Guha, Brishti and Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2012): Micro-finance competition: motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default.
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Abstract
We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We find that equilibria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very profit-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with double-dipping, borrowers who double-dip are actually worse off compared to those who do not. Further, for intermediate levels of motivation, there can be multiple equilibria, with a double-dipping equilibrium co-existing with a no default equilibrium. Interestingly, an increase in MFI competition can lower efficiency, as well as increase the extent of double-dipping and default. Further, the interest rates may go either way, with the interest rate likely to increase if the MFIs are very motivated.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Micro-finance competition: motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Micro-finance competition; motivated MFIs; double-dipping; default |
Subjects: | G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design |
Item ID: | 36116 |
Depositing User: | Prabal Roy Chowdhury |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2012 04:25 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 15:15 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/36116 |