Institutions first

Boettke, Peter and Fink, Alexander (2011): Institutions first.

Abstract

Chang (2011) raises doubts about the effects of institutions on economic development and questions the positive effects of entirely free markets based on secure private property rights. We respond by stressing that institutions structure the incentives underlying individual action, secure private property rights are indispensable for prosperity, institutions have a first-order effect whereas policies only have a second-order effect, successful institutional change comes from within a society, and given the status quo of developing countries first-world institutions are likely not to be available to them.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Institutions; Incentives
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B53 - Austrian

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