Berg, Sanford V and Jiang, Liangliang and Lin, Chen (2011): Regulation and corporate corruption: new evidence from the telecom sector.
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This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that 1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; 2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; 3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and 4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Regulation and corporate corruption: new evidence from the telecom sector|
|Keywords:||Telecommunications; Regulation; Corruption|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
|Depositing User:||Sanford V. Berg|
|Date Deposited:||22. Aug 2011 16:25|
|Last Modified:||01. Jan 2016 03:25|
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