Fanti, Luciano and Gori, Luca (2011): Stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rationality.
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Abstract
The present study analyses the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rational players. We find that when firms’ owners hire a manager and delegate the output decisions to him, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is more likely to be destabilised (through a flip bifurcation) than when firms maximise profits. Moreover, highly periodicity and deterministic chaos can also occur as the managers’ bonus increases.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rationality |
English Title: | Stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rationality |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Bifurcation; Chaos; Cournot; Duopoly; Managerial incentive contracts |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium |
Item ID: | 33828 |
Depositing User: | Luca Gori |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2011 02:54 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 19:53 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/33828 |