See you on Facebook! A framework for analyzing the role of computer-mediated interaction in the evolution of social capital

Antoci, Angelo and Sabatini, Fabio and Sodini, Mauro

University of Sassari, Dipartimento di Economia Impresa e Regolamentazione, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises (Euricse), Trento, University of Pisa, Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata all’Economia

31 March 2011

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29998/
MPRA Paper No. 29998, posted 09 Apr 2011 00:47 UTC
See you on Facebook! A framework for analyzing the role of computer-mediated interaction in the evolution of social capital

Angelo Antoci\textsuperscript{2}, Fabio Sabatini\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{*}, Mauro Sodini\textsuperscript{4}

March 2011

Abstract

Empirical studies have documented a decline in indicators of social participation in the last decades. The responsibility of social disengagement has been often attributed to pervasive busyness and the rising pressure of time. In this paper we argue that computer-mediated interaction, and particularly online networking, can help mitigate this downward trend. We develop a logical framework for assessing the role of the internet in the evolution of social participation. We analyze an economy where agents can develop their social interactions through two main modes of participation, one encompassing both online networking and face to face interactions, and another solely based on physical encounters. We study the interdependence between the rise in the pressure of time and the variation in the relative performance of the two strategies of participation.

**Keywords:** internet, computer-mediated communication, online networking, Facebook, social networks, social capital.

**JEL Codes:** O33, Z13

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\textsuperscript{1} This paper was written as part of a research project supported by the European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises (Euricse), Trento – Italy. Materials for the study of the relationship between the Internet and social capital are retrievable on Social Capital Gateway, a website edited by the corresponding author of this article and powered by Euricse at the address www.socialcapitalgateway.org.

\textsuperscript{2} Dipartimento di Economia Impresa e Regolamentazione, Università di Sassari. Email: antoci@uniss.it.

\textsuperscript{3} European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises (Euricse), Trento, and Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto, Sapienza Università di Roma. Email: fabio.sabatini@euricse.eu.

\textsuperscript{*} Corresponding author. Postal address: Euricse, via San Giovanni 36, 38122, Trento – Italy.

\textsuperscript{4} Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata all'Economia, Università di Pisa. Email: m.sodini@ec.unipi.it.
1. Introduction

Many empirical studies document that a decline in indicators of social participation has occurred in the last decades (Paxton 1999, Putnam 2000, Robinson and Jackson 2001, Costa and Kahn 2003, Bilancini et al. 2011). The most obvious suspect behind the tendency to reduce relational activities and drop out of community affairs is pervasive busyness. As Putnam (2000) writes in *Bowling Alone*, the lack of time is in fact the most common explanation that Americans offer for social disengagement when interviewed in survey studies. Putnam suggests that endemic economic pressures, job insecurity, and declining real wages, especially among the lower two-thirds of the income distribution, may be related potential causes of disengagement (2000, 189).

Previous theoretical analyses of the evolution of social capital (Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini 2011a, 2011b) have shown that aggregate social participation is strongly path-dependent, pointing out the possibility of a self-feeding cycle further accelerating the disengagement process. As the social environment deteriorates, relational activities can become less and less rewarding. Agents may thus prefer to reduce their own social participation as well (Antoci, Sacco and Vanin 2007, Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini 2011a).

In this paper we argue that computer-mediated interaction, and particularly online networking, can help mitigate this downward trend. Even if, with respect to face to face interactions, online networking presents a number of easy to guess shortcomings, it certainly exhibits two major advantages as well: it is both less time intensive and less expensive.

There are at least three reasons to suspect that web-mediated social participation can work as an effective strategy to protect the relational sphere of individuals’ lives from the pressure of time. First, it is less exposed to the deterioration of the social environment that physically surrounds the individuals. Online networking allows people to interact even with friends and acquaintances in distant locations. Second, it is less time consuming than face to face interaction. So, it suffers less from the reduction in the time available for social participation. Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter allow users to stay in touch with friends in their spare time, while sitting at a desk during the work day or while waiting for the train. Third, online interactions contribute to the accumulation of an “internet social capital” which benefits solely internet users. A peculiarity of this kind of social capital is that it allows asynchronous social interactions: one can benefit from the others’ participation, for example through the act of reading a message or viewing a photo, even if the person who wrote the message or posted the photo is currently offline.

In our view, social participation through the internet can be considered as a “defensive choice” allowing people to protect their relations from the rising pressure on time and from the possible decrease in the opportunities of physical encounters. The spreading of this mode of participation can lead to second-best scenarios, in the case that face to face interaction is socially optimal. However, as shown in Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini (2011c), it may prevent the economy from falling into a “social poverty trap”.

In this paper we develop a theoretical framework for assessing the potential role of internet-mediated interaction in halting the self-feeding process of declining participation. To this purpose, we analyze an economy where agents can develop their social participation in two main modes: they can adopt a “social networking strategy”, allowing them to participate both through online networking and face to face interaction. Or they can opt for a “face to face strategy”, which does not encompass internet-mediated interaction. In this case, all relationships take place through face to face encounters.

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5 The debate was raised by Putnam (1995) who found a significant decline in Americans’ engagement in social and political activities starting from the 1970s. The robustness of this claim to the use of different indicators has then been tested by a number of following studies. The overall findings of this literature seem to support the thesis that social capital has declined in the U.S., although not so dramatically as Putnam claimed.

6 This finding is consistent with empirical analyses of historical trends (see for example Putnam et al. 1993 and De Blasio and Nuzzo 2010).
Our main objective is to point out the possible interdependence between the rise in the pressure of time and the variation in the relative performance of the two strategies of participation. This operation is intended to provide theoretical research, as well as the rapidly growing empirical literature on the role of the internet, with a logical framework for analyzing the causal nexus possibly connecting phenomena such as online networking, other forms of web-mediated communication, the evolution of human interaction, and the accumulation of social capital.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review the related literature. In section three we present our framework. In light of this framework, section four discusses the interdependence between the phenomena we are considering. The paper is closed by a few concluding remarks and considerations for further studies.

2. Related literature

To date, there are no economic studies on the relationship between the internet and social capital, and a framework for analyzing the choice to join online networks is still missing. However, there is a growing body of empirical literature from other disciplines which provides interesting insights on the relational consequences of social networking sites (SNSs) use.

For almost a decade, studies on SNSs have been constrained into the fields of law and applied psychology, mostly pointing at issues like privacy risks and the effects of the internet on teenagers’ mental health. Early studies in the field of sociology mostly shared the fear that the internet would have brought about a progressive reduction in social interaction. This concern was based on three main arguments. First, the more time people spend using the internet during leisure time, the more time has to be detracted from social activities like communicating with friends, neighbours and family members (Nie 2001, Nie et al. 2002, Gershuny 2003, Wellman et al. 2006). These studies date back to just shortly before the explosion of online networking, and they could not differentiate between pure entertainment and social activities. At that time, using the internet was in fact predominantly an individual activity like watching TV or reading newspapers. Today, the use of the internet is strongly related to being connected to social networking sites, which in turn brings about engagement in social activities. According to data on the U.S. provided by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, as of September 2009 nearly three quarters (73%) of online teens (aged 12-17) and an equal number (72%) of young adults (18-29) use social network sites. This evolution makes any comparison between the internet and TV anachronistic.

Second, the internet allows users to conduct many daily transactions such as shopping or banking online from home (Nie et al. 2002, Franzen 2003). The supporters of this argument suggest that to shop and carry out a number of tasks without leaving home may reduce face to face interaction. A straightforward objection is that transactions and other commissions often do not have particular relational implications. By contrast, they distract time from relational activities. If we spend part of the day dealing with a bank or a public administration office, then we may be constrained to work more to make up for the hours lost, and to give up the intention of meeting friends. Obtaining a birth certificate or a bank statement online in just a few seconds from home allows us to gain more time for leisure and social participation.

A third more intriguing argument relies on the concept of “community without propinquity” (Weber 1963) and on the earlier theories of the Chicago School of Sociology. In a famous paper, Wirth (1938) claimed that a heterogeneous urban environment would be characteristic of the absence of “intimate personal acquaintanceship” and would result in the “segmentation of human relations” into those that were “largely anonymous, superficial, and transitory” (Wirth 1938, p. 1). This argument can be easily applied to the internet, which seems to have the potential to fragment local communities into new virtual realities of shared interest that may negate the necessity (or even the desirability) of face to face encounters. The “anonymization hypothesis”, however, has been challenged by results from studies specifically targeted at verifying the effects of online networking on communities living in a precise geographic location (e.g. a city area or suburb). The seminal paper in this field is probably the pioneer study by Hampton and Wellman (2003). Drawing on
survey and ethnographic data from a “wired suburb” of Toronto, the authors find that high-speed, always-on access to the internet, coupled with a local online discussion group, transforms and enhances neighbouring. The internet especially supports increased contacts with weaker ties, without bringing about a deterioration of strong ties. In the authors’ words, “Not only the internet supported neighbouring, it also facilitated discussion and mobilization around local issues” (Hampton and Wellman 2003, p. 277). A similar study by Kavanaugh et al. (2005) on the Blacksburg Electronic Village concludes that computer-mediated interactions have positive effects on community interaction, involvement, and social capital. Findings from the latest wave of studies (i.e. carried out between 2006 and 2010) on the relational effects of social networking unanimously converge on the claim that online networks support the consolidation and development of existing ties. The main reason for which these works appear to be more reliable than those arguing about a possibly negative relationship between web-mediated interaction and social capital is that they were conducted after the explosion of online networking. Thus, they are specifically targeted at assessing the implications of SNSs. From a methodological point of view, it is remarkable that studies on Facebook often rely on server log data provided by the platform itself, which provides large samples, higher representativeness, objective information on what people really do on the platform, allowing for the distinction between social activities and individual pastimes like taking quizzes. Furthermore, some researchers have been able to carry out the first longitudinal analyses in the field (see for example Steinfield et al. 2008).

According to this strand of the literature, SNSs support the strengthening of bonding and bridging social capital (Valkenburg et al. 2006, Ellison et al. 2007, Steinfield et al. 2008, Gilbert et al. 2009, Burke et al. 2009), allow the crystallization of weak or latent ties that might otherwise remain ephemeral (Haythornthwaite 2005, Ellison et al. 2007), support teenagers' self-esteem - encouraging them to relate to their peers (Ellison et al. 2007, Steinfield et al. 2008), stimulate social learning (Burke et al. 2010), enhance social trust, civic participation and political engagement (Valenzuela et al. 2009), facilitate the creation of electronic networks of practice (Vasko and Faray 2005, Landqvist and Teigland 2010, Matzat 2010), and help the promotion of collective actions to the pursuit of shared goals (Landqvist and Teigland 2010).

Drawing on survey data from a random sample of 800 Michigan State University undergraduate students, Ellison et al. (2007) find that certain kinds of Facebook use can help students accumulate and maintain bridging social capital. The authors suspect that the social network serves to lower the barriers to participation so that students who might otherwise shy away from initiating communication with others are encouraged to do so through the Facebook infrastructure. In the authors' words, “Highly engaged users are using Facebook to crystallize relationships that might otherwise remain ephemeral” (2007). As argued by Haythornthwaite (2005), social media create “latent tie connectivity among group members that provides the technical means for activating weak ties” (p. 125). Latent ties are those social network ties that are “technically possible but not activated socially” (p. 137). According to Ellison et al. (2007), “Facebook might make it easier to convert latent ties into weak ties, in that the site provides personal information about others, makes visible one’s connections to a wide range of individuals, and enables students to identify those who might be useful in some capacity, thus providing the motivation to activate a latent tie”. Ellison et al. (2007) also demonstrate a correlation between bridging social capital and subjective well-being measures: less intense Facebook users report lower levels of life-satisfaction, self-esteem and bridging social capital. As an explanation, the authors suggest that Facebook use may be helping to overcome barriers faced by students who have low satisfaction and low self-esteem. Steinfield et al. (2008) analyzed panel data from two surveys on Facebook users conducted a year apart at a large U.S. university. Intensity of Facebook use in year one strongly predicted bridging social capital outcomes in year two, even after controlling for measures of self-esteem and satisfaction with life. The authors suggest that “Facebook affordances help reduce barriers that lower self-esteem students might experience in forming the kinds of large, heterogeneous networks
that are sources of bridging social capital”. This study claims that SNSs may be particularly helpful in assisting students during the transition from school to college or work. In most cases, these transitions bring about socially disruptive changes in individuals’ lives. Routledge and von Ambisberg (2003) indeed attribute the cooling and disruption of social ties to the rise in people’s mobility. The authors suggest that, at the macro level, this process may result in the progressive erosion of the stock of social capital.

Taking into account the results from the latest studies on Facebook users, it is possible to argue that SNSs can work as an antidote slackening the mobility-driven erosion process. Online networking indeed seems to support the maintenance of relationships among individuals entering college, moving between residences, graduating and entering the professional workforce (Steinfield et al. 2008, Subrahmanyam et al. 2008).

Using data from a random web survey of 2,603 college students in Texas, Valenzuela et al. (2008) find moderate, positive relationships between intensity of Facebook use and students’ life satisfaction, social trust, civic participation and political engagement. After controlling for a series of variables, the authors claim that their results show that the association between online networking and social capital cannot be considered spurious. Despite the interesting results and convincing interpretations, the empirical analyses carried out by Ellison et al. (2007), Steinfield et al. (2008), and Valenzuela et al. (2008) share a common shortcoming: they all refer to localized communities, like the students of a specific college. An interesting development in this sense is provided by two recent studies based on the matching between survey and server log data provided by Facebook (Burke et al. 2009, 2010). The cooperation with the biggest social network has allowed researchers to investigate the behaviour of largest and more representative samples.

Drawing on survey data from a sample of 1,193 participants recruited via an “ad” on Facebook targeted at English-speaking adults, Burke et al. (2009) find that overall SNS activity, particularly friend count, is positively correlated with bonding and bridging social capital. It is also negatively correlated with loneliness. Content production (e.g. writing notes and sharing photos) is strongly associated with increases in bridging social capital. Using server log data from approximately 140,000 newcomers who joined Facebook in March 2008, Burke et al. (2010) find evidence of social learning: newcomers who see their friends contributing go on to share more content themselves.

Overall, the main claim emerging from the empirical studies presented in the review is that online networking is a means for nurturing and articulating existing ties, as well as a fertile ground for the development of new ones. We try to integrate this hypothesis into a logical framework aimed at the assessment of the causal relationships possibly existing between online networking, social interaction, and the evolution of social capital.

3. A simple framework to analyze the role of web-mediated interaction

We start from the acknowledgement that a share of the population develops its social life both through face to face encounters and online contacts via SNSs like Facebook. Drawing on a review of descriptive data from the major U.S. survey sources (e.g. the Pew Internet & American Life Project), we assume that a decreasing but still significant part of the population remains unfamiliar with online networking. These individuals are likely to develop their social participation only by meeting their friends and acquaintances in person.

We model an economy composed by a continuum (of measure 1) of identical individuals. In each instant of time they choose how to allocate their leisure time, $p$, which is exogenously given, between two kinds of social interaction.

In each instant of time $t$, the share $x(t) \in [0,1]$ of agents embrace a social networking strategy $SN$, i.e. their social participation relies both on online networks and face to face interaction. The remaining share of the population $1-x(t)$ adopts a face to face strategy $FF$: they do not interact online and thus develop all their relationships through face to face encounters.
We assume that the technology for social networking is available for all agents. In principle, individuals can thus simultaneously interact with multiple agents (theoretically, even with all of the agents in the population).

The payoff of the \( FF \) strategy, \( \Pi^{FF} \), depends on \( x(t) \) and on the share of time devoted to social interaction, \( p \), \( \Pi^{FF} := \Pi^{FF}(x, p) \). The payoff of the \( SN \) strategy, \( \Pi^{SN} \), depends on the share of the population adopting it, \( x(t) \), on the time agents devote to social participation, \( p \), and on the wealth of ties - or, in other words, the stock of social capital - of online networks at time \( t \), \( K_N(t) \): \( \Pi^{SN} := \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p) \).

In this framework, we focus solely on the internet’s social capital, instead of also accounting for the stock of ties accumulated through face to face interactions. This strong assumption is made for the sake of simplification and can be motivated by two main reasons. First, there is a significant difference in the velocity of accumulation of the two types of stock. Online ties can be formed and deepened much more rapidly than face to face interactions. Second, given the extraordinary velocity with which the social networking revolution is taking off, our model is intended to address a rather limited lapse of time.

The stock \( K_N(t) \) is a public good, in that it potentially benefits whoever is connected to the Web and adopts the \( SN \) strategy. A peculiarity of \( K_N \) is that it allows asynchronous interactions which may help people to reconcile working activities and pervasive busyness with the need to take care of social relationships. When individuals cannot meet in person, nor chat at distance due to time differences (think, for example, of people working on a night shift, or of friends living in different hemispheres), the internet social capital offers the possibility of a quality though deferred interaction. A worker on a night shift can deposit in the Web his interaction with others (e.g. by sending emails, writing a post on his blog, sharing photos or comments on Facebook); his friends will “complete” the interaction by watching the deposited material and eventually sending feedback when they awake or when they find the right time, thereby contributing to the accumulation of the Internet social capital. What happens here is not the replacement of actual encounters with deferred, more impersonal and less deep, contacts. Rather, in this case the Internet social capital offers individuals the possibility to preserve relationships which would otherwise be unravelled by busyness, distance, and the pressure of time.

We assume that the payoff \( \Pi^{FF} \) decreases as the share of the population adopting the \( SN \) strategy grows. On the other hand, we account for the claim that online networks are used mainly to maintain existing offline relationships (boyd and Ellison 2007), to crystallize weak ties (Ellison et al. 2007) and to activate latent ties (Haythornthwaite 2005), through the assumption that the payoff \( \Pi^{SN} \) increases as \( K_N \), i.e. the stock of the internet’s social capital, grows. In other words, the more the number of relatives and friends who join SNSs grows, the higher the return of joining those networks will be as well. Formally, we assume \( \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p) \) and \( \Pi^{FF}(x, p) \) to be differentiable functions satisfying the following conditions:

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p)}{\partial x} > 0 > \frac{\partial \Pi^{FF}(x, p)}{\partial x}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p)}{\partial K_N} > 0
\]

An increase in the share \( x \) of the population adopting the \( SN \) strategy positively affects the payoff \( \Pi^{SN} \) and negatively affects the payoff \( \Pi^{FF} \): the more our friends join Facebook, the higher the
utility of subscribing to the platform will be as well. On the other hand, being outside of the network (i.e. continuing to play the FF strategy) may imply an increasing relational cost. Think for example of an FF-playing teenager whose classmates join Facebook. Not following them into the network may lead to the cooling of some relationships as well as to the exclusion from new ones established through the activation of latent ties. Since the comparative advantage of the SN strategy is partly driven by the pressure on time, we assume that, when the time $p$ available for social participation grows, the payoff $\Pi^{FF}$ for agents playing the FF strategy increases more than the payoff $\Pi^{SN}$ obtained by SN players. If agents are forced to be deeply immersed in their professional activities, the ability to take care of human relationships in spare moments (e.g., while on the train, or at home before going to sleep) becomes a precious means for the preservation of social life. SN can thus be interpreted also as a “defensive” strategy that individuals adopt to protect their social life from growing pressure on time. The more the time available for social participation $p$ declines, the more a defensive reaction is needed, making the SN strategy comparatively more profitable. By contrast, if the time $p$ for leisure grows, then there is a relaxation in the need for defensive behaviours, which makes the FF strategy comparatively more profitable. Formally, this assumption can be expressed as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi^{FF}(x, p)}{\partial p} > \frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p)}{\partial p}
\]  

We follow an evolutionary game approach and assume that the time derivative of $x(t)$, $\dot{x} = dx/dt$, is given by:

\[
\dot{x} = F\left[x, \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p) - \Pi^{FF}(x, p)\right]
\]

where $F$ is a differentiable function for every $x \in (0,1)$ and $K_N$, $p \geq 0$. Furthermore, $F$ satisfies the following assumptions:

a) It is strictly increasing in $\Pi^{SN} - \Pi^{FF}$ (i.e. $F_2 > 0$) for every $x \in (0,1)$ (“payoff monotonicity” assumption, see for example Weibull 1995);

b) $F(x,0) = 0$ for every $x(t) \in [0,1]$, i.e. $x$ does not change when the payoffs of the two strategies are the same.

c) Moreover, as usual, we assume that the share $x(t)$ of agents adopting the SN strategy cannot become negative or bigger than 1 (i.e. $0 \leq x(t) \leq 1$ always holds); in particular, we assume that $F$ satisfies the following conditions:

\[
F\left[0, \Pi^{SN}(K_N,0, p) - \Pi^{FF}(0, p)\right] = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi^{SN}(K_N,0, p) - \Pi^{FF}(0, p) \leq 0 \quad (2)
\]

\[
F\left[0, \Pi^{SN}(K_N,0, p) - \Pi^{FF}(0, p)\right] > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi^{SN}(K_N,0, p) - \Pi^{FF}(0, p) > 0
\]

and

\[
F\left[1, \Pi^{SN}(K_N,1, p) - \Pi^{FF}(1, p)\right] = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi^{SN}(K_N,1, p) - \Pi^{FF}(1, p) \geq 0 \quad (3)
\]

\[
F\left[1, \Pi^{SN}(K_N,1, p) - \Pi^{FF}(1, p)\right] < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi^{SN}(K_N,1, p) - \Pi^{FF}(1, p) < 0
\]

The time evolution of the internet’s stock of social capital is path dependent and positively influenced by the size $x$ of the population adopting the SN strategy. An increase in the wealth of
ties of online networks at time $t$ will foster the accumulation of social capital $K_N$. Furthermore, since human relations developed online need care to be preserved just like “traditional” ties, we introduce a positive social capital depreciation rate to account for possible cooling over time. The time evolution of $K_N$ is thus described by the equation:

$$\dot{K}_N = \beta x - \gamma K_N$$

where $\beta$ is the elasticity of the time evolution of $K_N$ with respect to the share $x$ of the population adopting the SN strategy and $\gamma$ is the depreciation rate of $K_N$.

Notice that the maximum sustainable level of the stock $K_N$ is $K_N = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}$, which can be reached only if the whole population chooses the SN strategy (i.e. $x = 1$). We assume that, in this context ($x = 1$ and $K_N = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}$), the payoff $\Pi^{SN}$ is higher than the payoff $\Pi^{FF}$. On the other hand, if every individual adopts the FF strategy (i.e. $x = 0$) and $K_N = 0$, the payoff of $SN$ is lower than that of $FF$ (whatever the value of $p$ is):

$$\Pi^{SN}(\frac{\beta}{\gamma},1,p) > \Pi^{FF}(1,p) \quad (4)$$
$$\Pi^{SN}(0,0,p) < \Pi^{FF}(0,p) \quad (5)$$

Thus, the system to be analyzed is:

$$\dot{K}_N = \beta x - \gamma K_N \quad (6)$$

$$x = F\left[x, \Pi^{SN}(K_N,x,p) - \Pi^{FF}(x,p)\right] \quad (7)$$

which is defined in the set:

$$S := \{(K_N,x) \in \mathbb{R}^2 | K_N \geq 0, 0 \leq x \leq 1\}$$

4. **The two modes of social participation and the accumulation of social capital**

The following propositions highlight the qualitative features of the dynamics of the framework.

**Proposition 1.** The dynamic system (6)-(7) always admits three stationary states, i.e. three states $(K_N,x)$ where $\dot{K}_N = x = 0$ (see Fig. 1):

$$(K_N,x) = (0,0), (\frac{\beta}{\gamma},1), (K_N^*,x^*)$$

where $\frac{\beta}{\gamma} > K_N^* > 0$ and $1 > x^* > 0$.

Proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix.
**Proposition 2.** The interior stationary state \((K_N^*, x^*)\) is always a saddle point, while both the stationary states \((\frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1)\) and \((0, 0)\) are locally attractive. Each trajectory of the dynamic system (6)-(7) approaches one of these stationary states (see Fig. 1).

Proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix.

Notice that in Figure 1 the basins of attraction of the stationary states \((0, 0)\) and \((\frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1)\) are separated by the stable manifold \(\Omega\) of the stationary state \((K_N^*, x^*)\), which is a saddle point. The next proposition shows how a variation in the parameter \(p\) affects the size of such basins.

**Proposition 3.** The size of the basin of attraction of the stationary state \((\frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1)\) increases if the value of the parameter \(p\) increases (see Fig. 2).

Proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix.

The same shift in the position of \(\Omega\) can be caused by a increase in the elasticity \(\beta\) of the accumulation of social capital with respect to the share \(x\) of agents playing SN, or by a reduction in the depreciation rate \(\gamma\) of \(K_N\). Both these parameters mainly depend on a variety of (mainly technological) factors. First, the design and dimension of the prevalent online networks are likely to play a relevant role.

At the dawn of the social networking era, the elasticity \(\beta\) probably had a “low” value. At that time, the social capital of the Web was “fragmented” in a big number of small networks, within which newcomers had a limited probability of meeting all of their SN playing actual friends. On the other
hand, people who joined just one network were not necessarily able to connect with members of other platforms.

If newcomers do not connect each other, then the increase in their number is likely to exert a limited influence on the overall wealth of ties of the Web. This implies a low value of the elasticity $\beta$. By contrast, if newcomers are attracted by a small number of “big” networks, or even by just one enormous platform like Facebook, they are more likely to interact with each other and to re-connect with a major share of their actual, old-SN-player friends. An increase in the share $x$ of the population adopting the SN strategy will thus exert a major influence on the Web’s social capital, i.e. the elasticity $\beta$ has a “high” value.

In this framework, the “explosion” in the number of subscribers that Facebook and a few other sites experienced in the last two years can be viewed as a true turning point. Before the Facebook era, a newcomer could choose among at least 100 major online networks counting more than 100,000 subscribers. The risk of meeting just a very limited part of one's circle of friends on the Web was very high, so that the Web could hardly be seen as an effective, alternative, way to take care of the relational sphere of an individual’s life. Now that Facebook counts more than 500 million users, the probability of finding a big and growing part of one's actual network of relations on the platform is higher. Newcomers will be attracted by just one or two major sites (probably Facebook and Twitter) where they will be able to find their old friends and meet a significant amount of new ones. So, the stock of the Web’s social capital will benefit from an increase in the share $x$ of SN players to a higher extent. Second, since the dimension of the network determines its gravitational pull, bigger networks are likely to keep their members for a longer time. Relationships nurtured through such networks are thus less likely to cool over time, and the depreciation rate $\gamma$ probably exhibits a lower value. Everyday Facebook experience indeed suggests that users who temporarily move away from the platform are very likely to come back. Upon their return, they will find the network as they left it, making it easy to engage in the same old relationships again. Another technological factor that may decisively affect the social capital of the Web is the diffusion of broadband. Online networks can attract new users only as far as people can be easily connected to the Web. The lack of proper infrastructure can thus be viewed as a factor reducing both the payoff of SN players and the elasticity $\beta$.

![Figure 2: Shift of the stable manifold $\Omega$ when $p$ varies from $p = p_1$ to $p = p_2 < p_1$.](image-url)
6. Welfare analysis
Let us now consider the welfare properties of the two attracting stationary states \((K_N, x) = (0,0)\) and 
\((K_N, x) = \left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\). Figure 3 shows the payoff \(\Pi^{FF}(x, p)\) and the payoff \(\Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p)\); the latter 
evaluated at \(K_N = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}\). Notice that two cases are possible: (0,0) may Pareto dominate \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\) (Fig. 
3a) or vice-versa (Fig. 3b). In particular, (0,0) Pareto dominates \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\) if 
\(\Pi^{SN}\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1, p \right) < \Pi^{FF}(0, p)\) while the opposite holds if 
\(\Pi^{SN}\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1, p \right) > \Pi^{FF}(0, p)\). Both these 
scenarios are consistent with conditions (4)-(5). As expected, our model does not provide clear-cut 
welfare implications, both \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\) and (0,0) can be socially suboptimal destinations for the 
economy, depending on the payoff structure; therefore, both \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\) and (0,0) can become “social 
poverty traps”.

![Figure 3: (a) Stationary state (0,0) Pareto dominates \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\); (b) Stationary state \(\left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1 \right)\) Pareto dominates (0,0).](image)

7. Concluding remarks
This paper develops an evolutionary framework to explore the dynamics of social interaction in an 
environment where social relationships can be developed in two possible ways: through face to face 
encounters (the FF strategy), or by means of a mix of actual meetings and online interactions (SN 
strategy). Our findings suggest that the new opportunities for participation offered by social 
networking may progressively lead a growing share \(x\) of the population to embrace the SN strategy. 
The process is path dependent: the increase in \(x\) in fact rises the wealth of ties of the internet, 
thereby fostering the accumulation of online social capital and making social networking more and 
more attractive. At the end of the process, the economy is likely to converge to a state where all 
agents take care of their relationships both through face to face encounters and online networking, 
thereby expanding the stock of the internet’s social capital at its highest possible level 
\(\frac{\beta}{\gamma}\). In 
principle, the analysis cannot provide a precise evaluation of the social desirability of this scenario.
Both the steady states $(\frac{\beta}{\gamma},1)$ and $(0,0)$ can in fact be socially suboptimal solutions to the model, depending on the payoff structure.

In previous papers, we showed how the reduction in the time $p$ devoted to social participation can trigger self-feeding processes leading to the progressive erosion of the stock of social capital. A decline in social participation may in fact reduce the productivity of the time spent on human interactions, thereby stimulating a process of substitution of relational goods with material ones, which in turn will cause a further decline in social participation (Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini 2011a, 2011b). In these works, we analyzed a scenario in which time for social participation is an endogenous variable (i.e. it depends on agents’ allocation choices) and social relationships can be developed just by means of face to face interaction. In the present paper, we address a scenario in which agents can interact with each other both through actual encounters and online networking, but $p$ is exogenously given. The analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the substitution process causing the erosion of the stock of social capital can be impeded by the new forms of web-mediated communication. In this scenario, social interaction through the Internet can protect the relational sphere of individuals’ lives from the pressure of time. The Internet social capital, in fact, constitutes an infrastructure allowing social participation to overcome space and time constraints. The asynchronous interactions which take place on the Web can allow people to reconcile working activities and pervasive busyness with the need to take care of human relationships. We point out the interdependence between the rise in the pressure of time and the variation in the relative performance of the different modes of social participation. Agents can choose to develop their social participation through online networking as a defensive strategy against pervasive busyness. This result may look predictable, but the paper adds to the literature by providing a logical framework for analyzing the interdependence between increasing busyness, social participation and emerging phenomena such as online networking and, in general, internet-mediated communication. The next step in our research programme will be the analysis of the agents’ choice between the two possible strategies of social interaction within a new framework where the time $p$ for social participation is no longer exogenously given.

8. Bibliography


**Appendix**

**Proof of Proposition 1.** $K_N = 0$ holds along the straight line $x = \frac{\gamma}{\beta} K_N$ while $\dot{x} = 0$ in the states $(K_N, x)$ satisfying the equation:

$$\Delta \Pi(K_N, x, p) := \Pi^{SN}(K_N, x, p) - \Pi^{FF}(x, p) = 0$$

or in the states $(K_N, 0)$ and $(K_N, 1)$ satisfying respectively the conditions (see (2) and (3)):

$$\Pi^{SN}(K_N, 0, p) - \Pi^{FF}(0, p) \leq 0$$

$$\Pi^{SN}(K_N, 1, p) - \Pi^{FF}(1, p) \geq 0$$

So, under conditions (4)-(5), the states $(K_N, x) = (0,0), \left(\frac{\beta}{\gamma},1\right)$ are stationary states.

By the implicit function theorem we have that equation (8) defines a function $x = g(K_N)$ such that:
Therefore the curves $x = \frac{\gamma}{\beta} K_N$ and $x = g(K_N)$ can intersect at most once. It is easy to check that, under the assumptions (4)-(5), these curves always admit an intersection point in the interior of the set $S$ and, consequently, an interior stationary state $(K_N^*, x^*)$ with $\frac{\beta}{\gamma} > K_N^* > 0$ and $1 > x^* > 0$ always exists.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Notice that $K_N > 0$ for $x > \frac{\gamma}{\beta} K_N$ and $K_N < 0$ for $x < \frac{\gamma}{\beta} K_N$; furthermore, $x > 0$ holds above the graph of the function $x = g(K_N)$ (see the proof of Proposition 1) and $x < 0$ below it. This implies that both the stationary states $(\frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1)$ and $(0, 0)$ are locally attractive (see Fig. 1). The stability properties of the interior stationary state $(K_N^*, x^*)$ can be easily checked by writing the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (6)-(7) evaluated at $(K_N^*, x^*)$ (by assumption (b), $F_i(x, 0) = 0$ always holds):

$$J(K_N^*, x^*) = \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{\gamma}{\beta} \frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}}{\partial K_N} & F_2 \left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial \Pi^{FP}}{\partial x} \right) \\ F_2 \frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}}{\partial x} & F_2 \left( \frac{\beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Pi^{SN}}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial \Pi^{FP}}{\partial x} \right) \end{pmatrix}$$

This matrix has a strictly negative determinant and consequently the stationary state $(K_N^*, x^*)$ is a hyperbolic saddle. Since the point $(K_N^*, x^*)$ is a saddle, limit cycles cannot exist around it; therefore, by the Poincare-Bendixson Theorem, each trajectory approaches a stationary state.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** The basins of attraction of the stationary states $(0, 0)$ and $(\frac{\beta}{\gamma}, 1)$ are separated by the stable manifold of the stationary state $(K_N^*, x^*)$ (see Fig. 1). This separatrix is the graph $\Omega$ of a decreasing function of $K_N$ with slope $\frac{dx}{dK_N} = \frac{x}{K_N} < 0$ if $K_N \neq 0$ (in particular, on the left of $(K_N^*, x^*)$ we have $x < 0$ and $K_N > 0$, on the right $x > 0$ and $K_N < 0$). Let us consider two different values of $p$, $p_1$ and $p_2$, with $p_1 > p_2$, and indicate by $\Omega_{p=p_1}$ and $\Omega_{p=p_2}$ the separatrices corresponding, respectively, to the values $p = p_1$ and $p = p_2$.

Notice that, if $p$ increases (ceteris paribus), the value of $x$ decreases (i.e. $\frac{\partial x}{\partial p} < 0$) by assumption (1) while that of $K_N$ remains constant. It follows that, setting $p = p_2$, the locus $\Omega_{p=p_1}$ is crossed
from the left to the right by the trajectories of the system (6)-(7) with $p = p_2$. This implies that the basin of attraction of $\left( \frac{B}{\gamma}, 1 \right)$ is larger for $p = p_2$ than for $p = p_2$, that is, $\Omega_{p-p_2}$ lies on the left of $\Omega_{p-p_1}$ (see Fig. 2).