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Abstract
We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperation case is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the wholesale price. Then, the retailers determine non-cooperatively the price for consumers. In the partial-cooperation case, retailers decide jointly for the price. In the full-cooperation case, all members of the channel cooperate by maximizing a joint profit function. Interestingly, partial-cooperation reduces the profits of retailers with respect to non-cooperation, when the degree of substituability between the two products proposed by retailers is low. Because of symmetry, this also implies that the total profit of retailers may decrease with partial-cooperation. We propose a cooperative implementable contract between all channel members, which shares the extra-profit due to full-cooperation. We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers’ surplus which positively depends not only on the price-demand function but also on the spending in national advertising. Partial-cooperation is always the worst case for the manufacturer, the whole channel, consumers’ surplus and social welfare, while full-cooperation is the best case.

Keywords: Game theory; National advertising; Partial-cooperation; Full-cooperation; Welfare.

1 Introduction
Supply channel management research has gained a considerable attention from both the academics and the practitioners. The supply channel is generally con-
ceptualized as a network of interconnected businesses that produce raw materials, change these materials into intermediate goods and then finished products, distribute and sale the products to the targeted consumers. One interesting issue in this area is how the actions taken by one member of the channel can influence the profitability of other members. The supply channel implies an important relationship between its different members as manufacturers and retailers. This relationship can be non-cooperative or cooperative. In the non-cooperative situation, each member of the supply channel has his own objective function. The members who act first, usually manufacturers, are leaders, while those who react, as retailers, are followers. In a cooperative situation, the channel members work together for the same goal.

Many studies on advertising efforts and pricing policy have focused on distribution channels formed by one manufacturer and one retailer. Karray and Zaccour (2006) proposed a model to study the decision of a private label introduction for a retailer and its effects on the manufacturer. They showed that the private label introduction improves the profits of both the retailer and the channel while harming the manufacturer’s profit. Nevertheless, under some conditions, the manufacturer could profit from the private label introduction. Yue et al. (2006) studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to consumers. They showed that for any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than without cooperation. Xie and Neyret (2009) discussed Nash, Stackelberg retailer, Stackelberg manufacturer and cooperative games. They solved the bargaining problem, engendered by the extra joint profit achieved by moving to cooperation, using the Nash bargaining model. Xie and Wei (2009) addressed channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a manufacturer-retailer distribution channel. They compared two models: one is a non-cooperative leader–follower game, where the leader is the manufacturer and the follower is the retailer, and the other is a cooperative game. They showed that cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel total profit, lower retail price to consumers, and higher advertising efforts for all channel members than the non-cooperative model. They identified the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra-profits generated by cooperation. SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) considered three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, the total profit of the whole channel is the highest and a scheme was determined by these authors to share the extra joint profit.

Other papers have been interested in distribution channels without advertising. Choi (1996) modeled price competition with a channel structure in which there are duopoly manufacturers and duopoly common retailers. They adopted a non-cooperative approach and derived managerial implications of the results.
Tsay and Agrawal (2004) reviewed the modeling of conflict and coordination in multi-channel distribution systems. They particularly emphasized the implications of the internet for distribution strategy and identified a number of opportunities for future research. Ingene and Parry (2004) presented the mathematical models of distribution channels with the objective to contribute to the creation of a *Unifying Theory of Distribution Channels*. Ingene and Parry (2007) developed a general, linear-demand model in which distributors face demand and costs heterogeneities. They derived six *Channel Propositions* and presented a *Channel-Modeling Proposition*. By considering a supplier-one (or more) retailer(s) supply channel, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by each retailer’s purchase quantity and price. Yang and Zhou (2006) considered the pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system with a manufacturer who supplies a single product to two competitive retailers. A Stackelberg structure is assumed where the manufacturer is a leader and the retailers are followers. They analyzed the effects of the duopolistic retailers’ different competitive behaviors (Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg) on the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailers. Xiao and Qi (2008) considered the coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers after the disruption of manufacturer’s production cost. They considered two coordination mechanisms: an all-units quantity discount and an incremental quantity discount. They developed the conditions under which the supply chain is coordinated and also discussed how the cost disruption may affect the coordination mechanisms.

Taboubi and Zaccour (2005) reviewed the major contributions in the literature that examined the issue of channel coordination according to the game theory approach. They highlighted the main literature results and identified research questions for further investigation. Karray and Zaccour (2007) considered a distribution channel formed by two manufacturers and two retailers to investigate whether cooperative advertising programs are profitable to such channels. They showed that, under some conditions, cooperative advertising may be profitable to retailers and the whole channel, but not to the manufacturers. However, their model is limited to local advertising with no national advertising, and full cooperation between the retailers or between all channel members are not studied. Wang et al. (2011) considered a distribution channel formed by one manufacturer and two retailers. They discussed four possible game structures: Stackelberg-Cournot, Stackelberg-collusion, Nash-Cournot and Nash-collusion. They revealed how cooperative advertising policies and profits of all participants are affected by various competitive behaviors. However, all their results are made under the heavy assumption that the retailers’ and the manufacturer’s marginal profits are exogenously determined. Moreover, welfare implications are not studied.

Our research is closely related to that of Xie and Wei (2009). We made some simplifications to their model by considering that there are no retailers’ local advertising expenditures and no manufacturer’s participation rate. However, we enrich their model by considering two competing retailers. This extension
enables us to study the case of cooperation between retailers. In addition, we evaluate the impact of cooperation between retailers and between all members of the supply channel on consumers’ and social welfare. Such welfare consequences are interesting and have not been done before by previous studies on supply channel.

We consider a supply channel game model with a single manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. The manufacturer sells a product with a wholesale price to the retailers, which sell the product purchased to final consumers. Without loss of generality, we suppose that production and handling costs are zero. The manufacturer uses national advertising to increase consumers’ interest in the product. Consumers’ effective-demand for the product depends not only on its price-demand, i.e. the demand due to the product price, but also on the advertisement effort made. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and national advertising spending. Then, the retailers determine the price for consumers. We consider and compare three cases. The non-cooperative case, where the manufacturer and the retailers decide non-cooperatively, and each of them maximizes its own profit. The partial-cooperation case, where only the two retailers cooperate by maximizing a joint profit function. Finally, in the full-cooperation case, the three members of the supply channel engage in a cooperative program and maximize the total profit of the supply channel. We note that for the first two cases, the manufacturer is the leader while the retailers are the followers. These games are solved backward to obtain subgame-perfect Nash equilibriums.

We show that when only retailers cooperate, this has no effect on the wholesale price, the price for consumers is the highest, while the quantity produced and the spending in advertising are the lowest with respect to non-cooperation and full-cooperation.

Interestingly, when the degree of substituability between the two goods proposed by retailers is not important, partial-cooperation deteriorates the profit of each retailer and, because of symmetry, deteriorates the total profit of retailers. This is the principal result of our paper. This result is new and non-obvious for symmetric retailers, because retailers are usually better off when they cooperate. This result is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed, when retailers unilaterally cooperate, the retail price increases and the spending in national advertising decreases leading to an important decrease in sales and in retailers’ profits.

Let’s notice that when retailers are symmetric, Yang and Zhou (2006) showed that each partially-cooperating retailer gains more than with non-cooperation. However, when retailers are asymmetric and face different demand functions, one retailer may be worse off, whereas the other may be better off, with partial-cooperation. The total profit of retailers being always higher with partial-cooperation. These results are intuitive. Wang et al. (2011) showed that partially-cooperating retailers can be worse off under some conditions for both symmetric special case and Stackelberg game. However, their findings are obtained under heavy hypotheses: the marginal profits per unit of retailers and manufacturer, and consequently the selling prices of retailers, are exogenously
When the degree of substituability between the two goods is sufficiently high, we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their profits with respect to non-cooperation. Moreover, partial-cooperation decreases the profit of the manufacturer because the wholesale price is not affected and the quantities sold are diminished. Consequently, and independently of whether the degree of substituability between the two goods is high or low, the total profit of the supply channel is the lowest when only retailers cooperate.

When all members of the supply channel cooperate, the price for consumers is the lowest, the spending in advertising, production and total profit of the supply channel are the highest. The manufacturer and retailers can determine a wholesale price enabling them to share this extra-profit due to full-cooperation. When this cooperative wholesale price is at its lower bound, all the extra-profit goes to the retailers; when it is at its higher bound, all the extra-profit goes to the manufacturer; and when it is in the middle, the extra-profit is equally shared by the manufacturer and the two retailers. We design a contract making this full-cooperative outcome implementable with a reasonable wholesale price.

We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers' surplus which does not depend only on the price-demand function, but it also depends positively on the spending in national advertising. We show that consumers' and social welfare are the lowest when only retailers cooperate, and they are the highest when all members of the channel cooperate. This constitutes an interesting and non-obvious contribution of our paper since previous studies have not evaluated the impact of cooperation on consumers' and social welfare.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic game-theoretic model. Section 3 solves the non-cooperation case. Section 4 solves the partial-cooperation game. Section 5 solves the full-cooperation case. Section 6 studies the extra-profit sharing. Section 7 discusses and compares the three cases studied, and Section 8 concludes.

2 The basic model

We consider a manufacturer-two-retailers distribution channel in which both retailers sell only the manufacturer’s brand within the product class. Decision variables for the manufacturer are the national advertising expenditure $A$ and the wholesale price to retailers $w$. The decision variables for the retailers are their retail prices $p_i, i = 1, 2$. For tractability reasons, we suppose that there are no local advertising expenditures for retailers. This is a leader-follower game: the manufacturer chooses his decision variables, then the retailers choose their retail prices. This game is solved backward to get a subgame-perfect

\footnote{The Robinson-Patman Act requires comparable treatment of competing retailers (Moorthy, 1987).}
Nash equilibrium. Let’s notice that our model is not suitable for the Nash or Stackelberg-retailers games.

The manufacturer uses brand advertising to increase consumers’ interest and demand for the good produced. Consumers’ demand $V_i$, or effective-demand, for the good proposed by retailer $i$, also known as the sale response function, depends on the retail prices and the advertising level as

$$V_i(p_i, p_j, A) = g_i(p_i, p_j)h(A), i = 1, 2, j = 3 - i$$ (1)

where $g_i(p_i, p_j)$ and $h(A)$ reflect the impact of the retail prices and the brand advertising expenditures on the demand of product $i$, respectively. To distinguish between the effective-demand and the demand due to price variations, we will call $g_i(p_i, p_j)$ as the price-demand function for product $i$.

As many studies (Xiao and Qi, 2008, Ingene and Parry, 2007), we assume that the price-demand function for product $i$ is linear with retail prices:

$$g_i(p_i, p_j) = 1 - p_i + \beta p_j, 0 < \beta < 1, i = 1, 2, j = 3 - i$$ (2)

where $\beta$ is the degree of substitutability between the two products proposed by retailers. The maximum value for $g_i(p_i, p_j)$ is normalized to 1 for simplicity of the expressions.

The impact of national advertising expenditures on the effective-demand of product $i$ is an increasing and concave function consistent with the advertising saturation effect:

$$h(A) = \sqrt{A}$$ (3)

Therefore, we have:

$$V_i(p_i, p_j, A) = (1 - p_i + \beta p_j)\sqrt{A}, i = 1, 2, j = 3 - i$$ (4)

We suppose that both the manufacturer’s unit production and the retailers’ unit handling costs are constant. We normalize them to zero to simplify our expressions.

The profits of the manufacturer, each retailer, the two retailers, and the whole system are, respectively:

$$\Pi_m = w(V_1 + V_2) - A$$ (5)

$$\Pi_{r_i} = (p_i - w)V_i$$ (6)

$$\Pi_{r_1+r_2} = (p_1 - w)V_1 + (p_2 - w)V_2$$ (7)

---

2Using a more general, symmetric and linear, price-demand function as $g_i(p_i, p_j) = a - \alpha p_i + \beta p_j, 0 < a, 0 < \beta < \alpha$, does not change our analytical results.

3We can use a more general function $h(A) = l\sqrt{A}, l > 0$, but this has no effect on our analytical results.
An important contribution of this paper is the evaluation of the impact of cooperations between retailers and between all members of the channel on consumers’ and social welfare.

The consumers’ surplus engendered by the consumption of quantity $V_i$ of the product sold by retailer $i$ is:

$$CS(V_i) = \int_0^{V_i} p_i(t) dt - p_i V_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

From (4), we have:

$$p_i(V_i) = 1 + \beta p_j - \frac{V_i}{\sqrt{A}}, i = 1, 2, j = 3 - i$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Using (10) in (9), we get:

$$CS(V_i) = \frac{V_i^2}{2\sqrt{A}} = \frac{g_i^2}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{A}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The above expression is a new evaluation of consumers’ surplus, or consumers’ welfare, which is function of the price-demand for the good and of the spending in advertising. It is a new one because we are accustomed with consumers’ surplus in micro-economic theory in function only of the price-demand. This expression shows that consumers’ surplus increases with the price-demand for the good, which is an usual result, and also increases with the national advertising spending, which is a new result.

The total consumers’ surplus, i.e. consumers’ welfare, engendered by the consumption of the two products is:

$$CS_t = CS(V_1) + CS(V_2)$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

We define the social welfare as the total consumers’ surplus plus the total profit of the supply channel:

$$S = CS_t + \Pi_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

In what follows, we will solve backward the three games.

3 The non-cooperation game

The three members of the supply channel behave non-cooperatively. It is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the manufacturer (leader) maximizes his profit with respect to its decision variables, which are $w$ and $A$. Then, each retailer
(follower) maximizes his profit function with respect to the price he proposes for consumers.

Solving the second-stage first-order conditions, which are\[ \frac{\partial \Pi_i}{\partial p_i} = 0, \ i = 1, 2, \]
gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:

\[ p_i^* = p^* = \frac{1 + w}{\delta} \quad (14) \]

where \( \delta = 2 - \beta \). We can verify that \( 1 < \delta < 2 \).

Using the expression given by (14) in (5), we get:

\[ \Pi_m^* = \frac{2}{\delta} w(1 - \lambda w) \sqrt{A} - A \quad (15) \]

where \( \lambda = 1 - \beta \), verifies \( 0 < \frac{1}{\delta} < 1/2 \).

Using (15) and solving the first-stage first-order conditions\(^4\) for the manufacturer, which are \( \frac{\partial \Pi_m^*}{\partial w} = 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial \Pi_m^*}{\partial A} = 0 \), we get the optimal wholesale price and advertising spending:

\[ w^* = \frac{1}{2\lambda} \quad (16) \]

\[ A^* = \frac{1}{16\lambda^2 \delta^3} \quad (17) \]

Using \( w^* = \frac{1}{2\lambda} \) and \( A^* = \frac{1}{16\lambda^2 \delta^3} \) in the other expressions, we get the optimal values for the non-cooperation case of the other variables, which are given in Table 1. It is easy to verify that the wholesale price is lower than the retailers’ price. Also, we can verify that \( \Pi_m^* > 2\Pi_r^* \), meaning that the manufacturer gains more than the two retailers together.

### 4 The partial-cooperation game

In this section, the retailers decide to cooperate by maximizing their joint profit function, while the manufacturer still maximizes his own profit function. This is a two-stage game where the manufacturer plays first (leader) and the retailers play second (followers).

Solving the second-stage first-order conditions,\(^5\) which are \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{i1+r2}}{\partial p_i} = 0, \ i = 1, 2, \) gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:

\[ \tilde{p}_i = p = \frac{1 + \lambda w}{2\lambda} \quad (18) \]

\(^4\)Second-order conditions are verified because \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m^*}{\partial w^2} < 0, \ \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m^*}{\partial p_1^2} > 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m^*}{\partial p_1 \partial p_2} = 0 \).

\(^5\)Second-order conditions are verified because

\[
\begin{vmatrix}
-2\sqrt{A} & 2\beta \sqrt{A} \\
2\beta \sqrt{A} & -2\sqrt{A}
\end{vmatrix} > 0
\]
Using the expression given by (18) in (5), we get:
\[ \Pi_m = w(1 - \lambda w)\sqrt{A} - A \] (19)

Using (19) and solving the first-stage first-order conditions\(^6\) for the manufacturer, which are \( \frac{\partial \Pi_m}{\partial w} = 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial \Pi_m}{\partial A} = 0 \), we get the optimal wholesale price and advertising spending:
\[ \bar{w} = \frac{1}{2\lambda} \] (20)
\[ \bar{A} = \frac{1}{64\lambda^2} \] (21)

Using the optimal values of the decision variables, we get the optimal values for the partial-cooperation case of the other variables, which are given in Table 1.

We can verify that the wholesale price is lower than the retail price. It is easy to verify that \( \Pi_m = 2\Pi_r \). Contrary to the non-cooperation case, when retailers cooperate, their joint gain is equal to that of the manufacturer.

5 The full-cooperation game

In this case, the manufacturer and retailers agree to make decisions that maximize the total supply channel profit. Then, they negotiate how they will share the extra-profit engendered by such cooperation.

The total profit of the system given by (8) can be written as:
\[ \Pi_1 = (p_1 + p_2 - p_1^2 - p_2^2 + 2\beta p_1p_2) \sqrt{A} - A \] (22)

The total profit of the system depends only on \( p_1, p_2 \) and \( A \). The three first-order conditions\(^7\) of optimality are \( \frac{\partial \Pi_1}{\partial p_1} = 0 \), \( \frac{\partial \Pi_1}{\partial p_2} = 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial \Pi_1}{\partial A} = 0 \), which give us the unique cooperative solution, which is symmetric:
\[ p_i^c = p^c = \frac{1}{2\lambda} \] (23)
\[ A^c = \frac{1}{16\lambda^2} \] (24)

\(^6\)Second-order conditions are verified because \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m}{\partial w^2} = -2\lambda\sqrt{A} < 0 \), \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m}{\partial A^2} = \frac{\bar{A}}{8\lambda^3} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_m}{\partial w \partial A} = 0 \).

\(^7\)Second-order conditions are verified by using the following partial derivatives:
\[ \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial p_1^2} = -2\sqrt{A}, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial p_1 \partial p_2} = 2\beta \sqrt{A}, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial A^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial A \partial p_1} = 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial A \partial p_2} = 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_1}{\partial p_1 \partial p_2} = \frac{1}{8\lambda^3\sqrt{A}} \]
In Table 1 we give the cooperative values of the remaining expressions by using the optimal values of the decision variables.

### Table 1

**Comparison of the results for the three cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Non-cooperation</th>
<th>Partial-cooperation</th>
<th>Full-cooperation</th>
<th>Comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( w^* = \frac{1}{2\lambda} )</td>
<td>( \hat{w} = \frac{1}{2\lambda} )</td>
<td>( \tilde{w} = \frac{1+4\epsilon}{2\lambda^2} &lt; w^c &lt; \frac{3-\lambda}{2\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( w^c &lt; w^* = \hat{w} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p^* = \frac{2\lambda^2}{3\lambda} )</td>
<td>( \hat{p} = \frac{\lambda}{2\lambda} )</td>
<td>( p^c = \frac{1}{2\lambda} )</td>
<td>( p^c &lt; p^* &lt; \hat{p} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A^* = \frac{1}{10\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( \hat{A} = \frac{6\lambda^2}{12\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( A^c = \frac{1}{10\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( A &lt; A^* &lt; A^c )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V^* = \frac{1}{8\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( \hat{V} = \frac{1}{2\lambda} )</td>
<td>( V^c = \frac{1}{6\lambda} )</td>
<td>( V &lt; V^* &lt; V^c )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Pi^*_m = \frac{1}{16\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^*_r = \frac{1}{128\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^*_c = \frac{1-2\lambda \delta}{16\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^<em>_r &lt; \Pi^</em>_c \Rightarrow \beta &lt; 3 - \sqrt{5} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Pi^*_m = \frac{1}{16\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^*_m = \frac{1}{64\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^*_m = \frac{1-2\lambda \delta}{16\lambda^3} )</td>
<td>( \Pi^<em>_m &lt; \Pi^</em>_m )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( CS^*_i = \frac{1}{10\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( CS^*_i = \frac{1}{128\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( CS^*_c = \frac{1}{10\lambda} )</td>
<td>( CS^<em>_i &lt; CS^</em>_c )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S^* = \frac{4\lambda^2}{10\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( S = \frac{4\lambda^2}{128\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( S^c = \frac{1}{10\lambda^2} )</td>
<td>( S &lt; S^* &lt; S^c )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6 Extra-profit sharing

To commit to a cooperative program, the profits of the manufacturer and retailers through full-cooperation should be higher than their own profits realized in the non-cooperation Stackelberg game. We need a bargaining mechanism to motivate the channel members to cooperate and to share the extra-profit engendered by full-cooperation, which is:

\[
\Delta \Pi^*_i = \Pi^*_c - \Pi^*_i > 0 \tag{25}
\]

To share this extra-profit due to cooperation, the members of the channel can set a wholesale price \( w^c \) for each unit of product purchased by the retailers from the manufacturer. Let’s notice that in Wang et al. (2011) the sharing of the extra-profit is done by means of the fraction of local advertising costs paid by the manufacturer.

Using expression (5) with production and advertising spending equal to \( V^c \) and \( A^c \), respectively, the profit of the manufacturer under full-cooperation is:

\[
\Pi^*_m = \frac{4\lambda w^c - 1}{16\lambda^2} \tag{26}
\]

The manufacturer will participate to full-cooperation iff

---

*Almost all the comparisons are easy to establish. We present some of them: i)\( \Pi^*_r < \Pi^*_c \Leftrightarrow \beta^2 - 6\beta + 4 = (\beta - (3 - \sqrt{5})) (\beta - (3 + \sqrt{5})) > 0 \Rightarrow \beta < 3 - \sqrt{5} \). ii)\( \Pi^*_r < \Pi^*_c \Leftrightarrow 6(1 - \beta) + \beta^2 > 0 \) : which is true. iii)\( \Pi^*_c < \Pi^*_r \Leftrightarrow 6\beta^2 - \beta^3 - 9\beta + 4 = 4(1 - \beta)(1 - \frac{3}{4}) > 0 \) : which is evident.*
Thus, if the wholesale price is higher than \( w_{c_{\text{min}}} \), the manufacturer finds full-cooperation interesting.

Using expression (6) with retail prices and expenditures in advertising equal to \( p^c \) and \( V^c \), respectively, the profit of each retailer under full-cooperation is:

\[
\Pi^c_r = \frac{1 - 2\lambda w^c}{16\lambda^2} \tag{28}
\]

Non-cooperating retailers will participate in the full-cooperation game iff

\[
\Pi^c_r > \Pi^* _r \iff w^c < w_{c_{\text{max}}} = \frac{\delta^3 - \lambda}{2\lambda\delta^3} \tag{29}
\]

Therefore, when the wholesale price does not exceed a certain value \( w_{c_{\text{max}}} \), it is in the interest of non-cooperating retailers to cooperate with all members of the supply channel. Thus, we can establish the following proposition:

**Proposition 1** To get all partners interested in cooperation, the wholesale price should be between a minimal value and a maximal value

\[
w_{c_{\text{min}}} < w^c < w_{c_{\text{max}}} \tag{30}
\]

We can easily verify that \( w_{c_{\text{min}}} < w_{c_{\text{max}}} \) and that when inequality (30) is verified, then \( w^c < p^c \).

The above Proposition shows that when the wholesale price belongs to \([w_{c_{\text{min}}}, w_{c_{\text{max}}}]\), cooperating members channel are better than with non-cooperation, when the retail prices and the national advertising spending are set at their cooperative values \( p^c \) and \( A^c \). A cooperative implementable contract between all channel members means that each retailer buys from the manufacturer the quantity \( V^c \) at the wholesale price \( w^c \), and sells it to consumers at price \( p^c \). The manufacturer engage himself to spend \( A^c \) in national advertising.

A wholesale price near \( w_{c_{\text{min}}} \) gives a higher share of the extra-profit to the retailers, and when it is near \( w_{c_{\text{max}}} \), it gives a higher share to the manufacturer.

When \( w^c = w_{c_{\text{min}}} \), all the extra-profit goes to the retailers: the manufacturer is indifferent between cooperating or not. When \( w^c = w_{c_{\text{max}}} \), all the extra-profit goes to the manufacturer: the retailers are indifferent between full-cooperation and non-cooperation.

**Proposition 2** The wholesale price that splits equally the extra-profit between the cooperating manufacturer and the two retailers is

\[
w^c_e = \frac{w_{c_{\text{min}}} + w_{c_{\text{max}}}}{2} \tag{31}
\]

Indeed, with \( w^c = w^c_e \), we have \( \frac{\Delta \Pi}{2} = \Pi^c_m - \Pi^* _m \).
7 Comparison of results and discussions

From the comparisons presented in Table 1, we deduce the following propositions.

**Proposition 3** (i) \( w^c < w^* = \bar{w} \), (ii) \( p^c < p^* < \bar{p} \), (iii) \( \bar{A} < A^* < A^c \), (iv) \( \bar{V} < V^* < V^c \).

With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas the quantity purchased and the spending in advertising are the lowest. Indeed, when retailers cooperate, the retail price increases reducing the price-demand for the product. Because of the multiplicability of the sale response function (see (4)), the spending in national advertising becomes less efficient for the manufacturer, inciting him to reduce advertising spending. The fact that the expenditures in advertising are the lowest under partial-cooperation is a new and interesting result. Wang *et al.* (2011, Theorem 4) showed that the spending in national advertising may be higher or lower with partial-cooperation than with non-cooperation, with the assumption that retail prices are exogenously determined.

The above proposition shows that the wholesale price does not depend on whether retailers cooperate or not. Moreover, the wholesale price of full-cooperation, which is determined to share the extra-profit, is the lowest because the retail price is the lowest with respect to those of non-cooperation and partial-cooperation. Indeed, when all members of the channel cooperate, there is no double marginalization, and the price for consumers is the lowest. Due to the multiplicability of the sale response function, the spending in national advertising becomes more efficient for the manufacturer, inciting him to increase advertising spending. Consequently, the quantity purchased and the spending in advertising are the highest under full-cooperation. This last result concerning national advertising is similar to that of Xie and Wei (2009) who have considered a supply channel composed of only one retailer, whereas Wang *et al.* (2011) have not addressed this question.

From the comparisons in Table 1, we can establish the principal result of this paper:

**Proposition 4** When the degree of substituability between the two products is sufficiently low, (symmetric) partially-cooperating retailers gain less than with non-cooperation. This also implies that the total profit of partially-cooperating retailers may decrease with respect to non-cooperation.

This result is interesting and even surprising because usually, in game theory, players are better off when they cooperate.

This result is not intuitive for symmetric players, i.e. symmetric model, and for an asymmetric model. Indeed, even if we could get an asymmetric solution, where one player gains from partial-cooperation and another looses, usually the total gain of players improves with partial-cooperation. This supposes a bargaining mechanism of sharing the gains from partial-cooperation between
retailers, particularly when there is a looser and a winner. Therefore, our result is new and interesting because it shows that the profit of each retailer may decrease with partial-cooperation with respect to non-cooperation. Because of symmetry of both the model and the solution, the total profit of retailers may decrease with partial-cooperation.

Our principal finding is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed, when retailers unilaterally cooperate, the retail price increases and the spending in national advertising decreases, leading to an important decrease in sales and therefore in retailers’ profits. With the present model, we can easily show that, when consumers’ demand is not affected by advertising, the retailers’ profits are always higher under partial-cooperation.

Let’s notice that when retailers are symmetric, Yang and Zhou (2006, Proposition 2) showed that each partially-cooperating retailer gains more than with non-cooperation. However, when retailers are asymmetric and face different demand functions, one retailer may be worse off, whereas the other may be better off, with partial-cooperation (Yang and Zhou, 2006, page 112, inference (4) and Table 3). They have not given any response to the total profit of retailers. We have verified that the total profit of retailers is always higher with partial-cooperation than without cooperation, by using their Table 3. All their results are intuitive. Therefore, our principal result, stating that each retailer’s profit and the total profit of retailers may be higher with non-cooperation, constitutes a non-obvious result. It is a new and interesting result when compared to the findings of Yang and Zhou (2006).

Wang et al. (2011, Theorem 4) showed that partially-cooperating retailers may be worse off under some conditions for the symmetric special case and the Stackelberg game. Nonetheless, their findings are obtained under heavy hypotheses: the marginal profits per unit of retailers and manufacturer, and consequently the selling prices of retailers, are exogenously determined. This implies that these latter are the same whether retailers partially-cooperate or not, making the retailers’ profits comparisons between the Stackelberg non-cooperative and partially-cooperative cases questionable.

**Proposition 5**

(i) $\Pi_r^* < \Pi_r$, $\Leftrightarrow 3 - \sqrt{5} < \beta < 1$, (ii) $\Pi_m < \Pi_m^*$, (iii) $\Pi_t < \Pi_t^* < \Pi_t^f$.

When the degree of substitutability between the two products is sufficiently high, we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their profits with respect to non-cooperation.

Also, partial-cooperation decreases the manufacturer’s profit because it does not modify the wholesale price while decreasing the quantities sold. Our computations show that, even when the profits of retailers increase with partial-cooperation, the total profit of the supply channel always decreases with respect to non-cooperation. Finally, and as expected, the total profit of the supply channel is the highest with full-cooperation.

Let’s notice that, for the manufacturer’s and the whole channel’s profits, Yang and Zhou (2006, Propositions 4 and 5, Table 3) found similar results as
ours, whereas Wang et al. (2011, Theorem 4) showed that partial-cooperation may be harmful or good for the manufacturer and the whole channel.

**Proposition 6** (i) $CS_i < CS^r_i < CS^c_i$; (ii) $\overline{S} < S < S^*$.

The above Proposition shows that cooperation between retailers reduces consumers’ surplus. This result is not as obvious as one may think. Indeed, our expression (11) shows that consumers’ surplus is not positively dependent only on price-demand, as usual in micro-economic theory. But it depends positively also on the spending in advertising, which is a new consumers’ surplus evaluation that we propose. Since partial-cooperation increases retail prices, leading to a decrease in price-demands, and decreases the spending in advertising, consumers’ surplus, i.e. consumers’ welfare, decreases. However, full-cooperation reduces retail prices and increases advertising spending leading to an increase in consumers’ welfare. By taking into account the total profit of the supply channel, we can conclude that the worst situation for consumers and the society is the partial-cooperation case, and the better one is the full-cooperation case. Let’s remind that previous studies have not evaluated the impact of cooperation between retailers or between all members of the supply channel on consumers’ and social welfare.

## 8 Conclusion

Our paper extends the growing literature on supply channel by considering a Stackelberg manufacturer-two-retailers relationship. We evaluate the impact of cooperation between retailers and between all channel members on profits, consumers’ and social welfare.

The manufacturer produces one product that he sells to the two retailers. These latter sell only the manufacturer’s product to consumers. The manufacturer decides on the wholesale price and uses brand advertising to attract consumers and to increase the effective-demand for the product. The retailers decide on the retail prices. Consumers’ effective-demand for the product depends on the retail prices of the two retailers and on the manufacturer’s advertising spending.

First, we model the decision process as a non-cooperative game in which the manufacturer is the leader and the two competing retailers are the followers. The manufacturer chooses the spending in national advertising and the wholesale price, then each retailer chooses its price to consumers. Then, we consider the partial-cooperation case where the retailers maximize a joint profit function. In the full-cooperation case, all members of the supply channel maximize the total channel profit.

We show that the wholesale price does not depend on whether retailers cooperate or not. With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas the quantity purchased and the expenditures in advertising are the lowest.
When the degree of substitutability between the two products proposed by retailers is sufficiently low, both cooperating retailers gain less than with non-cooperation. This result is interesting and even surprising because usually firms are better off when they cooperate. This result is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed, when retailers unilaterally cooperate, we showed that this increases the retail prices and reduces the spending in national advertising leading to an important decrease in sales and in retailers’ profits. When the degree of substitutability between the two products is sufficiently high, we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their profits with respect to non-cooperation. In addition, cooperation between retailers decreases the profit of the manufacturer because there is no change in the wholesale price and the quantities sold are diminished. As a result, and independently of whether the degree of substitutability between the two products is high or low, the total profit of the supply channel is the lowest with partial-cooperation.

As expected, full-cooperation gives the highest total profit for the supply channel. Channel members can share the extra-profit due to full-cooperation by setting a wholesale price which is lower than those of non-cooperation and partial-cooperation. There exists a cooperative wholesale price that splits the extra-profit equally between the manufacturer and the two retailers. We propose a cooperative implementable contract between all channel members.

We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers’ surplus which does not depend only on the price-demand function, but it depends positively also on the spending in national advertising. We show that the worst situation for consumers and the society is partial-cooperation, and the better situation is full-cooperation.

We agree that our model is simple and tractable. As most of papers, we use a special form of sale response function. We think that many of our results can be generalized to other forms of demand functions for goods, especially when these latter are not linear.

Finally, this model can be extended by considering that retailers spend in local advertising, and that the manufacturer pays a fraction of this local advertising cost. Such an extension complicates enormously the tractability of the model and necessitates numerical methods. We think that the introduction of local advertising will not change our results when the impact on effective-demand and on firms’ profits of this latter is weak compared to the impact of national advertising.

References


