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Abstract

In this paper we propose a theoretical model where formal and informal sectors co-exist in tandem. Trade union segregates some labor from being formal. Capital is not allowed to freely move between formal and informal sectors. Using this sort of framework it has been shown that immigration of unskilled workers reduces the return to informal labor and makes the informal good relatively cheaper. A tariff slash also impinges on similar kind of results. In both the cases informal capitalists gain. Moreover, what is more striking is that both migration and tariff reform are equally bad for the economy as a whole since these policies enhance the ‘unproductive’ element or labor in the society which is really costly as these laborers could have been used to produce some more consumable commodities.

Key words: International Trade; Corruption/Extortion; Informal sector; Migration; General Equilibrium.

JEL classification: F11; D73; O17; R23; D5.
1. Introduction

Irrespective of the type of countries, be it developing or developed, the existence of informal sector is an undeniable fact of real world. Informal sector mainly consists of non-agricultural sector or any sector which is not registered and not legal, per se. In fact more than 50% of South Asia, 30-50% in South East Asia, almost 50% in Africa, 55% in Latin America and Caribbean, 24% in Southern Europe, 10% in Western Europe, 18% in Canada and 8% in USA employment come under the informal purview ([7]; [8]; [9]). Here we define informal sector by the non-existence of trade union implying a perfectly competitive labor market for unskilled informal workers. Since informal sector is unlawful, it is beset with intermediation related extortion\(^1\). At this point extortion is defined by the set activities of a group of people who intermediate with local governmental authority for the survival of informal units. In return of this intermediation extortionists get a wage equivalent to the wage of informal workers. Hence informal production and extortion are complementary with each other in a sense.

Another important facet of factual world is migration. It could be immigration of unskilled workers or emigration of skilled workers. The reasons might be a search for better job opportunity (pull factor) or relatively poverty-stricken native land (push factor). Coupled with these issues trade protectionist policies are gradually taking the backseat. Continuing demolition of tariff has become the prime agendum of all economies across the globe. Therefore, in this paper we will try to look at the possible effects of all these policies in a trade theoretic framework described in the next section. We primarily focus on three things: informal wage, price of the informal good and extortion activity due to immigration and tariff reform. Several papers have been written in this line ([2]; [3]; [5]; [12]; [13]; [15]; [16]). In a recent volume authors [6] emphasized on different facets of informal sector and dealt with varied intricate issues. But none of the papers in the existing literature has attempted to focus on the effects of migration on informal wage, informal price etc.

The next section describes the model and provides with the solution. Section 3 analyses the effects of migration and reform. Section 4 points to some possible extensions which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.

2. The Basic Model and Solutions

Here we have a small open economy producing three goods: X, Y and Z. Out of these three goods X (exportable) and Y (importable) are traded but Z is a non-traded one. Hence Px and Py are determined in the international market whereas Pz is determined by the standard Cobb-Douglas demand function. X and Y use skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L) respectively as specific factors but they share a common capital (K). Note that Y is protected by a tariff and L is

\(^1\) Interested readers may look into [1], [14], [19], [20] etc. for further understanding of extortion and informal activities.
unionized there. Thus L gets $\bar{W}$ as wage in Y. Therefore X and Y constitute the formal segment of the economy. However, Y is not capable of absorbing all unskilled workers. Hence some “unlucky” labors have to search for an alternative option and they find it in the informal sector (Z) where wage rate is determined by the competitive pressure. Z uses T as a specific factor. As informal sector is distorted by the intermediation of local ‘tolapickers’ (Ln) a certain proportion ($\alpha$) of the value of the good (Pz) is appropriated by Ln as the fee of extortion. Informal producers have to abide by this ‘system’ as informal units are illegal by rules. We can easily term this extortion activity as ‘corruption’ sector if we go by Bhagwati’s ([4]) concept of directly unproductive profit seeking activities (DUP). Since Ln workers get the same wage as informal workers total expenditure on Ln (=w.Ln) has to be equal with the lost value of output (=\alpha Pz.Z).

Following Jones ([10]; [11]) we can describe the model by the following set of equations:

The competitive price conditions are given by:

\begin{equation}
W_s a_{sx} + r a_{kx} = P_x
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\bar{W} a_{ly} + r a_{ky} = P_y(1 + t)
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
W a_{lz} + R a_{t} = P_z(1 - \alpha)
\end{equation}

Note that $\bar{w} > w$ because of the trade union exercise in the formal unskilled segment. Full employment of all the factors guarantee the following equations,

\begin{equation}
a_{sx}.X = S
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
a_{kx}.X + a_{ky}.Y = K
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
a_{ly}.Y + a_{lz}.Z = L - L_n
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
a_{t}.Z = T
\end{equation}

Let us further assume that the demand for Z follows standard Cobb-Douglas preference where $\beta$ fraction of consumers’ income is spent on the informal good. This is denoted by $\beta [P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y] = (1 - \beta)P_z.Z$

The value-cost equality of extortion is

$w.Ln = \alpha Pz.Z$

Here we have nine unknown variables ($W_s, W, r, Pz, X, Y, Z$ and $Ln$) and nine equations. So the system is solvable. For a detailed technique one can check [17]; [18].

3. Effects of Migration and Reform

3.A. Immigration of unskilled workers

An immigration of unskilled workers indicates an increase in labor supply in Z. This is likely to influence the output of Z, W and Ln. However as Px and Py are given ther would be no change in Ws, r and $\bar{W}$. Through CRS assumption output of X and Y would not change. This implies a constant $\{P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y\}$ for given t. Hence demand for Z remains same and Pz crucially depends on supply of Z.
An increase in $L$ immediately pushes $W$ down and for given $Z$ (and hence unchanged $P_z$) $R$ must go up. Producers will try to economize on the usage of $T$. This ensures an increase in the supply of $Z$ from equation (7). For given $\alpha, P_z$ if $Z$ goes up $L_n$ must increase from (9) (also see figure-1) Again as $Z$ rises and $\{P_x, X + (1 + t) P_y, Y\}$ remains same $P_z$ must fall because $\beta$ is constant.

$\alpha, P_z, Z$

![Figure -1](image)

When $W$ falls, $W_Ln$ rotates down. But as $L$ increases some more $L$ would also be employed as extortionists and productive $L$ in the informal sector will increase as well. Thus $\alpha, P_z, Z$ would shift up. These two effects would result in an unambiguous increase in $L_n$.

Using simple mathematical manipulation and using the standard notation we can arrive at the following expressions.

$$\xi = \frac{\sigma_x \theta_{kx}}{\theta_{xx}} \left( P_x - \frac{P_y (1 + t)}{\theta_{ty}} - \frac{t}{\theta_{ky}} \right) = 0, \text{ as } P_x = P_y = \dot{t} = 0 \quad (10)$$

Note that throughout the paper ‘$\Lambda$’ represents proportional change.

$\sigma_i$ = elasticity of substitution in $i^{th}$ commodity.

$\theta_{ij}$ = value share of ith factor in $j^{th}$ commodity.
\( \lambda_{ij} \): quantity share of the \( i^{th} \) factor in \( j^{th} \) commodity.

\[
\dot{y} = \frac{\lambda_{kx} \sigma_x \theta_{kx}}{\lambda_{ky} \theta_{xx}} \left\{ \dot{p}_x - \dot{p}_y \left( \frac{1 + t}{\theta_{ty}} - \frac{t}{\theta_{ky}} \right) \right\} = 0
\] (11)

\[
\ddot{r} = \frac{1}{\lambda_{tz} \sigma_z (\theta_{tz} + \theta_{tx})} \{ L - \lambda_{ln} \hat{L}_n \} + \frac{\dot{p}_z (1 - \alpha)}{(\theta_{tz} + \theta_{tx})} > 0
\] (12)

For given \( P_z \), \( \ddot{r} > 0 \) as \( \hat{L} \) can not be less than \( \lambda_{ln} \hat{L}_n \). Note that even if entire increased \( L \) is absorbed in extortion, \( \hat{L} > \lambda_{ln} \hat{L}_n \) as \( 0 < \lambda_{ln} < 1 \).

\[
\ddot{w} = (-) \frac{\theta_{tx}}{\lambda_{tx} \sigma_z (\theta_{tz} + \theta_{tx})} \left\{ L - \lambda_{ln} \hat{L}_n \right\} + \frac{\dot{p}_z (1 - \alpha)}{(\theta_{tz} + \theta_{tx})} < 0
\] (13)

\[
\ddot{z} = \frac{1}{\theta_{tz}} \{ L - \lambda_{ln} \hat{L}_n \} > 0
\] (14)

From (8) \( \ddot{p}_z = (-) \ddot{z} < 0 \) (as \( \ddot{r} = \ddot{y} = 0 \)) (15)

From (9) \( \hat{\alpha} + \hat{p}_z + \ddot{z} = \ddot{w} + \hat{L}_n \)

Or, \( \ddot{w} = (-) \hat{L}_n \) as \( \hat{\alpha} = 0 \) and \( (\ddot{p}_z + \ddot{z}) = 0 \) (16)

Or, \( \hat{L}_n = (-) \ddot{w} > 0 \) as \( \ddot{w} < 0 \) (17)

Thus the following proposition is immediate:

**Proposition I:** An immigration on unskilled labor

(a) Depresses the informal wage,

(b) Expands the informal output,

(c) Decreases the price of the informal good, and

(d) Enhances the number of extortionists.

**3.B. Tariff reform**

A reduction in tariff in the protected sector (Y) changes the return of capital \( \hat{r} \) as formal wage is already fixed at \( \hat{W} \). The return to capital \( r \) will fall in both X and Y. But as \( P_x \) is given, \( W_s \) must go up leading to an increase in \( X \) and a fall in \( Y \) as these two goods share the same mobile capital, \( K \). The moment \( Y \) falls some unskilled labor would be released from \( Y \) and would rush to \( Z \) to raise the output of \( Z \). In this process the informal wage rate must fall as the supply of unskilled workers go up in the informal sector. If we assume an unchanged \( P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y \), \( P_z \) should decline as \( Z \) has already increased. A similar diagram like figure-1 helps explaining the effects on \( L_n \) which must increase.

Mathematically the effects of a tariff cut can be summarized as follows:

\[
\ddot{r} = (-) \frac{\sigma_x \theta_{kx}}{\theta_{xx}} \left\{ \ddot{t} \hat{e}_{kx} \right\} > 0 \text{, as } \ddot{p}_x = \ddot{p}_y = 0 \text{ and } \ddot{e} < 0
\] (18)

\[
\ddot{y} = \frac{\lambda_{kx} \sigma_x \theta_{kx}}{\lambda_{ky} \theta_{xx}} \left\{ \ddot{t} \hat{e}_{ky} \right\} < 0 \text{, as } \ddot{p}_x = \ddot{p}_y = 0 \text{ and } \ddot{e} < 0
\] (19)
\[
\hat{R} = \hat{t} \frac{t}{\theta_{ky}} < 0 \quad (20)
\]

\[
\hat{W}_S = \frac{\theta_{kx}}{\theta_{ky}} \hat{t} \frac{t}{\theta_{sx}} \quad (21)
\]

\[
\hat{R} = \frac{1}{\lambda_{tx}\sigma_x(\theta_{tx} + \theta_{ty})} \left\{ -\lambda_{ty} \hat{L}_n - \frac{\lambda_{ty}\lambda_{kx}}{\theta_{ky}\lambda_{kx}} \frac{\theta_{kx}}{\theta_{sx}} t \cdot \hat{t} \right\} > 0 \quad (22)
\]

R will increase for a given \( \hat{L}_n \) and we prove later that \( \hat{L}_n > 0 \), in that case \( \hat{R} \) is not unambiguously positive. We need to put some more restrictions.

\[
\hat{W} = (-) \frac{\theta_{tx}}{\lambda_{tx}\sigma_x(\theta_{tx} + \theta_{ty})} \left\{ -\lambda_{ty} \lambda_{kx} \frac{\theta_{kx}}{\theta_{sx}} t \cdot \hat{t} \right\} < 0 \quad (23)
\]

\[
\hat{Z} = \theta_{tx}\sigma_x(\hat{R} - \hat{W}) > 0 \quad (24)
\]

If there is no change in \( \{P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y\}, \alpha. P_z.Z \) would also remain unaltered. Hence from (9) \( \hat{L}_n = (-)\hat{W} > 0 \) as \( \hat{W} < 0 \)

And from (8) \( \hat{P}_Z = (-)\hat{Z} < 0 \)

However, if \( \{P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y\} \) does not remain unaltered

\[
\hat{P}_Z + \hat{Z} = \theta_{kx} \frac{\theta_{kx}}{\theta_{sx}} t \cdot \hat{t} (\mu_y - \mu_x) \quad (28)
\]

Where \( \mu_x = \frac{\beta y P_x X}{\hat{P}_z \hat{Z}} \) and \( \mu_y = \frac{\beta y P_y Y}{\hat{P}_z \hat{Z}} \)

If \( \mu_x = \mu_y \) and \( \lambda_{kx} > \lambda_{ky} \) (likely to hold true), \( P_z \) must fall as \( Z \) has already increased. But for \( \lambda_{kx} < \lambda_{ky} \) the impact on \( P_z \) is uncertain.

This leads to the following proposition:

**Proposition II:** Due to trade reform informal workers are worsened but informal output gets a boost. However the number of extortionists must go up.

4. Some Possible Extensions

4.A. Capital mobility

If capital is allowed to move among X, Y and Z an immigration of L lowers W but r would not change (from equation (2)). Hence out put of Z will increase and that of Y would fall if \( \lambda_{iz} > \lambda_{iy} \) following Rybczynski argument. However, when \( \lambda_{iz} < \lambda_{iy} \), Z would, in fact, contract. Depending upon the output effect on Z, Pz will change. Note that if \( \lambda_{iz} > \lambda_{iy} \), \( \{P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y\} \) would fall as Y falls. Thus Pz must decrease as Z has already risen. And again \( \alpha. P_z.Z \) should fall as \( \{P_x.X + (1 + t) P_y.Y\} \) has fallen. We already know that W has gone down; therefore the effect on Ln is uncertain.
4.B. Skilled emigration

If skilled workers emigrate, there will be a tendency for Ws to rise. But since the system determines r from (2) and it is unchanged, Ws can not change because of small country assumption. Therefore production of X would fall due to shortage of specific skilled labor. Subsequently, some capital would be released from X to augment production of Y. Again in order to produce more Y some more unskilled workers need to be relinquished from Z. This will induce an increase in W and hence a fall in R for given Pz. As R falls, $a_c$ should increase and subsequently Z will fall.

If we assume $\{Px.X + (1 + t) Py.Y\}$ as constant eventually Pz would go up. Thus from equation (9) Ln has to fall as $\propto Pz.Z$ remains same through the constancy of $\{Px.X + (1 + t) Py.Y\}$. Thus an outmigration of skilled workers is good for the society as a whole as Ln falls and is also good for informal workers in particular as W goes up.

4.C. Foreign capital inflow

If foreign capital comes in in the formal sector there will be changes in the outputs but r, $\overline{W}$ and Ws would remain unchanged because of the structure of the model. Hence both X and Y would increase. X would expand more than Y if distributive share of capital is higher in X than that of in Y. In order to produce more X skilled labor need to be substituted by increased capital as supply of skilled labor is fixed at $s$. However, as far as an increase in Y is concerned along with increased capital the necessity of an increased employment of unskilled workers is there. These labors should come from informal sector and hence $\overline{W}$ will rise. At given Pz, R has to fall. This will induce a reduction Z. From (8) LHS has gone up and Z falls, therefore, subsequently Pz must increase. But what happens to Ln that is uncertain.

5. Conclusion

Here we have built a trade theoretic model where both formal and informal sectors are embedded. Informal sector is segregated from the formal world by the non-existence of trade union. Since informal units are illegal, they are distorted by extortion. In this framework we have shown that both the immigration of unskilled workers and a tariff cut lead to similar kind of results. Under these two situations informal workers lose, informal output expands but informal capitalists gain. But what is more worrying is that under both these cases number of extortionists in the economy inflates. If we allow for capital mobility between formal and informal sectors, this would not change the fate of informal workers under immigration of unskilled workers and reform. Nevertheless, an outmigration of skilled workers would raise the informal wage and reduce the number of extortionists. Informal wage would also go up if we allow foreign capital to come in.
References