The Management of Greek Sovereign Risk

OLDANI, CHIARA (2011): The Management of Greek Sovereign Risk. Published in: The UIP Journal of Financial Risk Management , Vol. VIII, No. 4 (December 2011): pp. 25-36.

Abstract

In 2010 the excessive public spending produced the first sovereign bond market crisis in Europe: Greece. The Hellenic crisis is the product of years of recession, of the sluggish economic environment and poor productivity – but above all it is the product of the mismanagement of the public finance, of unsatisfactory reporting, risk management and accounting practices. Information about Greece is scarce and fragmented, but the inability by European authorities to understand the incredible mismanagement strongly disappoints the taxpayer. The relevant exposure of European banks in the bond market toward the default risk of Greece supports the need for hedging tools, such as Credit Default Swaps. However, there is evidence that the CDS market on Greek sovereign bonds is segmented, and contracts are mis-priced. The lack of comprehensive data on CDS and other OTC contracts impedes any further investigation. European authorities should consider revising CDSs trading rules and requirements, until the risks produced are properly limited

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Greek crisis, Credit Default Swap, sovereign risk management
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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