Bourjade, Sylvain and Rey, Patrick and seabright, paul (2009): Private antitrust enforcement in the presence of pre-trial bargaining. Published in: The Journal of Industrial Economics , Vol. LVII, No. 3 (September 2009): pp. 372-409.
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We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model in which a plaintiff, who may have private information about whether a breach of law has been committed, decides whether to open a case against a defendant. If opened, the case may be settled out of court or may proceed to full trial. The authorities can facilitate private actions by lowering the costs of opening a case or of proceeding to a full trial, or by raising the damages to be expected in the event of success. We show that facilitating private action increases the number of cases opened and sometimes but not always makes plaintiffs more aggressive in pre-trial bargaining. The latter, if it occurs, tends to make defendants who have committed anti-trust violations more likely to settle than innocent defendants. We also show that for screening to work requires the Court to be committed to rely only on submitted evidence in the case, and not on other possibly relevant background material. We finally study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation on antitrust enforcement and prove that it is better to increase damages that to reduce costs of initiating a suit. In particular we find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for Defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Private antitrust enforcement in the presence of pre-trial bargaining|
|Keywords:||litigation, private actions, out-of-court settlement, enforcement|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process
L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L40 - General
|Depositing User:||Sylvain Bourjade|
|Date Deposited:||18 Nov 2011 15:28|
|Last Modified:||27 Feb 2016 12:03|
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