Three steps ahead

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Three Steps Ahead (Preliminary Draft, June 13, 2012)

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Abstract

Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and each agent is characterized by the number of steps he thinks ahead. When two agents interact, each of them has an independent probability to observe the opponent’s type. We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the evolutionary process admits a unique stable outcome, in which the population includes a mixture of “naïve” agents who think 1 step ahead, and “sophisticated” agents who think 2-3 steps ahead.

Keywords: Indirect evolution, cognitive hierarchy, bounded forward-looking, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Cooperation. JEL Classification: C73, D03.

1 Introduction

Experimental evidence suggest that in new strategic interactions most people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning. This stylized fact is observed in different forms in various contexts. First, when playing long finite games, people only look a few stages ahead and use backward induction reasoning to a limited extent. For example, players usually defect only at the last couple of stages when playing finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, (Selten and Stoecker (1986) and the other references discussed at the of the introduction) and

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“Centipede” games (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Nagel and Tang (1998)), and when interacting in sequential bargaining, players ignore future bargaining opportunities that are more than 1-2 steps ahead (Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)). Second, when facing serially dominated strategies, almost everyone make the first iteration (not playing a dominated action), many do the second iteration - assume that their opponent would not play dominated strategies, a few make the third iteration, and further iterations are rare (Beard and Beil Jr (1994); Rapoport and Amaldoss (2004)). Third, according to the models of cognitive hierarchy (or level-k), most players best respond to a belief that others use only at most two iterations of strategic reasoning (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson (1994); Nagel (1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002); Crawford (2003); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Crawford and Iriberri (2007)).

A second stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systematically use less iterations than others (see, e.g., Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005) and Hyndman, Terracol, and Vaksman (2012)). These stylized facts raise two related evolutionary puzzles. The first puzzle is why people only use 1-3 steps. Experimental evidence suggest that using more iterations is only unintuitive but not computationally complex (at-least in simple games): with appropriate guidance and feedback players can learn to use many iterations in a given game; however, when facing a new game people immediately return to use only 1-3 iterations (Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002), Camerer (2003, Section 5.3.5)). In many games, being able to do one more step than the opponent gives a substantial advantage. As the cognitive cost of an additional level is moderate, it is puzzling why there hasn’t been an “arms race” (“red queen effect”, see Robson (2003)) that caused people to use more strategic iterations throughout the evolutionary process.

The second puzzle is how the “naïve” people, who systematically use less iterations than the more “sophisticated” agents, survived the evolutionary process. At first glance, it seems that naïve people would fare substantially less than sophisticated agents who enjoy the benefit of thinking one level ahead. In this paper we present an evolutionary model that explains both puzzles and yields a unique sharp prediction: an heterogeneous population which only uses 1-3 strategic iterations. Our model focuses on limited forward-looking in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, but we believe that it can also shed light on other forms of bounded iterative reasoning.

Following the “indirect evolutionary approach” (Güth and Yaari (1992)) we present a reduced-form static analysis for a dynamic process that describes the evolution of types in a large population of agents. Each agent has a type (level) in the set \( \{L_1, ..., L_M\} \)

\(^1\) The indirect approach was mainly used to study evolution of preferences. Following, Stahl Dale (1993); Stennek (2000); Frenkel, Heller, and Teper (2012), we apply it to analyze evolution of cognitive biases.
that determines how many steps he looks ahead (as described in the next paragraph). At each generation the players are randomly matched and each couple plays $M$ times (without rematching) the symmetric stage game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the payoffs given in Table 1:² mutual cooperation (both players play $C$) yields both players $A > 2 + \sqrt{2}$, mutual defection (both players play $D$) gives 1, and if a single player defects, he obtains $A+1$ and his opponent gets 0. Observe that the parameter $A$ is the ratio between what can be gained by mutual cooperation to the additional payoff that is obtained by defecting.³ The total payoff from the repeated interaction is the undiscounted sum of payoffs. We assume that types are partially observable in the following way (similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)): before the interaction begins, each agent has an independent probability $p$ to observe his opponent’s type. Informally, this can be interpreted as an opportunity to observe your opponent’s past behavior, or to observe a trait that is correlated with cognitive level (such as I.Q. level, see Gill and Prowse (2012)).

An agent of type $L_k$ looks $k$ steps ahead in his strategic reasoning. When the horizon (the number of remaining stages) is larger than $k$ the agent must follow a simple heuristic — “grim”: he cooperates if and only if is opponent never defected before.⁴ When the horizon is equal to $k$, the agent begins to play strategically and he may choose any action. We interpret $L_k$’s behavior to stem from bounded forward-looking: when the horizon is larger than $k$, he subjectively perceives it to be infinite, and he does not take into account the fact that the interaction has a well-defined final period, and that this final period has strategic implications. One can also consider our model as a reduced-form for an interaction with a random unknown long length, in which each type $L_k$ gets a signal about the interaction’s realized length $k$ periods before the end (see Section 6). Observe that the set of strategies of type $L_k$ is a strict subset of the set of strategies of type $L_{k+1}$, and that type $L_M$ is fully-rational and has an unlimited set of strategies.

² All our results are independent of the value of $M$ for every $M \geq 4$.
³ We assume that defection yields the same additional payoff (relative to cooperation) regardless of the opponent’s strategy to simplify the presentation of the result (but the results remain qualitatively similar also without this assumption). Given this assumption we normalize, without loss of generality, the payoff of being a single cooperator to be 0, and the additional payoff of defecting to be 1.
⁴ In Section 6 we discuss the extension of our model to a setup in which a player may choose his heuristic for long horizons, and the relation to the notion of analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)).

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Tab. 1: Payoff at the symmetric stage game Prisoner’s Dilemma ($A > 1$).
In common with much of the evolutionary literature, we use a static solution concept to tractably capture the stable points of a dynamic evolutionary process with the following three properties: (1) the frequency of types changes slowly according to their success: types that have yielded higher payoffs increase at the expense of those that yielded lower payoffs, and (2) given a distribution of types, players learn to best-respond to each other (i.e., they learn to play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, given their forward-looking constraints), and (3) rarely a few mutants with arbitrary type and behavior enter the population; if these mutants have a completely new type (which has not existed among the incumbents), then it is assumed that the incumbents learn to best reply to the mutants. This evolutionary process can be interpreted in two different ways: (1) biological process - types are genetically determined, and the payoff is the expected number of offspring, and (2) learning and imitation process - an agent’s type describes the way he perceives strategic interactions; once in a while an agent may decide to change his strategic framework and imitate another person’s type, if the other person is more successful.

The configuration of the population is a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the strategy that each type \( L_k \) uses in the repeated game (which must be grim as long as the horizon is larger than \( k \)). A configuration is stable (a variant of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)’s definition) if it satisfies 3 conditions: (1) balance - each type in the population has the same expected payoff; (2) equilibrium - each type uses a best reply strategy; and (3) resistance - a small group of mutants that enters the population fares worse than the incumbents.\(^5\)

Our main result shows that if \( p \) is distanced enough from both 0 and 1, then there exists a unique stable configuration which includes two kind of players: (1) naive agents of type \( L_1 \) who only begin defecting at the last stage, (2) sophisticated agents who look 2-3 steps ahead: usually they begin defecting two stages before the end, unless they observe that their opponent is sophisticated, and in this case, they begin defecting one stage earlier. The stability relies on the balance between the direct disadvantage of naive agents - they defect too late, and the indirect advantage - when nativity is being observed, it induces sophisticated opponents to postpone their defection, and this allows an additional round of mutual cooperation.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Our solution concept extends the notion of neutral stable strategy (NSS, Maynard Smith (1982)) from direct evolution, in which types completely determine the actions, to indirect evolution. In Appendix B we present a few alternative variants to the resistance condition (including Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)’s definition), and we demonstrate that our results are robust to its exact properties.

\(^6\) The proportion of sophisticated players is equal to \( \frac{1}{p(A-1)} \). The types of the sophisticated agents are not uniquely determined. The sophisticated players may have any type of \( L_3 \) or higher (but all types play as if they were type \( L_3 \)). If one adds to the model an arbitrarily small cost of having an higher cognitive level, then all the sophisticated players must have type \( L_3 \) (see Corollary 1).
It is interesting to note that stable configurations are very different when \( p \) is close to 0 or 1. In both cases, stable configurations must include fully-rational players who, when facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When \( p \) is close to 0, types are too rarely observed, and the indirect advantage of naive agents is too weak. When \( p \) is close to 1, there is an “arms-race” between sophisticated agents who observe each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The result of this “race” is that there must be some fully-rational agents in the population.

Existing evolutionary models that studied bounded strategic reasoning (Stahl Dale (1993); Stennek (2000)) focused on the case where types are unobservable (\( p = 0 \)), and showed that: (1) the highest type always survives, and (2) other types may also survive if they do not play serially dominated strategies. Recently, Mohlin (2012) also dealt also with the case of fully-observable types (\( p = 1 \)), and characterized conditions under which other types beside the highest may survive. This paper is the first to study partial observability in such a setup, which, perhaps surprisingly, leads to a much sharper prediction: a unique stable state in which everyone thinks 1-3 steps ahead.

Existing experimental results verify the plausibility of both our assumption of using “grim” strategy for large horizons, and of our main prediction. Selten and Stoecker (1986) study the behavior of players in iterated Prisoner Dilemma games of 10 rounds (similar results are presented in Andreoni and Miller (1993); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996); Bruttel, Güth, and Kamecke (2012)). They show that: (1) if any player defected, then almost always both players defect at all remaining stages (a “grim”-like behavior), (2) usually there is mutual cooperation in the first 6 rounds, and (3) players begin defecting at the last 1-4 rounds. Such behavior has two main explanations in the literature: (1) some players are altruistic, and (2) players have limited forward-looking. Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) studied the relative importance of these explanations in a related sequential bargaining game, and their findings suggest the limited forward-looking is the main cause for this behavior.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 describes our solution concept (and in Appendix B we demonstrate the robustness of our results to a few plausible variants of this concept). In Section 4 we present our results, and it is followed by

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7 In Selten and Stoecker (1986)'s experiments players engaged in 25 sequences (“super-games”) of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The above results describe the behavior of subjects in the last 13 sequences (after the initial 12 sequences in which players are inexperienced and their actions are “noisier”). During these 13 sequences there is a slow drift in the behavior of players towards earlier defections. Nevertheless, defections before the last 4 rounds were infrequent also in the last couple of rounds.

8 Heifetz and Pauzner (2005) explain this behavior with a different kind of cognitive limitations: at each node, each player has a small probability to be “confused” and choose a different action than the optimal one.
sketches of the proofs in Section 5 (formal proofs appear in Appendix A). We conclude in Section 6.

2 Model

We study a symmetric finitely-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game that repeats $M$ stages ($M \geq 4$), denoted by $G$. The payoff of each stage game are as described in Table 1 ($A > 2 + \sqrt{2}$). The payoff of the repeated game is the undiscounted sum of the stage payoffs. This payoff is interpreted, as standard in the evolutionary literature, as representing “success” or “fitness”.

Define the horizon of a stage as the number of remaining stages including the current stage. That is, the horizon at stage $k$ is equal to $L - k + 1$. History $h_k$ of length $k$ is a sequence of $k$ pairs, where the $l$-th pair describes the actions chosen by the players at stage $l$. Let $H_k$ be the sets of histories of length $k$, and let $H = \bigcup_{1 \leq k < M} H_k$ be the set of all histories.

A pure strategy $s$ is a function from $H$ into $\{C, D\}$, and a behavioral strategy $\sigma$ is a function from $H$ into $\Delta(\{C, D\})$. With some abuse of notations we write $\sigma(h_k) = C$ when $\sigma$ assigns probability 1 to playing $C$ (and similarly for $D$). Let $\Sigma$ be the set of behavioral strategies. Strategy $\sigma$ is $k$-grim if whenever the horizon is larger than $k$: (1) $\sigma$ assigns probability 1 to $C$ if the opponent has never defected before, and (2) $\sigma$ assigns probability 1 to $D$ if the opponent has defected in the past. Let $\Sigma_k$ be the set of $k$-grim behavioral strategies. Let $u(\sigma, \sigma')$ be the expected payoff of a player who plays behavioral strategy $\sigma$ against an opponent who plays behavioral strategy $\sigma'$. Let $d_k \in \Sigma_k$ be the pure strategy that plays grim as long as the horizon is larger then $k$, and then defects at all following stages (when the horizon is at most $k$).

We imagine a large population randomly matched to play $G$. Different agents in the population differ in their cognitive ability, which is captured by their type. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{L_1, ..., L_M\}$ be the set of types (or levels). An agent of type $L_k$ looks only $k$ steps ahead, and when the horizon is larger than $k$ he ignores end-of-game strategic considerations and plays grim-defecting if and only if his opponent defected in the past. That is, an agent with type $L_k$ can only play $k$-grim strategies. When the horizon is at most $k$, the agent is no longer limited in his play.

Following the model of partial observability of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we assume that each player knows the type of his opponent with probability $p$ (and get no information about his opponent’s type with probability $1 - p$), independently of the event that his opponent knows his type. Let a stranger denote an opponent that his type was not

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9 We explicitly omit type of level 0 (who keep using use grim throughout the entire interaction). See Subsection 4 for a discussion of this assumption, and the influence of changing it.
3 Solution Concept

In this section we formally present a reduced-form stability concept (a variant of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s notion of stability), which extends neutral stable strategy (NSS, Maynard Smith (1982)) to indirect preferences. This concept is intended to capture the essential features of the following three components of the evolutionary process: (1) mutations - which introduces new types and behaviors in the population, (2) optimization - agents best respond to the behavior of the population within the limits of their bounded forward looking, and (3) natural selection - type composition is updated as successful types replicate. Mutations are modeled by considering an entry of a small group of players of any type who play any strategy. It is assumed that the population continues to play the pre-entry equilibrium, except when observing an opponent with a type that did not exist in the pre-entry distribution; in this latter case the incumbents are assumed to learn to play a best response to the mutants’ strategy. Finally, natural selection is modeled by a static stability concept that identifies populations of types in which: (1) all types have the same fitness, (2) any small group of mutants that enter the population fare worse than the incumbents.

Suppose that the distribution of types in the population is given by $\mu \in \Delta (L)$. Let $C(\mu)$ be the support of $\mu$. The interaction can be analyzed via the following two-player Bayesian game, $\Gamma_p(\mu)$. The types of the two players are drawn independently from $\mu$, and each player with independent probability $p$ observes the preferences of the other. With the complementary probability $1 - p$, the player observes the uninformative signal $\emptyset$. A strategy for type $L_k$ is a rule that specifies a behavioral $k$-grim strategy in the repeated game for each possible observation: $b_k : L \cup \emptyset \rightarrow \Sigma_k$. We assume that aggregate play in the population corresponds to a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game. That is, we assume that each individual of type $L_k$, when the horizon is at most $k$, plays a best reply to a correct belief about the distribution of his opponents’ play. When type $k$ is matched with type $k'$ and plays strategy $\sigma_k \in \Sigma_k$, the expected payoff of $k$ is:

$$pu(\sigma_k, b_k'(k)) + (1 - p) u(\sigma_k, b_{k'}(\emptyset)).$$

The payoff is the average over two possibilities. With probability $p$, the opponent observes the type $k'$, and with probability $1 - p$ he observes $\emptyset$. An equilibrium $b$ is thus characterized by two properties. First, type $k$ chooses a $k$-grim optimal action $b_k(k')$ conditional on observing that the opponent’s type is $k'$:
for each $k' \in C(\mu)$. Second, type $k$ chooses an optimal $k$-grim action conditional on observing nothing informative:

$$b_k (\emptyset) \in \argmax_{\sigma_k \in \Sigma_k} \sum_{k' \in C(\mu)} \left( pu(\sigma_k, b_{k'} (k')) + (1 - p) u(\sigma_k, b_{k'} (\emptyset)) \right)$$

Let $B_p (\mu)$ denote the set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the game $\Gamma_p (\mu)$. Given a population distribution $\mu$ and an equilibrium $b \in B_p (\mu)$, the average fitness of type $L_k \in C(\mu)$ is denoted $\Pi_k (\mu|b)$ and is given by:

$$\sum_{k' \in C(\mu)} \left[ p^2 u(b_k (k'), b_{k'} (k)) + p (1 - p) u(b_k (k'), b_{k'} (\emptyset)) \right]$$

$$+ p (1 - p) u(b_k (\emptyset), b_{k'} (k)) + (1 - p)^2 u(b_k (\emptyset), b_{k'} (\emptyset))$$

This fitness, which depends on the equilibrium played, is the measure of evolutionary success for types. Hence, evolution depends both on the distribution of types and the equilibrium played given this distribution, and the stability definition applies to configurations $-(\mu, b)$, where $b \in B_p (\mu)$.

A configuration is stable if it is satisfies two conditions. First, it must be balanced: all types present must get the same fitness. If the configuration were not balanced, then some types have higher fitness than others and natural selection would alter the configuration as the former types multiply and the latter types recede. Formally:

**Definition 1.** Configuration $(\mu, b)$ is balanced if $u_k (\mu|b) = u_{k'} (\mu|b)$ for all $L_k, L_{k'} \in C(\mu)$.

Second, a stable configuration must resist entry by mutants who have some arbitrary type $L_{\tilde{k}}$ and play an arbitrary strategy $\sigma_{\tilde{k}}$. We assume that after the entry, the incumbents continue to play the same against strangers and incumbents, while they play a best response to the mutant’s strategy when they observe a new type, which did not exist in the pre-entry population. Formally, the post-entry state of the population is described by a perturbed configuration:

**Definition 2.** Given configuration $(\mu, b)$, parameter $\epsilon > 0$, type $L_{\tilde{k}} \in \mathcal{L}$ and strategy $\sigma_{\tilde{k}} = (\sigma_{\tilde{k}} (k') \in \Sigma_{k'})_{k' \in C(\mu) \cup \tilde{k} \cup \emptyset}$ for each $k' \in C(\mu) \cup \tilde{k} \cup \emptyset$, let the perturbed configuration $(\tilde{\mu}, \tilde{b}|\mu, b, \epsilon, L_{\tilde{k}}, \sigma_{\tilde{k}})$ where $\tilde{\mu} \in \Delta (\mathcal{L})$ and $\tilde{b}$ is a profile of strategies for the different types in $C(\tilde{\mu})$ be as follows:
\[ \tilde{\mu}(L_k) = \begin{cases} (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \mu(L_k) & k \neq \tilde{k} \\ (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \mu(L_{\tilde{k}}) + \epsilon & k = \tilde{k} \end{cases} \]

\[ \tilde{b}_k(k') = \begin{cases} b_k(k') & k \neq \tilde{k}, \ k' \in C(\mu) \cup \emptyset \\ \text{k-grim best response to } \sigma_{\tilde{k}}(k) & k \neq \tilde{k}, \ k' = \tilde{k} \notin C(\mu) \\ (1 - \epsilon) \cdot b_k(k') + \epsilon \cdot \sigma_{\tilde{k}}(k') & k = \tilde{k} \in C(\mu), \ k' \in C(\mu) \cup \emptyset \\ \sigma_{\tilde{k}}(k') & k = \tilde{k} \notin C(\mu), \ k' \in C(\mu) \cup \tilde{k} \cup \emptyset \end{cases} \]

Given perturbed distribution \((\tilde{\mu}, \tilde{b})\), type \(L_k \in C(\tilde{\mu})\) and k-grim strategy \(\sigma_k\), define \(\Pi_{k,\sigma_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b})\) as the expected payoff of an agent of type \(L_k\) who plays strategy \(\sigma_k\) against population \(\tilde{\mu}\) who plays \(\tilde{b}\). A configuration is stable if mutants fare worse than all incumbents in any perturbed configuration. Formally:

**Definition 3.** Configuration \((\mu, b)\) is **stable** if it is balanced and there exists \(\epsilon' > 0\), such that for each parameter \(0 < \epsilon \leq \epsilon'\), type \(L_{\tilde{k}} \in L\) and strategy \(\sigma_{\tilde{k}} = (\sigma_{\tilde{k}}(k') \in \Sigma_{k'} \forall k' \in C(\mu) \cup \tilde{k} \cup \emptyset)\), the mutants fare worse than all incumbents in any perturbed configuration \((\tilde{\mu}, \tilde{b}) = (\tilde{\mu}, \tilde{b}|\mu, b, \epsilon, L_{\tilde{k}}, \sigma_{\tilde{k}})\).

That is:

1. If \(L_{\tilde{k}} \notin C(\mu)\) then \(\Pi_{k,\sigma_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b}) \leq \Pi_{k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b})\) for each \(k \in C(\mu)\).

2. If \(L_{\tilde{k}} \in C(\mu)\) then \(\Pi_{k,\sigma_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b}) \leq \Pi_{k,b_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b})\) for each \(k \in C(\mu)\).

Our notion of stability extends the direct evolution notion of neutral stability strategy. Recall, that a mixed strategy \(\sigma\) in a normal-form game is **neutrally stable** (NSS, Maynard Smith (1982)) if for every strategy \(\tilde{\sigma}\) there exists \(\epsilon_0 > 0\) such that for every \(0 < \epsilon \leq \epsilon_0\):

\[ u(\tilde{\sigma}, \epsilon \sigma + (1 - \epsilon) \tilde{\sigma}) \leq u(\sigma, \epsilon \sigma + (1 - \epsilon) \tilde{\sigma}) \]

Observe, that when the set of types is a singleton and only includes fully-rational players, then our Definition 3 coincides with Maynard Smith (1982)'s neutral stability.

In Appendix B we present a few alternative notions of stability (including Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s definition), which differ in the way the population reacts to the entry of the mutants, and in how much mutants are required to fare worse than the incumbents, and we demonstrate that our results are robust to the way in which stability is defined.
4 Results

Our main result gives a sharp prediction for the unique stable configuration in the interval $\frac{A}{(A-1)p} < p < \frac{A-2}{A+1}$. In this configuration naive players (of type $L_1$) and sophisticated players (who play as if they were $L_3$, and start defecting 2-3 stages from then end) co-exist. Formally:

**Theorem 1.** Let $\frac{A}{(A-1)p} < p < \frac{A-2}{A+1}$. A configuration $(\mu, b)$ is stable if and only the following three conditions are satisfied:

1. Players of type $L_1$ (dubbed, “naive” players) have frequency $\mu(L_1) = 1 - \frac{1}{p(A-1)}$, and they all play $d_1$ (play “grim” until the last stage, and defect at the last stage).

2. There are no players of type $L_2$ ($\mu(L_1) = 0$).

3. All other players (types $L_3$ or more, dubbed “sophisticated” players) play the same strategy: $d_3$ against an observed sophisticated opponent (following “grim” until the last 3 stages, and defecting at the last 3 remaining stages), and $d_2$ in all other cases.

Let $C$ be the sets of configurations that satisfy conditions 1-3 above. The sketch of the proof is presented in the next section, and the formal proof is given in Appendix A.

All the stable configurations in $C$ are “equivalent” in the sense that they differ only by the types of the sophisticated players ($L_3$ or higher) but all of them play as if they had type $L_3$. If one adds arbitrarily small costs for having higher cognitive levels, then there is a unique stable configuration in which all the sophisticated players have type $L_3$. Formally:

**Corollary 1.** Let $f : \mathcal{L} \to \mathbb{R}^+$ be any strictly increasing function on the set of types $(f(L_k) > f(L_{k'}) \iff k > k')$ that represents cognitive costs. For each $\epsilon > 0$, let the $\epsilon$-perturbed model be the same as our basic model, except that the fitness of $L_k$ is equal to his total payoff in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma minus his cognitive cost, which is equal to $\epsilon \cdot f(L_k)$. Then:

1. For sufficiently small $\epsilon$ the game admits a unique stable configuration that only include naive players of type $L_1$ (that play $d_1$) and sophisticated players of type $L_3$ (that play $d_3$ against observed sophisticated opponents and $d_2$ otherwise).

2. In the limit when $\epsilon \to 0$, the share of naive players converge to $1 - \frac{1}{p(A-1)}$.

The corollary follows from simple adaptations to the proof of Theorem 1 (proof is omitted).

Our next result, shows that in the benchmark cases when $p$ is close to 0 and 1 the stable configurations are very different. In both cases, stable configurations must include fully-rational players who, when facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When $p$ is
close to 0, this occurs because the indirect advantage of lower types is too small and they can
not exist in a stable configuration (because the probability of being identified by the opponent
is too low). When $p$ is close to 1, there is an “arms-race” between sophisticated agents who
observe each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The
result of this “race” is that there must some fully-rational agents in the population.

Formally:

**Theorem 2.**

1. Let $0 \leq p < \frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)}$. Then there exists a unique stable configuration where all
   players have type $L_M$ and they defect at all stages.

2. Let $1 \geq p > \frac{A-1}{A}$. Then in any stable configuration there is a positive frequency of
   players of type $L_M$, and these players defect at all stages when observing an opponent
   of type $L_M$.

5 **Sketches of Proofs**

In this section we present a few propositions that imply the results of the previous section,
and sketch the intuition behind their proofs. The formal proof are presented in the appendix.

5.1 **Stability of the Configurations in $C$ (Theorem 1 - “if side”)**

The following proposition shows that the configurations in $C$ are stable in the interval $\frac{A}{(A-1)^2} < p < \frac{A-1}{A}$.

**Proposition 1.** Let $\frac{A}{(A-1)^2} < p < \frac{A-1}{A}$. Any configuration $(\mu, b) \in C$ (see Theorem 1) is
stable.

The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. First we have to show that $b$ only includes
best-responses (given the bounded forward-looking). Naive players ($L_1$) play their unique
dominating strategy - $d_1$ (as they must play grim when he horizon is larger than 1). Sophis-
ticated players play $d_3$ against observed sophisticated players. This is optimal (and not $d_4$)
for small enough $p$. They play $d_2$ otherwise. This is optimal (and not $d_3$) if $\mu(L_1)$ is large
enough.

Next, we have to show that $(\mu, b)$ is balanced. In order to show it, we compare the fitness
of naive and sophisticated agents as a function of their opponent. Naive agents succeed more
only against an observing sophisticated opponent (who observed their type), because their
observed naivety induces an additional round of mutual cooperation. Sophisticated agents
fare better in the two other cases: against naive opponents and against an unobserving sophisticated opponent. This implies that there is a unique intermediate level of $\mu (L_1)$ that balance the payoff of the two kinds of players.

Finally, we have to show resistance to mutations. If $\epsilon$ more naive players join the populations, then due to the previous argument, naive agents fare worse and the excess frequency of naive players (the mutants) will be eliminated. The same holds for $\epsilon$ more sophisticated who join the population and play the same as the existing sophisticated players. Finally, one can show that $\epsilon$ sophisticated mutants (type 3 or more) who play different actions fare strictly worse than the incumbents.

5.2 Instability Outside $C$ (Theorem 1 - “only if side”)

The next proposition shows that any configuration outside $C$ are unstable in the interval $\frac{1}{A-1} < p < \frac{A-2}{A-1}$.

**Proposition 2.** Let $\frac{1}{A-1} < p < \frac{A-2}{A-1}$ and let $(\mu, b)$ be a configuration outside $C$. Then $(\mu, b)$ is not stable.

The intuition behind the proof is as follows. First, observe that a configuration with a single type is not stable: 1) if the type is $L_M$, then the entire population defects all the time, and mutants of type $L_1$ would induce cooperation against them and invade the population; and 2) if the type is $L_k \neq L_M$, then mutants of type $L_{k+1}$ can invade the population and get strictly higher payoff then the incumbents. Let $L_k$ be the smallest type in the population. Then, type $L_k$ must always defect when the horizon is $k$ (as it is common knowledge that all players are rational at that stage), and all other types must defect at horizon $k + 1$ (or sooner). The next step is to show that all other types in the population must play $d_{k+1}$ against strangers. This is because if there is type $L_{k'}$ that plays $d_l$ ($l > k + 1$) against strangers, then it implies (assuming that $p$ is not too small) that type $L_{k'}$ fares worse against $L_k$, then $L_k$ gets against itself (because members of $L_{k'}$ lose at least one round of mutual cooperation when facing unobserved $L_1$). This implies, that $\epsilon$ mutants of type $L_k$ who enter the population and slightly increase $L_k$’s frequency, would fare better than the incumbents of type $L_{k'}$ (before the entry, both types fared the same as the configuration was balanced; after the entry $L_k$’s payoff becomes higher because there are more $L_k$ agents). This contradicts the stability of the configuration.

Next we show that if $p$ is not too close to 1, then all the sophisticated players play $d_{k+2}$ when they observe that their opponent is sophisticated, and that type $L_{k+1}$ cannot exist in the population (as its members would fare strictly worse then the more sophisticated types).
Finally, we show that if $L_k \neq L_1$, and $p$ is not too small, then the population can be invaded by mutants of type $L_1$ as they would fare strictly better than the incumbents of type $L_k$ (because they induce more mutual cooperation when their type is observed).

5.3 Stable Configuration for Low and High $p$-s (Theorem 2)

1. **Low $p$-s**: The configuration that everyone has type $L_M$ (fully-rational) and begin defecting at the first stage is stable because the indirect advantage of naive mutants (with a lower type than $L_M$) is too small: they strictly lose when their naivety is unobserved, and their naivety is observed too rarely. Due to a similar argument, in any other configuration where different types co-exist, the lower type would fare strictly worse (and this implies the uniqueness).

2. **High $p$-s**: Assume to the contrary that no agent in the population ever defects at the first stage. Let $L_k$ be the highest type in the population. Let $l < M$ be the horizon in which $L_k$ players begin defecting when they observe an opponent of type $L_K$. If $p$ is large enough, their opponent is likely to observe their signal as well and begin defecting at stage $l$ as well. This implies (again for large enough $p$) that starting to defect one stage earlier is strictly better. This implies that either type $L_k$ does not play a best response (if $L + 1 \leq k$) or that mutants with type $L_{k+1}$ who play like type $L_k$ except that they defect one stage earlier against $L_k$ opponents would fare strictly better.

6 Concluding remarks

1. **Other heuristics for long horizons**: In our model we assumed that all players use a “grim” heuristic whenever the horizon is larger than their forward-looking ability. One could relax this assumption by allowing a player to choose his strategy for long horizons from some fixed set of heuristics. For example, the set of possible heuristics might be the strategies with “memory-1” (which depend only on the actions observed in the previous stage). Observe that these “memory-1” strategies include the “grim” heuristics: cooperate at stage 1, and cooperate at any later stage if and only if both players cooperated at the previous stage. A strategy of a player of type $L_k$ in this setup specifies two strategic components for each possible signal about the opponent’s type: (1) the heuristic he plays when the horizon is larger than $k$, and (2) the (unrestricted) strategy he plays when the horizon is at most $k$. It is immediate to apply our first result (Proposition 1) in this setup, and show that any configuration in $C$ in which all players choose grim as their heuristic is stable. We conjuncture that there are only two sets of
6 Concluding remarks

stable configurations in this extended setup: (1) the efficient configurations in \( C \) in which all players use a “nice” (cooperate at the first stage) and “retaliating” heuristic (defect if your opponent defected at the previous stage), and (2) inefficient configurations in which all players defect at all stages (and use “always-defect” heuristics).

2. **Analogy-based expectation equilibrium:** Our model of bounded forward looking types could also be formulated using Jehiel (2005)’s Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium (ABEE). In this formulation a player of type \( L_k \) bundles all nodes with horizon of at least \( k \) into a single analogy class (while fully-differentiating among nodes with horizons smaller than \( k \)), and expects his opponent to play the same in all nodes of this class. The requirement that players play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a configuration (restricted by \( k \)-grim consistency) is replaced with the requirement that players play an ABEE in a configuration: at each stage every player best-responds to his analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior in every class. As in the previous remark: (1) it is immediate to show that every configuration in \( C \) is stable in this formulation, and (2) we conjecture that there are only two sets of stable configurations in this ABEE formulation: efficient \( C \)-like configurations (in which everyone is “nice” and “retaliating” in his non-trivial analogy-class), and inefficient configurations in which all players defect at all stages.

3. **Random continuation probability:** Our model assumes that the repeated interaction has a deterministic constant length, and that players completely ignore this fact when the horizon is too large. These assumptions may seem unrealistic. However, one should note that the model may be a reduced-form for a more realistic interaction with a random length and incomplete information. Specifically, let \( T \) be the random unknown length of each interaction. Assume that the interaction lasts at least \( M \) rounds \( (Pr (T \geq M) = 1) \), and that the continuation probability at each stage \( (Pr (T \> n|T \> n - 1)) \) is not too far from 1. Bounded forward-looking is modeled in this setup as the stage in which a player becomes aware to the timing of the final period: player of type \( L_k \) gets a signal about the final period of the interaction (i.e., about the realization of \( T \)) \( k \) stages before the end. In this setup, players are not restricted in their strategies (each type may play any strategy at any horizon). As in the previous remarks: (1) it is immediate to see that any configuration in \( C \) is stable, and (2) we conjecture that other stable configurations are only those in which everyone defects at all stages.

4. **Level 0:** In the main model we do not allow players to belong to “level-0” \( (L_0) \) who
follow *grim* strategy at all rounds of the interaction. Such “level-0” players play a strictly-dominated strategy (cooperating at the last stage), and we chose to omit them from the model as such extreme bounded forward-looking may seem implausible. We note that our results are qualitatively robust to the addition of type $L_0$ in the following sense. All of our results would remain shift a single step backwards: the naive players in the stable configurations in $C$ would be of type $L_0$ instead of $L_1$, and the sophisticated players would look 1-2 steps ahead instead of 2-3 steps.

5. **Other games**: The formal analysis deals only with iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, we conjecture that the results can be extended to other games in which iterated reasoning decreases payoffs. In particular, the extension of our results to “centipede”-like games (Rosenthal (1981)) is relatively straightforward. Such game can represent sequential interactions of gift exchanges. Such interactions were important in primitive hunter-gatherer populations (see, e.g., Haviland, Prins, and Walrath (2007), P. 440), which driven the biological evolution of human characteristics.

A  **Proofs**

A.1  **Proposition 1 - Stability of Configurations in $C$**

**Proposition. 1** Let $\frac{A}{(A-1)^2} < p < \frac{A-1}{A}$. Any configuration $(\mu, b) \in C$ (see Theorem 1) is stable.

**Proof.** We divide the proof into three lemmas: we first show that the configuration is balanced (Lemma 1), then we show that the configuration only includes strict best replies (Lemma 2), and finally we show stability against mutations (Lemma 3).

**Lemma 1.** Any configuration $(\mu, b) \in C$ is balanced.

**Proof.** Let $q = \mu (L_1)$ be the frequency of the naive players. A naive player gets $(L - 1) A + 1$ against a naive opponent, and $(L - 2) A + 1$ against a sophisticated player. A sophisticated player gets $(L - 2) A + (A + 1) + 1 = (L - 1) A + 2$ against naive, and against a sophisticated opponent he gets: $(L - 3) A + 3$ if both players identify each other, $(L - 3) A + (A + 1) + 2 = (L - 2) A + 3$ if only he identifies his opponent, $(L - 3) A + 0 + 2$ if only his opponent identifies him, and $(L - 2) A + 2$ if both players identify each other. The different types get the same payoff if:
\begin{align*}
q((L - 1)A + 1) + (1 - q)((L - 2)A + 1) &= q((L - 1)A + 2) + (1 - q) \\
(p^2((L - 3)A + 3) + p(1 - p)((L - 2)A + 3) + ((L - 3)A + 2)) + (1 - p)^2((L - 2)A + 2)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
q &= (1 - q)(A - (2p^2 + p(1 - p)(A + 3) + (1 - p)^2(A + 1)))
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
q &= (1 - q)(A - (p(1 - A) + (A + 1)))
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
q &= (1 - q)(-p(1 - A) - 1) = (1 - q)(p(A - 1) - 1)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
q(p(A - 1) - 1 + 1) &= p(A - 1) - 1
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
q &= \frac{p(A - 1) - 1}{p(A - 1)} \quad (1)
\end{align*}

Observe, that for each $p \geq \frac{1}{A - 1}$ we get a valid value of $0 \leq q \leq 1$. \hfill \Box

**Lemma 2.** In any configuration $(\mu, b) \in C$ all types play a best response (thus, these configurations are well defined). Moreover, any deviation that induces a different play on-equilibrium-path, yields a strictly worse outcome.

**Proof.** We have to show that all types play a best response (among the $k$-grim strategies). This is immediate for the naive player, as his only choice is between cooperating and defecting at the last stage, and the latter strictly dominates the former. We have to show that the sophisticated players play best responses. It is immediate that $d_2$ is a strict best response against naive opponents. Next, we show that playing $d_2$ against a stranger is strictly better than playing $d_3$. This is true if the following inequality holds (looking at the payoff of the
last 3 rounds):

\[ q (2A + 2) + (1 - q) (2p + (1 - p) (A + 2)) > q (A + 3) + (1 - q) (3p + (1 - p) (A + 3)) \]

\[ q (A - 1) > (1 - q) \]

\[ q > \frac{1}{A} \]

Using (1) one obtains:

\[ \frac{p (A - 1) - 1}{p (A - 1)} > \frac{1}{A} \]

\[ pA (A - 1) - A > p (A - 1) \]

\[ pA^2 - pA - A > pA - p \]

\[ p (A^2 - 2A + 1) > A \]

\[ p > \frac{A}{(A - 1)^2} \]

It is immediate that \( d_2 \) is also strictly better (against strangers) than any other strategy that induces a different play on-equilibrium-path. We are left with showing that it is strict better for a sophisticated player to play \( d_3 \) and not \( d_4 \) against a sophisticated opponent (and this immediately implies that \( d_3 \) is strictly better against identified sophisticated opponents than any other strategy that induces a different play on-equilibrium-path). This is true if the following inequality holds (focusing on the payoffs of the last 4 rounds, as all preceding payoffs are the same):

\[ p (A + 3) + (1 - p) (2A + 3) > p (A + 4) + (1 - p) (A + 4) \]

\[ (1 - p) (A - 1) > p \]

\[ A - 1 > Ap \]

\[ p < \frac{A - 1}{A} \]

Lemma 3. Any configuration \((\mu, b) \in C\) is stable.

Proof. We have to show resistance against mutations (for all variants of stability presented in this paper). Observe first that naive players fare strictly worse than sophisticated agents
against naive opponents (the sophisticated players obtain an additional fitness point by defecting when the horizon is equal to 2). As the configuration is balanced, it immediately implies that sophisticated players fare strictly worse than naive agents against sophisticated opponents. This implies that if $\epsilon$ naive (sophisticated) players join the population and play the same as the naive (sophisticated) incumbents, then naive (sophisticated) agents would fare worse (as their number has become larger and they fare worse against themselves). This implies that the mutants would fare worse than all the incumbents. Next, observe that any mutants of type $L_2$ would fare strictly worse than the sophisticated players: $L_2$ players would fare the same when they do not observe their opponent, and fare strictly worse when they observe a sophisticated opponent. Finally, if sophisticated mutants enter the population and play differently on-equilibrium-path, then they would earn strictly less due to Lemma (2). □

### A.2 Proposition 2 - Instability of Configurations Outside $C$

**Proposition.** Let $\frac{1}{A-1} < p < \frac{A-2}{A-1}$ and let $(\mu, b)$ be a configuration outside $C$. Then $(\mu, b)$ is not stable.

The proposition follows immediately from the following lemmas.

**Lemma 4.** If any player ever defects in a configuration, then both players defect at all following stages.

*Proof.* Assume to the contrary that player 1 defected at some stage of the game. After the deviation it is common knowledge, that player 1 plays rationally. Similarly, it is also common knowledge that player 2 either defects (if his horizon hasn’t arrived yet) or play rationally. The fact that the game is dominance solvable then implies that both players must defect at all the following stages. □

The lemma immediately implies the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.** It can be assumed without loss of generality that in any configuration, and given any signal about the opponent, all players play with positive probability only strategies $d_l$ for some $l$.

**Lemma 5.** Let $(\mu, b)$ be a configuration. Let type $L_k \in C(\mu)$ be the smallest type in the population. Then: (1) $L_k$ always defects with probability 1 at horizon $k$; (2) all other types in the population always defect with probability 1 at horizon $k + 1$; and (3) if $\frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)} < p$ and $\mu(L_k) = 1$ then the configuration is not stable.
Proof. It is common knowledge that all types are at least $k$. This implies that defecting when the horizon is equal to $k$ is the unique strategy that survives iterations of eliminating dominated strategies, and thus all players must defect with probability 1 when the horizon is equal to $k$ given any signal about the opponent (as the strategy profile in a configuration must be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium). This, in turn, implies that all agents of type higher than $k$ must defect with probability 1 at horizon $k + 1$. To prove part (3), observe that if $k < M$, then $\epsilon$ mutants of type $L_{k+1}$ would fare strictly better than the incumbents. If $k = M$, $\epsilon$ mutants of type $L_1$ would fare strictly better than the incumbents: with probability $1 - p$ the mutant’s type is unobservable and he would obtain 1 point less than the incumbents (when facing an incumbent). With probability $p$ the mutant is identified and he obtains $(M - 2) \cdot (A - 1) - 1$ points more than the incumbents. This implies the mutants would earn strictly more than the incumbents if and only if:

$$1 - p < p ((M - 2) \cdot (A - 1) - 1) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$p > \frac{1}{(M - 2) \cdot (A - 1)}.$$

Lemma 6. If Players of type $L_k$ are indifferent between playing $d_l$ and $d_{l'}$ against strangers with $k \geq l > l'$ in a stable configuration, then they can not play $d_{l'}$ with positive probability.

Proof. Assume to the contrary that players of type $L_k$ are indifferent between defecting at horizon $l$ and horizon $l'$ when playing against strangers, and that they play $d_{l'}$ with positive probability. Consider mutants of type $L_k$ who defect at horizon $l$ against strangers (and play the same as the incumbents in all other cases). Such mutants would fare strictly better than the incumbents of type $L_k$ who happen to begin defecting against strangers only at the smaller horizon $l'$: pre-entry both strategies yielded the same payoff, now as there a bit more early defectors, defecting at the larger horizon $l$ is strictly better. This implies that the configuration cannot be stable or adjusting-stable.

The lemma immediately implies the following corollary:

Corollary 3. All players only use pure strategies when playing against strangers in a stable configuration.

Lemma 7. Let $p < \frac{A - 2}{A - 1}$. Let $(\mu, b)$ be a balanced configuration. Let type $L_{k_1} \in C(\mu)$ be the smallest type in the population. Assume that there exist type $k_2$ who begins defecting at
horizon $l_2$ (with probability 1) against strangers and that $k_1 < l_2 - 1$. Then, the configuration is not stable.

**Proof.** It is sufficient to show that type $L_{k_1}$ gets an higher payoff when playing against $L_{k_1}$ than $L_{k_2}$ gets against $L_{k_1}$ (because if this holds, then an entry of $\epsilon$ mutants of type $L_{k_1}$ who play like the incumbents would violate stability and adjusting-stability). Due to Lemma 5, type $k_1$ always begin defecting at stage $k_1$, and thus gets against itself the following payoff: $(L - k_1) A + k_1$. Type $k_2$ gets 1 more if he observes $k_1$’s type (probability $p$), but gets $(l_2 - k_1 - 1) (A - 1) - 1$ less if he doesn’t observe (probability $1 - p$). Thus type $k_1$ gets a higher payoff against itself if:

$$(((l_2 - k_1 - 1) (A - 1) - 1) (1 - p) > (A - 2) (1 - p) > p$$

This holds if:

$$p < \frac{A - 2}{A - 1}$$

**Lemma 8.** Let $\frac{1}{A - 1} < p < \frac{A - 2}{A - 1}$. Let $(\mu, b)$ be a balanced configuration. Let $L_{k_1} \in C(\mu)$ be the lowest type in the population. Then:

1. Type $L_{k_1}$ always plays $d_k$ (begin defecting at horizon $k$). All other types $L_k \neq L_{k_1}$ play $d_{k_1 + 1}$ against strangers and against an observed $L_{k_1}$, and play $d_{k_1 + 2}$ when they observe an opponent with any other type $L_k \neq L_{k_1}$.
2. If $\mu(L_{k_1}) \neq 1 - \frac{1}{p(A - 1)}$ then the configuration is not stable.
3. If $k_1 > 1$ then the configuration is not stable.

**Proof.**

1. Type $L_{k_1}$ behavior is immediately implied from Lemma 5. By Lemma 8, all other types $L_k \neq L_{k_1}$ play $d_{k_1 + 1}$ against strangers (and against observed $L_{k_1}$). If $p < \frac{A - 1}{A}$, then by a similar argument to the one given in Lemma 2 all other types $L_k \neq L_{k_1}$ play $d_{k_1 + 2}$ against observed types $L_k \neq L_{k_1}$.
2. Assume first that $\mu(L_{k_1}) = 1$. If $k_1 < N$ then $\epsilon$ mutants of type $k_1 + 1$ who always play $d_{k_1 + 1}$ would earn strictly more than the incumbents. If $k_1 = N$, then we show that $\epsilon$ mutants of type $L_1$ would fare strictly more than the incumbents. The mutants would get 1 less point than the incumbents when their type is unobserved, and $(N - 2)$. 


$(A - 1) - 1$ more points if their type is observed. Thus, they would earn strictly more than the incumbents if:

$$1 - p < p \cdot ((N - 2) \cdot (A - 1)) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$1 < p \cdot ((N - 2) \cdot (A - 1)) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$p > \frac{1}{(N - 2) \cdot (A - 1)},$$

which holds for every $p > \frac{1}{A - 1}$ (as $N > 2$). We are left with case that $\mu(L_{k_1}) = 1$. In this case, the balance between the payoff of type $L_{k_1}$ and the higher types implies (in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1) that $p(L_{k_1}) = 1 - \frac{1}{p(A - 1)}$.

3. Now assume $k_1 > 1$. Consider $\epsilon$ mutants of type 1 who enter the population. We show that these mutants earn strictly more than type $k_1$. This is true because type 1 and type $k_1$ get the same payoff whenever their types are unobserved and their opponent has a type larger than $k_1$. Type $k_1$ gets at most 1 more point when the opponent is of type $k_1$. Type 1 gets at least $A - 1$ points more when the opponent identifies him and has type larger than $k_1$. Thus the mutants would get a strictly higher payoff if:

$$(1 - \mu(k_1)) p(A - 1) > \mu(k_1)$$

$$p(A - 1) > \mu(k_1) (1 + p(A - 1))$$

$$\frac{p(A - 1)}{1 + p(A - 1)} > \mu(k_1) = 1 - \frac{1}{p(A - 1)} = \frac{p(A - 1) - 1}{p(A - 1)}$$

Which always holds.

A.3 Theorem 2 - Stable Configurations Near 0 and 1

Theorem. 2

1. Let $0 \leq p < \frac{1}{(M - 2)(A - 1)}$. Then there exists a unique stable configuration where all players have type $L_M$ and they defect at all stages.

2. Let $1 \geq p > \frac{A - 1}{A}$. Then in any stable configuration there is a positive frequency of players of type $L_M$, and these players defect at all stages when observing an opponent of type $L_M$.

Proof.

1. We begin by showing the stability of the configuration in which all players have type $L_M$ and they defect at all stages. It is immediate that player best respond to each
other and that the balance property holds. By a similar argument to the proof of Lemma 5, $\epsilon$ mutants with type $k < L$ would fare worse than the incumbents if and only if 
$$\frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)} < p.$$ 
This implies that the configuration in which all players are fully-rational and defect at all stages is stable if and only if 
$$p < \frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)}.$$ 

Next we show that no other configuration is stable when 
$$p < \frac{1}{A-1}$$ (thus, if 
$$\frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)} < p < \frac{1}{A-1}$$ then no stable configuration exist). By Lemmas 7 and 10, in any stable configuration, all players have wither type $L_k$ and they always play $d_k$ or they have higher types and they play against strangers $d_{k+1}$. If the entire population has type $L_k$ and $k < M$, then mutants type $L_{k+1}$ would earn strictly more. Otherwise, by similar arguments to those given in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 if $p < \frac{1}{A-1}$ then either the configuration is unbalanced, or the higher types do not play a strictly best reply.

2. Assume first that no fully-rational players exist in the population: $\mu(L_N) = 0$. In this case, fully-rational mutants who defect one stage earlier then an identified opponent with the highest existing type, and imitate that highest existing type in all other cases, would earn strictly more then the incumbents. Now, assume that fully-rational players exist, and that they play $d_k$ when observing a fully-rational opponent for some $k < N$. Consider fully-rational mutants who play $d_{k+1}$ when observing a fully-rational opponent, and imitate incumbents otherwise. Such mutants would get 1 more point against a fully-rational opponent if both players identify each other. If only they identify their fully-rational opponent they would get at most $A-1$ less points. In all other cases they would fare the same as the fully-rational incumbents. This imply that the mutants would fare strictly better if:

$$p > (1 - p) \cdot (A - 1) \iff$$

$$pA > (A - 1) \iff$$

$$p > \frac{A - 1}{A}$$

B Robustness to Alternative Stability Notions

In this appendix we present a few alternative notions of stability (Subsection B.1), and we demonstrate the robustness of our results to the exact way in which stability is defined (subsection B.1.2). The presentation and the discussion of the alternative definitions may be
of a separate interest for readers who are interested in applications of indirect evolutionary approach in other setups.

B.1 Alternative Definitions of Stability

In this subsection we present a few alternative ways to define stability, which differ in: (1) the way mutant’s payoff is compared with the incumbent’s payoff, (2) the way incumbents react to entry of mutants.

B.1.1 Weak Stability

The requirement in Definition 3 that the mutants must earn lower fitness than any incumbent may be too strong. When the entrants earn more than some incumbents, but less than the mean payoff of the incumbents, the mutants would be eliminated from the population. However, in this case it is not clear in general if the induced decline in the frequency of the incumbents who fare the worst would cause the aggregate behavior to move farther from the equilibrium. In some examples, the aggregate behavior would move back to the equilibrium. One such example, is a variant of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with a victory yielding 1.5 and a loss giving -1. Assume that there are 3 types in the population \{rock, scissors, paper\}, and that each type limits its members to only use “its” action (i.e., types directly determine member’s actions). Further assume that the pre-entry distribution of types is uniform over all these 3 types. Then an entry of \(\epsilon\) mutants of type rock would violate our notion of stability (Definition 3), because the entrants would fare strictly better than incumbents of type scissors. Yet, it is well known that under the replicator dynamics, such mutants (that fare, on average, worse than the incumbents) would be eliminated without disturbing the equilibrium (see, e.g., Neeman, 1980).

In what follows we present a weaker notion, according to which entrants are only required to fare on average worse than the incumbents. We interpret this notion as a necessary requirement for evolutionary stability, and we use it to refine our uniqueness results in the next subsection. Formally:

**Definition 4.** A configuration \((\mu, b)\) is *weakly-stable* if it is balanced and there exists \(\epsilon_0 > 0\), such that for each \(0 < \epsilon \leq \epsilon_0\), \(L_k \in \mathcal{L}\) and strategy profile \(\sigma_k = (\sigma_k(k') \in \Sigma_{k'}), k' \in C(\mu) \cup \bar{k} \cup \emptyset\), the mutants fare worse on average than the incumbents in any perturbed configuration \((\tilde{\mu}, \tilde{b})\) = \((\mu, b), (\mu, \epsilon, L_k, \sigma_k)\). That is:

1. If \(L_k \notin C(\mu)\) then \(\Pi_k(\tilde{\mu} | \tilde{b}) \leq \sum_{k \in C(\mu)} \mu(k) \cdot \Pi_k(\tilde{\mu} | \tilde{b})\).
2. If $L_k \in C(\mu)$ then $\Pi_{k,\sigma_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b}) \leq \sum_{k \in C(\mu)} \mu(k) \cdot \Pi_{k,b_k}(\tilde{\mu}|\tilde{b})$.

It is immediate to see any stable configuration is also weakly-stable.

### B.1.2 DEY-Stability (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007))

A different way one may criticize our definition of stability is our assumption that the incumbents continue playing the same strategy unless they observe a new mutant type. This implies that post-entry the incumbent may play an approximate best response, but not necessarily an exact one. This is because they do not take into account the presence of the $\epsilon$ mutants when playing against strangers. Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)’s notion of stability takes the opposite assumption: post-entry the incumbents adapt their strategies such that the new strategy profile is again an exact equilibrium. They require that there exists post-entry equilibria in which the incumbents pay is only slightly changed (dubbed, approximate focal equilibria), and that in all these equilibria the mutants would fare worse than all incumbents.

In order to formally present their notion, we shall introduce some notation. Let $N_{\epsilon_0}(\mu, L_k)$ be the set of all distributions resulting from entry by no more than $\epsilon_0$ mutants of type $L_k$ to population $\mu$. Formally:

$$N_{\epsilon_0}(\mu, L_k) = \{\mu' : \mu' = (1 - \epsilon) \mu + \epsilon L_k, 0 \leq \epsilon < \epsilon_0\}$$

Let $\delta \geq 0$. Beginning with a configuration $(\mu, b)$, and following an entry by at most $\epsilon_0$ mutants of type $L_k$ leading to $\tilde{\mu} \in N_{\epsilon}(\mu, L_k)$, an equilibrium $\tilde{b}^E \in B_p(\tilde{\mu})$ is $\delta$-focal if incumbent’s behavior is changed by at most $\delta$, that is, $|\tilde{b}^E_k(k') - b_k(k')| \leq \delta$ (whenever $p > 0$) and $|\tilde{b}^E_k(\emptyset) - b_k(\emptyset)| \leq \delta$ (whenever $p < 1$) for all $L_k, L_k' \in C(\mu)$. An equilibrium is focal if it is 0-focal. Notice that when the entrants have a new type ($L_k \notin C(\mu)$), then a $\delta$-focal equilibrium does not restrict the behavior of entrants, nor does it restrict the behavior of incumbents when they observe that they have been matched with mutants. Let $B^\delta_p(\tilde{\mu}|b)$ denote the set of all $\delta$-focal equilibria relative to $b$ if the post-entry distribution is $\tilde{\mu}$.

Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) assume that any focal equilibrium can potentially arise following a mutation. Thus, $DEY$-stability requires that in all of them, entrants earn no higher fitness than any incumbent. However, not all post-entry populations will have focal equilibria. In that case, they require that approximate focal equilibria exist, and that in all of them entrants earn no higher fitness than any incumbent. Formally:

\footnote{We simplified the original more complex notion of almost-focal equilibria in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), using the fact that the set of possible types in our setup is finite.}
**Definition 5.** A configuration \((\mu, b)\) is \textit{DEY-stable} if it balanced and for every \(\delta_0 > 0\) there exist \(0 \leq \delta \leq \delta_0\) and \(\epsilon > 0\) such that for every \(L_k \in \mathcal{L}\) and \(\tilde{\mu} \in N_\epsilon (\mu, L_k)\), \(u_k (\tilde{\mu} | \tilde{b}) \geq u_k (\mu | b)\) for all \(\tilde{b} \in B^{\delta}_p (\tilde{\mu} | b)\) and \(L_k \in C (\mu)\).

We think that Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)’s assumption that the incumbents adjust their play to have an exact post-entry equilibrium in less plausible when the mutants have a type and play a strategy that was already existed before the entry. Such \(\epsilon\) mutants can enter the population very quickly. In particular, they may not be “mutants” in the biological sense, they may simply be the result of a small difference between the realized number of offspring of some type and its expectation. Such a small change in the distribution of play, which does not introduce of a new type or a new strategy, is unlikely to be unnoticed, and the incumbents may not have an opportunity to adjust their play in this case.

Moreover, Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)’s adjustment causes their notion to be inconsistent with Maynard Smith (1982)’s neutral stability, and to predict counter-intuitive result in the following example: a single-stage 2-strategy \((T, B)\) symmetric coordination game with a single fully-rational type. One can see that the mixed symmetric equilibrium that gives equal weight to both actions is DEY-stable, while it is not stable according to our definition, nor it is neutral stable à la Maynard Smith (1982). Consider, an entry of \(\epsilon\) mutants who play \(T\). Such an entry is adjusted by the incumbents slightly decreasing the probability of choosing \(T\) from 0.5 to \(0.5 - \epsilon\). Such a prediction is counter-intuitive: first, it is not clear how the incumbents become aware about the mutants, and second, the incumbents adjust by playing less often the better strategy (the one that before the adjustment yielded a strictly higher payoff).

**B.1.3 Adjusting-Stability**

When the mutants have a new type (or play a new strategy that was never played before), the adjustment to a new exact equilibrium seems more plausible, as the incumbents immediately observe things (types or actions) that were never existed before, thus the entry is quickly recognized. With this intuition we offer the following definition which is a mixture of our original definition (Definition 3) and DEY-stability. Specifically, when checking if a configuration is \textit{adjusting-stable} we assume that post-entry behavior of incumbents is unadjusted (perturbed configuration as in Definition 2) if the mutants both have a type and play a strategy that existed in the pre-entry population, and it is adjusted into an approximate focal equilibrium if the type or the strategy are new (formal definition is straightforward and it is omitted for brevity).
B.1.4 Undominated-Stability

In our solution concept we assume that incumbents best reply to observed mutants (who belong to new types that have not existed in the population before). One can relax this assumption, and allow the incumbents to play against observed mutants any strategy that is not strictly dominated. With this relaxed assumption, one can define *undominated-stability*, by requiring that mutants would fare worse than incumbents in any perturbed configuration and given any undominated strategy the incumbents play against observed mutants (not necessarily a best reply). It is immediate to see that undominated-stability implies stability.

B.2 Robustness of The Results

In this subsection we show that our results are robust to other definitions of stability:

1. The stable configurations (the set $C$) that we characterized in Theorem 1 are also stable according to all other definitions.

2. All other configurations (outside $C$) are also unstable according to the adjusting-stability and undominated-stability variants (in the same interval of $p$-s).

3. The weak-stability and DEY-stability variants may induce other stable configurations, but all of them (in the interval $\max\left(\frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)}, \frac{1}{(A-1)^2}\right) < p < 1 - \frac{2(A-1)}{A^2-A}$) would have similar properties to the configurations in $C$: the population will include naive players of type $L_1$ and sophisticated players of higher types who start defecting only 2-4 stages before the end.

B.2.1 Adjusting-stability and Undominated-stability

It is immediate to see that all the proofs of our results (Appendix A) hold also for adjusting stability and undominated stability. In particular, the only place in the proofs that we relied on incumbents best-responding to observed mutants was in part (3) of Lemma 8, where entry of mutants of type $L_1$ was considered. In this case, the incumbents have a unique dominating strategy against identified mutants, and thus the proof remains unchanged.

B.2.2 Weak-Stability and DEY-Stability

Lemmas 1-5 hold for weak-stability and DEY-stability with minor adaptations. In particular, it is immediate that any configuration in $C$ is also weakly-stable and DEY-stable. However, the proofs of Lemmas 6-7 are not valid for the setup of weak-stability and DEY-stability.
The following proposition shows that any weak-stable or DEY-stable configuration has key properties that are qualitatively similar to the configurations in $C$ : the population will include naive players of type $L_1$ and sophisticated players of higher types who start defecting 2-4 stages before the end.

**Proposition 3.** Let $\max \left(\frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)} \cdot \frac{1}{(A-1)^2}\right) < p < 1 - \frac{2A-1}{A^2 - A}$ and let $(\mu, b)$ be a weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) configuration. Then:

1. $0 < \mu(L_1) < 1$. Players of type $L_1$ always play $d_1$.
2. All other types $L_k \neq L_1$ only start defecting at the last four rounds.

**Proof.** The proposition follows from the following three lemmas.

**Lemma 9.** Let $(\mu, b)$ be a weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) configuration, let $L_{k_1} \in C(\mu)$ be the lowest type in the population and let $p > \frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)}$. Then $\mu(L_k) < 1$, and the mean probability that a random player with type different than $L_{k_1}$ plays $d_{k_1+1}$ against strangers (denoted by $q$) is at-least:

\[
\frac{(A-1) \cdot (1-p) - 1}{(A-1) \cdot (1-p)}.
\]

**Proof.** $\mu(L_{k_1}) < 1$ is implied by Lemma 5 (which is valid also for weak-stability and DEY-stability). Type $L_{k_1}$ gets $(L - k_1) \cdot A + k_1$ points when playing against itself. A random player with a type different than $L_{k_1}$ who plays against $L_{k_1}$ gets at most $(L - k_1) \cdot A + k_1 + 1$ when he observes his opponent’s type, and an expected payoff of at most $q \cdot ((L - k_1) \cdot A + k_1 + 1) + (1-q) \cdot ((L - k_1 - 1) \cdot A + k_1 + 2)$. This implies that other types fare better when playing against $L_{k_1}$ than the payoff that $L_{k_1}$ gets against itself only if (subtracting the equal amount of $(L - k_1 - 1) \cdot A + k_1$ from each payoff):

\[
A \leq p \cdot (A + 1) + (1-p) \cdot (q \cdot (A + 1) + 2 \cdot (1-q))
\]

\[
A \leq 1 + p \cdot A + (1-p) \cdot (q \cdot A + 1 - q)
\]

\[
A - \frac{1}{1-p} \leq q \cdot A + 1 - q
\]

\[
A - 1 - \frac{1}{1-p} \leq q \cdot (A - 1)
\]
\[ 1 - \frac{1}{(A-1) \cdot (1-p)} \leq q \]

\[ \frac{(A-1) \cdot (1-p) - 1}{(A-1) \cdot (1-p)} \leq q \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The configuration may be weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) only if \( \frac{(A-1) \cdot (1-p) - 1}{(A-1) \cdot (1-p)} \leq q \). \( \square \)

**Lemma 10.** Let \((\mu, b)\) be a weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) configuration, let \( L_{k_1} \in C(\mu) \) be the lowest type in the population, and let \( 1 - \frac{2A-1}{A^2 - A} > p > \frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)} \). Then:

1. No player defects with positive probability against strangers at horizon strictly larger than \( k_1 + 2 \).

2. No player defects with positive probability against any other player at horizon strictly larger than \( k_1 + 3 \).

**Proof.**

1. Assume to the contrary that there is a type who defects with positive probability against strangers at horizon \( l > k_1 + 2 \). This implies that \( d_l \) yields a weekly better payoff against strangers than \( d_{k_1 + 2} \). This can occur only if:

\[ q \cdot (1 - p) \cdot (A - 1) \leq ((1 - q) + qp) \cdot 1 \]

\[ q \cdot (1 - p) \cdot (A - 1) \leq 1 - q \cdot (1 - p) \]

\[ q \cdot (1 - p) \cdot A \leq 1 \]

\[ q \leq \frac{1}{(1-p) \cdot A} . \]

Substituting (2) yields:

\[ \frac{(A-1) \cdot (1-p) - 1}{(A-1) \cdot (1-p)} \leq \frac{1}{(1-p) \cdot A} \]

\[ A \cdot ((A-1) \cdot (1-p) - 1) \leq (A - 1) \]

\[ A \cdot (A - 1) \cdot (1-p) - A \leq A - 1 \]

\[ A \cdot (A - 1) \cdot (1-p) \leq 2 \cdot A - 1 \]

\[ 1 - p \leq \frac{2 \cdot A - 1}{A \cdot (A-1)} \]
\[ p \geq 1 - \frac{2 \cdot A - 1}{A^2 - A}, \]

and we get a contradiction to \( p < 1 - \frac{2A-1}{A^2-A} \).

2. Strategy \( d_l \) \((l > k_1 + 3)\) may yield a better payoff than \( d_{k_1+3} \) only if:

\[
(1 - p) \cdot (A - 1) \leq p \cdot 1 \\
A - 1 \leq p \cdot A \\
\frac{A - 1}{A} \leq p.
\]

The latter inequality cannot hold because \( 1 - \frac{2A-1}{A^2-A} < \frac{A-1}{A} \) for every \( A > 1 \).

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 11.** Let \((\mu, b)\) be a weakly-stable (resp. DEY-stable) configuration, let \( L_{k_1} \in C(\mu) \) be the lowest type in the population, and let \( 1 - \frac{2A-1}{A^2-A} > p > \max \left( \frac{1}{(M-2)(A-1)}, \frac{1}{(A-1)^2} \right) \). Then:

1. If every type different than \( L_{k_1} \) always plays \( d_{k_1+1} \) against strangers, then the configuration must be in \( C \).

2. If there are types who play with positive probability \( d_{k_1} + 2 \) against strangers than \( \mu(L_{k_1}) \leq \frac{1}{3} \).

3. \( k_1 \) must be equal to 1.

**Proof.**

1. If everyone besides type \( L_{k_1} \) always plays \( d_{k_1+1} \) against strangers, then we can immediately apply the arguments in the proof of Lemma 8, and conclude that the configuration must be in \( C \).

2. The fact that there are types who play with positive probability \( d_{k_1} + 2 \) against strangers implies that \( d_{k_1} + 2 \) yields a weakly-better payoff than \( d_{k_1+1} \) against strangers. This implies that:

\[
\mu(L_{k_1}) \cdot (A - 1) \leq (1 - \mu(L_{k_1})) \cdot 1 \\
\mu(L_{k_1}) \leq \frac{1}{A}.
\]  

3. Assume to the contrary that \( k_1 > 1 \). Observe that \( \epsilon \) mutants of type \( L_1 \) would fare strictly better than the incumbents of type \( L_{k_1} \) (and thus would fare strictly better than
all incumbents in the post-entry perturbed-configuration / approximate focal equilibrium) if:

\[ p \cdot (A - 1) \cdot (1 - \mu (L_{k1})) > \mu (L_{k1}) \cdot 1 \]

\[ p \cdot (A - 1) > \mu (L_{k1}) \cdot (1 + p \cdot (A - 1)) \]

\[ \frac{p \cdot (A - 1)}{1 + p \cdot (A - 1)} > \mu (L_{k1}). \]

Substituting (3) yields:

\[ \frac{p \cdot (A - 1)}{1 + p \cdot (A - 1)} > \frac{1}{A} \]

\[ p \cdot A \cdot (A - 1) > 1 + p \cdot (A - 1) \]

\[ p > \frac{1}{(A - 1)^2} \]

\[ \Box \]

References


Hyndman, K., A. Terracol, and J. Vaksmann (2012): “Beliefs and (In) Stability in Normal-Form Games.”


