A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice

Dai, Darong and Shen, Kunrong (2012): A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice.

Abstract

In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Stochastic replicator dynamics; Rational choice; Normal-form game; Stability
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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