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Productivity Growth and Ownership Change in China: 1998-2007 ^{*}

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Abstract

This paper studies the industry productivity dynamics in China's manufacturing sector from 1998 to 2007, and in particular, explores to what extent the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) contributes to the aggregate productivity growth. Our results show that, though non-SOEs on average are more productive than SOEs, the average productivity growth among SOEs is greater than the privately-owned firms. Industry concentration, taxation, and credit market all account for this difference in growth between SOEs and non-SOEs. In addition, industry productivity growth is mainly attributed to the growth of non-SOEs, entry of non-SOE firms, and the exit of SOEs. However, non-SOE firms that are transformed directly from SOEs make a small but negative contribution to industry productivity growth.

Keyword: Productivity Growth, Industry Dynamics, Ownership Change, Reallocation

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1 Introduction

It is well documented that capital and labor misallocation across firms can be an important barrier to the aggregate productivity growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) measure the effects of misallocation by showing that, if the marginal products across firms are equalized, the aggregate industry total factor productivity would be boosted by 30 to 50 percent in China relative to such gains in the U.S. In this paper, we study directly how reallocation has contributed to the aggregate productivity growth in China between 1998 and 2007. By reallocation, we mean the firm entry, exit and the change of firm ownership, but we focus more on ownership changes. The share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in industry production during this period shrank significantly. In 1998, SOEs employ 49 percent of total workers. By 2007, it dropped to 10 percent. SOEs are in general considered to have low production efficiency while often they enjoy the preferential government policy treatments (for example, formal credit is more accessible to SOEs than to non-SOEs). Switching from the state ownership to the private ownership presumably promotes the aggregate productivity growth.

Studying the impact of ownership change on productivity improves our understanding of the role of reallocation in aggregate productivity transition and dynamics, which is particularly important for emerging economies where regulatory and policy distortions can be more severe than the developed economies. Moreover, if reallocation (e.g., through ownership changes) contributes significantly to the aggregate productivity growth, once this reallocation process slows down or approaches to an end, the aggregate productivity growth will likely also slow down if the rest of the economy keeps the same pace of the growth.

To study the role of SOE privatization, we use the firm-level data on China's manufacturing during 1998-2007, and estimate the firm production function with one Olley-Pakes approach (Olley and Pakes (1996)), taking into account the ownership type in production. With the estimated firm-level TFP, we characterize the productivity dynamics of both SOEs and non-SOEs, and quantify to what extent the privatization of the state sector contributed to the aggregate productivity growth. Change of ownership takes two forms. In the first one, an SOE is transformed a non-SOE through increased private share of the firm equity, but the firm name does not change. In the second and more common form, an SOE firm exits through acquisition by private owners, after which the firm may goes through restructuring and the firm name also changes. Unfortunately, in the firm-level data we use, we do not observe the second form. When an SOE firm exits from the data set, there are three possibilities: downsizing (so that no longer eligible to be surveyed),

shutting down (and capital being scrapped), and acquired by private owners. We have very limited to identify how the SOE firms exit.

Our main findings are as follows. Not surprisingly, SOEs on average have lower estimated TFP than non-SOE firms between 1998 and 2007. SOEs had lower average labor productivity (ALP) than non-SOE firms before 2004, but higher since then. SOEs have higher growth rates in both TFP and ALP than non-SOEs. Further, we find that both employment size and market power contribute to the higher productivity growth of SOEs. High firm indebtedness can curtail the productivity growth, though the impact on SOEs and non-SOEs may differ.

We find that industry productivity growth is mainly attributed to the entry of non-SOEs, the growth of non-SOEs and the exit of SOEs. Contribution from firms that are transformed from SOE to non-SOE type is small and negative. This seemingly counter-intuitive result may be interpreted in several ways. One is the selection problem, that is, the SOEs that did transform were less productive firms and they turned out to remain unproductive even after privatization. Our statistics suggest that this may form a partial explanation. It could also arise from the loss of policy favoring such as government subsidies, which offsets its expected growth from switching to be non-SOE.

There is a fast growing literature that studies the productivity growth in China and the role of reallocation in the process. [Hsieh and Klenow \(2009\)](#) show that reducing misallocation can significantly improve the industry productivity. [Brandt et al. \(2009\)](#) present the first comprehensive facts regarding productivity growth and they found that net entry accounts for most of productivity growth in China.

Our paper is the closest and complementary to [Brandt et al. \(2009\)](#). The difference is that in the present paper we focus on the role of firm ownership changes as a form of reallocation in the aggregate productivity growth, and in production function estimation we explicitly take into account ownership types. Further, we provide insights on potential reasons for differences in productivity growth between SOEs and non-SOEs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces firm ownership types in China and a brief history of evolution of ownership. Section 3 describes the firm data. Section 4 develops a simple model of ownership change and firm dynamics. In Section 5, we estimate the productivity dynamics by taking into account the firm entry/exit and ownership changes in Section 5. The estimation and analysis of the contribution of ownership changes on productivity and on labor costs are given in Section 6. Implications on estimation results are given in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.

2 Firm ownership change in China

Before China’s economic reform in 1978, the majority of Chinese firms were SOEs clustered in big cities. In 1978, SOEs accounted for 78 percent of industrial output, 76 percent of employment and over 84 percent of physical capital investment.¹ The economic reform in 1978 led to an economy that is progressively more open to free market (Lau, Qian and Roland (2001) and Li (1997)). The proportion of products traded in the market, which reflects the supply and demand, increased from zero percent in 1978 to 78 percent in 1995 (OECD (2005)). Meanwhile, new firms with various non-state ownership types emerged and were permitted to enter industries which were previous exclusively monopolized by SOEs. In particular, governmental policies are introduced and enforced to boost foreign ownership, particularly in the special economic zones. SOEs in many sectors now are faced with increasingly intensive competition from the emerging private firms. By 1995, share of total industrial output by SOEs fell sharply, from 78 percent in 1978 to 34 percent.

Appendix A describes the firm data we use for this paper. Since 1998, China’s manufacturing industries have experienced further substantial change in ownership type, characterized by SOE restructuring and flourishing non-SOEs. There are five types of ownership: state-owned, private-owned, limited liability companies, non-domestic-owned (including foreign firms and firms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan), collectively-owned, and shareholding corporations (see Figure 1).² Both SOEs and collectively-owned firms have been decreasing over time, and private firms and limited liability companies have been expanding since then. During 2000 and 2007, the fraction of SOEs declined from over 15 to 2 percent, and that of collective firms fell from 42 to 5 percent. It brings us attention to the rapid growth in the fraction of private firms within the manufacturing sector, rising from less than 10 percent in 2000 to over 40 percent by 2007. The fraction of limited liability companies rose from 12 to 27 percent, while the fraction of non-domestic-owned (including HMT & foreign) firms remains comparatively steady at around 15 percent.

Focusing on the SOEs, the total number of SOEs fell from over 24 thousands in 1998 to 6 thousands in 2007, almost one-fourth of its previous size, while the total number of manufacturing firms more than doubled, rising from around 87 thousands in 1998 to 213 thousands in 2005 (Figure 2). The fraction of SOEs fell from 28 percent in 1998 to 3 percent in 2007 (Figure 3). Meanwhile, the average age of firms decreased from 14.4 years in 1998 to 9.7 years in 2007, suggesting that sizable non-SOEs were entering the manufacturing sector, contributing to the growing population of firms.

¹See National Bureau of Statistics (2000).

²Different governmental policies (e.g. taxation) apply to different ownership types.

The significant decline of SOE firms began with a government-initiated three-year plan in effort to reform SOEs with poor performance. By 2000, 4,000 large- and medium-size SOEs with poor performance have been restructured or closed; the number of such SOEs dropped from 6,599 in 1997 to 3,463. Meanwhile, 66.5 percent of SOEs improved their performance in 2000, with 140 percent increase in profit from the previous year. In addition to the extensive government intervention, these achievements are attributed to the 360 billion Renminbi (over 10% of GDP in 2000) directly injected into SOEs by government from 1997 to 2000, as well as expansive monetary and statutory policies such as interest cut, debt-equity swap, and debt write-off to reduce the SOEs' excessive debt.³ Overall, the share of SOEs in China's gross domestic product fell from 77.6 percent to less than 30 percent during this period, while SOEs still provided about 40 percent of urban employment.

Figure 4 further explores the fall of SOEs in manufacturing and presents the rate of SOE survival. Note that survival here refers to a firm remaining SOEs conditional on its stay in the sample. We find that if a SOE remains in the market, it is getting more likely to switch to non-SOE during this period. The rate of this possibility kept on rising from no more than 10 percent to around 20 percent, though after 2005, this trend disappeared.

Historically, there are deep-rooted differences between SOEs and non-SOEs. Their growth can not be assumed or supposed to follow the same trend⁴. So for the rest of this paper, we focus on one classification of ownership type: SOE and non-SOEs, and estimate the production function based on such type change between SOEs and non-SOEs.

It should be noted that the three years below mark the key points of great changes occurred.

- 2001: in this year China became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO).⁵ China experienced rapid growth in export since then.
- 2004: the year that China experienced an investment boom in infrastructure projects, which induced a rising demand for commodities and other raw materials. The fixed asset investment accounted for as high as 42 percent of China's gross domestic product. The high investment level propelled China's economy to grow by 10.7 percent in the first nine months of 2004, raising concerns that the then world's fourth largest economy was overheating.

³It is estimated that a series of interest rate cuts during 1997-2000 brought down financing costs by 260 billion RMB for SOE firms, **about XX per cent of firm revenue**.

⁴Before 1978 when China's economic reform started, private firms were not permitted in China's economy. Though private enterprises emerged after 1978, the debates on different ownership type, especially over the legitimacy of private-owned remain until the mid-1990s. It was until late 1990 private firms were widely encouraged and especially welcomed by the local government.

⁵See [Lardy \(2001\)](#) and [World Trade Organization \(2005\)](#).

- 2005: in this year China took a series of temporary measures to cool down the overheated economy, including tightening the credit supply and restricting industrial land use.⁶

3 Productivity estimation

The sweeping ownership change of China's manufacturing firms during 1998-2007 is hard to ignore. Heavy presence of SOEs in manufacturing is considered as a factor contributing to resource misallocation in existing studies, for example, [Hsieh and Klenow \(2009\)](#). The rapid shrinking of SOEs in the manufacturing sector is supposed to promote the aggregate productivity growth. The main interest of this paper is to quantify the effect of ownership change on productivity and its growth pattern. This complements the study conducted by [Hsieh and Klenow \(2009\)](#) on misallocation.

We first estimate the production function, taking into account the ownership change. With the estimated productivity measures, we decompose the productivity growth so as to single out the contribution of the ownership change. The Olley-Pakes method of estimating production function overcomes two types of biases, namely, the simultaneity bias and the selection bias. The simultaneity bias arises from that labor input choice is a function of predetermined capital stock. The selection bias arises from that the distribution of total factor productivity is truncated due to firm exit. Recent studies extended [Olley and Pakes \(1996\)](#) to improve the estimation, with [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#) as the latest. To overcome the selection bias and simultaneity bias in estimating the production function, we first describe and model the firm's dynamic problem. Then the estimation equations are derived.

We assume that the ownership type change is exogenous. This assumption is necessary and reasonable, based on the fact that changes in ownership types from private-owned to state-owned is rare in our data, while the privatization of SOEs prevails during this period. This process of SOE restructuring owes more to the governmental policy than the firm's choice. Such a ownership change may have direct effects on productivity and on labor costs. In China, SOEs in general bear higher burden of labor costs for two reasons. First, besides wages SOEs generally provide benefits including housing subsidy, health care, and pension benefits. Secondly, the wage setting might be distorted in state-owned firms. For example, wage depends more on tenure than on worker productivity. Switching to non-SOE type of ownership will reduce employment-related costs. Other than including an ownership type indicator in estimation, we do not explicitly model

⁶In China, land is state-owned. Firms heavily rely on land use permission from government.

why the ownership change contributes to productivity growth.

3.1 Firm's Problem

The firm's production function has the Cobb-Douglas form as follows,

$$Y_{it} = e^{\omega_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}} K_{it}^{\alpha_k} L_{it}^{\alpha_l}, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{it} is the value added of firm i in period t , j_{it} is the ownership type, ω_{it} denotes TFP, and ε_{it} is the measure error. Let the firm's value function be $V(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it})$ for ownership type j in period t , where j could be SOE or non-SOE. The physical capital evolves as $K_{it} = (1 - \delta)K_{it-1} + I_{it-1}$. The capital adjustment cost is $C(I_{it})$ for firm i . To apply the original Olley-Pakes approach, adjustment cost is assumed to be convex, which appears inconsistent with the investment lumpiness shown in the data. In implementing the estimation we use the method by [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#).

We assume that the unobserved productivity ω_{it} follows the same Markov process for all types of firms, so it does not have j as a subscript, though the estimated productivity process is still affected by the presence of ownership type. In later sections we estimate the serial correlation and dispersion parameters for the productivity processes for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively.

Let $w(\omega_{it}, j_{it})$ be the compensation function per worker. We assume that the firm-level compensation is determined by three variables: market wage, ownership type, and firm productivity. The continuation value of type j incumbent firms is given by

$$V^c(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it}) = \max_{\{L_{it}, I_{it}\}} Y(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it}, L_{it}) - C(I_{it}) - w(\omega_{it}, j_{it})L_{it} + \frac{1}{1 + r_t} E_t V(\omega_{it+1}, j_{it+1}, K_{it+1}). \quad (2)$$

Let the firm exit value be $V^e(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it})$. The firm's value in period t is then

$$V(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it}) = \max(V^c, V^e).$$

The demand for investment in capital is

$$I_{it} = I(\omega_{it}, j_{it}, K_{it}). \quad (3)$$

Its inverse function

$$\omega_{it} = h(j_{it}, K_{it}, L_{it}) \quad (4)$$

is used to estimate the production function. [Olley and Pakes \(1996\)](#) show the conditions under which the inverse demand function exists. It requires that investment is a monotonic function of productivity. Here the extension to the Olley-Pakes method is the additional state variable, ownership type.

The firm's exit decision rule is given by

$$\chi_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \omega_{it} \geq \bar{\omega}(j_{it}, K_{it}) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

The inverse investment function and the exit rule are the two equations used to overcome the simultaneity and selection problems of estimation.

3.2 Production Function Estimation

The firm's dynamic optimal policy functions guide how ownership type enters the production function estimation. We apply the extended Olley-Pakes type of estimation to correct for the simultaneity bias, but not the selection bias arising from firm exit. Not correcting the selection bias is mainly due to the data limitation. The data sample does not provide information on the true firm exit, because one firm exited from the sample may still exist.⁷ In addition, the exit decision of one SOE may not arise from productivity shock, but rather closely relates to the government policy that leads to the wide-spread SOE privatization⁸.

Half of the observations in our sample have investment rate equal to or lower than 1 percent, suggesting some degree of non-convexity in capital adjustment cost which invalidates the original Olley-Pakes approach. To overcome this problem, we adopt the Levinsohn-Petrin method and the method proposed by [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#) (hereby ACF). We estimate the production function using value added as output for 28 industries. In the following analysis on productivity, the ACF estimation results are used. The difference between LP and ACF is that

⁷Due to the sampling rule of the original data that all the SOEs and "above-scale" non-SOEs are covered, one non-SOE firm that is no longer observed in the sample could be simply falling below the scale. However, the "above-scale" rule is not strictly imposed and we still observe sizable "below-scale" non-SOEs within our sample.

⁸We also estimate the production function after correcting the selection bias. The predicted probability of survival for most industries is close to one.

the latter identifies coefficient for labor in the second step of estimation. It turns out that when labor choice is made to be dynamic, the estimated coefficient for labor in production function is much larger in the ACF method than that in the LP method. Details of estimation are described in Appendix B.

Table 1: Production function estimation

Industry	Labor		Capital		Ownership	
	OLS	ACF	OLS	ACF	OLS	ACF
Average	0.454	0.351	0.423	0.304	-0.942	-0.134
Diary products (13)	0.495	0.330	0.312	0.115	-1.048	-0.098
Food processing (14)	0.533	0.283	0.442	0.233	-1.369	-0.046
Beverage and soft drinks (15)	0.587	0.345	0.463	0.298	-0.964	-0.062
Tobacco (16)	0.465	0.185	0.899	0.326	-0.060	-0.150
Textile (17)	0.467	0.380	0.345	0.230	-0.822	-0.101
Apparel and foot wear (18)	0.568	0.379	0.261	0.218	-0.910	-0.269
Leather products (19)	0.468	0.390	0.329	0.095	-1.166	-0.312
Timber and wood products (20)	0.468	0.294	0.301	0.295	-1.076	-0.286
Furniture (21)	0.590	0.365	0.245	0.322	-1.320	-0.197
Paper (22)	0.428	0.350	0.402	0.348	-0.874	-0.117
Printing and publishing (23)	0.376	0.297	0.603	0.423	-0.841	-0.078
Recreation and sport products (24)	0.512	0.347	0.269	0.289	-0.996	-0.121
Refinery (25)	0.248	0.413	0.621	0.587	-0.496	-0.148
Chemical products (26)	0.335	0.336	0.467	0.339	-0.926	-0.123
Medicine (27)	0.430	0.376	0.550	0.451	-0.793	-0.155
Chemical fibre (28)	0.478	0.298	0.375	0.503	-0.880	-0.089
Rubber (29)	0.435	0.322	0.442	0.272	-0.833	0.006
Plastics (30)	0.419	0.364	0.368	0.395	-1.073	-0.170
Non-metallic mineral products (31)	0.382	0.342	0.384	0.279	-0.791	-0.066
Ferrous metals (32)	0.433	0.400	0.479	0.280	-0.778	-0.160
Metal products (34)	0.398	0.328	0.403	0.300	-0.975	-0.073
General machinery (35)	0.431	0.350	0.433	0.218	-1.027	-0.111
Special machinery (36)	0.488	0.390	0.410	0.188	-1.228	-0.160
Transport equipment (37)	0.555	0.438	0.452	0.340	-1.049	-0.105
Electrical machinery and equipment (39)	0.438	0.362	0.455	0.286	-0.935	-0.124
Communication and electronic equipment (40)	0.484	0.451	0.467	0.382	-1.049	-0.107
Measuring Instruments and office products (41)	0.384	0.361	0.392	0.238	-1.001	-0.095
Artworks (42)	0.427	0.339	0.281	0.269	-1.092	-0.225

Table 1 gives the parameter estimates of the production function for each industry. The average share of labor in production is 0.35, and the average share of capital is 0.30. The share of labor in production is much lower than the similar estimates using the U.S. plant-level data, while the

capital share is higher than that estimated using the U.S. data. This suggests that the production of Chinese firms are more labor intensive relative to that of the U.S. firms. The estimated production function exhibits very different scale to returns across industries, with dairy product industry (industry 13) being the lowest at 0.45 and refinery industry (25) being the largest at 0.99. Finally, a comparison with OLS estimation shows that the ACF estimation effectively corrects the downward bias of the capital share estimate.

SOEs are less productive than other firms, as suggested by the negative coefficient of ownership for SOEs. Except the chemical fiber industry (28), the estimated coefficients of the ownership type dummy for industries are all negative. The average estimate is -0.13, suggesting that SOEs are 13 percent less productive than other firms holding other variables the same across ownership types.

3.3 Is the ownership change endogenous?

In the estimation of production function, we assume that the ownership change from SOE to non-SOE is exogenous, and determined by the government policy. However, government, as the owner of SOE firms, may behave like a private owner and scrape SOE firms with poor productivity performance. In this section, we conduct a simple Logit estimation on the probability of transforming from SOE to non-SOE and on the probability of exit by SOE firms. Table 10 gives the probability of an SOE being transformed to a non-SOE or exit the market, compared to remaining SOE. It shows that the probability of transforming the SOE to non-SOE is larger for more productive SOEs, and that of exiting is larger for less productive firms. This suggests that the privatization of SOEs is strongly driven by policy under which the government privatize the productive SOEs other than productivity itself.

4 Productivity Growth

With the estimated production functions, we obtain the TFP measure for each firm. We assume that the firm's productivity shock follows AR(1) process, $\omega_{it} = \gamma x_t + \rho \omega_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$, where x_t includes a constant and the year dummy. The average (over all industries) of the estimated serial correlation (ρ) is 0.75, and the standard deviation of ω_{it} is 1.30. The productivity shock is fairly persistent with the serial correlation ranging from 0.54 to 0.95, while the dispersion is large.

In this section, we examine the heterogeneity of productivity processes across industries, focusing on the differential between SOEs and other ownership types. The aggregate manufacturing TFP grows by 24 percent from 1998 to 2007. The average annual growth rate is close to 2.7 percent.

Table 2: Productivity differentials between SOEs and non-SOE firms

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
$\frac{\omega_{non-SOE}}{\omega_{SOE}}$	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.03	1.01	0.99	0.98	0.96	0.96	0.95
$\frac{ALP_{non-SOE}}{ALP_{SOE}}$	1.18	1.16	1.16	1.11	1.06	1.04	1.01	0.98	0.97	0.96

The estimated TFP ω_{it} differs significantly between SOEs and other firms, as shown in Table 2. The table shows the ratio of weighted average TFP values for SOEs and non-SOEs. Non-SOE firms are 6 percent more productive than SOEs between 1998 and 2000, and this positive gap narrows since then. By 2007, SOEs become more productive than other firms by 5 percent. This may reflect that the low productive SOEs either exited or were privatized between 1998 and 2007, as shown in Figure 14 and 18. The shrunken productivity gap between SOEs and other types are due to the faster productivity growth by SOEs during these years, on average catching up the non-SOEs, especially private ones. Figure 7 shows the TFP growth for SOEs and non-SOEs, normalized by the average SOEs TFP. It should be noted that when calculating TFP for firms, we have already removed the negative contribution of SOE-type presented in the production function. The aggregate TFP changes with ownership even ownership type is already in production function. This is mainly because the estimated coefficient for the ownership dummy variable captures only the average partial difference between the two ownership type. Moreover, differences in the trend of productivity by ownership is only captured in the estimated TFP.

The similar trend is observed when we use average labor productivity (ALP) to measure productivity as shown in Figure 15. Moreover, the gap in ALP growth is even larger, as seen in Figure 8. The plotted labor productivity values are already normalized by the average labor productivity of SOEs. In 1998, non-SOE firms are 18 percent more productive than SOEs, by 2007 the SOEs are 4 percent more productive than non-SOE firms.

The differential productivity growth is attributable to mainly the deepening reform on SOEs including employee lay-offs (Yearbook (2006)) and capital restructuring (Jefferson et al. (1999)). This change is also closely related to government policies which are to be in details discussed in later sections. The ownership change between SOE and other types plays a negative but minor role in the aggregate productivity growth.

Figure 14 shows the differences of TFP distribution between the SOEs and other firms, as well as over time. It is clear from the plots that the TFP of SOEs tends to converge to that of non-SOEs. The difference between the two ownership types becomes smaller in 2007, while the SOEs are still

less productive and with fatter left tails.

4.1 Why Do SOEs outgrow non-SOEs?

The firm-level TFP summarizes all factors other than capital and employment in affecting production capacity of the firms. In this section, in addition to size, we examine three possible factors that can benefit the state-owned sector: competition, sales tax, and firm borrowing. These factors may arise from preferential policies toward the state-owned sector, such as market power, government subsidies, financing condition, etc.

Industry concentration

One hypothesis is that the market power of the state-owned firms may grow faster in TFP because of growing market power (See [Sutton \(1998\)](#) and [Klepper and Graddy \(1990\)](#)). We measure the market power with the industry concentration, that is, the Herfindahl index. The market power is calculated by summing up the squared market shares of top 10 percent firms. To measure the industry concentration due to the state-owned firms, we calculate the SOE Herfindahl index, measured as the sum of squared market shares of the state-owned firms among the top 10 percent firms. [Figure 9](#) shows that on average the industry concentration in manufacturing decreases over time. The declining share of SOE firms in total sales is consistent with the shrinking number of state-owned firms and their falling role in the manufacturing sector.

Tax

Another potential candidate is tax, though its impact could be complicated. On the one hand, to promote the fast growth of SOEs, the government may subsidize these firms to make them more competitive. Meanwhile, as the fundamental form of China's economy, the SOEs have historically carried large share of government expenditures via corporate income tax ([Wong and Shue \(2007\)](#)). [Figure 11](#) shows the tax per unit of firm income keeps increasing for the state-owned firms, which may negatively contribute to productivity growth. Thus the impact of tax depends on which side of effect dominates. The average tax ratios of both state-owned firms and other firms. Clearly, the non-SOEs have been paying much higher tax than SOEs. On average, between 1999-2007, the state-owned firms paid 25 percent less tax than the private firms per unit of sales (income). This gap narrowed only in 2007. The impact of such tax advantage on productivity growth of SOEs

could be huge. If tax is taken into account, the state-owned firms would even be less productive than the private firms.

Debt

In China, the biggest eleven banks are all state-owned and their state-owned shares of assets are as high as 95.5 percent. These state-owned banks dominate the credit market. In 1999, the big-four state-owned banks⁹ accounted for over 77 percent of loans. By 2007, the 99 percent of mid-cap and small-cap non-SOEs took no more than 33 percent of bank loans. The state-owned firms have advantage in getting financed¹⁰. This potential credit misallocation strongly relates to government policy. It can be distortionary in that compared to SOEs, the private firms are in general smaller, and those small and median entrepreneurial firms are more likely to be credit constrained. Figure 12 shows two interesting things. First, the ratio of debt over asset for private firms is on average only half of that for state-owned firms, with slightly narrower gap in recent years. Secondly, the debt-asset ratio has been declining for both types of ownership. However, the lower debt-asset ratio for private firms does not suggest that the growth rate of productivity for private firms is lower than state-owned firms. Entry of private firms is significant and it's an important component of industry growth. The lower debt-asset ratio is more likely to be outcomes of limited access to credit. Such credit constraint¹¹ on small- and mid-cap private firms suggests that the government credit policy may hinder productivity growth of private firms.

Our estimation shows that state-owned firms are on average less productive than those non-SOE firms, though state-owned firms grow faster. The factors that may affect this outcome, however, remains unclear. To shed light on this, we conduct a regression of one firm's TFP growth on its firm size, industry concentration–Herfindahl index, indebtedness, and tax payment. Table 3 shows the regression results. It is a reduced-form regression, thus the causality effect will not be discussed.

First, we use employment to measure the firm size. The coefficients of firm size is negative at -.008 for non-SOEs, and positive at .03 for SOEs. That means, among non-SOEs, the larger

⁹They refer to bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).

¹⁰Historically, SOEs have been contributing to majority of government tax revenue; meanwhile, state-owned banks used to subsidize SOEs heavily via the administrative methods. After economic reform in 1978, these administrative methods were gradually replaced by bank loans, which from many aspects inherit the similar tasks. The state-owned firms could obtain bank loans for some reasons, not necessarily because they are more productive.

¹¹Until 2007, private firms are not allowed to issue corporate bonds to raise capital and finance their growth. This combined with the poorly-developed stock market in China makes financial options narrow to bank loans and internal finance, though underground financing is getting common for many small and median private entrepreneurial firms (see Qi (1991)).

Table 3: Factors Affecting TFP growth

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.
SOE	-0.311	0.0142
Employment	-0.008	0.0011
Employment*SOE	0.038	0.0023
Herfindahl Index	-9.045	0.5324
SOE Herfindahl Index	4.500	0.8077
Tax/Sales	1.012	0.1059
Debt/Asset	-0.052	0.0079
Tax/Sales*SOE	-0.175	0.3240*
Debt/Asset*SOE	0.019	0.0176*

Note: Coefficients that are starred are statistically insignificant.

firms have slightly lower productivity growth. For SOEs, the productivity growth increases with employment size.

Secondly, we look at the impact of competition. The coefficient for industry concentration index is negative at -9.045. The negative index suggests that, the more decentralized the industry is, the higher productivity growth is. The coefficient for SOE industry concentration is positive at 4.5, suggesting that if the state-owned firms have more market shares among the top 20 percent firms, the corresponding productivity growth is higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that state-owned firms enjoy market power while they dominate the market.

Third, tax sales ratio may reflect potential differences of effective tax rates by ownership. The regression shows that firms that pay higher income tax per unit of sales have larger productivity growth than those with lower tax sales ratio. However, the state-owned firms paying higher tax per unit of sales grow even faster, though statistically insignificant. As we mentioned earlier, the impact of debt and tax on productivity growth may be causal. Due to the causality effect that SOEs on average have lower tax ratio than non-SOEs, this result only shows the cross term of SOE and tax ratio does not contribute in explaining the growth gap between SOEs and non-SOEs.

Fourth, for non-SOE firms, productivity growth is negatively correlated with the debt-asset ratio. A higher debt-asset ratio indicates slower growth. For SOEs a higher debt-asset ratio, however, indicates faster productivity growth. Given the available information, it remains unclear whether and via what channel debt-asset ratio affects the productivity growth. Without further and more structural analysis, it is difficult to speculate the underlining correlation between credit market and productivity growth.

In summary, faster productivity growth of SOEs relative to that of non-SOEs is positively correlated with size and industry concentration. Firms with higher indebtedness tend to grow slower, and this observation remains for both SOEs and non-SOEs.

5 Decomposing productivity growth

With the estimated productivity, we now decompose productivity growth into components accounting for contributions from within the firm, between the firm, and reallocation terms (entry/exit and ownership change). In order to examine to what extent the privatization of SOE firms has contributed to the productivity growth, we also decompose the productivity growth by the ownership type.

Two important methods of decomposition are the one in [Baily, Hulten and Campbell \(1992\)](#) and its extension in [Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan \(2002\)](#). Given our interest of quantifying the contribution from ownership changes, we extend the method by [Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan \(2002\)](#) to allow for ownership changes. Let P_t be the TFP or labor productivity measure of the entire manufacturing in period t , and p_{jt} be the productivity of firm j . The aggregated industry productivity is $P_t = \sum_j s_{jt}p_{jt}$, where s_{jt} is the share of employment of firm j . Let $\Delta p_{jt} = p_{jt} - p_{jt-1}$, let C_t^1 be firms that did not change ownership between period $t - 1$ and t , C_t^2 be firms that did change ownership. Also let EN_t be the entrants in period t and EX_t be the firms exited in period $t - 1$. The aggregate industry-level productivity is decomposed into three components: within ownership, ownership change, and entry/exit, as follows,¹²

$$\Delta P_t = \sum_{j \in C_t^1} (s_{jt}p_{jt} - s_{jt-1}p_{jt-1}) + \sum_{j \in C_t^2} (s_{jt}p_{jt} - s_{jt-1}p_{jt-1}) + \sum_{j \in EN_t} s_{jt}p_{jt} - \sum_{j \in EX_t} s_{jt-1}p_{jt-1}. \quad (6)$$

The first term is the productivity growth accounted by firms that did not experience ownership changes. The second term captures the contribution through ownership change. The last two terms are respectively entry and exit. Within each component, we separate the contribution by SOEs from that by non-SOEs. Table 4 shows the decomposition for TFP.¹³

The contribution from the SOE transforming to the non-SOE type contributed negatively to the total productivity growth. This is counter-intuitive, since the SOEs on average are less productive

¹²Lentz and Mortensen (2008) also decompose productivity growth by firm types. They take into account the role of innovative firms in aggregate productivity growth, but in their data there is no switch of firm types.

¹³To remind, Chinese government cooled down the economy with tightening policies in 2005, we observe that the productivity growth is negative in 2005.

than non-SOEs, the transformation is expected to improve performance and promote productivity. However, we find that the private firms transformed from previous SOEs have lower productivity growth than the firms born as private.

The other contribution of SOE transformation is through the exit. The last two columns of Table 4 show that the exiting SOEs are in general less productive than exited non-SOEs, suggesting that the SOE exiting helps improve the aggregate productivity.

Lastly, the net entry dominates all other components in the aggregate productivity growth, which confirms the findings by Brandt et al. (2009). The industry productivity is mainly driven by the entry of non-SOE firms and exit of SOE firms.

We further decompose the TFP growth for C_t^1 firms into the within, between and cross terms, as in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002) and given by

$$\Delta P_{t,C_t^1} = \sum_j s_{jt-1} \Delta p_{jt} + \sum_j p_{jt-1} \Delta s_{jt} + \sum_j \Delta s_{jt} \Delta p_{jt}. \quad (7)$$

Table 5 shows decomposition. For non-SOE firms both the firm growth and the reallocation between non-SOE firms are driving the productivity growth, but for SOEs the firm growth dominates. Similar to the previous studies using the U.S. data, we also find that the cross-firm effect of growth is small, relative to within effect and reallocation.

The decomposition of ALP displays a similar picture as delivered by the TFP decomposition, see Table 11. The main sources of labor productivity growth come from the growth of non-SOE firms, the entry of non-SOE firms, and the exit of SOEs. The net contribution of SOEs to labor productivity, through within effect, transforming, entry and exit, is negative. The decomposition within an ownership is shown in Table 12, which exhibits very similar results as the TFP case.

In summary, the growth of productivity at the industry level arises mostly from the expansion of non-SOEs and the exiting of SOE firms. Transforming an SOE firm to non-SOE firm without changing the firm production does not increase the productivity.

5.1 Negative Growth in Productivity of SOE transformation

In our decomposition, a counter-intuitive but interesting observation is that, the transformation from SOEs to non-SOEs contributes negatively to productivity growth in China. In order to further understand the role of ownership type transformation, Table 6 shows the average growth of both TFP and ALP for SOEs before and after their transformation to non-SOEs. After becoming non-

Table 4: Manufacturing TFP Growth Decomposition, 1998-2007

Year	Total Growth	Within ownership		Cross ownership		Entry		Exit	
		Non-SOEs	SOEs	SOE→Non-SOE	Non-SOE→SOE	SOE	Non-SOE	SOE	Non-SOE
1999	-0.019	-0.081	-0.198	-0.009	0.004	0.059	0.176	0.000	0.000
2000	0.094	0.164	0.053	-0.006	0.002	0.026	0.163	0.066	0.104
2001	0.150	0.013	-0.144	-0.018	-0.002	0.037	0.310	0.064	0.137
2002	0.146	0.107	-0.081	-0.009	0.001	0.021	0.249	0.046	0.112
2003	0.152	0.066	-0.079	-0.011	0.000	0.022	0.324	0.045	0.112
2004	0.213	0.692	0.058	0.009	0.006	0.025	0.648	0.072	0.240
2005	-0.026	-0.920	-0.219	-0.028	-0.012	0.019	0.303	0.023	0.088
2006	0.124	-0.030	-0.034	-0.009	0.000	0.011	0.267	0.021	0.106
2007	0.194	0.499	0.037	0.005	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.015	0.117

Table 5: TFP growth decomposition within ownership type, 1998-2007

Year	Non-SOEs			SOEs		
	Within	Between	Cross	Within	Between	Cross
1999	-0.011	-0.060	-0.010	-0.013	-0.180	-0.005
2000	0.034	0.142	-0.011	0.024	0.037	-0.008
2001	0.023	0.005	-0.015	0.022	-0.153	-0.013
2002	0.056	0.056	-0.005	0.029	-0.105	-0.005
2003	0.077	-0.006	-0.005	0.022	-0.097	-0.004
2004	0.116	0.577	-0.001	0.021	0.040	-0.003
2005	0.037	-0.932	-0.024	0.007	-0.222	-0.004
2006	0.112	-0.133	-0.008	0.007	-0.040	-0.001
2007	0.127	0.371	0.002	0.011	0.026	0.000

SOE, both TFP and ALP growth became slower.

On the one hand, it may be because the process of ownership change takes time to affect growth or it may disturb the production. On the other hand, in the process of privatization SOEs may survive either because they are highly productive or because the government prefers to maintain their market power in certain industries; the transformed SOEs could be simply poor-performed ones. This is consistent with the observation shown in Table 6 that the transformed SOEs had slower TFP growth than the industry average for all the SOEs before ownership change occurred, and not surprisingly, after transformation their TFP growth was slower than the average non-SOEs.

We find that those transformed firms are large in employment size. They are 6 percent larger than the average SOEs, with the ratio (in employment) being 1.06. After ownership change, these firms downsize by 78 percent in employment, though their employment is still twice the size of an average non-SOE firm. Apparently, employment downsizing did not make these firms grow faster. In addition, the firm's debt burden can potentially cause slower growth through financial constraint. We find that before the ownership change, the debt-asset ratio for transformed SOEs is only slightly lower than the average SOEs, while transformed SOEs are much less productive than industry average for SOEs. After the ownership change, their debt-asset ratio declines slightly but stays high, roughly twice the size of the average non-SOEs. It remains to be investigated on why the transformed SOE firms experience slower productivity growth, which is beyond this paper.

Table 6: Productivity growth before and after SOE becoming non-SOE

Year	TFP		ALP	
	Before	After	Before	After
1999	0.047	0.075	0.289	0.003
2000	0.060	-0.002	0.018	0.010
2001	0.017	-0.008	0.027	0.000
2002	0.020	0.000	-0.006	0.035
2003	0.023	-0.008	0.186	0.047
2004	0.015	0.031	0.079	0.052
2005	0.000	-0.009	0.001	-0.006
2006	0.004	0.012	0.006	0.002
2007	-	0.024	-	0.044
Average	0.023	0.013	0.075	0.021
Industry Average	SOE	non-SOE	SOE	non-SOE
	0.034	0.020	0.060	0.036

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have estimated the productivity of China’s manufacturing firms and decomposed its growth in 1998-2007. We find that SOEs on average exhibit a lower level of productivity but higher productivity growth, relative to other ownership types. The exit of SOEs is one of the main sources of productivity growth at the industry level. Finally, the non-SOE firms transformed directly from the state-owned type have a small and negative contribution to the industry productivity growth.

Our findings contribute to the understanding of the role of reallocation in aggregate productivity. The ownership of SOE represents the unique feature of industry structure in emerging economies as China. Our findings shed lights on the consequences of more general government policies towards a particular group of firms through protection or preferential credit policy.

So far, our approach to quantifying the role of reallocation (more specifically ownership transformation) in the aggregate productivity growth is still reduced form. We did not identify the sources of misallocation and their quantitative importance. Further research is needed to quantify with more structural methods how the ownership transformation improved productivity. One such exploration could be to look into the labor adjustment in transition. [Cooper et al. \(2010\)](#) have demonstrated that labor reallocation and labor market frictions are important in better understanding the aggregate productivity growth.

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A Firm data

The firm data sample we use comes from the annual survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, covering all industrial firms during the period 1998-2007 that are identified either as SOEs or non-SOEs with annual sales value above 5 million RMB. Industries in the original data include mining, manufacturing and public utilities. This paper focuses on only the manufacturing sector. According to the 2004 national industry survey, though covering only 21.5 percent of all firms, firms in our sample account for over 70 percent employment, 89.97 percent sales value, 89.83 percent output, 87.14 percent capital and 97.74 percent export in China’s manufacturing sector.

Over this period sizable firms experienced restructuring, merger and acquisition, and may change their identity numbers due to the change of ownership. We use information, such as firm name, address, telephone number, fax number, and zip code, to track a firm over time. We keep as many observations as possible, but exclude firms with broken history. During this period, China’s manufacturing sector experienced a large volume of entry and exit. Our final sample is an unbalanced firm-level panel between 1998 and 2007 with over 100,000 firms in each year. Table 7 lists variable in the data.

Table 7: Available Variables on Firm Heterogeneity

Variable	Definition
Output	real output of any manufacturing firm within the sample
Industrial value-added	real value added
Total employment	log(number of employees in a firm)
Wage	log (total compensation/(number of employees))
Capital stock	log of physical capital
Investment	investment in physical capital
Credit constraints	the ratio of a firm’s interest expenditures that is used as a proxy for its capability to borrow over its total debts
Tax	the ratio of the firm’s income tax over its annual sales
Ownership Type:	
State-owned	if registration type is claimed to be state-owned, or be limited liability corporations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the registered assets being state-owned ¹⁴ 15
Collective	if registration type is claimed to be collective, or be limited liability corporations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the registered assets being from the collective source
Private	if registration type is claimed to be private, or be limited liability corporations or shareholding corporations with over 50% of the registered assets being private-owned
HMT	if registration type is claimed to be Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan
Foreign	if registration type is claimed to be other than Mainland China, Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan

A.1 Summary Statistics

Industry classification

The industry classification of a firm follows a 4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) system that resembles the old U.S. SIC system. Our sample covers 29 manufacturing industries (by taking first two digits of 4-digit CIC code), including food processing, textile, refinery, plastics, electronic equipment and so on. Further details on industries is available in Table 1. The setting of the classification system in the original data was revised in 2003 to incorporate more detail for some sectors, while some other sectors were merged. To make the industry code consistent over the period, we constructed a unified set of classification as did in Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2009).

Real output and industrial value added

We use China's Producer Price Index (PPI) at the CIC 2-digit level as the deflator to convert data from nominal to real terms. Not surprisingly, shown in Figure 6, the aggregate real output increased from 4,460 billion RMB in 1998 to 25,200 billion in 2007. And industrial value-added increased from 1,210 billion RMB in 1998 to 6,640 in 2007. Both measures rose over fivefold over the past decade. Though increase in prices could reflect increases in quality, the magnitude of increases is sizable.

Ownership type

A firm claims its registration type annually. Using such information we classify the ownership of one firm into five basic groups: state-owned (SOEs), collectively-owned, private-owned, HMT (from Hong-Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) and foreign (from the rest of the world except mainland China and HMT). Meanwhile, additional information on the composition of a firm's registered capital is used to classify those firms that claim themselves as limited liability companies and shareholding corporations¹⁶ to be state-owned, collective or private. In particular, one firm is termed as SOE if its registration type is claimed to be state-owned, or to be limited liability companies or shareholding corporations but with over 50 percent of its registered assets being owned by the state. Ownership change hereafter refers to the change in ownership type.

Capital

We follow Brandt et al (2009) and use the perpetual method to obtain the real value of capital

¹⁶Mostly such firms are reconstructed from previous state-owned enterprises or collective firms. The changes in ownership type occur by means of management buy-out (MBO), previous management raising capital to form a new firm, shareholdings by previous employees, external finance such as getting public and/or private equity, and reporting bankrupt and turning private.

stock.

Figure 16 and 17 show the smoothed firm size distribution measured using both employment and capital, respectively. Relative to 1998, the firm size distribution shifted leftward, suggesting smaller average size due to the substantial entry during this period. The distribution of SOEs apparently displays larger dispersion and smaller skewness than that of non-SOEs.

Capital investment exhibits significant lumpiness with at least half of the firms investment as low as 1 percent of capital, while the investment rate among the top 10 percentile of firms is as high as 40 percent. The coexistence of extremely low and extremely high investment rates has not changed during this period. On average, the investment rates of SOE firms are lower than Non-SOEs.

Table 8: Investment in 1999 and 2006

	1999			2006		
	All	SOE	non-SOE	All	SOE	Non-SOE
Mean	13.1%	8.2%	14.8%	16.5%	9.7%	16.7%
Median	1.6%	1.0%	2.2%	2.2%	1.0%	2.4%

Employment and real wage

A firm reports its total annual employment and several components of employee compensation including total annual wages, total employee supplementary benefits, and total unemployment insurance¹⁷. Total wage here is termed as the sum of the above three classifications of compensations. The real term of firm-level average wage is calculated by dividing total deflated wage of one firm over its total number of employees within. Note that since our sample covers all the SOEs and those "above-scale" non-SOEs for the manufacturing sector, the deflator we use not only deflates across time but approximates the representative wage at the aggregate level¹⁸. As shown in Figure 6, employment of manufacturing sector keeps on rising, from less than 35 million workers in 1998 to over 46 million in 2004. This increase in manufacturing employment is mostly due to the rise of non-SOEs, both numerically and proportionally, as well as their increasing demand for labor force. We will further discuss this issues on section of change in ownership type. After 2004, the rising trend flats out and the total employment fell but remains over 20 million, which is also closely

¹⁷Most SOEs may further provide information on their expenditures/payment on employees' total housing subsidy, medical care and pension plan.

¹⁸From NBS website we obtain the average wage payment within the whole economy and this sampling deflator is calculated by dividing the average annual aggregate wage compensation in our sample over that in the whole economy.

related to the growing pace of non-SOEs.

Productivity

Besides labor productivity, we also measure productivity in total factor productivity (TFP), which is derived from four-digit industry-specific production function. During 1998-2007, China's manufacturing industries experienced rapid growth both in output and total factor productivity. If gross output production function is estimated, the average TFP growth in manufacturing sector is 2.6 percent. As is shown in Section 3, TFP is obtained by estimating the firm's production function, but we explicitly include the ownership type, and in particular, consider the privatization of SOEs.

Table 9: Summary Statistics

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
No. of firms	87,145	99,345	112,212	121,906	129,750	146,008	186,457	213,721	205,255	191,633
Firm Age	14.44	14.41	14.09	12.41	11.67	10.55	8.40	8.24	9.00	9.72
Capital Stock	2.57	3.53	3.90	4.13	4.19	4.55	5.15	6.10	6.45	6.79
Investment	981	439	462	464	571	701	1,040	1,122	1,190	691
Value Added	1.21	1.44	1.71	1.97	2.37	3.03	4.28	4.92	5.78	6.64
Output	4.46	5.24	6.34	7.33	8.67	11.3	11.5	18.5	21.8	25.2
Employment	34.5	36.1	37.2	37.6	38.5	41.7	46.1	52.6	52.3	51.7
No. of SOE	24,091	25,728	25,285	21,119	17,514	14,213	11,293	9,816	8,272	6,125
Percentage SOE	0.28	0.26	0.23	0.17	0.13	0.10	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03
SOE Surv. Rat.		0.95	0.92	0.90	0.91	0.87	0.81	0.88	0.85	0.87
ALP (labor productivity)	3.15	3.26	3.41	3.46	3.60	3.74	4.15	3.98	4.18	4.33

Note: Employment is in the unit of million, capital stock, value-added and output are thousand billion renminbi (RMB), and investment is billion RMB.

B Production function estimation

Let the production function of firm i with ownership j be

$$Y_{it} = e^{\omega_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}} K_{it}^{\alpha_k} L_{it}^{\alpha_l}, \quad (8)$$

where Y_{it} is the value added of firm i in period t , j_{it} is the ownership type, and ε_{it} is the measure error. The ownership type affects the firm's total factor productivity. Potentially, the ownership change may improve the efficiency of capital and labor, but it is difficult to identify this efficiency if we assume that the capital, labor and intermediate input shares in production is the same across different ownership types. Moreover, ownership can affect productivity that arises from competition. For example, the state-owned firms may be able to dominate a particular market designated by the government, switching to non-SOE ownership can lose such a market power.

We start with the well-known estimation procedures of [Olley and Pakes \(1996\)](#) and [Levinsohn and Petrin \(2003\)](#). Then we also discuss [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#).¹⁹

In natural logarithm form, the firm's production function can be written as

$$y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_l l_{it} + \alpha_k k_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + \omega_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (9)$$

Notice that ownership is now an input factor. The state variables in period t is capital stock k_{it} , ownership j_{it} , and productivity shock ω_{it} . Firm's ownership type j_{it} in period t is given, hence behaving as a state variable like the capital. Though the labor choice is partly determined by ownership, it is a static choice, hence labor is not a state variable.

Following [Olley and Pakes \(1996\)](#), the estimation can be done in three steps. In step one, inverse the investment demand function and estimate α_l with nonparametric function. In step two, we estimate α_k and α_j .

In the first step, we inverse the investment policy function, and plug the inverse function into production function as follows

$$y_{it} = \alpha_l l_{it} + \phi(j_{it}, i_{it}, k_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (10)$$

where $\phi(j_{it}, i_{it}, k_{it}) = h(j_{it}, i_{it}, k_{it}) + \alpha_0 + \alpha_k k_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it}$, ϕ_t is a high-order polynomial in j_{it} , k_{it} and

¹⁹ See [Doraszelski and Jaumandreu \(2008\)](#) for endogenous productivity arising from R & D, and [Amiti and Konings \(2007\)](#) for applications to trade liberalization. See ? for adjustment cost and production estimation.

i_{it} .

The second step is to estimate α_k and α_j from the following

$$y_{it} - \alpha_l l_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_k k_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + \omega_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (11)$$

where α_l and ω_{it} are estimated in the first step. Note, in obtaining the estimated ω_{it} , its Markovian property is needed, so that we can write

$$\omega_{it} = g(\omega_{it-1}) + \xi_{it}$$

with $\omega_{it-1} = \phi_{it-1} - \alpha_0 - \alpha_k k_{it-1} - \alpha_j j_{it-1}$.

The second step estimation equation becomes

$$y_{it} - \alpha_l l_{it} = \alpha_k k_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + g(\omega_{it-1}) + \xi_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (12)$$

We can estimate this equation with NLLS, using a high-order polynomial of $\phi_{it-1}, k_{it-1}, j_{it-1}$ for function $g(\cdot)$.

As [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#) noted, the step one and step two can be estimated in one step with GMM. However, the firm exit decision is correlated with ξ_{it} in the step two equation. This is the selection bias, which needs to be corrected. Olley and Pakes use a probit model to estimate the conditional continuing probability P_{it} where the independent variables are 4th order polynomial in $j_{it-1}, i_{it-1}, k_{it-1}$. Then the step two estimation equation is given by

$$y_{it} - \alpha_l l_{it} = \alpha_k k_{it} + \alpha_j j_{it} + \tilde{g}(\phi_{it-1} - \alpha_0 - \alpha_k k_{it-1} - \alpha_j j_{it-1}, P_{it}) + \nu_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (13)$$

In this equation, we use the estimated \widehat{P}_{it} , $\widehat{\phi}_{it}$, and $\widehat{\alpha}_{it}$ are obtained from step one. The above equation can be estimated with NLLS, by using a polynomial to approximate $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$.

[Levinsohn and Petrin \(2003\)](#) extends Olley-Pakes method by using intermediate inputs for a proxy for the choice variable that is monotonic in unobserved productivity shocks.

[Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#) further assume that labor choice can be a dynamic decision. Hence, step one does not identify α_l . All parameters are identified in step two and step three.

C Additional tables

Table 10: Probability of SOE being transformed to non-SOE or exit (Logit)

VARIABLES	(1) SOE to non-SOE	(2) SOE exit
ω_{it-1}	.198*** (.034)	-.428*** (.020)
ω_{it-2}	-.065 (.040)	.060** .028
ω_{it-3}	.005 (.034)	.179*** (.025)
l_{it-1}	.165*** (.058)	-.441*** (.036)
l_{it-2}	-.024 (.065)	.155*** (.047)
l_{it-3}	-.058 (.055)	.027 (.043)
k_{it-1}	.305*** (.075)	-.480*** (.091)
k_{it-2}	-.128 (.095)	.121 (.112)
k_{it-3}	-.107 (.057)	.265*** (.062)
Constant	-4.381*** (.139)	.348*** (.096)
Observations	15,369	32,656

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth Decomposition, 1998-2007

Year	Total Growth	Within ownership		Cross ownership		Entry		Exit	
		Non-SOEs	SOEs	SOE→Non-SOE	Non-SOE→SOE	SOE	Non-SOE	SOE	Non-SOE
1999	0.110	-0.026	-0.081	-0.003	0.003	0.052	0.165	0.000	0.000
2000	0.125	0.087	0.016	-0.004	0.002	0.031	0.158	0.062	0.103
2001	0.193	0.094	-0.041	-0.005	-0.001	0.043	0.298	0.067	0.129
2002	0.152	0.083	-0.043	-0.003	0.000	0.024	0.242	0.046	0.105
2003	0.179	0.064	-0.050	-0.005	-0.001	0.021	0.321	0.050	0.121
2004	0.237	0.565	0.056	0.013	0.005	0.001	0.011	0.108	0.306
2005	0.010	-0.752	-0.164	-0.020	-0.011	0.052	0.927	0.007	0.016
2006	0.150	-0.005	-0.024	-0.005	-0.001	0.012	0.271	0.021	0.078
2007	0.238	0.493	0.037	0.005	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.021	0.280

Table 12: Labor productivity growth decomposition within ownership, 1998-2007

Year	Non-SOEs			SOEs		
	Within	Between	Cross	Within	Between	Cross
1999	0.076	-0.034	-0.068	0.062	-0.107	-0.036
2000	0.071	0.077	-0.062	0.047	0.001	-0.031
2001	0.061	0.114	-0.082	0.061	-0.060	-0.042
2002	0.090	0.063	-0.070	0.042	-0.071	-0.014
2003	0.110	0.013	-0.059	0.031	-0.072	-0.010
2004	0.160	0.483	-0.078	0.036	0.031	-0.011
2005	0.058	-0.739	-0.071	0.012	-0.164	-0.011
2006	0.155	-0.094	-0.066	0.010	-0.029	-0.005
2007	0.179	0.348	-0.034	0.016	0.022	-0.002

D Figures




Figure 1: Ownership changes in China: from 2000 to 2007. In order from left to right for each year, ownership type of the bars is SOEs, private-owned, limited liability, HMT & foreign (including foreign firms and firms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan), collectively-owned, and shareholding corporations.




Figure 2: Number of firms, SOEs and firm age: 1998 to 2007.




Figure 3: Number and percentage of SOEs: 1998 to 2007.




Figure 4: Number of SOEs and their survival rate: 1998 to 2007.




Figure 5: Aggregate Capital and Investment in Chinese Manufacturing: 1998 to 2007.




Figure 6: Aggregate Output and Employment in Chinese Manufacturing: 1998 to 2007.




Figure 7: TFP 1998-2007.




Figure 8: Labor Productivity 1998-2007.




Figure 9: Average industry concentration 1999-2007.




Figure 10: Average industry concentration 1999-2007.




Figure 11: Average tax sales ratio.




Figure 12: Average debt-asset ratio.




Figure 13: Average interest expenditure asset ratio.




Figure 14: TFP distribution




Figure 15: Labor productivity distribution



Figure 16: Firm size distribution: employee




Figure 17: Firm size distribution: capital




Figure 18: TFP distribution: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs




Figure 19: Labor productivity distribution: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs




Figure 20: Firm size distribution: employee: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs




Figure 21: Firm size distribution: capital: All SOEs vs. Survived SOEs




Figure 22: SOE: before & after privatization