Allocation rules for fixed and flexible networks: the role of players and their links

Borkotokey, Surajit and Sarangi, Sudipta (2011): Allocation rules for fixed and flexible networks: the role of players and their links.

Abstract

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require component additivity. Next, we extend it to flexible networks a la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed (network Myerson and Position value) and flexible network (player and link based) allocation rules through a number of examples.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Network games; Allocation rules; Cooperative games
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A14 - Sociology of Economics

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