The redistributive role of non-profit organizations

Cerulli, Giovanni (2006): The redistributive role of non-profit organizations. Published in: IDEGA - Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, , Vol. 36, No. Análise Ecónomica, n

Abstract

By starting from the consideration that non-profit organizations cover a significant re-distributive function beside that of governmental agencies, the paper questions why government prefers to finance via transfers private entities likewise lucrative and non-lucrative entities rather than produce these goods directly. By generalizing the Hansmann (1996) theory, we propose a “make or buy” approach in which the choice among three different ownership regimes (governmental, non-profit and for-profit) providing services in public benefit oriented sectors is affected not only by costs reduction (X-efficiency) but also by the level of transfers (degree of “redistribution”) decided at a political level.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: non-profit organizations; redistribution; property rights
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out

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