Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe

Halkos, G.E. (1994): Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe.

Abstract

Acid rain causes greater environmental damage than would occur if countries act cooperatively. Based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions, the potential gains from cooperation are calculated for Europe. Various cooperative abatement rates are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements. The distinction is made between primary and secondary abatement, and their respective roles are discussed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Environmental Management; abatement; acid rain; cooperation
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs ; Distributional Effects ; Employment Effects; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O52 - Europe; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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