A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (re – visited)

Ojo, Marianne (2011): A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (re – visited).

Abstract

This paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. As well as illustrating why effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance; ownership structures; banks; risk; regulation; monitoring; disclosure; accountability; liquidity; internal controls
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G01 - Financial Crises

References

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Edwards J and Nibler M „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership Concentration.“ 2000 Journal of Economic Policy 31: 237-260

Gorton G and Schmid F, ‘Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms’ NBER Working Paper 5453, 1996

Ojo M, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023> and http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf

Ojo M, „The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems and the Management of Risk“ at pages 2 and 3 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15989/1/MPRA_paper_15989.pdf and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427899

Ojo M, „Preparing for Basel IV : why liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II)“ <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27778/> and <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304>

Schmidt RH “Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective” CFS Working Paper 2003/36 August 2003

Vieten HR, „Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and Internal Controls“ (1997)