Teng, Jimmy (2011): Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures: a theory of games with players forming conjectures iteratively starting with first order uninformative conjectures.

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Abstract
This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, rationality is achieved for strategies and conjectures. The BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current Nash Equilibrium based games theory, including games with inaccurate observations, games with unstable equilibrium and games with double or multiple sided incomplete information games. On the other hand, for the set of games analyzed by the current games theory, it generates far lesser equilibriums and normally generates only a unique equilibrium. It also resolves inconsistencies in equilibrium results by different solution concepts in current games theory.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures: a theory of games with players forming conjectures iteratively starting with first order uninformative conjectures 
English Title:  Bayesian Equilibrium by Iterative Conjectures: A Theory of Games with Players forming Conjectures Iteratively Starting with First Order Uninformative Conjectures 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  new equilibrium concept, iterative conjectures, convergence, Bayesian decision theory, Schelling point 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D84  Expectations ; Speculations D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81  Criteria for DecisionMaking under Risk and Uncertainty C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  37969 
Depositing User:  jimmy teng 
Date Deposited:  10. Apr 2012 03:52 
Last Modified:  13. Sep 2015 23:40 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/37969 