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A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma.

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Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it into five different types. For the type-4 Prisoner's Dilemma game, we will propose a self-enforcing algorithmic model to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs. The algorithmic model is based on an algorithm using complex numbers and can work in macro applications.

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