Yamamura, Eiji (2012): Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure.
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This paper uses data from Japan to ascertain the determinants of government information disclosures by considering the role of special interest groups and government size. A IV-Tobit model is employed to control for endogeneity bias of government size. The major findings are as follows: (1) special interest groups have a detrimental effect on information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aging population increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are more likely to be enacted with a large government size.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure|
|Keywords:||pecial interest group, Government size, Information-disclosure ordinance|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies
|Depositing User:||eiji yamamura|
|Date Deposited:||23. Jan 2012 18:01|
|Last Modified:||11. Sep 2015 17:42|
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