Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet

Wu, Haoyang (2012): Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet.

Abstract

The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (\emph{e.g.}, Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable when an additional condition is satisfied. The key points are: 1) The agreement is unobservable to the designer, and the designer cannot prevent the agents from constructing such agreement; 2) The agents act non-cooperatively, and the Maskin mechanism remain unchanged from the designer's perspective.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Mechanism design; Nash implementation; Social choice
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General

References

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