Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games

Martimort, David and Stole, Lars (2011): Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games.

Abstract

An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy profile of all players. Aggregate games possess a set of purely algebraic properties that can often provide simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without first requiring that one solves for the equilibrium strategy profile. The defining nature of payoffs in an aggregate game allows one to project the n-player strategic analysis of a normal form game onto a lower-dimension aggregate-strategy space, thereby converting an n-player game to a simpler object – a self-generating single-person maximization program. We apply these techniques to a number of economic settings including competition in supply functions and multi-principal common agency games with nonlinear transfer functions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Aggregate games, common agency, asymmetric informa- tion, menu auctions
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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