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"White Men Can't Jump," But Would You Bet On It?*

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Abstract

We identify an otherwise efficient market in which racial stereotypes affect market outcomes. In this market, there are well-defined prices, well-defined outcomes, a finite time horizon, and readily available information. The market appears to efficiently process the available information, with the exception of the race of the participants. We examine data on point spreads for NBA games over the 15 seasons from 1993-94 to 2007-08. We find evidence that the racial composition of the team is related to the size of the spread and their performance against the spread. Specifically, we find that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. It is possible that this effect is driven by the bookmakers setting a biased point spread or driven by excessive betting on the more black team. Using a different data set containing the movement of the spread, we do not find a relationship between the movement of the spread and the racial composition of the team. As a result, we favor the explanation that the bookmakers set a biased point spread.

Keywords: Stereotypes, Point spread, Market efficiency

JEL Classification: D03, G00, J15

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"Billy, listen to me, white men can't jump."

Sydney Deane

1 Introduction

Some of the most deeply held ideas about race and racial difference are expressed in our beliefs about sports and athletic ability, creating one of the most well-known stereotypes: the natural black athlete, and especially, the black basketball star. The common perception that black people are better at basketball than people of other races and/or ethnicities is so evident that the term "the black game" was coined to refer to the sport (see, for instance, George, 1992, and Freeman, 2010). What makes it so difficult to counter the argument that blacks have an innate ability to play basketball is that there appears to be evidence to support it: roughly 70% of National Basketball Association (NBA) players are black. As a result, the idea that blacks are better basketball players and the evidence that seemingly supports this idea can have far-reaching consequences affecting observed behavior. For instance, a self-reinforcing loop may emerge where black youngsters become encouraged by media images while the whites get discouraged to play the game, creating a discrepancy in athletic participation (Hall, 2002; Ogden, 2004). For economists, a more interesting question arises when these observations become unwavering, subconscious attitudes that athletic ability is inextricably tied to race and these attitudes affect economic decision making in a predictable manner, thus challenging the rationality tenet in its standard form.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between NBA betting outcomes and the race of the participants. Betting on NBA basketball generally involves a point spread wager, where the bet wins based on the relationship between the final score and the point spread. To illustrate, the Los Angeles Lakers visited the Washington Wizards on February 3, 2008. The spread was +3.5 for the home team, putting the Lakers as a road favorite and the Wizards as a home underdog. An \$11 bet on the Wizards would pay \$21 if either the Wizards won the game or the Wizards lost by 3 points or less. An \$11 bet on the Lakers would pay \$21 only if the Lakers won by 4 points or more. In this setting, the point spread is a market-based estimate of the actual margin at the end of the game.¹

This paper provides evidence that stereotypes have an impact on financial decisions by examining how the point spread and the performance against the spread in NBA betting markets varies with the racial composition of the teams. We ask whether the belief that black players are better than their white counterparts affects the point spread and hence the likelihood of beating the spread.

¹The Lakers won the game 103 to 91, and hence, beat the spread.

In other words, do more black basketball teams look better than less black teams in the sense that, all things equal, bettors are more inclined to bet on the former? If this is the case, then the spread on a “more black” team will be higher than it should be, leading to a negative relationship between the fraction of black players and the performance against the spread.

We examine the outcomes of NBA games and the Las Vegas point spreads on these games, from the 1993-94 season through the 2007-08 season. We find that the point spreads are higher for teams with a relatively higher fraction of black players. We also find that the probability of beating the spread decreases as the fraction of black players increases. Note that our results are robust to alternate measures of race: the difference between the number of black players starting the game, the number of black players on the full roster, and the minutes played by black players.

One important assumption in interpreting the finding that it is less likely for black teams to beat the spread, concerns the efficiency of NBA betting markets. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that the spread incorporates all relevant and available information about the game. We confirm that this is indeed the case, by showing that the actual margin minus the spread is normally distributed with a mean of zero. Hence, unconditionally, any game has an equal probability of ending up with a score on either side of the spread.

Further, the notion that the ability difference is indeed a bias (or stereotype), and is not real, is confirmed by the empirical observation that performance measures for black and white players are not statistically different. In fact, white players tend to be taller and more efficient in the sense that they score almost the same points as black players despite playing fewer minutes. However, there is no significant difference in terms of scoring ability between black players and their white counterparts.

There are two hypotheses for the cause of the relationship between race and the point spread. It could be that biased bettors place more money on the more black team, thus causing the spread to move from an unbiased spread to a biased spread. Or it could be the case that the bookmakers are aware of the bias of bettors, and set the spread in order to extract more surplus. Why would bookmakers set a biased spread? Levitt (2004) shows that bookmakers can increase their earnings if bettors have a bias. This is because the bookmakers can set the point spread in a manner such that more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which wins less than half of the time. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we use a second data set containing the opening and closing lines, for the 2003-04 season through the 2009-10 season.

Our results show that the opening spread does not move *at all* a quarter of the time and the difference between the closing and opening lines is normally distributed around zero. Moreover, the movement of the spread is not related to the racial composition of the teams in a statistically significant and robust manner. Hence, it appears to be the case that the bookmakers know of the

bias towards more black teams and consider this when they set the spread.

To gain intuition on our results, consider two teams which are exactly as good as each other, consequently each team will win with a probability of 0.5. However, one team is “more black” than the other. Therefore, some people will have a bias that the black team is better and deem their probability of winning to be greater than 0.5, even though “the truth” is 0.5. To exploit this bias, rather than setting the spread as a “pick-em” (spread of 0), the bookmaker sets the spread in favor of the black team at a value different than 0. This means that (all things equal) the black team will cover the spread with a probability less than 0.5, making this a worse bet. This reasoning still holds when the teams are not as good as each other. In this case, there is a “true spread” which each team will cover with probability 0.5. But the bookmakers do not set the spread at the true spread but rather the true spread plus a few points for the black team. Again, the black team covers with probability less than 0.5.

Let us return to the case where both teams are equally good, so the expected final margin is zero. Further, let us assume that the spread at which an even amount of money would be placed both sides of the bet would be -3 for the more black team. In this case, since half of the money is on either side of the bet, the bookmakers’ expected payoff is determined exclusively by the betting cost: for every \$11 bet, the winner gets \$21, that is, a return of \$10 and not \$11. Similarly if the spread is set at 0, the bookmakers’ expected payoff is again determined exclusively by the betting cost.² The profit-maximizing spread is somewhere between 0 and -3. So, the bookmakers set the spread at, say, -2 and more money is bet on the black team because bettors think the spread should be -3. Since more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which occurs less than half the time, the bookmakers earn extra profits.

Our results imply that stereotypes can influence behavior in financial settings. Hence, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence that economic decision making is altered by conscious or subconscious categorization based on observable characteristics, e.g., race and gender. Such biases appear more likely to stem from information-based motives than from taste-based motives. Because the bookmakers seem to incorporate these biases into prices and there is no reason to expect these particular agents to be of a different racial composition than the others. Also, if one presumes that bettors from a particular city would be more inclined to bet on the team based in their city and bettor racial profile resembles the demographics of the region, preference-based explanations would imply a negative relationship between the “black cities” and the probability of the more black home teams beating the odds. We do not, however, find evidence of such a relationship.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on sports betting

²For more on this, see Levitt (2004).

markets and racial issues in sports. Section 3 provides an overview of the data. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.

2 Background

Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The first such strand examines the efficiency of sports betting markets. Sports betting markets provide an attractive test of market efficiency because, unlike most financial markets, the sports betting markets contain well-defined prices, well-defined outcomes and a finite time horizon. In particular, sports betting markets have outcomes which are realized within a short time frame, are observable by all market participants, and are unambiguous (no measurement error or uncertainty about the horizon over which outcomes should be measured). Finally, these markets are unlikely to have uninformed traders due to the widespread availability of information. Therefore, the questions related to the efficiency of the sports betting markets are of interest to economists in order to test market efficiency hypotheses in general.

Echoing findings in other financial markets, several studies have found inefficiencies in the sports betting markets.³ For instance, studies have found that bettors erroneously place bets for sentimental reasons (Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Braun and Kvasnicka, 2008; Forrest and Simmons, 2008), on teams which are deemed *hot* (Brown and Sauer, 1993; Camerer, 1989), and on teams which are favorites (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Grey and Grey, 1997). Levitt (2004) finds, using data on the wagers placed by bettors as part of a handicapping contest offered at an online sports book during the 2001-02 NFL season, that the amount of money placed on both sides of the bet is not equal and this imbalance is related to observable information. In particular, Levitt finds that the proportion of money bet is higher for favorites and road teams. Levitt argues that the bookmakers set the spread in order to exploit common biases: people like favorites and people do not sufficiently account for the home field advantage.⁴ Paul and Weinbach (2010) confirm this finding using the percentage of bets actually placed on NFL games. Our analysis shows that the bets on NBA games are also distorted by racial stereotypes.

The second strand of related literature involves the effect of race on outcomes in sports. Again, this literature is significant beyond the sports context because it involves decisions which exhibit large incentives for success or accuracy and the outcomes can be objectively measured. Price and Wolfers (2010) find a negative relationship between the personal fouls assessed against NBA players and the number of own-race referees who officiated the game. Relatedly, Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates and Hamermesh (2011) find that the likelihood of a called strike in baseball is related to the

³See Sauer (1998) for an overview.

⁴Also see Kuypers (2000). Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) discuss the evidence that, in the odds betting of horse racing, bettors have a bias towards betting on longshots rather than on favorites.

agreement of the pitcher's and umpire's race. Although these judgments are made by well-trained and experienced professionals, they are also made under great duress and must be made almost instantaneously. Therefore, it is possible that these judgments, while obviously of great significance, would be attenuated if they were made under different circumstances. By contrast, the judgments which comprise the data which we provide are made by individuals who have the opportunity to reflect on the merits of their decisions. Hence, our findings imply that racial stereotypes may affect decisions even when they are made under an extended period of deliberation.⁵

There is also a literature involving an experimental investigation of the effects of stereotypes on judgments in sports.⁶ For instance, Stone, Perry and Darley (1997) directed subjects to listen to an audio clip of a basketball game after viewing a picture of the player whom they were instructed to judge. The subjects who were shown a picture of a black player rated the performance as better than those subjects who were shown picture of a white player. While existing experiments are suggestive of biases in judgments involving race and athletic performance, since the accuracy of these judgments are not related to the material incentives of the subjects, it can be difficult to interpret these results. However, our study is not vulnerable to this critique because obviously betting on the outcome of a basketball game is indeed related to a person's material incentives.

It should be noted that our paper does not deal with discrimination per se. Actually, the phenomenon we study is a product of "positive stereotypes" and can perhaps be more accurately viewed as "reverse discrimination" since the group which is deemed to be superior faces odds that are harder to overcome. In other words, the belief that black basketball players are better creates a bias for betting on the more black team and, as it becomes harder for the black team to beat the spread.⁷ Still, one could think of this phenomenon in terms of the main theories of discrimination in the microeconomics literature. In the first of these theories, differential behavior towards a certain group of individuals is driven by the preference for not interacting with them (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1973). In other words, individuals have a "taste" for their own kind or distaste for the other kind. In the second theory, agents take race to be a signal for unobserved or costly information about skill levels and mistaken beliefs can survive if they create self-fulfilling outcomes (Phelps, 1972). In our context, information-based explanations would be more relevant if bets reflected the prior belief that blacks are better at basketball while the findings would fit the taste-based explanations if white bettors bet against more black teams.⁸

⁵Kahn (2006) does not find evidence of racial discrimination for NBA coaches. Price, Lefgren, and Tappen (2009) do not find evidence of a relationship between the success of a pass in the NBA and the race of the participants.

⁶For more on the stereotype of the athletic black man, see Biernat and Manis (1994), Sailes (1996), and Stone et. al. (1999).

⁷Cheryan and Bodenhausen (2000) provide evidence that stereotypes can lead to such a "choking effect" by looking at the performance of Asian-American women in math tests.

⁸Unfortunately, we do not have information on the race of the individual bettors but we use the demographic characteristics of the city that hosts the team to indirectly address this issue.

To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper which addresses the intersection of race and inefficiencies in sports betting is Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008). They find that the relationship between race and fouls, documented in Price and Wolfers (2010), is significant enough so that, given information about the race of the referees and the relative racial composition of the teams, one could improve their chances of placing a winning bet against the spread. By contrast, we focus primarily on the racial composition of the teams. In addition, we analyze the opening and closing lines and we find evidence that the bookmakers are aware of the bias, thus suggesting that the phenomenon is more likely to be driven by information-based motivations than by taste-based explanations. In other words, we provide evidence that the bettors may be taking the racial composition of the teams as a signal to guide their betting decisions. However, the evidence also supports the claim that the bookmakers incorporate all relevant information which may not be reflected in the racial discrepancy between the teams and set the spread so that they can exploit the information-based bias of the bettors. Finally, note that, as does Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008), we offer an analysis of a simple betting strategy. The simple betting strategy proposed by Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) involves the interaction of the differences in the race of the teams and the referees, and in our case it is exclusively a function of the racial composition of the teams. Hence, arguably, our strategy requires less information and is less computation-intensive than theirs. Our betting strategies prove to be at least as profitable, and often more so, than the ones analyzed in Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008). Despite the differences between Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) and the present paper, we view our work as offering a complementary investigation into the relationship between race and sports betting.

3 Data

Our baseline dataset combines box score information on all regular season NBA games played from the 1993-94 season to the 2007-08 season. We exclude the playoff games since the outcomes for these games tend to be path-dependent not only across games in the same series but also through rounds, thus accentuating the survivorship bias in the sense that the number of player or team observations would closely depend on their past performance. The box score information is obtained at the player-game level from www.basketball-reference.com, which also keeps track of draft picks and other background information of the players, such as the height and weight. The ultimate team-game level dataset is constructed based on these player-by-player observations, obtained from www.basketball-reference.com.

One crucial variable, however, for our analysis that is missing from the www.basketball-reference.com website is the race of the players. In some cases (mostly for players that are still active), a picture of

the player accompanies the statistics but this happens only at a small fraction of the overall player universe during our sample period. Hence, we conduct an extensive search to obtain information on the race of the players, navigating www.nba.com, www.hoopedia.nba.com, www.draftreview.com, and Google images search. This information enables us, by visual inspection, to characterize the racial composition of each team at a point in time. Admittedly, we use a rather coarse definition of race by assigning players (and coaches) into two broad categories of black and white, where white includes Caucasians, Asians, and Latinos. Yet, we use several measures to ensure robustness of the results to a variable as subjective as a player's race and also double-check our classification of racial composition against other studies. For instance, the discrepancy between the race variable used in Price and Wolfers (2010) and that used in our analysis exists for a mere 31 out of 1128 matched players. This difference corresponds to only 2.5 percent of more than quarter of a million player-game observations used in our dataset.

The data for the betting lines we obtained from www.goldsheet.com. We verify the accuracy of the betting lines from this source against other sources commonly-used in the academic studies of sports betting, such as www.covers.com, and find no significant discrepancies. In fact, information on the ultimate outcomes of the games tends to be more accurate in www.goldsheet.com than it is in www.covers.com: of the 41 cases when a discrepancy between the two sources exists, the cross-check with www.espn.com confirms that the former has the correct information 80 percent of the time. We complement this information on point spreads and closing lines with information on the opening lines and the percent of bets placed on each side of the bet.⁹

A total of 18,450 regular-season games were played during the sample period. After excluding the games where there is missing box score or racial composition data, we are left with 17,211 games. Further, after excluding the games where there was no betting information and where the betting outcome was a push leading to cancellation of all bets (which happens around 1.3 percent of the time), we are left with 16,402 games in the sample. Before we move on to the formal analysis, we present some descriptive statistics of this final dataset.

Of the 1021 players who were active in the NBA during our sample period, 71.8 percent are black. Black players are even more over-represented in the starting line-up of the teams: only one out of five starters is white. In a typical game, each team employs 9 to 11 players, 8 of which are, on average, black players. As a result, at the player-game level, 76.7 percent of the observations are identified as being associated with a black player. These statistics confirm the casual observations on the dominance of black players in the NBA, not only by sheer number but also by the visibility they get by playing more minutes in more games.

Tables 1a and 1b provide a summary of the data used in our analysis at the player-game level,

⁹These data are available, at a fee, from www.sportsbetting.com.

and Table 2 summarized the data at the team-game level. At the player-game level, there are some statistically significant differences between black and white players. However, it is not always the case that black players have "more desirable qualities" and the magnitudes of these differences are not very meaningful. For instance, while black players score roughly two points more than their white counterparts on average, they are not as efficient as demonstrated by their slightly lower field goal percentages. These statistics are not altered drastically when the raw statistics are adjusted for playing time (Table 1b). According to these metrics, black players overall do not appear to be much better than their white peers. If one assumes that the team is a sum or reflection of the skill levels of individual players, there seems to be no obvious statistical reason to deem more black teams to be of better quality.

At the team-game level, on which we conduct the empirical analysis, we summarize the information on betting spreads and the racial composition of the teams. Racial composition is measured by three alternative metrics: the number of black starters, the number of black players on the team roster regardless of whether they actually play in a game, and the minutes played by black players. This final metric is calculated as the average of the past five games the team has played and is expressed as a percentage of the total minutes in the game. To avoid duplication, all variables are expressed from the home team's perspective. Simple statistics point to a slight advantage for the home team as they win the game 60 percent of the time by an average margin of around 4 points and beat the spread 55 percent of the time by an average of 2 points. However, note that the home team is the favorite 70 percent of the time. A home favorite wins the game 72 percent of the time while a home underdog wins only 34 percent of the time. Point spreads seem to take this into account at least partially: a home favorite beats the spread 59 percent of the time and a home underdog beats it 48 percent of the time. Note that the *partial* offset of the home court advantage is in line with earlier studies showing a similar bias in NFL betting markets (Levitt, 2004).

4 Analysis

4.1 Accuracy of point spreads and the link between race and winning probability

In order to demonstrate the relationship between performance against the spread and the racial makeup of the teams, we estimate the following regression:

$$P(\text{home team beats the spread})_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \text{black}_{it} + \gamma X_h + \varphi Y_s + \phi(X_h * Y_s) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the home team beats the spread on game i played at date t and 0 otherwise, $\Delta black_{it}$ is the difference between the "blackness" of the home team and the visiting team, X_h and Y_s are (home) team and season (during which date t is included) fixed effects, respectively. As noted in the previous section, the blackness of a team is measured by the various metrics (number of black starters, number of black players in the team roster, and the portion of minutes played by black players in the previous five games).

Thus, our empirical approach rests on a baseline specification where the probability that the home team beats the spread is a function of the racial composition of the team relative to its opponent. This relies on two assumptions and, before moving on to the analysis, we confirm that these assumptions hold. Specifically, it is assumed that the basketball betting markets are efficient and that the likelihood of winning a game does not increase in the blackness of the team.

The first assumption is that basketball betting markets are, in general, efficient, in that any observable information should be reflected in the spread. So, we start our analysis by looking at the accuracy of point spreads in forecasting the game outcome. Figure 1 shows the distribution of "forecast errors," defined as the actual margin (or realized spread) minus the point spread on a game. Indeed, the errors closely resemble a normal distribution with zero mean.¹⁰ Figure 2 formally verifies this statement by plotting the quintiles of the forecast error against the quintiles from a normal distribution.¹¹ We find that our betting markets are, in general, efficient in the sense that the distribution of the difference between the winning margin and the point spread is not distinguishable from a normal distribution. In line with this, when plotted against the realized winning margins, one can see that the point spread is a pretty accurate forecast of the actual game outcomes (Figure 3).

The second assumption is that the probability of winning a game does not increase in blackness. Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis where the more black team in a match-up is shown not to have a systematically higher probability of winning a game. The sign on the variables of interest, i.e., blackness of the home team relative to the visiting team, varies from one specification to the next and is not always significant when the dependent variable is the realized margin on the game (upper panel in Table 3). Therefore, there is little evidence of a positive association between the blackness of the teams and the decisiveness of the final scores. A quick glance at the table would suggest a somewhat robust *negative* relationship between the blackness of the teams and the probability of winning (lower panel in Table 3). It should be noted that

¹⁰See Wolfers (2006b) who examines the distribution of errors in college basketball games and finds evidence of point shaving in games with a large point spread.

¹¹Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test as well as skewness and kurtosis test for normality further verify that forecast errors are normally distributed. Results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.

this is not necessarily a sign of lower quality or generally worse performance of teams composed of more black players against teams with more white players. Rather, in these baseline specifications, the relative blackness of a team may be capturing the effect of other factors which determine the performance of one team against another. Indeed, once factors such as the record of the team up to a specific game in a season is controlled for, the magnitude and significance of this coefficient is weakened.¹² In summary, our assumption that the probability of winning a game does not *increase* with the differences in racial composition towards blackness has support in the data.

With the two assumptions verified, we now proceed to the regression analysis of the point spread and actual game outcomes.

4.2 Race and point spreads

Table 4 presents the main findings of our analysis. Here the analysis suggests that a more black team tends to face a higher spread, and that the team exhibits worse performance against the spread. Note that in each regression, team fixed effects and season fixed effects are employed. In addition, we also control for the team-season interactions. Hence, neither the time-invariant team characteristics nor the team-invariant time effects are driving the results.

In the upper panel, the dependent variable is the spread faced by the home team. According to our three measures of the racial differences between the teams, we see that there is a positive relationship between the spread and these measures. In the middle panel, the dependent variable is the realized margin of the home team minus the spread. According to our three measures of the racial differences between the teams, we see that there is a negative relationship between the blackness of the team and the realized margin minus spread. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the home team beats the spread and zero otherwise. Again, according to our three measures of the racial differences between the teams, we find a negative relationship between the blackness of the team and the probability that they cover the spread. To summarize, we find evidence that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. The evidence so far supports part of the conjecture we introduced at the beginning: point spreads, even as they control for all relevant and available information on the two teams facing each other, are disproportionately higher for more black teams, consistent with the belief that they are better than those with more white players.

¹²These results are not presented here for sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request.

4.3 Biased bettors or biased bookmakers?

A natural question then is, what is driving the relationship between the racial composition of the teams and the performance against the spread. There are two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the bookmakers are aware of the racial bias of bettors and they set the spread in such a way to exploit the bias à la Levitt (2004). The second hypothesis is that the bookmakers are unaware of the bias of bettors and set the spread to be the expected final score of the game and the relationship found above is caused by bettors who systematically bet on the more black team, thus moving the spread. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we investigate whether there is a relationship between the movement of the spread and the racial composition of the teams. Figure 4 demonstrates that the movement of the spread is normally distributed with a mean of zero.

Table 5a presents the results of our regressions involving the movement of the spread. In our first specification, in which we do not account for team- and season-specific factors, or team-season interaction terms, we find a significant relationship between race and the movement of the spread. However, for the three specifications in which we do account for these fixed effects, we do not find a significant relationship between the race of the teams and movement of the spread. Moreover, from Table 4, we know that there is a systemic relationship between the relative racial composition of the teams and the spread itself. Hence, the spread reflects the belief that teams with more black players should be placed as favorites. To further this argument, we investigate whether the money bet on the home team is related to the relative racial composition of the teams in a statistically significant way. Table 5b shows the results of this exercise. There appears to be a positive, albeit statistically weak, relationship between how much more black the team is and the percent of bets in favor of the home team beating the spread. Put differently, the spread is set in a way that the resulting bets are skewed in favor of the more black team. As a result of the regressions in Tables 5a and 5b, we favor the explanation that bookmakers are aware of the bias of bettors and set the spread to exploit this bias.

4.4 Robustness checks

How robust are our results? We perform several robustness checks controlling for the race of the referees, the race of the coaches, and the racial composition of the location of the home team.

First, one concern is that our results no longer hold when one accounts for the racial composition of the referee crew. For instance, Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) find that the racial composition of the referee crew, together with the racial composition of the teams, is relevant and can make an impact on the probability of a team winning the game and, hence, beating the spread. Specifically,

the authors find that teams can become disadvantaged when the racial composition of the referee crew differs from the racial composition of the team. We perform a series of regressions with the dependent variable as the probability of beating the spread, however, we restrict attention to the following categories: an all-white crew, a crew with at least one black referee, a crew with at least one white referee, and an all-black crew. We also consider the case where the crew is neither all black nor all white. Finally, we add the proportion of white referees as an additional control variable in our baseline specification. Table 6a presents the results of these regressions. Even when accounting for the racial composition of the referee crew, our results remain significant in each case with the exception of an all-black crew. However, note that an all-black crew is an extremely rare occurrence as it accounts for only 152 games out of 16,186 in our sample. Hence, in the majority of the games in our sample, it remains true that it is harder for the more black team to beat the spread.

Second, another important factor could be the race of the coaches. One could imagine that when the home team has more black players and, according to the beliefs, is more talented, there can be an additional bias if bettors also think that a more black team led by a black head coach should do even better than they would when led by a white head coach. We follow a similar approach as when controlling for the racial composition of referees and split our sample by the difference in the race of the head coaches of the two teams. Again, we also run a regression where the difference between race of the home team's head coach and that of the visiting team's head coach is introduced as an additional control variable. Results of these regressions are presented in Table 6b. Interestingly, more black home teams actually have a better chance of beating the spread when their head coach is white but the visiting team is led by a black head coach. We also note that when the coaches are of the same race, a majority of the cases, we find the negative relationship between the blackness of the team and the probability of beating the spread. Finally, our finding from the baseline regression also holds when the difference between the head coaches is controlled for as an additional regressor in the specification.

It is also possible that the biases found above are related to the racial composition of the bettor or the racial composition of the location of the basketball team. While we cannot account for the race of the bettors, we can control for the racial composition of the location of the teams. Therefore, to the extent that a person living in the location of the team is more likely to bet on the team, we can test whether our results are driven by the characteristics of the populations of the location of the teams. We run a series of probits with probability of beating the spread as the dependent variable. We include the difference in black starters as an independent variable, while accounting for the racial composition of the location of the teams. In particular we account for the difference in the proportion of blacks in the city and difference in the proportion of blacks in the

state. In Table 6c we present the results of these regressions. In all specifications, the difference in black starters remains significant, and none of the terms accounting for the racial composition of the location are significant. As a result, we do not find evidence that the racial composition of the locations are related to the bias found above.

On a related question about the race of the *audience* and the team, Kanazawa and Funk (2001) find that the television ratings of games are positively related to the fraction of white players on the teams. This is seemingly at odds with the evidence that white teams are perceived to be worse at basketball. Presumably spectators attend basketball games or watch on television in order to see "good basketball." If this was the case, there would be a negative relationship between the white composition of the teams and television ratings for that game. Yet, this finding could be explained if one considers another factor: that the majority of NBA fans are white (or that white fans are more likely to create revenue). Hence, while these white fans think that black players are better they still prefer to watch the white players, leading to a "premium" for white players. This is in line with the own-race preference, which would predict that white audiences choose to watch white players as they derive utility from associating with them even if they perceive the overall quality of the basketball played by these players to be inferior. We do not, however, find an analogous relationship between betting on the more black home teams in cities with a higher proportion of black population. This may imply that, when taking financial decisions directly associated with basketball, audiences stick to the stereotypes, perhaps relying on them as informative signals.

Finally, our finding may not survive if performance criteria of the teams or the factors that may be affecting each team's performance against specific opponents are explicitly included in the specification. As noted earlier, in our baseline, we control for time-invariant team characteristics and team-invariant time effects. But the performance and, relatedly, the morale of a team may vary through a given season or when faced with a certain opponent, e.g., because their game strategies are similar or because the bettors perceive a match between two specific teams differently from others. Another issue could be that bookmakers correct any systemic mistakes that may occur in setting the spread as the same two teams face each other again and again. Table 6d presents the results obtained when the records and winning streaks of the teams are added to the specification and fixed effects for specific team pairings are included. Our finding that the more black team has a lower probability of beating the spread is robust to these checks.

4.5 Profit opportunities

So far, we have presented evidence that there is a negative relationship between the relative blackness of a team and its probability of beating the spread. The question then is whether there are

profitable strategies which consistently yield returns over the break-even hurdle. We first examine the outcome of a simple betting strategy using data from the 2007-08 season. We employ a very simple strategy: only bet on the home team when it has 1, 2, 3, or 4 more white players than the visiting team. As a result of this simple betting strategy, we observe the probability of a winning bet to be as high as 75 percent and net returns (accounting for the cost of betting) ranging from 10 percent to 43 percent. Table 7 presents the results of adopting this strategy over our whole sample period. Indeed, this strategy of betting on the home team when it has more white players delivers positive net returns that increase with the starkness of the racial difference between the two teams. The bets placed, on average, win 63 percent of the time for an overall average return of 19 percent.

5 Conclusion

This paper looks at the impact of the positive stereotype of the black basketball star on financial decisions using evidence from sports betting markets. We find evidence of a bias in NBA betting markets based on race. We also find evidence that this bias is exploited by the bookmakers. This finding can be explained by bettors taking race as a signal of skill level in deciding on which team to bet but bookmakers, having more at stake, gathering more information on skill levels and setting the point spreads higher for more black teams to take advantage of the bias towards them. An interesting implication of the findings is that stereotypes may affect even well-thought financial decisions.

What do these findings mean for basketball markets in general and for other economic markets? Most straightforwardly, if the basketball betting market harbors overestimation of skill conditional on race, does this also apply to coaches and scouts or other basketball experts? Or, do presumptions about intellectual or athletic ability based on stereotypes increase or decrease the odds of success for certain groups in certain fields? Another, perhaps a socially and politically uncomfortable question which may arise from this analysis is, if people are prone to making suboptimal sports betting decisions due to racial stereotypes, do people make similar costly judgment errors in other economic decisions.¹³ For instance, do employers hire engineers with a background from a particular region presuming that they have an innate ability for quantitative tasks? Or, is provision of health, education, and other social services affected by subconscious attitudes towards some groups? These and other interesting questions are left for further research.

¹³See Wolfers (2006a) for more on this.

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Figure 1: Distribution of Forecast Errors




Figure 2: Difference between the Winning Margin and the Point Spread against Normal Distribution




Figure 3: Accuracy of Point Spreads




Figure 4: Distribution of Moves in the Betting Line




Table 1a. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Raw

Variable	Black players			White players			Significance of difference
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Age	323705	27.80	4.21	98200	27.56	3.85	<0.01
Height (inches)	323705	78.47	3.60	98202	80.37	3.85	>0.99
Weight (pounds)	323705	213.42	27.07	98202	224.40	27.91	>0.99
Games started	323705	0.52	0.50	98200	0.45	0.50	<0.01
Minutes played	323705	24.77	11.99	98200	22.09	11.85	<0.01
Personal fouls	323704	2.23	1.55	98200	2.16	1.57	<0.01
Points	323702	10.18	8.29	98200	8.65	7.45	<0.01
Free throws attempted	323705	2.69	3.14	98200	2.15	2.73	<0.01
Free throws made	323705	2.00	2.52	98200	1.64	2.24	<0.01
Free throw percentage	206297	0.73	0.28	55808	0.75	0.29	>0.99
Field goals attempted	323705	8.45	5.98	98200	7.04	5.22	<0.01
Field goals made	323705	3.83	3.18	98200	3.24	2.85	<0.01
Field goal percentage	308737	0.44	0.23	91852	0.44	0.25	>0.99
Two point shots attempted	323705	6.98	5.27	98200	5.61	4.59	<0.01
Two point shots made	323705	3.32	2.93	98200	2.72	2.61	<0.01
Two point shot percentage	303843	0.46	0.25	89369	0.47	0.28	>0.99
Three point shots attempted	323705	1.46	2.15	98200	1.43	2.07	<0.01
Three point shots made	323705	0.51	1.01	98200	0.53	1.01	>0.99
Three point shot percentage	155425	0.31	0.32	46555	0.34	0.33	>0.99
Offensive rebounds	323705	1.25	1.55	98200	1.16	1.48	<0.01
Defensive rebounds	323705	2.99	2.71	98200	2.92	2.70	<0.01
Total rebounds	323705	4.23	3.66	98200	4.09	3.58	<0.01
Assists	323705	2.27	2.58	98200	2.04	2.65	<0.01
Steals	323705	0.83	1.06	98200	0.66	0.96	<0.01
Blocks	323705	0.50	0.95	98200	0.50	0.96	0.38
Turnovers	323705	1.49	1.47	98200	1.30	1.40	<0.01
Win score	323702	4.23	5.51	98200	4.18	5.33	>0.99

Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for black players is greater than the statistic for white players.

Table 1b. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Adjusted

Variable	Black players			White players			Significance of difference
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Personal fouls	323178	4.99	5.07	98028	5.61	6.14	>0.99
Points	323176	18.04	12.07	98028	17.13	12.79	<0.01
Free throws attempted	323179	4.89	6.32	98028	4.38	6.69	<0.01
Free throws made	323179	3.55	4.85	98028	3.24	5.14	<0.01
Free throw percentage	206288	1.53	1.86	55807	1.76	2.33	>0.99
Field goals attempted	323179	15.61	8.07	98028	14.71	8.39	<0.01
Field goals made	323179	6.80	4.90	98028	6.44	5.16	<0.01
Field goal percentage	308710	1.15	2.27	91836	1.35	2.73	>0.99
Two point shots attempted	323179	12.94	7.62	98028	11.78	7.99	<0.01
Two point shots made	323179	5.92	4.70	98028	5.43	4.92	<0.01
Two point shot percentage	303829	1.18	2.25	89363	1.37	2.67	>0.99
Three point shots attempted	323179	2.67	4.04	98028	2.92	4.52	>0.99
Three point shots made	323179	0.88	1.89	98028	1.01	2.22	>0.99
Three point shot percentage	155412	0.64	1.39	46544	0.80	1.83	>0.99
Offensive rebounds	323179	2.48	3.55	98028	2.66	3.95	>0.99
Defensive rebounds	323179	5.66	4.93	98028	6.20	5.52	>0.99
Total rebounds	323179	8.15	6.52	98028	8.85	7.17	>0.99
Assists	323179	4.09	4.46	98028	3.92	4.77	<0.01
Steals	323179	1.57	2.38	98028	1.39	2.44	<0.01
Blocks	323179	0.98	2.14	98028	1.09	2.40	>0.99
Turnovers	323179	2.99	3.56	98028	2.90	3.87	<0.01
Win score	323176	6.74	11.70	98028	7.28	12.88	>0.99

Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for black players is greater than the statistic for white players. Adjusted statistics are calculated by multiplying the raw statistics in Table 1a with 48 (the total number of minutes in a regular game, i.e., no overtime) and then dividing by the actual number of minutes played by that player in that game.

Table 2. Summary Statistics at Team-Game Level

	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.
<i>All</i>			
Point spread	16375	-1.79	4.90
Realized margin	17183	3.35	14.15
Realized margin - spread	16375	1.59	12.25
Probability of beating the spread	16375	0.55	0.50
Black starters	17184	3.90	1.05
Difference in black starters	17183	0.01	1.41
Black players in the roster	17184	7.60	1.63
Difference in black players in the roster	17183	-0.01	2.12
Black minutes	17027	0.78	0.16
Difference in black minutes	16987	0.001	0.21
<i>Home underdog</i>			
Point spread	4866	4.52	2.56
Realized margin	5675	-3.17	13.19
Realized margin - spread	4866	0.39	11.63
Probability of beating the spread	4866	0.48	0.50
Black starters	5675	3.99	0.97
Difference in black starters	5675	0.20	1.41
Black players in the roster	5675	7.66	1.57
Difference in black players in the roster	5675	0.16	2.11
Black minutes	5612	0.80	0.14
Difference in black minutes	5608	0.03	0.21
<i>Home favorite</i>			
Point spread	11509	-4.46	2.74
Realized margin	11508	6.57	13.49
Realized margin - spread	11509	2.10	12.47
Probability of beating the spread	11509	0.59	0.49
Black starters	11509	3.85	1.08
Difference in black starters	11508	-0.08	1.41
Black players in the roster	11509	7.58	1.66
Difference in black players in the roster	11508	-0.10	2.12
Black minutes	11415	0.77	0.17
Difference in black minutes	11379	-0.02	0.21

Notes: Point spread is the quoted spread on a game as of closing time for bets, expressed from the home team's perspective. Realized margin is the actual difference between the home team score and the visiting team score at the end of the game. Probability of beating the spread is a dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team wins. Black starters is the number of black players in the starting line-up. Black players in the roster is the number of black players in the full team roster. Black minutes is the proportion of minutes played by black players to the total minutes in the game, calculated over the past five games the team has played. These measures of blackness of a team refer to the home team. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes) in the home team minus the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes) in the visiting team.

Table 3. Winning the Game

	Realized margin					
Difference in black starters	0.098 [0.080]	0.286*** [0.105]				
Diff. in black players in the roster			0.048 [0.059]	0.091 [0.066]		
Difference in black minutes					-4.152*** [0.579]	-4.347*** [0.675]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	17183	17183	17183	17183	16987	16987
R-squared	0.03	0.14	0.03	0.14	0.03	0.14
	Probability of winning					
Difference in black starters	-0.024*** [0.008]	-0.023*** [0.009]				
Diff. in black players in the roster			-0.021*** [0.005]	-0.029*** [0.006]		
Difference in black minutes					-0.331*** [0.053]	-0.399*** [0.065]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	17183	17183	17183	17183	16987	16987

Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the realized margin in the game, computed as the home team score minus the visiting team score. The dependent variable in the lower panel is the probability of winning, which is a dummy that is 1 if the home team won the game. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares for the winning margin, and using probit for the probability of winning. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past five games) in the home team minus the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past five games) in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4. Beating the Spread

	Point spread					
Difference in black starters	0.269***	0.341***				
	[0.029]	[0.029]				
Diff. in black players in the roster			0.092***	0.132***		
			[0.019]	[0.019]		
Difference in black minutes					2.264***	2.940***
					[0.204]	[0.211]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	16374	16374	16374	16374	16192	16192
R-squared	0.09	0.31	0.08	0.30	0.09	0.31
	Realized margin - spread					
Difference in black starters	-0.291***	-0.227***				
	[0.073]	[0.084]				
Diff. in black players in the roster			-0.211***	-0.240***		
			[0.048]	[0.054]		
Difference in black minutes					-1.878***	-1.441***
					[0.512]	[0.602]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	16374	16374	16374	16374	16192	16192
R-squared	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07
	Probability of beating the spread					
Difference in black starters	-0.023***	-0.023***				
	[0.008]	[0.008]				
Diff. in black players in the roster			-0.022***	-0.030***		
			[0.005]	[0.006]		
Difference in black minutes					-0.129**	-0.135**
					[0.053]	[0.064]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	16374	16374	16374	16374	16192	16192

Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the point spread quoted on the game, expressed from the home team's perspective. The dependent variable in the middle panel is the difference between the realized margin (the actual outcome of the game) and the point spread. The dependent variable in the lower panel is the probability of beating the spread, which is a dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team wins. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares for the point spread and the difference between the realized margin and the spread, and using probit for the probability of beating the spread. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past five games) in the home team minus the number of black players (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past five games) in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance

at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5a. Moving the Line

	Closing line - Opening line			
Difference in black starters	0.014** [0.007]	0.008 [0.008]	0.008 [0.008]	0.006 [0.009]
Team fixed effects	no	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	no	no	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	no	no	yes
Observations	7977	7977	7977	7977
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05

Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the closing and opening values of the line on the game, showing how much the point spread moves from the start of betting until all bets close. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5b. Bias in Bets

	Money bet on home team			
Difference in black starters	0.185 [0.118]	0.243* [0.140]	0.243* [0.140]	0.285* [0.158]
Team fixed effects	no	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	no	no	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	no	no	no	yes
Observations	8011	8011	8011	8011
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01

Notes: The dependent variable is the money placed as bets on the home team, expressed as a percentage of the total bets placed on the game. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6a. Robustness: Referees

	Probability of beating the spread	
	At least one black referee	At least one white referee
Difference in black starters	-0.018*	-0.023***
	[0.010]	[0.009]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	12414	16007
	All-black crew	All-white crew
Difference in black starters	-0.092	-0.046**
	[0.122]	[0.020]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	152	3876
	Neither all-black nor all-white crew	Referee race as additional control
Difference in black starters	-0.019*	-0.021**
	[0.010]	[0.009]
Proportion of white referees		-0.141***
		[0.043]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	12027	16281

Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The race composition of referees are taken into account by splitting the sample by the proportion of black referees in the 3-person crew. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6b. Robustness: Coaches

	Probability of beating the spread	
	Black (H), white (V)	White (H), black (V)
Difference in black starters	-0.018 [0.019]	0.051** [0.024]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	3201	3142
	Both black or both white	Coach race as additional control
Difference in black starters	-0.037*** [0.012]	-0.017* [0.009]
Difference in coaches' race		-0.092*** [0.022]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	9864	16374

Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The race of the coach is taken into account by splitting the sample by the races of both the home and visiting teams' coaches. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. In the first column, "Black (H), white (V)" indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is black and the coach of the visiting team is white are included. In the second column, "White (H), black (V)" indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is white and the coach of the visiting team is black are included. In the third column, either both coaches are black or both coaches are white. In the last column, difference in coaches' race is calculated by first creating a dummy for the coach of each team (1 if the coach is black) and then subtracting the visiting team's dummy from the home team's. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6c. Robustness: Population in Host Location

	Probability of beating the spread	
Difference in black starters	-0.022**	-0.021**
	[0.009]	[0.009]
Diff. in proportion of blacks in the city	-0.0001	
	[0.0001]	
Diff. in proportion of blacks in the state		-0.001
		[0.001]
Team fixed effects	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes
Observations	16293	16293

Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. The difference in proportion of blacks in the city (state) is computed by subtracting the percent of black population, as of 2000, in the visiting team's host city (state) from the percent of black population in the home team's host city (state). Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6d. Robustness: History of Teams

	Probability of beating the spread				
Difference in black starters	-0.021**	-0.023**	-0.026***	-0.029***	-0.009**
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.004]
Difference in records	0.033***				
	[0.007]				
Difference in streaks		0.092***			
		[0.032]			
Margin on the teams' last match			0.003***		
			[0.001]		
Spread on the teams' last match				0.0002	
				[0.003]	
Team fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Season fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Team-season interactions	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Match fixed effects	no	no	no	no	yes
Observations	16370	16192	15470	14814	16374

Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Difference in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the home team minus the number of black players in the visiting team. In the first column, the difference in records is calculated as the difference between the number of wins the home team had in a particular season until the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting team had in the same season. In the second column, the difference in streaks is calculated as the difference between the number of wins the home team had in a particular season over the five previous games before the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting team had over the five previous games. In the third column, the margin on the teams' last match is computed as the difference between home team's score and the visiting team's score obtained the last time the two teams played against each other (irrespective of the location). In the fourth column, the spread on the teams' last match is the point spread quoted on the last game the two teams faced each other (irrespective of the location and expressed from the home team's perspective). Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 7. Chances of Winning with a Simple Strategy

	Bet on the home team only when it has X more white players than the visiting ...											
	1			2			3			4		
	Bets	Win %	Return %	Bets	Win %	Return %	Bets	Win %	Return %	Bets	Win %	Return %
2007-08	249	57.4	9.6	143	58.0	10.8	44	61.4	17.1	8	75.0	43.2
2006-07	276	49.6	-5.2	113	54.9	4.7	41	53.7	2.4	10	70.0	33.6
2005-06	256	57.0	8.9	130	55.4	5.7	52	57.7	10.1	8	50.0	-4.5
2004-05	232	53.9	2.9	132	60.6	15.7	42	57.1	9.1	27	51.9	-1.0
2003-04	229	55.0	5.0	85	65.9	25.8	51	66.7	27.3	35	65.7	25.5
2002-03	238	53.8	2.7	118	65.3	24.6	49	69.4	32.5	16	75.0	43.2
2001-02	214	58.4	11.5	112	64.3	22.7	36	63.9	22.0	13	69.2	32.2
2000-01	217	54.4	3.8	133	57.9	10.5	33	57.6	9.9	17	58.8	12.3
1999-00	250	57.6	10.0	112	63.4	21.0	20	65.0	24.1	1	100.0	90.9
1998-99	153	56.9	8.6	67	52.2	-0.3	28	67.9	29.5	4	50.0	-4.5
1997-98	248	62.1	18.5	88	64.8	23.7	19	73.7	40.7	8	87.5	67.0
1996-97	254	51.2	-2.3	65	72.3	38	20	85.0	62.3			
1995-96	277	57.0	8.9	51	54.9	4.8	2	50.0	-4.5			
1994-95	245	58.8	12.2	72	47.2	-9.8	7	71.4	36.4			
1993-94	242	56.6	8.1	53	64.2	22.5	12	41.7	-20.5	1	100.0	90.9
Average	3580	56.0***	6.9***	1474	60.1***	14.7***	456	62.8***	19.9***	148	71.1***	35.7***
Average for all bets	5658	62.5***	19.3***									

Notes: The table shows the outcome of bets placed on the home team only when the home team has X (taking on values of 1, 2, 3, or 4) more white players than the visiting team. Bets show the number of games that satisfy the condition in a given season and the strategy would require a \$11 bet being placed on the home team. Win % is the proportion of bets that the home team would beat the spread and the bettor would get \$21. Return % denotes the return on the betting strategy, computed as the total money earned on the bets as a proportion of the money spent on placing the bets. Bets are expressed in units; win % and return % are in percent terms. The rows before last reports the total number of bets and the simple average for the wins and returns over all the seasons in the sample. The last row reports the total number of bets and the simple average for the wins and returns if one bets anytime the home team has more white players than the visiting team. *** indicates that the win % (return %) is higher than 52.4% (0.0%), i.e., the win percentage required to break even.