Fella, Giulio (2012): Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay.
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This paper studies the effect mandated severance pay in a matching model featuring wage rigidity for ongoing, but not new, matches and Pareto efficient spot renegotiation of mandated severance pay. Severance pay matters only if real wage rigidities imply inefficient separation under employment at will. In such a case, large enough severance payments reduce job destruction and increase job creation and social efficiency, under very mild conditions. Efficient renegotiation implies that severance pay never results in privately inefficient labour hoarding and that its marginal effect is zero when its size exceeds that which induces the same allocation that would prevail in the absence of wage rigidity. These results hold under alternative micro-foundations for wage rigidity.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay|
|English Title:||Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay|
|Keywords:||Severance pay; renegotiation; wage rigidity|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
|Depositing User:||Giulio Fella|
|Date Deposited:||07. May 2012 14:41|
|Last Modified:||09. Sep 2015 16:10|
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