Trust in government and its effect on preferences for income redistribution and perceived tax burden

Yamamura, Eiji (2012): Trust in government and its effect on preferences for income redistribution and perceived tax burden.

Abstract

This paper explores how a trust in government shared by neighbors is associated with individual preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions regarding income tax burden. Three measures for trust in government are used: “trust in ministries and government agencies”, “trust in diet members”, and “trust in members of municipal councils”. After controlling for individual characteristics, the key findings are: (1) people are more likely to express preferences for income redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high; (2) people are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low when trust in government in their residential area is high; and (3) when the sample is divided into high- and low-income earners, these results are only clearly observed for high-income earners and not low-income earners.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Trust in government; Redistribution; Perception of tax; Inequality
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General; D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D30 - General; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification

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