appendix

Table A1: Countries

code	Freq.	Percent	code	Freq.	Percent
ALB	770	1.30	MDA	892	1.50
ARG	1’055	1.77	MEX	2’159	3.63
ARM	1’872	3.15	MKD	911	1.53
AUS	1’958	3.29	NGA	1’744	2.93
AZE	1’925	3.24	NOR	1’116	1.88
BGD	1’152	1.94	NZL	998	1.68
BGR	931	1.57	PER	1’112	1.87
BIH	1’094	1.84	PHL	1’195	2.01
BLR	1’876	3.16	PRI	1’094	1.84
BRA	1’142	1.92	ROU	1’104	1.86
CHE	1’103	1.86	RUS	1’787	3.01
CHL	957	1.61	SCG	1’401	2.36
COL	2’96	4.98	SLV	1’144	1.92
CZE	1’036	1.74	SVK	981	1.65
DEU	1’932	3.25	SVN	937	1.58
DOM	358	0.60	SWE	979	1.65
ESP	1’17	1.97	TUR	1’537	2.59
EST	950	1.60	TWN	744	1.25
FIN	915	1.54	UKR	2’132	3.59
HUN	601	1.01	URY	957	1.61
IND	1’547	2.60	USA	1’434	2.41
LTU	860	1.45	VEN	1’138	1.91
LVA	1’103	1.86	ZAF	2’677	4.50
Total	59’440	100			

Notes: Based on regression sample of model 1 of Table 2.

Table A2: Descriptive statistics (wave 3)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Using violence for political goals not justified					
Strongly agree (1)	59440	0.51	0.50	0	1
Agree (2)	59440	0.28	0.45	0	1
Disagree (3)	59440	0.12	0.33	0	1
Strongly disagree (4)	59440	0.08	0.28	0	1
When came to country					
Within past 2 years	52951	0.00	0.05	0	1
Within past 3-5 years	52951	0.00	0.06	0	1
6-10 years ago	52951	0.01	0.09	0	1
11-15 years ago	52951	0.01	0.12	0	1
More than 15 years ago	52951	0.03	0.17	0	1
Native	52951	0.94	0.24	0	1
Birth country					
Born in this country	53189	0.94	0.25	0	1
Origin: Latin America	53189	0.00	0.06	0	1
Origin: USA/Canada	53189	0.00	0.05	0	1
Origin: Asia	53189	0.02	0.13	0	1
Origin: Europe	53189	0.03	0.17	0	1
Origin: Africa	53189	0.00	0.04	0	1
Origin: Other	53189	0.01	0.09	0	1
Origin: Oceania	53189	0.00	0.03	0	1
OECD (country of current residence)	59440	0.30	0.46	0	1
Religion					
Protestant	47266	0.21	0.41	0	1
Catholic	47266	0.43	0.49	0	1
Christian-Orthodox	47266	0.16	0.37	0	1
Jewish	47266	0.00	0.05	0	1
Muslim	47266	0.13	0.33	0	1
Hindu	47266	0.03	0.18	0	1
Buddhist	47266	0.01	0.08	0	1
Other	47266	0.03	0.18	0	1
Active membership	59390	0.41	0.49	0	1
Friends important	59070	0.85	0.35	0	1
Number of active memberships	59390	0.75	1.21	0	9
Number (squared)	59390	2.02	5.51	0	81

Table A2: Descriptive statistics (wave 3) (cont.)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Geographical groups belonging to first					
Local identity	59440	0.37	0.48	0	1
Regional identity	59440	0.14	0.34	0	1
National identity	59440	0.33	0.47	0	1
Continental identity	59440	0.03	0.18	0	1
World identity	59440	0.09	0.29	0	1
No geographic identity	59440	0.03	0.17	0	1
Socio-demographic controls					
Age	59440	40.86	15.76	15	94
Age^2/100	59440	19.18	14.47	2.25	88.36
Age^3/10000	59440	10.08	11.17	0.34	83.06
Male	59440	0.49	0.50	0	1
Children, 0-8	59440	1.86	1.68	0	8
Children^2	59440	6.28	10.28	0	64
Conservative-extreme	59440	0.11	0.31	0	1
Conservative-moderate	59440	0.14	0.35	0	1
Center	59440	0.37	0.48	0	1
Leftist-moderate	59440	0.13	0.33	0	1
Leftist-extreme	59440	0.07	0.26	0	1
Ideology missing	59440	0.18	0.39	0	1
Full time employed	59440	0.38	0.49	0	1
Part time	59440	0.08	0.27	0	1
Self-employed	59440	0.09	0.29	0	1
Retired	59440	0.14	0.35	0	1
Housewife	59440	0.12	0.33	0	1
Student	59440	0.07	0.25	0	1
Unemployed	59440	0.09	0.29	0	1
Other	59440	0.02	0.14	0	1
Married	59440	0.59	0.49	0	1
Living together as married	59440	0.06	0.24	0	1
Divorced	59440	0.04	0.20	0	1
Separated	59440	0.02	0.14	0	1
Widowed	59440	0.06	0.25	0	1
Single/never married	59440	0.22	0.42	0	1
Incomplete elementary education	59440	0.09	0.28	0	1
Completed elementary education	59440	0.14	0.34	0	1
Incomplete secondary school: technical	59440	0.08	0.27	0	1
Complete secondary school: technical	59440	0.21	0.40	0	1
Incomplete secondary: university-prep.	59440	0.10	0.29	0	1
Complete secondary: university-prep.	59440	0.15	0.36	0	1
Some university without degree	59440	0.07	0.26	0	1
University degree	59440	0.17	0.37	0	1

Notes: Descriptive statistics based on empirical model 1 of Table 2.

Table A3: Baseline model without integration measures

Variable	coeff.	Variable	coeff.	Variable	coeff.
		Full time			
Age	-0.012	employed	ref. cat.	Widowed	0.028
	[1.67]				[1.53]
Age^2/100	0.021	Part time	0.03	Single/never married	0.001
	[1.45]		[1.14]		[0.03]
				Incomplete	
Age^3/10000	-0.014	Self-employed	0.004	elementary education	ref. cat.
	[1.42]		[0.13]		
				Completed	
Male	0.073***	Retired	0.024	elementary education	-0.003
	[7.10]		[1.21]		[0.11]
				Incomplete secondary	
Children, 0-8	-0.007	Housewife	0.090***	school: technical	-0.018
	[0.69]		[3.83]		[0.67]
				Complete secondary	
Children^2	0.001	Student	0.013	school: technical	-0.059*
	[0.69]		[0.50]		[1.85]
				Incomplete secondary:	
Conservative-extreme	0.074***	Unemployed	0.070***	university-prep.	-0.039
	[3.57]		[3.40]		[1.28]
				Complete secondary:	
Conservative-moderate	-0.012	Other	0.042	university-prep.	-0.069**
	[0.64]		[1.34]		[2.07]
				Some university	
Center	ref. cat.	Married	ref. cat.	without degree	-0.096***
					[2.95]
		Living together			
Leftist-moderate	-0.013	as married	0.007	University degree	-0.116***
	[0.81]		[0.28]		[3.01]
Leftist-extreme	0.095***	Divorced	0.015	Constant	1.598***
	[3.29]		[0.93]		[13.54]
Ideology missing	-0.045**	Separated	0.064**	Country FE	yes
	[2.43]		[2.10]		
				Observations	59440
				Adjusted R2	0.08

Notes: Dependent variable: "using violence to pursue political goals is never justified". Answers range from "agree" (1) to "do not agree at all" (4). All models include country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. '*', '**', '***' denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance

Table A4: Descriptive statistics of the WVS (wave 1)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Behavior: Having committed violence against persons as political action	14330	0.01	0.09	0	1
Attitude: Terrorism is justified	11491	0.15	0.36	0	1
Protestant	14330	0.48	0.50	0	1
Jew	14330	0.00	0.05	0	1
Muslim	14330	0.00	0.04	0	1
other	14330	0.02	0.13	0	1
Catholic	14330	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	14330	42.07	17.99	16	100
Age^2/100	14330	20.94	16.84	2.56	100
Age^3/10000	14330	11.79	13.33	0.41	100
Male	14330	0.46	0.50	0	1
Conservative-extreme	14330	0.07	0.26	0	1
Conservative-moderate	14330	0.18	0.39	0	1
Leftist-moderate	14330	0.15	0.35	0	1
Leftist-extreme	14330	0.04	0.20	0	1
Ideology missing	14330	0.18	0.39	0	1
Full time employed	14330	0.41	0.49	0	1
Part time	14330	0.09	0.28	0	1
Self-employed	14330	0.07	0.25	0	1
Retired	14330	0.13	0.34	0	1
Housewife	14330	0.19	0.39	0	1
Student	14330	0.06	0.24	0	1
Unemployed	14330	0.05	0.22	0	1
Married	14330	0.60	0.49	0	1
Living together as married	14330	0.05	0.21	0	1
Divorced	14330	0.02	0.15	0	1
Separated	14330	0.01	0.11	0	1
Widowed	14330	0.07	0.26	0	1
Single/never married	14330	0.24	0.43	0	1
Education (years)	14330	17.09	2.98	12	21

Notes: Sample is based on model 4 of Table 9.

Table A5: Descriptive statistics for transnational terror 1995-2000

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Transnational terror events	41	4.90	20.64	0	126
Transnational terror events, 95-00	41	0.01	0.01	0	0.06
Transnational terror rate, 95-00	41	1.12	2.14	0	11.67
Violence justified, (%pop).	41	21.16	10.88	1.25	56.51
Violence justified, squared	41	563.18	615.58	1.55	3193.84
GDP per capita (log)	41	7.79	1.23	5.71	10.38
GDP per capita (log), 90-95	41	7.82	1.24	5.76	10.43
Population (log)	41	16.41	1.50	14.16	20.65
Population, (log), 90-95	41	16.41	1.51	14.15	20.70
Voting in line with USA	41	0.43	0.10	0.16	0.59
Voting in line with USA, 90-95	41	0.40	0.10	0.19	0.53
Economic growth	41	3.53	4.73	-10.00	15.60
Economic growth, 90-95	41	3.97	4.53	-3.57	29.14
Political rights	41	-2.82	1.45	-6.50	-1
Political rights, 90-95	41	-2.78	1.35	-6	-1
Political rights, change	41	0.05	0.29	-1	1

Year	countries	year	countries	year	countries
1995	7	1997	5	1999	1
1996	20	1998	8	Total	41

Countries included				
ALB	BRA	HRV	NOR	TUR
ARG	CHL	HUN	NZL	UKR
ARM	COL	IND	PER	URY
AUS	CZE	LTU	PHL	VEN
AZE	DOM	LVA	RUS	ZAF
BGD	ESP	MDA	SLV	
BGR	EST	MEX	SVK	
BIH	FIN	MKD	SVN	
BLR	GEO	NGA	SWE	

Notes: Based on regression sample of model 1 of Table 11.

Table A6: Descriptive statistics: Transnational terror attacks and migration

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
			Full sample		
Transnational terror events	189	.98	1.93	0	13
Immigrants, %pop, (t-1)	189	11.03	7.51	1.9	33.8
Log of immigrants, (t-1)	189	2.17	.70	.64	3.52
GDP per capita (log), (t-1)	189	10.10	.32	8.78	11.03
Log of population, (t-1)	189	16.33	1.32	12.94	19.49
Economic growth, (t-1)	189	3.11	2.10	-1.99	11.10
Political rights, (t-1)	189	-1.12	.318	-4.5	-1
Government fractionalization, (t-1)	189	.34	.27	0	.83
Trend	189	8.04	2.85	1	12
Year	189	2000.04	2.85	1993	2004
			Sample without Spain		
Transnational terror events	182	.88	1.85	0	13
Immigrants, %pop, (t-1)	182	11.24	7.56	1.9	33.8
Log of immigrants, (t-1)	182	2.19	.70	.64	3.52
GDP per capita (log), (t-1)	182	10.11	.32	8.78	11.03
Log of population, (t-1)	182	16.28	1.33	12.94	19.48
Economic growth, (t-1)	182	3.09	2.13	-1.99	11.10
Political rights, (t-1)	182	-1.11	.32	-4.5	-1
Government fractionalization, (t-1)	182	.35	.27	0	.83
Trend	182	8	2.87	1	12
Year	182	2000	2.87	1993	2004
			Countries in full sample		
	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	AUS
	CHE	CZE	DEU	DNK	CHE
	ESP	FIN	FRA	GBR	ESP
	GRC	HUN	IRL	ITA	GRC
	LUX	NLD	NOR	NZL	LUX
	POL	PRT	SVK	SWE	POL
	TUR	USA			

Notes: Samples are based on regression samples of models 4 (full sample) and 1 (subsample) of Table 13.

Table A7: Descriptive statistics: Transnational Terror attacks and immigrants' origin

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Transnational terror events	2.01	4.12	0	31
Origin: Africa, %pop, (t-1)	.47	.44	.001	1.88
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1)	.24	.29	0	1.2
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1)	.23	.22	0	.99
Origin: Asia, %pop, (t-1)	1.76	1.65	.01	7.19
Origin: Western Asia, %pop, (t-1)	.69	.72	0	2.77
Origin: Asia but Western Asia, %pop (t-1)	1.47	1.63	.01	6.88
Origin: Europa, %pop, (t-1)	5.56	4.86	.05	29.15
Origin: Northern America, %pop, (t-1)	.22	.14	.02	.63
Origin: Oceania, %pop (t-1)	.35	.83	.001	4.42
Origin: Caribbean and South American region, %pop, (t-1)	.66	1.35	.0008	6.11
Origin: Christian-Orthodoxism, %pop, (t-1)	.60	.62	.002	3.14
Origin: Protestantism, %pop, (t-1)	1.89	2.45	.04	8.74
Origin: Catholicism, %pop, (t-1)	1.82	2.46	.05	19.01
Origin: Buddhism, %pop, (t-1)	.60	.76	.003	3.26
Origin: Islam, %pop, (t-1)	1.55	1.13	.003	5.32
Origin: Other religion (incl. Hinduism and Judaism), %pop, (t-1)	2.55	2.03	.02	15.56
GDP per capita (log), (t-1)	10.13	.25	8.78	10.95
Population, (log), (t-1)	16.78	1.29	12.99	19.49
Economic growth, (t-1)	2.58	1.71	-1.99	7.36
Political rights, (t-1)	-1.18	.42	-4.5	-1
Government fractionalization, (t-1)	.28	.26	0	.75
Trend	9.22	3.56	1	14
	Included countries			
	AUS	CHE	DEU	DNK
	FIN	GBR	GRC	IRL
	ITA	LUX	MEX	NLD
	NOR	NZL	POL	SWE
	TUR	USA		

Notes: Sample for transitional terror attacks based on regression 1 of Table 14 (117 country-year observations).

Table A8: Specific to General: Transnational Terror attacks and immigrants' origin

	1	2	3	4	5
Origin: Asia, %pop, (t-1)	2.993***	2.931***	2.935***	2.883***	3.534**
	[2.85]	[2.65]	[2.66]	[2.64]	[1.99]
Origin : Northern America, %pop, (t-1)	0.014*	0.014*	0.014*	0.014*	0.014*
	[1.93]	[1.87]	[1.91]	[1.84]	[1.78]
Origin: Oceania, %pop, (t-1)	-11.433***	-11.157***	-12.842***	-11.151***	-10.070**
	[3.71]	[3.89]	[3.36]	[3.22]	[2.26]
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1)	2.299*	1.667	1.886	2.031	2.419**
	[1.79]	[1.08]	[1.10]	[1.49]	[1.97]
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1)	2.324**	2.604	2.426**	2.099**	1.994**
	[2.47]	[1.47]	[2.24]	[2.15]	[2.06]
Origin: Other religions (Hindus and Jews),	-2.438***	-2.093***	-2.235***	-2.125***	-2.307***
%pop, (t-1)	[3.87]	[5.66]	[5.55]	[4.38]	[2.69]
Origin: Islam, %pop, (t-1)	0.264	0.524*	0.330	0.499	0.380*
	[1.15]	[1.72]	[1.19]	[1.61]	[1.69]
Origin: Catholicism, %pop, (t-1)	-2.843***	-3.289**	-2.630***	-2.823***	-2.925***
	[3.27]	[2.28]	[2.66]	[3.28]	[3.47]
Origin: Europe, %pop, (t-1)	0.197				
	[0.77]				
Origin. Caribbean and South-American region, %pop, (t-1)		0.791			
		[0.46]			
Origin : Christian-Orthodoxism, %pop, (t-1)			0.509		
			[0.93]		
Origin. Protestantism, %pop, (t-1)				0.088	
				[0.25]	
Origin : Buddhism, %pop, (t-1)					-1.463
					[0.39]
Observations	117	117	117	117	117
Akaike information criterion	3.267	3.268	3.266	3.268	3.267
Akaike*n	382.288	382.317	382.168	382.398	382.297

Notes: Models results from a step-by-step specific-to-general selection of the cultural variables based on the Akaike information criterion. Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror attacks in a country, 1992 – 2004, in 18 OECD countries. All models employ a negative binomial estimator and include country fixed effects. Observations are clustered at the country level. All models control, for commonly used macroeconomic and political factors of transnational terror. The starting model also included the share of Muslim immigrants in the population, and the population shares of those originating from Northern Africa and from Central and Southern Africa.

Tables

Table 1a: The propensity to use violence of natives and immigrants (world sample)

Using violence for political goals not justified	immigrant	%	native	%	total	%
Strongly agree	1'857	50.89	28'115	51.30	29'972	51.28
Agree	1'085	29.73	15'652	28.56	16'737	28.63
Disagree	446	12.22	6'425	11.72	6'871	11.75
Strongly disagree	261	7.15	4'612	8.42	4'873	8.34
Total	3'649	100.00	54'804	100.00	58'453	100.00

Table 1b: The propensity to use violence of natives and immigrants (OECD sample)

Using violence for political goals not justified	immigrant	%	native	%	total	%
Strongly agree	742	58.33	10'798	59.22	11'603	51.28
Agree	301	23.66	4'633	25.41	4'992	28.63
Disagree	136	10.69	1'512	8.29	1'661	11.75
Strongly disagree	93	7.31	1'290	7.08	1'393	7.09
Total	1'272	100.00	18'233	100.00	19'649	100.00

Table 2: Integration and acceptance of violence for political purposes

	1 World	2 World	3 World	4 World	5 OECD	6 OECD	7 OECD	8 OECD
Conservative-extreme	0.074***	0.074***	0.074***	0.073***	0.049	0.048	0.051	0.046
	[3.57]	[3.65]	[3.58]	[3.56]	[1.45]	[1.47]	[1.50]	[1.34]
Conservative-moderate	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.011	-0.051	-0.049	-0.049	-0.049
	[0.64]	[0.60]	[0.63]	[0.58]	[1.33]	[1.27]	[1.27]	[1.26]
Center	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.
Leftist-moderate	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013	-0.013	-0.084***	-0.084***	-0.084***	-0.084***
	[0.81]	[0.84]	[0.79]	[0.78]	[3.09]	[3.07]	[3.08]	[3.06]
Leftist-extreme	0.095***	0.094***	0.094***	0.093***	0.06	0.058	0.059	0.062
	[3.29]	[3.27]	[3.28]	[3.26]	[1.43]	[1.44]	[1.44]	[1.47]
Ideology missing	-0.045**	-0.047**	-0.044**	-0.047**	-0.066**	-0.070**	-0.066**	-0.067**
	[2.43]	[2.61]	[2.40]	[2.65]	[2.44]	[2.57]	[2.43]	[2.37]
Full time employed	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.	ref.cat.
Part time	0.03	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.032	0.031	0.031	0.03
	[1.14]	[1.09]	[1.10]	[1.11]	[1.36]	[1.37]	[1.28]	[1.22]
Self-employed	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.103**	0.101**	0.104**	0.102**
	[0.13]	[0.10]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[2.69]	[2.74]	[2.67]	[2.61]
Retired	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.024	0.041*	0.042*	0.039	0.041
	[1.21]	[1.18]	[1.25]	[1.21]	[1.78]	[1.81]	[1.67]	[1.74]
Housewife	0.090***	0.089***	0.091***	0.092***	0.101**	0.102**	0.099**	0.100**
	[3.83]	[3.82]	[3.85]	[3.91]	[2.60]	[2.65]	[2.59]	[2.52]
Student	0.013	0.014	0.012	0.014	0.04	0.044	0.039	0.04
	[0.50]	[0.53]	[0.47]	[0.53]	[0.67]	[0.70]	[0.64]	[0.68]
Unemployed	0.070***	0.069***	0.071***	0.071***	0.084**	0.082**	0.082**	0.084**
	[3.40]	[3.33]	[3.45]	[3.37]	[2.84]	[2.84]	[2.85]	[2.89]

Table 2: Integration and acceptance of violence for political purposes (cont.)

	1 World	2 World	3 World	4 World	5 OECD	6 OECD	7 OECD	8 OECD
Other	0.042	0.04	0.043	0.046	0.049	0.044	0.047	0.05
	[1.34]	[1.30]	[1.35]	[1.47]	[1.00]	[0.88]	[0.95]	[1.01]
World identity		ref.cat.				ref.cat.		
Local identity		0.019				0.049		
		[0.74]				[1.36]		
Regional identity		-0.026				-0.029		
		[0.91]				[0.94]		
National identity		-0.038**				-0.025		
		[2.02]				[1.02]		
Continental identity		-0.039				-0.029		
		[1.38]				[0.75]		
No geographic identity		0.109**				0.168*		
		[2.06]				[2.09]		
Active membership			0.006				-0.029**	
			[0.38]				[2.37]	
Friends important				-0.033*				-0.044
				[1.82]				[1.17]
country FE	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
other micro controls	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	59440	59440	59390	59070	17919	17919	17871	17822
Adjusted R2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04
number of countries	46	46	46	46	14	14	14	14

Notes: Dependent variable: "using violence to pursue political goals is never justified". Answers range from "agree" (1) to "do not agree at all" (4). All models includes control variables for age, gender, marital status, children, education, occupational status, self-positioning on political left-right scale, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. '*', '**', '***' denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance.

Table 3: Integration of immigrants and acceptance of violence as political means: world sample

Model 1: Immigrants	
Born in this country	-0.020
	[0.68]
Observations	53200
Adjusted R2	0.07
Model 2: Duration of residence	
Within past 2 years	ref. cat..
Within past 3-5 years	0.009
	[0.10]
6-10 years ago	-0.03
	[0.33]
11-15 years ago	0.021
	[0.21]
More than 15 years ago	0.001
	[0.02]
Born in this country	-0.026
	[0.29]
Observations	52951
Adjusted R2	0.07
Model 3 : private networks	
Born in this country	-0.008
	[0.14]
Friends important	-0.018
	[0.34]
Friends imp.* born	-0.013
	[0.26]
Observations	52866
Adjusted R2	0.07

Model 4 Political ideology	
Born in this country	-0.010
	[0.28]
Conservative-extreme	0.028
	[0.39]
Conservative-moderate	0.022
	[0.45]
Leftist-moderate	-0.006
Leftist-extreme	0.171***
	[3.19]
Ideology missing	-0.044
	[1.08]
Ideology * born	0.047
	[0.67]
Ideology * born	-0.043
	[0.83]
Ideology * born	-0.011
	[0.23]
Ideology * born	-0.092
	[1.59]
Ideology * born	-0.001
	[0.02]
Observations	53200
Adjusted R2	0.07

Model 5: Employment	
Born in this country	-0.025
	[0.72]
Part time	-0.009
	[0.16]
Self-employed	0.094
	[1.29]
Retired	0.029
Housewife	-0.064
	[1.19]
Student	0.064
	[1.05]
Unemployed	0.044
	[0.79]
Other	0.017
	[0.15]
Part time * born	0.026
	[0.47]
Self-employed * born	-0.096
	[1.45]
Retired * born	-0.016
	[0.39]
Housewife * born	0.154***
	[2.73]
Student * born	-0.06
	[0.89]
Unemployed * born	0.016
	[0.29]
Other * born	0.016
	[0.13]
Observations	53200
Adjusted R2	0.07

Notes: Dependent variable: "using violence to pursue political goals is never justified". Answers range from "agree" (1) to "do not agree at all" (4). All models includes control variables for age, gender, marital status, children, education, occupational status, self-positioning on political left-right scale, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. '*', '**', '***' denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance.

Table 4: Integration of immigrants and acceptance of violence as political means: OECD countries

Model 1: Immigrants	
Born in this country	-0.079**
	[2.56]
Observations	17800
Adjusted R2	0.04

Model 2: Duration of residence	
Within past 2 years	ref. cat.
Within past 3-5 years	0.044
	[0.34]
6-10 years ago	-0.011
	[0.07]
11-15 years ago	-0.059
	[0.34]
More than 15 years ago	-0.048
	[0.32]
Born in this country	-0.119
	[0.83]
Observations	17725
Adjusted R2	0.04

Model 3: Social networks	
Born in this country	-0.075
	[0.64]
Friends important	-0.042
	[0.38]
Friends imp.* born	0.003
	[0.03]
Observations	17703
Adjusted R2	0.04

Model 4: Political ideology	
Born in this country	-0.054
	[1.23]
Conservative-extreme	0.045
	[0.54]
Conservative-moderate	0.025
	[0.33]
Leftist-moderate	-0.052
	[0.54]
Leftist-extreme	0.147
	[1.23]
Ideology missing	-0.067
	[0.77]
Ideology * born	0.007
	[0.10]
Ideology * born	-0.081
	[1.02]
Ideology * born	-0.034
	[0.40]
Ideology * born	-0.091
	[0.86]
Ideology * born	0.002
	[0.03]
Observations	17800
Adjusted R2	0.04

Model 5: Employment	
Born in this country	-0.108**
	[2.58]
Part time	0.025
	[0.34]
Self-employed	0.197
	[1.19]
Retired	0.033
	[0.54]
Housewife	-0.163*
	[1.89]
Student	-0.018
	[0.21]
Unemployed	0.035
	[0.27]
Other	0.085
	[0.37]
Part time * born	0.002
	[0.02]
Self-employed * born	-0.100
	[0.70]
Retired * born	0.009
	[0.13]
Housewife * born	0.278**
	[3.00]
Student * born	0.057
	[0.70]
Unemployed * born	0.054
	[0.38]
Other * born	-0.044
	[0.19]
Observations	17800
Adjusted R2	0.04

Notes: See Table 2

Table 5: Social networks and support for using violence for political goals

	1 World	2 World	3 World	4 World	5 World
Born in this country	-0.017			-0.005	-0.021
	[0.50]			[0.14]	[0.60]
Active membership	0.024				
	[0.70]				
Born*active mem.	-0.012				
	[0.33]				
Number of active membership		0.004	-0.006	0.030**	-0.051
		[0.59]	[0.43]	[2.35]	[1.55]
Number of active memberships, squared			0.002		0.021***
			[1.08]		[2.91]
Born * act. num.				-0.025*	0.051
				[1.89]	[1.55]
Born * act. num., squared					-0.020**
					[2.67]
Observations	53151	59390	59390	53151	53151
Adjusted R2	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07
no of countries	42	46	46	42	42
	6 OECD	7 OECD	8 OECD	9 OECD	10 OECD
Born in this country	-0.067			-0.038	-0.067
	[1.41]			[0.93]	[1.46]
Active membership	-0.007				
	[0.18]				
Born*active	-0.022				
	[0.52]				
Number of active memberships		-0.01	-0.029***	0.024*	-0.064*
		[1.76]	[3.19]	[1.91]	[1.95]
Number of active memberships, squared			0.005**		0.021***
			[2.43]		[3.19]
Born * number				-0.036***	0.038
				[3.12]	[1.02]
Born * number, squared					-0.017**
					[2.45]
Observations	17753	17871	17871	17753	17753
Adjusted R2	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
no of countries	14	14	14	14	14

Notes: See Table 2. 'Active membership' is a dichotomous measure of social capital through civic engagement in clubs and organizations, while 'Number of active memberships' is the number of active memberships in such organizations.

Table 6: Integration of immigrants: geographic identity and geographic origin

	World	OECD		World	OECD
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3	Model 4
Born	0.015	-0.084	Born in this country	ref. cat.	ref. cat.
	[0.25]	[1.01]			
Geographic identity			*Region of Origin*		
Local	0.046	0.032	Origin: Latin America	-0.100	-0.250***
	[0.86]	[0.51]		[1.59]	[5.66]
Local * born	-0.037	0.023	Origin: USA/Canada	-0.140**	-0.085
	[0.67]	[0.42]		[2.35]	[0.80]
Regional	0.08	0.159	Origin: Asia	0.103*	0.238***
	[1.15]	[1.37]		[1.70]	[5.35]
Regional * born	-0.112	-0.191	Origin: Europe	-0.004	0.034
	[1.64]	[1.46]		[0.15]	[0.78]
National	-0.027	-0.049	Origin: Africa	0.169	0.343***
	[0.40]	[0.51]		[1.67]	[3.10]
National * born	-0.019	0.031	Origin: Other	0.015	0.128***
	[0.29]	[0.30]		[0.15]	[3.36]
Continent	0.044	0.003	Origin: Oceania	0.251	0.664***
	[0.48]	[0.02]		[0.85]	[11.04]
Continent * born	-0.095	-0.035			
	[1.09]	[0.26]			
No geog. identity	-0.006	-0.117			
	[0.05]	[0.59]			
No ident. * born	0.132	0.350*			
	[1.06]	[1.77]			
Other micro controls	yes	yes	Other micro controls	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	Country FE	yes	yes
Observations	53200	17800	observations	53189	17790
Adjusted R-squared	0.07	0.05	Adjusted R2	0.07	0.05
number of countries	42	14		42	14

Notes: See Table 2.

Table 7: The role of religion

	1 World	2 OECD		3 OECD
Protestant	Ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	Protestant	Ref.cat.
Catholic	0.023	0.020	Catholic	0.014
	[1.32]	[0.83]		[0.61]
Christian-Orthodox	0.026	0.006	Christian-Orthodox	-0.013
	[0.49]	[0.06]		[0.12]
Jewish	0.013	0.007	Jewish	-0.020
	[0.18]	[0.13]		[0.36]
Muslim	0.022	0.205**	Muslim	0.073
	[0.53]	[2.22]		[0.90]
Hindu	0.025	0.360*	Hindu	0.056
	[0.76]	[1.92]		[0.26]
Buddhist	0.062	0.050	Buddhist	-0.120
	[0.96]	[0.59]		[1.31]
Other	0.072***	0.122***	Other	0.116***
	[3.04]	[5.27]		[4.53]
			Region of Origin	
			native	Ref.cat.
			Latin America	-0.192**
				[2.55]
			USA/Canada	-0.029
				[0.21]
			Asia	0.394***
				[6.02]
			Europe	0.057
				[1.12]
			Africa	0.369*
				[2.13]
			Other	0.112***
				[3.25]
			Oceania	0.749***
				[7.75]
Other micro controls	yes	yes		yes
Country FE	yes	yes		yes
Observations	47266	13791		13720
Adjusted R-squared	0.09	0.05		0.05

Notes: See Table 2.

Table 8: Does integration prevent the clash-of cultures in OECD countries?

	1	2	3	4
Origin: Latin America	-0.165	-0.145**	-0.05	-0.497***
	[1.20]	[2.51]	[0.44]	[5.99]
Origin: USA/Canada	-0.448***	-0.305***	-0.098	-0.099
	[5.06]	[3.82]	[0.40]	[0.66]
Origin: Asia	0.182	0.361***	0.469***	0.272***
	[1.55]	[4.20]	[3.52]	[4.69]
Origin: Europe	0.008	0.04	-0.002	0.042
	[0.18]	[0.68]	[0.03]	[0.79]
Origin: Africa	0.169	0.583***	0.740**	0.481***
	[0.74]	[3.84]	[2.50]	[3.53]
Origin: Other	0.105**	0.067	0.093	0.034
	[2.49]	[0.70]	[0.79]	[0.71]
Origin: Oceania	1.195***	0.24	-0.184	0.286**
	[73.40]	[1.70]	[1.60]	[2.23]
Integration measures				
Full-time or part-time employed	-0.071***			
	[3.34]			
At least 15 years in host country		1.049***		
		[3.42]		
At least 6 years in host country			-0.459	
			[1.54]	
Number of active engagements in social and political groups				-0.012**
				[2.24]
*Region of origin * integration measure*				
Latin Am. * integration	-0.165	-1.346***	0.144	0.209***
	[0.95]	[3.97]	[0.39]	[6.14]
USA/Canada * integration	0.672***	-0.444	0.479	0.011
	[4.42]	[1.55]	[0.93]	[0.23]
Asia * integration	0.093	-1.467***	0.089	-0.032
	[0.65]	[3.93]	[0.38]	[0.83]
Europe * integration	0.052	-1.057***	0.503*	-0.006
	[0.70]	[3.39]	[1.77]	[0.18]
Africa * integration	0.394	-1.666***	0	-0.137
	[0.81]	[4.03]	[.]	[1.64]
Other * integration	0.041	-0.959**	0.502	0.063***
	[0.44]	[2.93]	[1.49]	[3.16]
Oceania * integration	-0.936**	0	1.595***	0.210**
	[2.88]	[.]	[5.27]	[2.92]
Other micro controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	17790	17790	17790	17743
Adjusted R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05

Notes: See Table 2.

Table 9: Comparability of 'support of terrorism' with 'support for violence for political goals'

	1	2	3	4	5
	wave 3: using violence for political goals not justified (1)/justified (4)			wave 1: terrorism justified (1)/ must be condemned (-1)	
Protestant	Ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	Ref.cat.	Ref.cat.
Catholic	0.021	0.022	0.022	0.007	0.007
	[0.89]	[0.91]	[0.96]	[0.28]	[0.27]
Christian-orthodox	0.002	0.002	-	-	-
	[0.01]	[0.02]			
Jewish	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.011	0.011
	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.11]	[0.07]	[0.07]
Muslim	0.212**	0.212**	0.226**	0.514***	0.515***
	[2.50]	[2.51]	[2.71]	[3.47]	[3.48]
Buddhist	0.364*	-	-	0.399***	-
	[1.94]			[3.17]	
Hindu	0.051	0.051	0.049	0.216*	0.216*
	[0.59]	[0.59]	[0.57]	[1.81]	[1.82]
Other	0.123***	0.123***	0.123***	-0.052	-0.052
	[5.34]	[5.36]	[5.37]	[1.61]	[1.61]
Micro controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Observations	14038	14018	13928	12911	12897

Notes: In models 1 through 3, dependent variable: "using violence to pursue political goals is never justified". Answers range from "agree" (1) to "do not agree at all" (4). In models 4 and 5, dependent variable: "(A) There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified. (B) Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned". Answers include "agree with B" (-1) ", "agree to neither (0)", and "agree with A (1)". For both dependent variables, higher values indicate a greater support for terror. All models include as additional controls age, gender, occupational status, marital status, education, and political ideology. Education in models 4 and 5 is measured in year of schooling, while models 1 through 3 use a categorical measure based on the ISCED scale. All models include country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. '*', '**', '***' denote 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance.

Table 10: Support for terror and committing violent acts against persons

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Attitude: "Terrorism is justified"		0.009***	0.015***		0.006***	0.008***
		[5.71]	[7.08]		[4.88]	[5.86]
Jew	0.015			0.005		
	[1.16]			[0.55]		
Muslim	0.058**	0.051**		0.058***	0.041**	
	[2.30]	[1.97]		[2.69]	[2.14]	
Other	0.003	0.003		0.002	0.001	
	[0.55]	[0.49]		[0.40]	[0.19]	
Catholic	0.000	-0.001		0.000	-0.001	
	[0.16]	[0.38]		[0.07]	[1.14]	
Male	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***
	[3.11]	[2.98]	[2.97]	[3.85]	[4.07]	[2.78]
Selected controls						
Conservative-extreme				0.007***	0.003	0.004
				[2.68]	[1.24]	[1.24]
Leftist-extreme				0.047***	0.042***	0.049***
				[3.96]	[3.61]	[4.85]
Unemployed				0.010***	0.007***	0.006**
				[4.90]	[2.99]	[2.44]
Single				0.003***	0.003**	0.002
				[2.86]	[2.08]	[1.21]
Other micro controls				yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	15255	12213	13669	14330	11463	13450

Notes: Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of having a past of committing violence against persons. Models 4 to 6 include as socio-demographic controls gender, age, political ideology, marital status, occupational status, and education. They also include country fixed effects. Probit estimations with standard errors adjusted to clustering at the country level. Reported are marginal effect for a 1 percent change in the explanatory variable (dummy: change from 0 to 1) evaluated at the sample mean.

Table 11: Support for violence and transnational terror attacks 1995-2000

	1	2	3
Estimation method	Neg. bin.	OLS	OLS
Dependent variable	count	Average count	Average rate
Violence justified (%pop)	0.242**	0.224**	0.001**
	[2.29]	[2.45]	[2.13]
Violence justified, squared	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.000**
	[2.39]	[2.30]	[2.32]
GDP p.c. (log)	-0.212		
	[0.48]		
Population (log)	0.596*		
	[1.87]		
Voting in UN in line w. USA	-2.571		
	[0.55]		
Economic growth	0.12		
	[1.51]		
Political rights	-0.071		
	[0.20]		
Political rights, change	-3.925**	-3.200**	-0.016**
	[2.42]	[2.23]	[2.14]
GDP p.c. (log)		0.108	-0.002
1995-2000		[0.26]	[0.93]
Population (log)		0.632**	-0.001
1995-2000		[2.21]	[0.54]
Voting in UN in line w. USA		1.889	0.024
1995-2000		[0.41]	[1.01]
Economic growth		0.044	0.002***
1995-2000		[0.63]	[4.45]
Political rights		-0.485	-0.002
1995-2000		[1.34]	[1.27]
Observations	41	41	41
Adjusted R-squared		0.23	0.47
Pseudo R-squared	0.36		

Notes: Dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is the counted terror events in a country in the year of attitude-measurement, in models 2 and 5 the number of terror events in a country averaged over 1995 to 2000, and in models 3 and 6 the average count of terror events per 10'000'000 residents. All models control for economic growth, political rights, change in political rights, GDP, population, and voting in the UN in line with USA. Contemporaneous control measures are used in models 1 nd 4, and averages (1995-2000) in the remaining models. Models 1 and 4 employ the negative binomial estimator, while the remaining models are estimated with OLS.

Table 12: Support for terror and transnational terror attacks 1980-1985

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Estimation method	Neg. bin.	OLS average	OLS average	Neg. bin.	OLS average	OLS average
Dependent variable	count	count	rate	count	count	rate
Terrorism justified, %pop	1.129***	5.679**	0.011			
	[3.63]	[2.75]	[0.74]			
Terrorism justified, squared	-0.026***	-0.126**	0.000			
	[3.47]	[2.58]	[0.73]			
Terrorism justified (log)				3.001***	24.154***	0.041
				[3.89]	[3.92]	[0.75]
Population (log)	0.636***			0.635***		
	[5.34]			[5.39]		
GDP p.c. (log)	0.006			0.138		
	[0.01]			[0.19]		
Political rights	-1.224*			-0.961		
	[1.94]			[1.47]		
Population (log)		2.925***	-0.007		3.015***	-0.007
1980-1985		[4.03]	[1.33]		[5.15]	[1.30]
GDP p.c. (log)		6.867	0.007		7.079	0.007
1980-1985		[1.42]	[0.19]		[1.85]	[0.20]
Political rights		-28.528***	-0.049		-25.730***	-0.043
1980-1985		[4.58]	[1.08]		[5.05]	[0.94]
Observations	12	12	12	11	11	11
Adjusted R2		0.85	-0.24		0.9	-0.15
Pseudo R2	0.2674			0.3087		

Notes: Dependent variable in models 1 and 4 is the counted transnational terror events in a country in the year of attitude-measurement, in models 2 and 5 the number of terror events in a country averaged over 1995 to 2000, and in models 3 and 6 the average count of terror events per 10'000'000 residents. All models control for economic growth, political rights, GDP, population. Contemporaneous control measures are used in models 1 and 4, and averages (1995-2000) in the remaining models. Models 1 and 4 employ the negative binomial estimator, while the remaining models are estimated with OLS. Models 4, 5 and 6 exclude the Netherlands (with 29% finding terrorism as justified) as outlier.

Table 13: Immigration into OECD countries and transnational terror incidents 1993-2004

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Spain excluded			full sample		
Immigrants (non-natives),	0.470	0.971*		0.245	0.343**	
%pop, (t-1)	[1.22]	[1.75]		[1.56]	[2.54]	
Immigrants squared, (t-1)		-0.022*			-0.008	
		[1.65]			[0.95]	
Log of immigrants, (t-1)			4.948*			1.278*
			[1.84]			[1.80]
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time trend (non-linear)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Countries	25	25	25	26	26	26
Observations	182	182	182	189	189	189

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events, in 25 and 26 OECD countries, respectively, all from 1993 to 2004. Countries included are reported in Appendix Table A6. Models 1 through 3 exclude Spain which was identified as a statistical outlier, while models 3 to 6 report the estimates for the full sample. All models control for economic growth, political rights, GDP, population, a time trend, and country fixed effects. All models employ the negative binomial panel estimator with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.

Table 14: Immigration into OECD countries, culture and terror incidents 1991 - 2004

	1	2	3	4	5
Origin: Africa , %pop, (t-1)	1.137*				2.201**
	[1.65]				[2.45]
Origin: Northern Africa, %pop, (t-1)		2.607***		1.917**	
		[2.76]		[2.00]	
Origin: Africa but Northern Africa,		-0.452		2.108*	
%pop, (t-1)		[0.30]		[1.77]	
Origin: Asia, %pop, (t-1)	1.251			3.846**	
	[1.41]			[2.16]	
Origin: Western Asia, %pop, (t-1)		0.465			1.969
		[0.38]			[0.82]
Origin: Remaining Asia, %pop, (t-1)		2.319**			5.715*
		[1.99]			[1.80]
Origin: Europe, %pop, (t-1)	-0.139	-0.257		0.119	0.499
	[0.69]	[1.45]		[0.35]	[1.23]
Origin: Northern America, %pop, (t-1)	1.582	2.533		3.908	3.704
	[0.33]	[0.41]		[0.79]	[0.72]
Origin: Oceania, %pop, (t-1)	-11.621***	-15.191***		-10.650**	-17.413***
	[3.05]	[3.04]		[2.47]	[3.90]
Origin: Caribbean and	-1.874**	-3.097**			
South American region, %pop, (t-1)	[2.44]	[2.44]			
Origin: Christian-Orthodoxism,			-0.927		
%pop, (t-1)			[1.27]		
Origin: Other rel. (incl. Hinduism and Judaism), %pop, (t-1)			-1.530*	-2.762***	-2.831*
			[1.69]	[2.64]	[1.65]
Origin: Catholicism, %pop, (t-1)			-2.211**	-2.858***	-2.549***
			[2.17]	[3.57]	[3.02]
Origin: Islam, %pop, (t-1)			1.037***	0.182	-1.086
			[2.89]	[0.66]	[1.41]
Origin: Protestantism, %pop, (t-1)			0.914		
			[1.22]		
Origin: Buddhism, %pop, (t-1)			2.442	-2.518	-4.291
			[1.48]	[1.00]	[1.03]
Time trend (non-linear)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	117	117	117	117	117
Akaike information criterion	3.320	3.325	3.324	3.327	3.332
Akaike*n	388.486	388.982	388.945	389.253	389.823

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events, in 18 OECD countries, from 1991 to 2004. All models control for economic growth, political rights, GDP, population, a non-linear time trend, and country fixed effects (see also Table 13). All models employ the negative binomial panel estimator with observations clustered at the country level. Models 4 and 5 are robust to the inclusion of share of Protestant immigrants; in model 5; the effect of 'Origin:Africa' becomes then more pronounced.