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Abstract

Mediterranean was, Mediterranean is and Mediterranean will be. With its undeniably rich history, colorful geography and wide spectrum of humanity, Mediterranean is an important entity. Nevertheless, a long and rich background may not always yield a stable and secure future. In the absence of a correct perception of what is happening, the region might drift toward undesirable directions. This study argues that this is not a small probability for the Mediterranean as an economic region. Certain demographic and economic patterns of the region point at the observation that Mediterranean is losing part of its momentum. The study, which is indeed fairly eclectic, elaborates the dimensions of this observation and reveals some policy directions.

JEL Classification: F50, R11, R12, R58, Z13.

Keywords: Mediterranean, Economic region, Consensus building, Governance.

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1. Introduction: A Brief Characterization of the Mediterranean as a Region

Mediterranean was, Mediterranean is and Mediterranean will be. With its undeniably rich history, colorful geography and wide spectrum of humanity, Mediterranean is an important entity. The word ‘Mediterranean’ is a compound of ‘medius’ (middle) and ‘terra’ (earth), meaning the ‘Middle Earth’, not so differently from the treatment of J.R.R. Tolkien. The concept of middle earth directly reflects the perceptions of the time: within the known boundaries of the ancient world, from south to north Mediterranean established the center. Against this background, Mediterranean being the most important trade route/hub and the cradle of civilizations is intuitive. It was not only a connector between different trade destinations, but also a connector between different cultures of the time: languages, religions and many traditions were transmitted through the Mediterranean Sea and ports located in there.

In this spirit, it is a historical fact that the Mediterranean was the cradle of civilizations. However, insisting on extending this view to modern times may be misleading and may turn the ‘cradle of civilizations’ into pure myth or folklore. The rationale behind this is very simple: the world is not the ancient world, and Mediterranean is no longer the center of the world. So a re-concretize the Mediterranean and liberate it from the ancient myth within a modern perspective, reality must be rebuilt by considering world’s recent dynamics.

This study is an effort to rebuild reality based on the world’s recent dynamics. But what is recent? A two-part understanding of time might help. First, the second wave of globalization (1945 to 1980) may be referred to as far-recent and it may shed light on liberation of previously dominated countries, establishment of a new order characterized by the United Nations and the EU in the political/international, Bretton Woods in the financial/economic, NATO in the security front. Second, the third wave of globalization (1980 to present) may be referred to as near-recent and it covers the financialization stage of capitalism, popularity of westernization, enormous pace of technological improvement and deregulation/liberalization of world’s governance structures. It is crucial to highlight the fact that the first wave of globalization represents a multi-polar, the far-recent represents a bi-polar, and the near-recent represents a uni-polar view of the world. In that, bi-polar world was characterized by the Cold War episode, i.e. USSR-USA. Uni-polar world of present times, on the other hand, is ruled by the financial markets and possibly the multinational corporate entities. Due to data limitations the far-recent of this paper starts from 1960 and ends in 1980. The period from 1995 to 2009 symbolizes the near-recent as in this period globalization gained a large momentum.

One may expect a purely economic investigation of issues based on the framework introduced above; yet such an approach might cause a high degree of blindness when trying
to understand the Mediterranean world. As a matter of fact, segmentation does not occur only on the basis of countries’ official borders and economic standing. On the contrary, individual, societal and geographical bases must be discussed carefully. In that respect Mediterranean is outlined by the Sahara in the south, starting from Algeria and ending in Syria, similarly in the north by the European Alps and Pyrenees. Furthermore, in the east it is restricted by tectonic structures around Red Sea and Dead Sea. Indeed, in the literature this understanding was supported by Braudel (1972, Chapter 1, pp.25-102).

From a regional/anthropological perspective, Mediterranean is constituted by a number of subgroups which can be marked literally as hinterlands (Calleya, 2005). In that, southern Europe, Levant and Maghreb are the subgroups bordering the Mediterranean. In this paper, however, the main line of segmentation passes from west to east so as to divide the Mediterranean Sea into two halves: North and South.

Due to hegemonic relationships of the history, Europe constitutes the center; North Africa is the periphery, whereas Greece and Turkey are more like semi-periphery. Europe’s dominance over the region has historical roots that reached its climax during the first wave of globalization (1870-1914). During this long period, North African territories were hegemonic subjects to European rulers. Greece’s and Turkey’s labeling of semi-periphery depends to a large extent on their involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Moreover, Turkey’s historical roots are also nourished by Ottoman hegemonic position of the past. This treatment has some parallels with Braudel and Calleya as it is not mutually excludes the treatments of the two.

A secure future for the Mediterranean cannot be expected in the absence of efforts toward a new paradigm. A long and rich background may not always yield a stable and secure future. In the absence of a correct perception of what is happening, the region might drift toward undesirable directions. This study argues that this is not a small probability for the Mediterranean as an economic region. Certain demographic and economic patterns of the region, which will be elaborated in the subsequent sections, point at the observation that Mediterranean is losing part of its historically inherited name. In that sense, the geographical and historical view of being a cradle might face obstacles to continue its existence as an economic region.

The Mediterranean in this study is composed of Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Portugal is also added to this set owing to its neighborhood and increasing trade relations. Island countries and Adriatic countries are omitted. This omission does not alter the conclusions.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses the technical perspective of the paper. In Section 3, selected socio-economic indicators are discussed. Section 4 is
devoted to construction of a new imagination of Mediterranean reality. Section 5 concludes
the paper.

2. Perspective of this Paper

The nature of this study is fairly eclectic: We purposefully avoid formal statistical/econometric analysis, fancy number crunching techniques and the like. Our aim is
to provide a naked-eye assessment of the recent trends and to develop a conceptual
discussion. Our problematic consists of the parallels of the aforementioned question of
whether the Mediterranean constitutes an economic region. Consequently, we elaborate the
dimensions of this question-at-large and try to reveal some policy directions.

As summarized in the previous section, the Mediterranean was the home for antiquity and
medieval ages. So it would not be wrong to assert that it fostered a high degree of
interdependence, if not integration, among countries/societies. This is probably the
fundamental reason, even today, to see the Mediterranean economic relationships as a rigid
and intact web. In this paper, however, we argue that the term “region” should be subject to
criticism in the context of modern Mediterranean: The interdependence of the earlier ages
does not continue any more at the same pace. Rather the northern and southern members of
the Mediterranean community get separated from each other in terms of their economic
linkages. In this spirit, the Mediterranean Sea today functions more like a separator rather
than connector. Then one must understand the reasons behind the current picture in order to
reach tangible outcomes in the future.

In the last fifteen years, the loss of momentum of the Mediterranean gained more
importance. Increased pace and spectrum of globalization is the first reason behind this.
More importantly, the six-decade project of the European Union entered into a new phase
with developed institutions. Currently both of these processes are of a self-perpetuating
nature. At the end, whether all Mediterranean countries belong to the same perception of the
world and whether all Mediterranean countries perceive the world similarly become an issue.
This issue gains importance especially when the rising nationalism in the continental Europe
is taken into consideration.

An important dimension of the Mediterranean as a geographical region is that it hosts a
number of cultures: This simply means that there are several different, though not mutually
exclusive, sets of cultural traits. Language, religion, tribal linkages, pre-existing hostilities and
the like define some boundaries. These boundaries must be carefully treated owing to their
possibly strong effects on the web of economic relationships. An eloquent study of these is
essential considering the first two dimensions.
Finally, social dynamics and governance in the Mediterranean countries display a wide spectrum: Each country has naturally different social structures, power relationships and representation patterns. Two points must be mentioned with regard to these differences. First, not every country has totally distinct characteristics. Indeed, the South European Mediterranean countries and North African Mediterranean countries can be thought of as two main clusters. Second, the similarities among the former are more punctuated compared to similarities among the latter. That is, the South European Mediterranean countries enjoy a greater degree of fusing forces.

3. Observations on the Mediterranean: Several Dimensions, One Story

There is a multiplicity of indicators for assessing an economy’s overall performance. Economic growth rates provide a great deal of information regarding the development of an economy over time. Size of value added, trade volumes and indicators alike, on the other hand, are important ones to understand the degree of global penetration of an economy. We resort to all these in assessing the Mediterranean economy as a whole. Composition of value added, orientation of countries to different trade partners and evolution of bilateral trade linkages are also insightful. These give some idea about the global positioning of an economy. Finally, globalization indicators, governance indicators and demographic indicators provide summary information about a country’s socio-economic standing in the world. In this section, we examine these indicators to understand the main temporal and geographical gradients of the Mediterranean economy. For simplicity, we report our naked eye findings as a numbered sequence of observations. However, as the reader shall notice, observations are thematically grouped.

Performance of Mediterranean Economy in Retrospect

In Figure 1 we examine exports of Mediterranean countries among them among themselves and to the rest of world. We treat exports as important since it is a good reflection of economic performance of a country in a global setting. MM, MW and NMW respectively denote intra-Mediterranean exports, Mediterranean-to-World exports and Mediterranean-to-non-Mediterranean exports.

Observation 1: All three exports series increase over time, except for global turmoil episodes. However, the rate of increase of MM is not as high as the rate of increase of MW. In other words, Mediterranean economy seems to have increased its exports to the rest of world (NMW) yet fallen short in cultivating better export relationships in it.
Inward Orientation

Figure 2 is a refinement of Figure 1; it displays ratios rather than levels. Here we present inward orientation (INWARD) of Mediterranean economy first. Inward orientation is calculated as MM divided by NMW. A higher value of INWARD indicates a higher inclination within Mediterranean toward Mediterranean. WORLDSHARE is the ratio of intra-Mediterranean exports (MM) to world exports. NMWORLDSHARE is obtained in a similar fashion.

Observation 2: Inward orientation of Mediterranean increased from 1960s to 1980. From 1980 to 2010, there is no change in orientation which stays around 35%. Temporary fall in 1991 and 1992 might need further explanation. During the recent global financial crisis period, inward orientation displays a fall. Equivalently, intra-Mediterranean exports collapsed at a higher rate than that of Mediterranean-to-non-Mediterranean exports, INWARD remained near 33%.

Observation 3: WORLDSHARE and NMWORLDSHARE both decline from 1978 to 2009. Mediterranean’s relative impact on the world economy has been falling.

Revealed Completion Performance of First Generation Reforms

In percentage terms of value added, a declining share of agriculture, a constant or steadily increasing share of industry and an increasing share of services, as a whole, can be read as an evidence of good completion of first generation reforms. Increasing industrialization (against agriculture) is expected to yield higher value added and to foster expansion in services. In Figure 3, this is checked for twelve Mediterranean countries, whenever the data are available.

Observation 4: Over time, France, Greece, Italy and Spain seem to have in line with the above description, i.e. they are moving toward a more modern scheme of value added composition. In Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia, sectoral shares are fairly stable. Egypt and Turkey seem interesting: in the former, trade-off is between agriculture and industry where services occupy a nearly constant part of economy. In the latter, from 1960 to 2010, share of agriculture is on a constant decline, share of industry doubles and services expand in a considerable manner. So, North Mediterranean (South Europe) can be marked as achievers, South Mediterranean (North Africa) has a static picture and two major economies of East Mediterranean (Egypt and Turkey) are on their way to a more industrialized scheme. This leaves us with a segmented picture of Mediterranean which we further elaborate in the subsequent parts of the paper.
Growth

Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the growth of real output and real output per capita, respectively. These figures support the aforementioned observation of a segmented view of Mediterranean. For better exposition, we focus on per capita output.

Observation 5: Over the full period of Figure 5, France, Italy and Spain have a stable growth history: they maintained good averages and experienced less road accidents. In the others, a boom-bust pattern is visible.

Observation 6: When we focus on the period after 1995, Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Spain and Tunisia are good performers. Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Turkey experienced fluctuations, sometimes of high amplitudes. Practically all countries kept a better track after 2001. Note that the effects of recent global crisis are omitted.

Inward Orientation Revisited

Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 investigate the degree of inward orientation on a country basis. In Figure 6, we look at the share of other Mediterranean countries in each Mediterranean country’s exports. Intuitively, inward orientation is seen as a measure of region formation. Then, in Figure 7 and Figure 8, we examine selected couples of countries. The selected couples are those with historical hegemonic relationships. It should be intuitive to think that past hegemonic relationships should be fostering better economic linkages, if not political.

Observation 7: Based on Figure 6, maintaining a judgmental threshold of 40%, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia have high orientation toward Mediterranean. A sizable part of their exports are made to Mediterranean destinations. France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon and Turkey are just the opposite. Portugal and Spain are interesting in that their inclination toward Mediterranean has been increasing since 1995. In short, some countries have many global export destinations where the others do not. The latter set makes up the genuinely Mediterranean.

Observation 8: Having examined the couples of countries with hegemonic heritage in Figure 7, it is trivial to say that the dominant country (of the past) has a lower share of total exports to dominated country. Dominated country, however, still maintains a non-negligible percentage to dominant one. Nevertheless, share of dominant in the dominated country’s exports declines as we move further and further away from the date of liberation of the previously dominated country. The couples with such a pattern are Algeria-France, Libya-Italy, Morocco-France and Tunisia-France. Despite the absence of a past hegemonic relationship, Algeria-Spain, Morocco-Spain and
Tunisia-Italy display a similar pattern. What interest us more here is the apparently low linkage in the cases of Egypt-Turkey and Syria-Turkey. The case of Syria-Turkey, as it clearly contradicts the argument of past hegemony.

**Observation 9:** In Figure 8, we change the denominator while computing the export shares. We use exports to Mediterranean instead of total exports. This time the numerical pattern remains almost intact on the side of the previously dominated countries. On the dominant countries' side, however, there is an important change: dominating countries of the past have a clear preference toward their past colonies. The cases of Egypt-Turkey and Syria-Turkey also behave regularly when Egypt and Syria are treated as destinations. The reverse direction does not work at all.

**Globalization**

As a summary measure of globalization, we use KOF Globalization Index of the Swiss Economic Institute (Figure 9). Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 expand the economic, social and political dimensions of the overall KOF index, respectively.

**Observation 10:** Except for France, Italy and Spain (Figure 9) it is hard to reveal strong globalization tendencies. Greece and Turkey have somewhat higher degrees of globalization compared to others. This is probably due to their involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU).

**Observation 11:** In terms of economic globalization (Figure 10), France, Israel, and Spain seem to have a better performance than others do. Greece, Italy, Tunisia and Turkey rank second, on average. A domestic rather than global orientation dominates in other countries.

**Observation 12:** Patterns of social globalization suggest a stronger segmentation: except for France, Italy and Spain social globalization remains weak. Though, there are some slight movements in Greece, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey (Figure 11).

**Observation 13:** Political globalization (Figure 12), overall, is higher as compared to other dimensions of globalization. The low performers can be listed as Israel, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. This can be attributed to vicinity and intersection of Mediterranean especially with the EU.

**Democratic Climate and Regimes**

A lower degree of globalization might be linked with poorer democratic climate and regime characteristics. So we examine democratic climate (Figure 13) and regime stability (Figure 14), both based on the POLITY IV database. In Figure 13, democracy rating (POLITY) is computed as the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC. DEMOC measures the extent of democratic maturity whereas AUTOC measures the existence of an autocratic domain in
countries (see POLITY IV database). Both ranging from 0 to 10; the difference (POLITY) ranges from –10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). Regime stability (Figure 14) on the other hand, is more straightforward. It (DURABLE) measures the number of years since the last regime change. In every instance of regime change, regardless of the change being democratic outcome or a coup d’état, the score is reset and accumulates again till the next instance.

Observation 14: Focusing on the last two decades (from 1990 to 2010) France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain and Turkey have high degrees of democracy (Figure 13). Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia are of autocratic nature. Lebanon is an exception owing to the reversal in its regime from autocracy to democracy.

Observation 15: Regime stability (Figure 14) has somehow different lessons. Focusing on the last two decades (from 1990 to 2010) again, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey have durable regimes. This is not true in the cases of Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon. The careful reader will be alerted not to misinterpret this observation as something salutary by itself. Indeed, interaction of regime durability with democracy rating should matter instead of regime or democracy in isolation. In that, survival of an autocratic environment may not be as good as the collapse of a democratic environment. The aforementioned segmentation between North Mediterranean and South Mediterranean is then further augmented in terms of governance characteristics.

Demographics

At the end, some demographics might be useful as a closure to our storyline. We investigate population growth in Figure 15. Age composition of population, which is an important socio-economic parameter as well as a measure of the popular ‘opportunity window’ is given in Figure 16. The last figure displays the recent trends in net migration to our sample countries.

Observation 16: On average, the population growth seems to have lost its high pace in the Mediterranean. The rate of population growth is low in France, Greece, Italy and Tunisia compared to other countries. By itself, this observation suggests a slight separation between North and South Mediterranean countries (Figure 15).

Observation 17: Age composition of countries’ populations (Figure 16) reveals more interesting results. Based on age composition data, all countries in our sample are ageing. However, stock of old-age population is highest in France, Greece, Italy and Spain. Other countries of the sample seem not to have exhausted their opportunity
windows. This must be read carefully as to the future of Mediterranean labor markets and social dynamics.

**Observation 18:** In the last fifteen years (1995-2010, Figure 17), net migration is negative in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Migration receiving countries, on the other hand, are France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Spain and recently Syria. Note that we are not accounting for only intra-Mediterranean movements here; migration to (from) a country can be from (to) anywhere. Despite, the patterns of migration in Figure 17 tells a lot about population and labor policies of the future.

**An Aggregation of Observations**

Pausing for a while, observations elaborated above can be synthesized into a lower number. First, the Mediterranean has a good demographic potential. Second, this potential suggests enhancing linkages between North and South Mediterranean. Third, the North and South Mediterranean differ in terms of their stage of development and economic stability. Fourth, their bilateral trade connections have still room for expansion. Fifth, important clues are embedded in the Mediterranean countries’ governance and globalization patterns for future cooperation. Sixth, inter-societal synergy seems to be missing despite the existence of strong historical ties. This is nothing more than one story out of several dimensions. The next section is devoted to further elaboration of our observations to reach a better imagination of a Mediterranean future rather than future of the Mediterranean.

**4. Imagining a Mediterranean Future: Definitions Reconsidered**

In the earlier sections we have provided a characterization as well as an overall critique of the Mediterranean as a region. Main line of thinking here was such that historical characteristics of the Mediterranean as an economic region are subject to deterioration. In continuation of our discussion up to this point, this section is devoted to consolidate our observations and to point at certain policy directions.

**Gaps and Clusters**

In the Introduction, it was mentioned that Mediterranean basin may turn into an obstacle from a cradle. The set of obstacles is embodied in the existing gaps between countries. The North-South gap, which is the most visible, resembles Huntington’s (1997) formulation of West-Muslim tension. Indeed, the rising nationalism and rightward political move in the Europe is nothing but a reflection of this first gap (Adler and Crawford, 2006).

The second gap appears in the economic transformation processes of the North and South. Where the center Mediterranean completed both the first and second generation economic reforms, the periphery stagnates in the first generation (see Observation 4, 5 and 15). The semi-periphery (Greece and Turkey) are exceptions as they completed the first
generation and took some way in the second (OECD, 2010). In connection with this, low industrialization of south Mediterranean countries makes them more dependent on their northern partners: North’s imports from South are mainly composed of energy and raw materials. This resource-based scheme reflects a great deal of dependence. Though this is not a problem under the current status quo, it can easily turn into one once the EU enlargement process spread more over the post-communist countries with energy supplies (Adler and Crawford, 2006). Undoubtedly, under such a scenario European countries will preferably demand energy from their new EU peers. Consequently, south Mediterranean exports to north will be largely jeopardized.

The third gap is demographic. It is a well-known fact that European societies have been ageing. This picture is indeed valid for all Mediterranean countries (Figure 16). However, the level of young population is still higher in south than in north (see Observation 17). The demographic gap, in close analogy to electronic circuits, is like a potential difference and it should ultimately trigger some flow of people. The demand of German authorities a large number of workers from Turkey in the late 1960s can be noted.

On the other hand, the possible population transfers may face some obstacles. In the German-Turkish case, Turkish immigrants experienced deep cultural adaptation problems, especially in their first generation. Although the subsequent generations somewhat improved in cultural terms, they were still not immune to the absence of cultural harmony. Even today, it is possible to mark many Turkish families (residing in Germany) with vague cultural identities. The European countries, with traces of this experience in their mindset, are extremely cautious against the sloppy westernization of their Mediterranean peers of mainly Arab origin. At the same time, the Arabic societies of Mediterranean are not that comfortable with the idea of westernization. Reflexes to conserve cultural traits (mainly traditions, language and religion) are still tense. Hence the demographic gap requires close attention while designing new policies of culture, labor markets and migration.

The final gap is in terms of governance and regime (Figure 13 and Figure 14). The separation between the democratic north and autocratic south is already known (see Observation 14). Allegorically, one can say that no wind of democracy can pass across the Mediterranean Sea to south. The European Union desires a stable, democratic, and problem-free Mediterranean. Since the north Mediterranean countries are already members of the EU, this desire is practically equivalent to ‘a desire for a stabilized, democratic and problem-free north Africa’.
The Mediterranean policies of the EU are erroneously ‘North African policies’. What is needed is a change in understanding of the problems and a shift toward ‘genuinely Mediterranean’ policies: What lacks in the Mediterranean policies of the EU is the full cooperation of the basin’s countries. Though, the consultation process should capture all Mediterranean countries. This is probably the only viable way to address the identified gaps (religious, economic, demographic, and governance-related) in a simultaneous manner. Indeed, economic conflicts of interests can be overcome and incentive compatibility in political arena can be ensured.

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UN COMTRADE, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. URL: http://comtrade.un.org/

WDI, World Development Indicators, International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).
Figure 1
Performance of Mediterranean Economy in Retrospect (%)

Figure 2
Inward Orientation and Global Position of the Mediterranean (%)

Figure 3
Composition of Output (% of total)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD). AGR: Agriculture, IND: Industry, SER: Services. CCCSSS denotes sector SSS in country CCC.
Figure 4
Growth of GDP (% per annum)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD).
Figure 5
Growth of GDP per capita (% per annum)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD).
Figure 6
Share of Mediterranean in Total Exports (%)

Notes: Data source: UN COMTRADE.
Figure 7
Share of Destination Country in Origin Country's Exports (%)

Notes: Data source: UN COMTRADE. Legend: Origin→Destination.
Figure 8
Share of Destination Country in Origin Country’s Exports to Mediterranean (%)

Notes: Data source: UN COMTRADE. Legend: Origin→Destination.
Notes: Data source: Swiss Economic Institute. KOF-Overall is a weighted sum of KOF-Economic, KOF-Social and KOF-Political with weights, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Figure 10
KOF Index of Globalization (Economic)

Notes: Data source: Swiss Economic Institute. See SRCSRC for dimensions of KOF-Economic index.
Figure 11
KOF Index of Globalization (Social)

Notes: Data source: Swiss Economic Institute. See SRCSRC for dimensions of KOF-Social index.
Figure 12
KOF Index of Globalization (Political)

Notes: Data source: Swiss Economic Institute. See SRCSRC for dimensions of KOF-Political index.
**Figure 13**

Democracy Rating

**Notes:** Data source: POLITY IV Database. POLITY=DEMOC-AUTOC, -10 (fully autocratic) ≤ POLITY ≤ 10 (fully democratic).
Figure 14
Regime Durability

Notes: Data source: POLITY IV Database. DURABLE: Number of years since the last regime change. In every instance of regime change the score is reset.
Figure 15
Population Growth (‰ per annum)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD).

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Figure 16
Age Composition of Population (% of total)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD). Y: Young, M: Middle aged, O: Old. CCCA denotes age category A in country CCC.
Figure 17
Net Migration (Number of people)

Notes: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI, IBRD).