Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros and Metaxas, Theodore (2011): EU and US security policy from the cold war era to the 21st century: the institutional evolution of cfsp and the factors that determine the American military supremacy.
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Abstract
This article aims to clarify the main parameters that define security policy in Europe and the United States. A historical review on the principal economic, political and military agreements in these two dipoles of power is presented from the dawn of Cold War to nowadays. We also examine the institutional integration of European defense strategy from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to nowadays, and the crucial effects of the 11/9/2001 terroristic attack on US security policy implementation. A comparative analysis between EU and US defense capabilities is displayed mainly through the issue of their defense outlays from which we try to explain US military and geopolitical supremacy in comparison to the defense weaknesses of their European allies. The study also raises questions about the possible dangers the USA might face through their attempts to maintain their global hegemony even further than 2025/30. We conclude that the European security policy, which was strongly motivated via economic integration during Cold War era, is highly characterized by structural inefficiencies and the unwillingness of European US allies to spend more about their defense by acting as NATO free-riders, which entails the reduction of its effectiveness comparing to US defense strategy.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | EU and US security policy from the cold war era to the 21st century: the institutional evolution of cfsp and the factors that determine the American military supremacy |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Security Policy, USA, EU, American military supremacy |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F52 - National Security ; Economic Nationalism H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories |
Item ID: | 41003 |
Depositing User: | THEODORE METAXAS |
Date Deposited: | 03 Sep 2012 13:49 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 05:07 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/41003 |