From Riches to Rags or What Went Wrong in Greece

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From riches to rags or what went wrong in Greece

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Abstract
The economic and social progress Greece achieved in the early post war decades decelerated after 1974 because all institutions sustaining the efficient operation of democracy and free markets were deliberately and gravely eroded. Under the impetus of hard core socialists provisions introduced in the 1975 constitution, economic policies extended further in the direction of unfettered statism, thus destroying the international competitiveness of the Greek economy. Some researchers have attributed the economic decline of Greece to its entry into the EU. I look into these allegations and find that they have little or no basis on the available evidence.

JEL classification: O5, N1, P1
Keywords: Economic development, economic decline, institutions, markets, macro and micro-policies.

Athens, August 2012
1. Introduction

The post war performance of Greece has all the characteristics of a period of remarkable progress, which was followed by a period of equally remarkable decline. It is a unique case which ought to be taught to students, ordinary citizens, politicians and experts in the expectation that they may appreciate how: (a) people can be misled by superficial and selfish leaders to consent to reforms and policies that kneel both democracy and economy, (b) the political parties in power undermine democracy, by discrediting gradually the institutions that safeguard the operation of free markets, and (c) policies, economic and others, which appear to be successful in the short run, in the long run become catastrophic, if they are not revised appropriately in time.

In this paper I do three things. In Section 2, I trace the path of economic growth in the post war period and identify the main factors that determined its phase of expansion before and its phase of contraction after 1974. The presentation in this section is purely factual in the sense that I abstain from interpretations as to why the forces that promoted economic growth before 1974 reversed afterwards, leading eventually to the present gruesome situation. My view about what went wrong and Greece experienced this spectacular reversal is explained in Section 3. More specifically, initially I turn attention to the changes that took place in the political and economic institutions and find that what happened was exactly what one would have expected from the relevant literature. After 1974 the economic and social progress decelerated at the beginning and gradually led to the crisis of today, because all institutions sustaining the efficient operation of democracy and free markets were deliberately and gravely eroded. Next, in the same section, I assess the economic policies that were adopted and arrive at the following reinforcing finding. In view of the advancing globalization and the accession of Greece to full membership in the European Union (EU) in 1981, and to Eurozone in 2002, the closed economy macroeconomic and structural policies of the past ought to have been reoriented towards those of an open and competitive economy. But under the impetus of the socialist provisions introduced for the first time in the 1975 constitution, economic policies in general extended further in the direction of unfettered statism, thus destroying the international competitiveness of the Greek economy.

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1 This paper is an abbreviated version of Chapter 9 in Bitros, Karayiannis (2012).
2 In 1974 democracy was restored in Greece after seven years of military rule.
3 After 1974 Greece progressed further into a statist country. Gwartney, Hall, Lawson (2010, 72) find, for example, that from 1980 to 2008 Greece with respect to: (a) property rights protection, fell the 50th position from the 25th; (b) the conditions for commerce, mainly towards third countries, tumbled to the 80th position from the 39th, and (c) state regulations in credit markets, labour markets, and enterprises, slipped to the 90th position from the 72nd. Noteworthy is also that on the basis of price controls and barriers to entry, Mylonas, Pa-
attributed the economic decline of Greece to its entry into the EU and the loss of monetary policy independence due to the adoption of a common currency. For this reason, in the last part of Section 3, I look into these allegations and find that all responsibility for what happened rests with the Greek governments, politicians and managers in the state sector of the economy. Finally, in Section 4, I close with a summary of findings and some comments regarding their usefulness as guiding principles of governance in the context of contemporary democracy.

2. Record and sources of economic growth: 1950-2010

Figure 1 presents the average percentage changes of GDP in Greece and the corresponding periods during which they were observed, beginning with 1954. Looking from left to right one cannot fail to observe that the process of economic growth registered five phases. In the first phase, which occurred in the period before 1974, the growth rate was 6.9%. This phase was followed by a second one, which lasted from 1974 until 1981, and exhibited a growth rate of around 3.5%. In the third phase, i.e. that of next phase of 1981-1994, the growth rate was less than 1%. Then, in the fourth phase, which lasted until 2008, the growth rate exhibited considerable variability around a trend of 2.4%; and, lastly, quite recently the economy entered a fifth phase with negative growth rates, which during the period 2009-2011 are likely

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paconstantinou (2001, 505) find that in 1998 Greece ranked as the most illiberal country in the European Union.
to average -3.2%. For the reasons that I shall explain later on, it should be noted that the growth rates over the period 1954-2010 followed a negative trend. In Figure 1 this is indicated by the downward slope of the dotted line, which corresponds to the following equation:

\[
\% \Delta GDP = 0.126T - 0.0006T^2
\]

(3.63) (-3.57)

\[R^2 = 0.23 \quad D.W = 2.0 \quad \text{RHO} = 0.185\]

where the variables \(\% \Delta GDP\) and \(T\) represent respectively the percentage change of GDP and the year; \(R^2\) is the adjusted correlation coefficient; D.W stands for the Durbin-Watson statistic; RHO is the autocorrelation coefficient, and the figures underneath the parameter estimates give the values of the t-statistic.

As to the sources of economic growth, these coincide with the changes in the productivities of human and physical capital, as well as the productivity contributed by numerous indistinguishable factors. Figure 2 depicts the time patterns of the productivity indexes for human and physical capital and the index of total factor productivity since 1960. This, in conjunction with Figure 1, helps us understand to a significant extent the sources from which economic growth emanated in post war Greece. Prior to 1974, the high growth rates were achieved because of strong contributions from accelerating productivities of both human and physical capital. In the period 1974-1981, the rate of increase in the productivity of these two productive factors de-
celerated, with the consequence that the pace of economic growth slowed down to half the average rate of the previous period. Over the years 1981-1994 economic growth collapsed because the decline in the productivity of physical capital was just counterbalanced by the changes in the productivity from all other sources. From 1994 to 2008 the growth of labour productivity accelerated significantly, whereas that of physical capital increased only moderately, thus raising economic growth to the average 1974-1981 rate. Lastly, the decline in all productivity indices since 2008 explains the progression into the territory of negative growth rates.

Here I adopt the view that Figures 1 and 2 describe with reasonable accuracy the process of economic growth, as well as the main sources that contributed to it during the post war period. My confidence in this respect is also reinforced by the following account regarding the forces that determined the accumulation of physical and human capital.

2.2 Investment and investable resources

After the Marshall Plan ended in 1952, the burden of financing investment shifted to sources such as domestic savings, capital transfers from abroad, and borrowing from international markets. Below I look into the developments that took place in these fronts.

Domestic and foreign direct investment

Figure 3 depicts the time patterns of gross fixed investment and some of its main components as percentages of GDP at constant 2000 prices. We observe that from 1954 until the early years of the 1970s, total fixed investment followed a strong upward trend. Then, it vacillated around a permanent downward trend, declining from 33.7% in 1973 to 16.8% in 2010. Business fixed investment, except for a brief period between the two oil crises, followed an uneven upward trend. In particular, while in the period 1953-1973 it grew at an average rate of 17.5%, in the period 1978-2010 its pace of increase slowed down to 7%. Fixed investment by the government remained stable with modest variability around an average annual percentage rate of 2.4%.

4 National income statistics are revised frequently and the revisions are not accepted without reservations among specialists. In Greece, for example, Tsoris (1975) expressed reservations regarding the revisions of national income accounts in 1973. But, as a rule, reservations do not exceed the limits of a technical discussion among economists, statisticians and other specialists, and in any case they do not give rise to suspicions and comments about expedient distortions by governments. Unfortunately, in Greece the revisions, for example, of 2000 and 2007 became subject of strenuous contentions among the political parties. As a result experts in Greece and abroad started to question the trustworthiness of the revisions. However, the Hellenic Statistical Service more recently became completely independent from the government, and hence, it is my hope that the demeaning references to the so-called “Greek Statistics” will be forgotten soon.
By implication, economic growth after 1974 was driven primarily by increased consumption.

The above trends were also reinforced by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Figure 4 illustrates the inflows and outflows of FDI using data from UNCTAD for the period 1970-2009 and from domestic sources for the period 1954-1970, as percentages of Gross National Product (GNP). From these it follows that the annual FDI inflows during the period 1954-2009 averaged...
5 % of the GNP. But, starting from the last years of the 1990s even these insignificant inflows were largely offset by outflows, mainly to neighbouring Balkan countries. Because of this reason, the data show that the last fifteen years, the average annual net inflow of FDI should not have exceeded 1.5 % of GNP.

**Saving**

Figure 5 sheds light on the sources and time patterns of saving. On closer look it is seen that during the first two decades, which coincide with the period of fast economic growth, saving increased gradually from about 20.7% of GNP in 1954 to 38.2% in 1973. Since then saving has followed a downward trend, which in 2010 stood at 18.1%. Throughout the period under consideration, almost all saving was generated by private sources. In particular, of the total savings of 38.2% of GNP in 1973, 37.8% was contributed by the private sector and only the remaining and 0.4% came from the public sector, whereas in 2010, when saving was 18.1% of GNP, the contributions were 25.7% and -7.5%, respectively. From 1954 to 1978, state budgets left slight surpluses averaging 1.1% of GNP per annum. However, since then, state budgets have experienced annual deficits of the order of 3.4% of GNP. While starting from 1981 public budgets incurred very heavy deficits, in the critical period 1998–2002, when the entry of the country into the Eurozone was at stake, the deficit nearly disappeared.

Europeans suspect that Greece was accepted in the Eurozone on the basis of data that had been “massaged” to look better than they were in reality. From Figure 5 we observe that from 1995 on Greek governments started efforts to reduce public deficits down to the Maastricht limits. Their efforts paid off in 1998-1999. But these years were very crucial because they were the years of observation, which would predicate the decision of the EU authorities. At that time no suspicions would have arisen, if the stabilization of public finances was permanent. However, public deficits started to accelerate again soon after the years of observation. According to Katsimi, Moutos (2010), as long as Greek governments were obliged to introduce measures to shrink public deficits to gain entrance into the Eurozone, they did so. Afterwards, when the pressure from the EU was loosened, Greek governments return to their old practices whereby they increased public expenditures to gain re-election. Thus, in the light of the inher-

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5 According to Alogoskoufis (1995, 158, 159), from 1958 until 1992, the budget of the central government run deficits, which in 1989 approached 18% of GDP, whereas the public debt had risen to 120% of GDP already from 1992. These data, perhaps due to definitional differences, are in sharp contrast to those reported by Bosworth, Kollintzas (2001), which come from the publication of the National Statistical Service of Greece, *Macroeconomic Series Based on ESA95, 1960-1999*, as well to those from AMECO on which Figure 5 is based.
ent difficulties in reducing public spending, Eurocrats are justified to suspect that the data were “massaged” and that stabilization policies were never applied in reality.

**Foreign aid**

Greece continued to receive financial aid for many years after the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. But all this assistance pales relative to that which began to flow from the European Economic Community (EEC) shortly after accession to full membership in 1981. Table 1 shows the net inflows of re-

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<td>0.013</td>
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<td>0.022</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.048</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.039</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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Table 1: Net inflows of financial aid from the European Union as a percentage of GDP

2. GDP from the AMECO data base.
receipts from EU. From this we see that over the last thirty years Greece received financial aid, which on average amounted to 2.7% of GDP per annum. Considering this finding in conjunction with the evidence from Figures 1, 3 and 5, several questions come to mind. For example, even though after 1981 the assistance from EU was extremely high, Greece experienced a period of economic stagnation which lasted until 1994. How can we explain the negative correlation between foreign aid and economic growth from 1981 to 1994? The answers to this and the other questions will occupy me later.

**Borrowing**

From Figure 3 we know that during the post war period public investment averaged 2.4% of GDP per annum, while from Figure 5 it follows that in the period before 1978 public saving averaged 1.1% of GNP per annum. Hence, since size wise GDP is normally less than GNP, the government had to borrow on average less than 1.3% of GNP per annum to finance public investment. Figure 6 shows that in the period before 1980 borrowing by the central government fluctuated within this narrow limit. In turn, this modest borrowing in combination with the fast economic growth of the period resulted in the accumulation of public debt which in 1981 reached 22.9% of GNP. But thereafter the rate of borrowing by the central government exceeded many times the rate of public investment, even though at the same time Greece was receiving voluminous financial aid from EU. As a result of this exorbitant government borrowing in a period when economic growth slowed down significantly pushed the public debt to GNP ratio to over 125% in 2010. What all this implies is that, if public investment was restrained, it was not...
from the lack of investable resources but from the nature of policies that were pursued.

With respect to the supply of loanable funds to the private sector and the public enterprises, a good indicator is that of bank credit, which covers the demand for loans by business concerns and households. Figure 6 shows the balance of outstanding loans by banks to these activities. Observe that the debt of public enterprises remained throughout the period at a very low level by fluctuating around an average annual rate of 4.8% of GNP. On the contrary, private sector debt to banks evolved in two phases. In the first one, covering the period 1954-2000, the average annual rate of debt to banks varied around a horizontal trend in the level of 25.6% of GNP. But from 2000 there begun a second phase of massive borrowing, which in 2010 raised the private sector debt to banks to 106.3% of GNP. More specifically, if we compare the slopes of the corresponding curves after 2000, it turns out that private sector debt grew faster than public debt, mainly because of the sharp increase of bank loans to households.

2.3 Structure and competitiveness
After 1973 there were indications that: (a) the structure of the Greek economy, which had served well in terms of economic growth in the two previous decades, was becoming increasingly inconsistent with the open economy environment that was emerging internationally, and (b) if the necessary structural reforms were not introduced in time, sooner than later robust economic growth would come to a halt, particularly if Greece acceded to full membership in the EEC. Therefore, to prepare the ground for the assessment of the policies that were adopted, I shall begin with a brief presentation of the structure and competitiveness of the Greek economy, with an eye towards the problems that needed to be addressed.

Employment
Because of the extreme poverty and the lack of employment opportunities that existed in the first post war years, many Greeks, more out of necessity rather than by choice, migrated to the USA, Western Europe, Australia, and elsewhere. However, despite the loss of valuable human resources, immigration helped in multiple ways the process of Greece’s economic development. With the remittances to their relatives in Greece, immigrants contributed to the increase in effective demand and eased the constraint of the balance of payments. Through their visits to their homeland, immigrants brought from the countries where they lived new ideas and lifestyles; and not a few from the most successful ones returned to invest, to establish enterprises and to contribute directly to the development efforts.
Moreover, immigration helped reduce the excess demand for jobs and, in conjunction with the take-off in the 1950s and the robust economic growth that followed, it made possible to confront the problem of unemployment. The data displayed in Table 2 ascertain this realization quite clearly. In particular, observe from the last line that the unemployment rate fell from 5.9 in the 1950s to 2.1% in 1970s. But then, from the 1980s on, as economic growth faltered, unemployment increased again gradually and over the last decade it climbed to 9.4%. In this thirty-year period of rising unemployment, there was no new big wave of immigration. Rather on the contrary, as more recent research has reported, the return migration flows became occasionally significant. Why did Greece become attractive to return to during a period of rising unemployment? I shall come to this question shortly.

Table 2 is revealing also in other respects. One has to do with the changes in the composition of employment. If we calculate the percentage of self-employed in the total labour force, this fell from 56.4% in the 1970s to 32.5% in the last decade. Such rates of self-employed are not found anywhere in Europe. For example, Pirounakis (1997, 15), reports that in 1993, when the rate of self-employed in Greece was 47%, the figures were 29% in Italy, 26% in Spain and Portugal, 24% in Ireland, and only in Turkey it was 60%. Consequently, if someone surmised that the scale of production units in Greece, and hence, their productivity was lower than in European countries because of this reason, his view would be justified. Another interesting observation is the rapid increase in the number of people working as employees. At a time when economic growth slowed down significantly, what might explain the acceleration in this category of workers? In our view, a hint lies in the number of employees who were lavishly hired in the public sector by the parties in government. Finally, it should be noted that, while on the one hand measured unemployment was reduced by excessive hiring in the public sector, on the other it
was augmented, particularly in the last two decades, by the influx of illegal immigrants, many of whom were naturalized and entered legally into the Greek workforce.

**Sectoral employment and production**

Table 3 shows the percentage distributions of employment and gross value added in the sectors of agriculture, industry, construction and services at the end of four periods. Looking at its columns from left to right and its rows from top to bottom, the data lead to the following findings: Of the total labour force in 1961, 53.4% were employed in agriculture and contributed 21.3% of the total gross value added. Twenty years later, the respective per-

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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
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**Notes:**
3. GVA: Gross Value Added.
4. Main source of other data: AMECO.
5. Industry includes manufacturing.

percentages were 27.4 and 14.6. That is, in the period 1961-1981, employment in agriculture fell by 48.7%, while its contribution to domestic production declined by 31.5%. The restructuring that was expected to take place by shifting employment away from agriculture and towards other sectors did materialise and as a matter of fact it did so successfully, since productivity in agriculture increased. But after 1981, employment continued to decline and agricultural production was marginalized. The last finding, combined with the significant EU aid to farming after 1981, raises many questions. Some are the following: A large part of the EU aid aimed at defraying the cost of restructuring. In particular, it aimed to enlarge the average size of agricultural lots; to introduce new crops; to train farmers in production and marketing methods, etc. Were the policies that the authorities implemented consistent with these objectives? If they were, why did they fail? If they were not, what
happened and Greece, which was self-sufficient in agricultural produce in 1960, in 2009 imported a great deal of farm products from abroad? To these questions I shall return in the explanatory part of our presentation. By 1981 the sector of industry had made significant advances. In particular, it share in employment increased by 40.6%, i.e. from 14.3% in 1961 to 20.1% in 1981, while its contribution to domestic production increased by 89.5%, i.e. from 13.3% in 1961 to 25.2% in 1981. From 1981 on industry entered a period of slowdown. But the data in Table 3 show that the degree of de-industrialization was moderate, since from 1981 to 2009 the shares of industry in employment and in gross value added fell by only 13.5% and 3.4% respectively. In the construction sector employment increased from 4.5% in 1961 to 9.2% in 1981, while its contribution in gross value added in the corresponding period fell from 11.1% to 7%. Since then, the percentage of construction workers in total employment stabilised around 7.5%, while the contribution of this sector in gross value added fell slightly to 6.3%. Unlike the above sectors, the shares of services in employment and gross value added increased continuously. In particular, employment, which accounted for 27.8% of the total in 1961, rose gradually to 69.2% in 2009, whereas in the same period its contribution to domestic production increased from 54.3% to 71.2%.

From the above it follows that, while the Greek economy during the period 1961-1981 maintained a structure of employment and production that was characterized by pluralism and complementarity in the fundamental economic activities, in 2009 two-thirds of its structure was dominated by one sector, i.e. that of services. But looking deeper into this sector, we find that services itself was dominated by two activities, i.e. tourism and maritime transport. As a result, the Greek economy has become highly unstable, because it is based on two activities that are highly sensitive to changes in the international business cycle and other exogenous forces.

*Rise and fall of competitiveness*

Table 4 shows the gross value added per employed worker in the four sectors shown in Table 2 for Greece and the EU in its various stages of enlargement. Based on the data from this table we can see how productivity evolved in the respective regions and bring to the forefront the problems of competitiveness that emanated from this source in the successive stages through which the integration of Greece into EU took place. From the first two columns of this table we observe that when Greece applied to join the customs union of Europe in 1959, with the exception of the construction industry, productivity in Greece lagged far behind the average productivity in all sectors of the EU. In particular, productivity in agriculture and industry was one third of the respective figures in the EU, whereas productivity in services lagged slightly less, since in this sector it was close to 45% of that in the EU.
To facilitate the comparisons between Greece and the EU through time, from Table 4, I derived Table 5. From this we observe the following: In the period 1959-1981, Greek agriculture covered its productivity shortfall in comparison to the EU and at the same time gained a significant competitive advantage. However, after 1981 its competitiveness regressed back to the

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6 Estimates based on data from the National Statistical Service of Greece and AMECO show that the competitive advantage of Greek agriculture in 1981 was 37%.
levels of 1960. Until 1981, industry and services improved their productivity in comparison to the corresponding sectors in the EU. But since then their productivity ceased to converge, thus adding to the forces which caused these sectors to lose shares continuously, both in domestic and foreign markets. In reference to the construction sector, what we observe is that its productivity evolves in a wave like pattern, with peaks in the periods of excessive construction pressure (1959, 2001). This implies that its productivity is driven primarily by demand and only secondarily by supply side conditions. In view of the preceding, the spectacular economic growth during the period 1954-1973 could be sustained only through continued and rapid gains in the productivity of the large and ever-expanding services sector. Unfortunately, this did not happen because, as corroborated by the figures in the last rows of Tables 4 and 5, the productivity in this sector stagnated at the 1981 levels.

However, apart from productivity, the competitiveness of a country’s products and services depends on many other factors which drive a wedge in the prices of goods and services among countries. To trace the extent and the direction of the influence that all these factors exercised on competitiveness, Table 6 shows in the third row the average levels per decade of the differential inflation in Greece and the EU. From this index it turns out that in the 1960s the rate of inflation in Greece was less than in the EU. As a result, since the prices of goods and services increased less in Greece than in the EU, Greece experienced gains in competitiveness, both because its productivity increased at a faster rate and its economic environment was characterized by greater price stability. But starting from the 1970s this trend reversed because, relative to the EU, in Greece: (a) there took place a sharp slowdown in productivity, and (b) isappe1980s and 1990s inflation was 4 times as high as that in the EU.

The figures in the last row of Table 6 depict the time pattern of changes in the ratio of the real unit labour cost in Greece and the EU. This, in conjunction with Figure 2 and Tables 5 and 6, suggests the following remarks: According to Table 6, before 2000 the real unit labour costs in Greece and the EU were roughly equal. To the extent that they differed, their differences were limited and fluctuated around 1.025 for the entire period. But after 2000, the real unit labour cost in Greece exceeded that in the EU by over 30%. From Figure 2 it turns out that in the period 1954-1973 labour productivity in Greece followed a strong upward trend. Moreover, Table 5 showed that in the same period labour productivity in Greece grew faster than in the EU, whereas Table 6 shows that the prices of Greek products and services rose at a slower pace than in the EU. Consequently, the finding that during this period Greek workers were paid 12.5% more per unit of labour relative to the workers in the EU is as one would have expected. In other words, the benefits of greater labour productivity in an environment of greater price stability rendered Greek products
more competitive and through increased exports enabled a relatively better remuneration of Greek workers. After 1973 and until 1993, labour productivity moved on a horizontal trend, while inflation in Greece accelerated much faster than in the EU. The result was that the competitiveness of Greek products and services slowed down significantly and the deficit in the balance of payments widened. Table 6 reveals that during the period 1971-1980 an attempt was made to offset the slowdown in productivity with a downward adjustment of the real unit labour costs. But after 1980, this effort was abandoned and the losses in competitiveness increased and consolidated. After 1994 labour productivity started to rise again (see Figure 2). But, as shown in Table 5, its increase was smaller than that in the EU, and hence, Greek products and services lost competitiveness. Meanwhile, the economic policies that were adopted not only did not reduce the unit labour cost, so as to offset the losses in competitiveness that emanated from the slowdown in productivity and the differential inflation, but on the contrary they increased it further.

On account of the decline in competitiveness, the explosion of deficits in the balance of payments emerged naturally and became systemic because, as Nicoletti, Scarpetta, Boylaud (1999) and others have stressed, even before entering the European Monetary Union (EMU) Greece had more regulations on the markets for goods and services and more restrictions on the labour markets than all other countries in the EU.

Centrally controlled and directed markets
Given the emphasis that policy makers placed on import substitution and command or top-down administered approaches to economic growth, the
regulatory and structural policies they adopted were as they could be ex-
pected. To seal the economy from foreign competition, they erected high
walls of trade and non-trade barriers. To direct loanable funds to investment
and productive activities in sectors they considered growth enhancing, they
set up a system of unparalleled administrative complexity to control the fi-
nancial system; and last but not least, to regulate competition in the domestic
markets they adapted various policies from centrally planned economies.
The result was that in the first two post war decades the Greek economy was
transformed into a nearly planned economy in which efficiency in the use of
resources, export orientation in productive activities, and competitiveness in
terms of world standards, were considered objectives of secondary im-
portance. For these reasons now it is recognized that, the remarkable eco-
nomic growth that was achieved during this period slowed down afterward
because Greek governments not only failed to introduce the reforms that
were necessary, as national economies started to open up and integrate into
the global economy, but also because they adopted policies which worsened
significantly the competitiveness of domestic goods and services.

To corroborate this view, consider first the policies in the financial sector.
As documented by Bitros (1981), Halikias (1978) and other researchers, un-
til fairly recently money and capital markets functioned under strict qualita-
tive and quantitative administrative controls. For example, each year credit
policies took the form of the so-called monetary program, through which the
central bank, i.e. the Bank of Greece, controlled the allocation of bank cred-
its and the pricing of bank deposits and loans. Main drivers of this program
were the banks and the special credit institutions which operated as a fairly
tight oligopoly. Unfortunately, using their economic power as well as their
connections in the political market, these banks merged financial with busi-
ness capital, quashed the competitive functioning of markets, and vitiated the
development of an autonomous, self-assured and outward looking entrepre-
neurial class.

Moreover, the multifaceted distortions that structural and regulatory poli-
cies introduced in product and labour markets did not go unnoticed. But to no
avail! There had to pass six decades for Greek citizens, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) to discover that the post war
model of economic growth in Greece is in shambles and that it must be re-
placed by one based on democracy with a truly free market economy, in which
the state performs only strategic and regulatory functions.

2.4 Deficits and debt
Countries like Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore opted for economic growth
models in which aggregate demand was driven by exports. Unlike them
Greece chose the model of a quasi-closed economy in which aggregate de-
mand is determined by import substitution. In my view, the policies that were adopted under this strategic choice, distorted the structure and undermined the international competitiveness of the Greek economy to such an extent that after 1974 its operation was characterized by several key imbalances. Among them the ones referred to below are most noteworthy.

**Swelling of the public debt**

As long as the cost of borrowing is less than or equal to the return of investment financed by loans, borrowing is beneficial because the wealth of borrowers increases. But if the cost of borrowing is greater than the return of the investments which are financed, borrowing becomes burdensome. Moreover, the situation for the borrowers becomes even harder, if they use the proceeds from the loans not for investment but for consumption. Based on this analysis, Figures 3, 5 and 6 warrant the following remarks: According to Figure 6, the interest payments by the Central Government on its outstanding debt climbed, and in some recent years exceeded, 5% of GNP. These outlays, in combination with the fact that the debt is held now largely by foreign creditors, widened the deficit in the balance of payments and by feeding back to the public debt destabilized the economy. From Figures 5 and 6 we observe that after 1981 government saving entered a declining trend, which resulted in a particularly rapid increase of the debt of the Central Government. Maintenance of the rising public debt would be feasible if: (a) the proceeds from the loans had been used to finance public investment; (b) public investments had accelerated economic growth, and (c) economic growth had increased public revenues so as to cover the required outlays for the payments of interest and amortization installments. But from Figure 3 we observe that public investment stagnated at around 2.4% of GDP per annum. Therefore, since government borrowing was used mainly to finance public consumption, it was to be expected that economic growth would decelerate, public deficits would swell and the government would become eventually unable to service public debt.

This is precisely the impasse Greece faces today and the challenge is how to return to the path of robust economic growth, so as to repay creditors without big losses in national sovereignty, credibility and pride.

**What happened in the balance of payments**

Figure 7 shows how the import and export of goods, the imports and exports of services, and the inflows and outflows of incomes and other transfer payments, determined the opening in the balance of payments, which had to be covered by transfers of savings from abroad. All series come from the AMECO database, they cover the period 1960-2010 and are stated as percentages of GNP. In conjunction with the remarks made earlier, in reference
to the changes in the composition of output, productivity and competitiveness, we observe the following: The balance of the trade account has been negative throughout the post war period. But while due to the rising productivity and competitiveness of Greek products the deficits until 1981 were maintained down to 4% of GNP on average per annum, since then the deficit kept increasing and in 2010 it reached 14.4%. The balance in the account of services has been consistently positive. In particular, by virtue of the increased productivity and competitiveness that the industry of services achieved before 1981, the surpluses from this account contributed increasingly to meet the expanding trade deficits. After 2005, the surpluses from the services account started to show signs of fatigue most likely because: (a) Greece lost the ability to offset the losses in competitiveness through currency devaluation; (b) losses of competitiveness in the tourist industry accelerated by the dynamic entry into this sector of neighbouring countries, and (c) the recession that plagues the world economy in general and the shipping industry in particular.

The net balance from income transfers and other current transactions with foreign countries, which was positive and increasing until 1995, initially slowed down and eventually turned negative. At a time when Greece was receiving significant aid from the EU, this development suggests that the outflows mainly for the payment of interest on the growing foreign debt began to contribute significantly to the balance of payments deficit and to add to its continuous enlargement. That this is what happened I am fairly certain because, as recent research has shown, the need for interest payments on foreign debt in the order of 5% of GNP rendered the imbalances in the balance of payments non sustainable.

In turn, the last point implies that the deficit in the balance of payments after 1981 became unsustainable both because of the losses in competitiveness of the Greek economy and the big deficits that fiscal policies generated,
which led to the accumulation of an unsustainable amount of public debt. Although from the presentation in Section 2.3 the reader may have appreciated the magnitude of the problem that government operations created since 1981, for reasons of completeness, the following brief account regarding the imbalances in the social security system is imperative.

The actuarial debt of social security
Under the current system the payment of pensions is based on three sources of revenues. These are: (a) the contributions of employers and employees; (b) the returns from the investments of the reserves, and (c) the reserves themselves. Later I shall have the opportunity to highlight the enormous responsibility of governments in their disastrous policies and management of the social security system. But here the goal is different. In particular, what I wish to do is to approximate the present value of reserves that the social security system ought to have in order to be able to cover the outstanding claims of policyholders. As pension funds lack this reserve, their shortfall is considered public deficit, which even though it does not translate into government bonds or treasury bills traded daily in the stock exchanges, it generates growing obligations for governments in the future.

The first two post war decades there was no problem. Since the ratio of workers to pensioners was high and real incomes were increasing, annual expenditures were more than covered by contributions and hence reserves kept increasing. But by the late 1970s, the ratio of workers to pensioners started to decline, whereas simultaneously economic growth slowed down, thus retarding contributions and eroding gradually the reserves. As a result the social security system entered a period of growing deficits. The study by OECD (1997) describes and evaluates all the reforms made since then in order to confront the problem. Unfortunately, none of these reforms was sufficiently radical to reverse the downward trend and the net liabilities of the social security system to policy holders from the one year to the next continued to grow. For example, OECD (1997, 93) experts calculated that at that time the present value of unsecured liabilities of the social security system amounted to at least 137% of GDP.

In the years since then governments initiated several reform efforts towards a tripartite scheme of funding, with a commitment on the part of the state to contribute annually one percentage point out of the GDP growth. However, as shown by studies from different institutions, the situation continued to deteriorate and the actuarial deficit of the social security system to date is probably

7 To a large extent this explains why prior to 1974 central government budgets did not show deficits. Simply, social insurance surpluses covered the shortfall of public revenues from taxes and other sources relative to public expenditures.
more than 150% of GDP. So, under the extraordinary financial conditions that emerged in 2010, the horizontal reduction in pensions, the mandatory prolongation of working years before retirement, and the tightening of conditions for early retirement, came naturally. However, none of the reforms of the current redistributive pension system has reversed the upward trend in the actuarial debt. What is needed is a reform towards remunerative pension schemes, whereby citizens themselves will assume the responsibility for the funding of their retirement plans, as well as looking carefully after the management of their savings over the span of their working lives.

3. Why things came upside down
After the great economic crisis of 1929, economists in general suspected that some policies that were suitable before, they were inappropriate after. But while the vast majority of researchers were interested in explaining the causes of great depression and prescribe economic policies to prevent its recurrence in the framework of the established social and economic order, a few others searched for answers without this restriction because in their view the crisis was due to the core structure of the order itself. Unfortunately, unlike what happened in Western countries, in Greece dominated the ideas and policies of the opponents of the open society and market economy. Nowhere is their influence more apparent than in: (a) the institutional arrangements by means of which collective entities such as the “nation”, the "state", the "society" and the “political parties” were endowed with rights over and above those of the individual, and (b) the economic policies through which markets were replaced by administrative processes of central direction and control. Here I shall explain why the developments in these two fronts could bring about different results than the ones I reported in the previous section.

3.1 Effects of changes in institutions
The propensity of a country to grow or regress is strongly influenced by which institutions administer the functions of the state, what mechanisms ensure the enforcement of checks and balances among them, how well protected are individual freedoms and property rights in the law and in practice, etc. The following describe the main trends that prevailed in Greece in the post war period.

One party governments
Since 1952 Greece has been governed by one-party governments, with all the cons that this entails in an environment of fierce partisan competition. Why have political parties in Greece shun cooperation? The usual explanation is that cooperation is not possible because the differences in their
programs are too big to converge. But as we know, this is not true because the two parties that governed Greece in the last three decades, i.e. the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party and New Democracy, have very similar political agendas. For example, they are in favour of democracy with a free market economy, albeit with some differences in the degree of state controls and regulations, they promote the country’s participation and integration into the EU, they pursue similar foreign and defence policies, etc. Rather the cause for their obsessive insistence on one-party governments should be sought in their inclinations to serve not the interest of all citizens, but those of their own and their civil and business clients. This explains why they will do anything, legal or illegal, moral or immoral, etc., to trap their constituencies, with the result that democracy in Greece combines with free markets in a grossly substandard way. Therefore, if Greek voters are to stop acting as "buyers of favours" by politicians, it is urgent to adopt constitutional reforms to re-establish their sovereignty over politicians and political parties, cut down on fractious politics, and impose conditions of full accountability and transparency on all individuals who are elected or appointed to public offices.

**Progressive government supremacy**

A second trend that prevailed was the transfer of overwhelming powers to the government from other decision making centres in the Greek democracy and economy. This trend appeared for the first time in the constitution of 1952 which, inter alia, granted the government rights to appoint the top justices and to supervise the educational system. Then it increased by a quantum leap in the constitution of 1975, which widened the immunity of the members of parliament, provided for state finance of the political parties, authorized the government to restrict property rights and to intervene in the civil service, in the labour unions, in all forms of cooperatives and associations of individuals, etc. Finally, it culminated in the 1986 revision of the constitution with the transfer from the President of the Republic to the government of the right to dissolve the parliament and to call for elections. Therefore, it is not surprising that gradually Greece slipped into a command regime, in which the government by controlling all levers of political and financial powers became invincible.

Did this trend contribute to the slowdown of economic growth after 1974? It did because: (a) democracy and economy in Greece were reduced to a “hydrocephalous” structure in which the power of decision-making by autonomous and independent institutions was usurped by governments in the name of citizens, but essentially in the service of a closely knit and controlled group of political and economic interests; (b) the concentration of powers in the central government transferred the authority of decisions from those who live and
have an immediate interest in the solution of problems to distant politicians and technocrats, who by approaching the problems from their point of view and deciding on limited information, frequently fail to act effectively, and (c) the concentration of powers in the central government undermined the flexibility and resiliency of the Greek democracy and economy to respond to domestic and external socks. For example, in the face of the current economic crisis, very few doubt that the responsibility for the failure to introduce the necessary structural reforms after 1974, and especially after 1981, rests with the politicians who propagated the preservation of the political system.

**Increasing lack of credibility, accountability and transparency**

With the exception of the period 1967-1974, when Greece was governed by a military regime, all governments since 1952 Greek governments did everything in their power to betray the trust of citizens. The successive revisions of the constitution through which the privileges of the members of parliament widened; their immunity against offences that concern even their private lives destroyed the principle of equality in front of the law; political parties were given rights that enabled them to transform the political market into a well-guarded oligopoly, etc. If to these aberrations we add the despicable laws that governments enacted, as well as the parliamentary manoeuvres they employed, to protect their members and their clients, it is not surprising that nowadays citizens demonstrating in the street of Athens and elsewhere demand the abolition of the current political system and a return to a politics with more accountability and transparency on the part of the political parties. That is why, the quality of Greek democracy and economy will not start improving until the constitution of 1975 is replaced by one in the direction of Western countries.

**Partisan politics in the civil service**

From the publication *Statistical Yearbook of Public Finance (1970)*, of the National Statistical Service of Greece, it turns out that the number of civil servants, which in 1940 stood at 54,909, in 1952 climbed to 72,671. Credible analyses at that time suggest that this increase was unjustified. But the situation was even worse because these data counted only those who worked for the state in legislated positions and left out all others who worked also for the state but on a contractual basis. Indications about how large the employment in the state sector has always been, started to appear slowly through studies by various researchers and reports by national commissions, which were appointed to study the problem and propose measures to solve it. One of these studies found that the number of civil servants in 1961 was over 260,000, in 1971 over 320,000 and in 1981 more than 500,000, whereas the census that was conducted in 2010 showed that their number had swelled to 768,000. Hence, if we add those working in public enterprises, autonomous public organizations and other non-permanent posi-
tions, state employees were more than 1,000,000. By itself this number is the most fundamental structural distortion of the Greek economy, which I doubt that can be confronted with gradualist approaches like the rule "one hired for every five retired", even if it were applied strictly.

Aside from using public employment as a means to meet the demand for well-paying jobs by their supporters, and thus perpetuate their tenure in the government, the two political parties that governed Greece in the post war period undermined civil service through yet another process. This took the form of labour unions. In particular, invoking the provisions of the 1975 constitution, they legalized and financed, usually in opaque ways, the establishment of labour unions all across the state sector. But soon the latter got loose from the control of the parties to which they held allegiance and imposed a regime of impunity for their members, resistance to reforms and rude behaviour towards citizens. In short they transformed into a state in the state.

Moreover, it is worth noting that, as the antagonism of the political parties in the domain of civil service increased, meritocracy in the hiring and promoting of civil servants receded. In turn, this trend eroded the morale of capable people working for the government, reduced their willingness to take responsibility, and turned civil service into a morass of mediocrity and indifference. No wonder therefore that in this hour of crisis that the country needs effective implementation of reforms, the civil service is in disarray.

3.2 Effects of economic policies
According to Figure 1, the growth rates that were achieved before 1974 were very high indeed. Most likely they would have been even higher, if the economic policies that the Greek authorities implemented were not oriented towards a centrally directed and nearly closed economy, without aspirations to achieve international competitive advantages for domestic products and services. For reasons that we shall explain shortly, this growth model exhausted its potential in the 1970s. So the institutions and the economic policies that enabled it to perform well previously ought to be reformed in the direction of an open and internationally competitive economy. Instead, the basic institutions changed in the opposite direction and pushed the structure of the economy towards a frenzied and rampant statism. Below I focus on the economic policies that help bring the economy of Greece to its knees.

Macroeconomic policies
Prior to 1974, macroeconomic policies made it possible to: (a) restore the vast damages that had been inflicted to the country’s infrastructure during the German occupation and the civil war that ensued, as well as to expand the networks of transportation, telecommunications, water-supply, public schools, etc.; (b) encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment, which resulted also in the technological upgrading of the sectors that benefited; (c)
accelerate private investment in housing and business activities; (d) balance public finances, and (e) stabilize monetary and credit policies under which: lending rates were kept low and stimulated private investment, the general price level increased only modestly and helped maintain the international competitiveness of Greek products and services, and the deficits in the balance of payments were contained within bounds that made it possible to avoid the accumulation of a large foreign debt. These desirable results do not imply that the policies were free of undesirable side effects. Rather on the contrary their consequences were both very serious and in retrospect not unexpected. For example, the payment of extremely low interest rates on the reserves of social security funds, which were deposited in the central bank on a mandatory basis, is responsible to some extent for the problems faced by pension funds today. But the dominant character of policies was growth oriented and that is why the unemployment rate in the 1970s fell to the extremely low level of 2.1%.

On the contrary, macroeconomic policies after 1974, and especially after 1981, promoted consumption and discouraged investment and economic growth. This view is corroborated by all the indices exhibited in the various figures and tables above. For example, despite the slight upward trend of public investments, the private ones decelerated (Figure 2). Net foreign direct investment initially vanished and more recently became negative (Figure 4). The deficits in the public sector and in the balance of payments (Figures 5 and 7) became self-sustaining; and, although labour productivity after 1994 accelerated, inflation eroded the international competitiveness of Greek products and services. The result was that the economy entered a prolonged recession during the period 1981-1993 and then it recovered, but the rates of growth were insufficient to absorb all the workers who entered the labour force for the first time. Thus, as joblessness in more recent years climbed to unprecedented levels, the annual rate of unemployment during last decade averaged 9.1%.

When Greece joined the Eurozone in 2002, monetary authorities knew or ought to know that fiscal imbalances were incompatible with the interest rates financial market determined for the national public debt. Simply the levels of its development and public debt did not justify that Greece borrowed at rates 30-50 basis points over German rates and indeed in doing so for consumption purposes. Greek authorities had all the time and the means to drive interest rates higher, and thereby slow down consumption and most likely economic growth, but at the same time implement structural reforms through which economic growth would have been jumpstarted again on a permanent and elevated basis. They did nothing and for this reason the monetary authorities of this period, in a similar way as the earlier ones who im-
posed the highly distortionary mechanism of centrally managed differential interest rates, are historically censurable.

In summary, the evidence is that with small differentiations fiscal and monetary policies before 1974 were conducted along high economic growth footprints. From 1974 on the earlier regime of macroeconomic policies changed mainly because of the sharp partisan competition that emerged in the political arena, which trickled down quickly to all levels of the Greek society. The result was that the state and the public budget became spoils for politicians, tightly organized minorities and interlocking groups of business interests. The apologists of the regime that took hold claim as success that from 1994 onwards the country returned to decent rates of economic growth, which were significantly higher than the average growth rates of the EU. I agree with this assessment, in as much as economic growth emanated from the acceleration of labour productivity and fixed business investment (Figures 2 and 3). I agree also that it was successful in that it facilitated the entry of Greece into the Eurozone. But, as the dividend of economic growth was directed by fiscal policies once again to consumption, economic expansion in the light of growing budget deficits and public debt was due to expire and did come to an end when the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. This explains why in 2009 and 2010 the Greek economy shrank by 2.3% and 4.3% respectively, while public debt climbed to 140% of GDP.

Unfortunately, after 1974, aside of fiscal and monetary policies, other macroeconomic policies exercised similarly adverse effects on economic growth and competitiveness. Some of them undermined further whatever flexibility existed in labour and goods markets. Such were, for example, the policies that introduced restrictions to the: (a) minimum wages; (b) conditions for recruiting employees (probationary period of employment, individual or collective contract, fixed or indefinite term of work assignment); (c) firing of employees (massive layoffs, timing of warning, severance pay, consultation procedures prior to notification of redundancies); (d) determination of working time (overtime, part-time, shift work, work on public holidays), (e) level of negotiation with employees (enterprise, sector), etc. Obviously, these restrictions introduced multiple rigidities in labour markets, which impeded the movement of employees among the available jobs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the representatives of the country’s cred-

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8 Because of over-borrowing from abroad Greece has gone bankrupt five times since 1821. These incidences took place in 1826, 1843, 1860, 1893, 1932 and in all Greece was obliged to make concessions to its creditors which reached up to surrendering its national sovereignty to “Big powers” (see, Reinhart, Rogoff, 2009, 96). Moreover, Greek governments have used frequently the “practice” of inflation to reduce in real terms the obligations of the state towards domestic creditors, i.e. Greeks.
tors demanded and the Greek government was compelled recently to abolish many of these restrictions and to loosen up the rest.

By still other policies governments extended the activities of the public deep into the private sector and to a large extent they misused them. Prior to 1974, State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations were established mainly in the public interest. I agree that the expansion of infrastructure in electricity by the Public Power Corporation, in telecommunications by Hellenic Telecommunications Organization, in rail transport by the Hellenic Railways Organization, etc., did facilitate economic development to take-off and become self-sustaining. To be sure, during this period elected governments in general and politicians in particular did not abstain from taking advantage of the attractive job opportunities that State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations offered to place their supporters and thus enhance their stay in power. But either because the administrations they appointed resisted indiscrete political interferences, or because politicians exercised some restrain, or employees felt allegiance and solidarity with respect to the social responsibility of State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations, excesses were avoided and social costs were kept reasonably low. But after 1974, the shield that the 1975 constitution provided to labour unions in conjunction with the extremely partisan politics that emerged, led to a reckless overmanning in SOEs, appreciable increase of their social costs and a parallel decline in the quality of their services. In short, as the behaviour of politicians became abusive, their employees gave precedent to their private interests, and the state became unable to modernize their installations through self-financed investments, the productivity of State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations and hence their contribution to economic growth decreased, whereas in some of them services collapsed completely, after bilking taxpayers of tens of billions of Euros.

In difference to what happened in other advanced European countries, in Greece the activities of public utilities were not limited to those that have been traditionally included in the so-called "natural monopolies". For various reasons, public ownership and management was also extended to banks and special credit institutions and through them to broad sectors of the economy. The impacts of these policies were as expected. Prior to 1974, the banking system was dominated by the National Bank of Greece, the top management of which is appointed to the present day by the government. With coverage from the Bank of Greece and other relevant government authorities, this bank encouraged the undertaking of investments by providing low-interest loans and taking over businesses in industries such as insurance, hotels, manufacturing, construction, etc. This policy helped spur economic development, since government plans and decisions could be implemented without the usual delays of bureaucratic procedures. But through this policy, the
National Bank of Greece merged and brought under its command powerful political, financial and business interests, in the core of which were embedded all the risks the positive results from its activities in the short-run to turn negative over the long hall. Unfortunately, after the two oil crises and the opening up of national economies to competition in the 1970s, it didn’t take long for the structural weaknesses in the Greek economy to surface, which were worsened further particularly with the nationalization in 1976 of the two banks, Commercial bank of Greece and Ionian and Popular Bank of Greece, as well as the major industrial complexes they controlled in several key sectors. Thus, there formed a powerful conglomerate of indirectly public enterprises, some of which were from the beginning or became later problematic and shut down, whereas a few continue to operate under accumulating losses.

Finally, it would be an omission not to mention the negative effects of policies that were adopted after 1974 with the aim to upgrade the services of the so-called "welfare state". According to the results presented by Matsaganis (2005), these policies failed because they reduced neither inequality, nor the various impediments to the access to public goods and services by poor people. But the cost of these policies to democracy and the economy was enormous, because they helped establish and diffuse to the whole society transaction mechanisms characterized by lack of transparency, impunity and extreme individualism.

Structural policies
Many researchers tend to classify structural economic policies into categories, depending on the sectors of the economy to which they apply. Based on these classifications, the relevant literature refers to structural policies in agriculture (agricultural policy), in industry (industrial policy), in energy (energy policy), in communications (telecommunications policy), in the environment (environmental policy), in education (educational policy), etc. My interest here is not to assess which structural policies were applied to particular sectors, for what purposes, or what were their results, since such an approach would be both unnecessary and impossible here. On the other hand, from what has happened to the Greek economy we know that, these policies were accompanied by catastrophic consequences mainly because they sought and achieved to replace the self-coordinating mechanisms of the market by procedures of central control. Therefore, I shall limit myself to some key examples.

1. The banking oligopoly
During the post war period, the monetary authorities sought and managed to eliminate competition from the financial system. Until late in the 1980s, the
adopted policies were embedded in a centrally administered system of differential interest rates which aimed to direct the flows of investment to those sectors that the technocrats in the Bank of Greece considered growth enhancing. In order to apply credit policies through this system, commercial banks and special credit institutions were induced by various means to comply with a predetermined set of interest rates for loans and deposits. Two such means were, for example, on the one hand the incentives and disincentives in the mechanism of credit policies, and on the other the ability of monetary authorities to regulate certain key activities of credit institutions through the so-called “expediency permits”. In our view, so wide and so permanent was the influence that these practices exerted that, despite their abolition in 1987, the oligopolistic structure they introduced in the banking sector has not changed much to the present day.

2. Strategic industries and enterprises
As they were impressed by the successes of the Soviet Union, especially in the sector of heavy industry, many noted economists and politicians in the period 1930-1950 proposed the organization of Greece as a command society and economy. The prevailing view was initially that, in order to achieve rapid economic growth, the state ought to own and manage the large enterprises in all sectors of the economy. But over time, and as it became apparent that the state could not afford the burden of required investments, their vision narrowed and what they suggested was the establishment of state-owned enterprises in those activities that were considered “strategic” in the sense that they contribute multiplicatively to all other sectors of the economy.

Later the concept of the "strategic sectors" was extended to include "strategic enterprises" as well. The suggestion for the state to invest in such enterprises was not new. But its time had not arrived yet. This happened in the early 1960s when conditions were ripe for the state and the banks it controlled to initiate it. In 1964 the Government took the lead in the establishment of the Greek Bank for Industrial Development, which became one of the largest investment banks in the country. Simultaneously, the National Bank of Greece started to acquire dominant stakes in financial and non-financial corporations, whereas the group of the Agricultural Bank of Greece at the end of 1999 comprised 17 companies, 8 of which were operating in the financial sector, 2 in the insurance industry and the remaining 7 in various other sectors. Parallely, the same bank had minority interests in 31 companies mainly in the processing of agricultural products. So, the question is whether this policy proved successful or not.

My assessment is that the results were negative. First, it should be noted that all banks which took part in this policy shut down or became problemat-
ic (e.g. Agricultural Bank of Greece). Second, from the companies in which the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development established majority or minority stakes, most went bankrupt, whereas the few that passed to private interests, when the bank itself was privatized in 2001, were in dire economic situation. Thirdly, the same fate had most, if not all, business concerns to which other state banks invested like, for example, Piraiki-Patraiki which, after operating for several years at the expense of taxpayers, eventually closed down in 1996, leaving debts of the order of 240 billion drachmas. The National Investment Bank for Industrial Development was perhaps the only investment bank which worked creatively, avoiding systematically to taking control or assuming the management of the industries in which it invested. But even in its case, the percentage of industries that survived was relatively small.

The usual explanation for the failure of the policy of “strategic sectors and enterprises” is that Greek banks proved incapable to implement it as effectively as, for example, Germans did. If some continue to believe in the merits of this policy, hopefully very few by now, it is useful for them to recall the disastrous turn its practice took after 1981. Then, the idea was launched that the state could take over the companies that had become problematic, due to the two oil crises and the march of international competition, restructure them and then return them to the private sector, thus preserving thousands of jobs which otherwise would have been lost. What happened we know precisely from the relevant literature and there is no need to repeat it here in detail. Of the nearly seventy companies that were placed under the Organization of Company Restructuring, the great-majority were liquidated, some were privatized, whereas two or three continue to operate under state ownership and management at the expense of taxpayers, since each year they leave mountains of losses. Thus, the nice idea of preserving jobs via company restructuring by the state added several billion Euros to the public debt that taxpayers are forced now to repay.

3. Protection of "infant industries"

The protection of "infant industries" in Greece took the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports. In both cases the objective was the same. Namely, to keep the prices of foreign products higher than the prices of those produced locally, so as to provide the Greek infant enterprises with the time and the resources to gain shares in the domestic and international markets. Did this policy succeed? We know that it failed because, when the economy opened to international competition in the 1970s, there emerged a populous generation of problematic enterprises, most of which went bankrupt. Why did this happen? It happened mainly for two reasons. First, because the orientation of structural poli-
cies was to support productive activities that aimed at import substitution; and, second, because after the tariff and non-tariff barriers were imposed they became permanent. Thus, as it happened elsewhere, experience in Greece ascertained that the imposition of barriers to imports is a pretext to protect non-competitive industries, the owners of which master and apply significant political influence on governments.

4. **Saturated branches of industry and expediency permits**

To direct the flows of investment towards activities they deemed growth enhancing, aside of those based on the credit terms mentioned above, the authorities employed a wide assortment of other policies. Two of them were applied very extensively. The first was the classification of certain industries as “saturated”, in the sense that their installed capacity exceeded the demand for the products they produced. In these industries no further investments were permitted because they were considered wasteful. The second policy drew on a legally established prerogative whereby the authorities investigated in advance whether the proposed investment in a particular industry would be useful or not from a social point of view and accordingly they permitted or not its implementation. As was the case with the other structural policies, these too turned out to be highly distortive and not only because the authorities inhibited entry into the various industries and protected incumbents from potential completion.

In addition, these policies were exceedingly distortionary, because over time they were extended deep into the private sector. For example, the policy of “expediency permits”, which was invented before the war to regulate competition in certain key sectors of the economy, in the post war period it was extended to numerous professional occupations. Certainly, this widening of its application was not adopted without benefits for the politicians and the professionals who cooperated. But the decline in the well-being of citizens as consumers of the services of these professions was significant and permanent because, due to the stifling of competition, prices have been kept above equilibrium up to the present. So it is not surprising that now the representatives of Greece’s creditors are asking the government to open up all closed professions. The amazing thing is that, ignoring the dire situation of the country, the government resorts to various tricks to avoid the substantive opening of privileged professions like those of engineers, pharmacists, public notaries, etc. And all this while direct state interventions like price controls are known to have unintended consequences, the cost of which over the years exceeds many times the benefits they generate for the professional classes that they are enacted to favour.
3.3 Effects of globalization

During the period under review the Greek economy was exposed to two waves of globalization. The first begun from the signing in 1961 of the Association Agreement with the EU, whereas the second from the cataclysmic changes that took place in the early years of the 1970s. Due to these changes, the economies of all countries opened up and instead of seeking economic growth through import substitution in a closed economy setting, they started to adopt the growth model which is based on exports. The objective here is to trace and assess the effects of globalization on the Greek economy.

Results from participating in the European integration

The nature and extent of the influences that the Greek economy received from the country’s participation in the process of European integration, as well as their consequences, have been studied, both by domestic and foreign researchers. The presentation below is based largely on this literature in conjunction with the findings in Section 2.

1961-1981: Agreement of Association

The tariff regime that this agreement established was quite favourable for Greece. In particular, while Greek tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports were marked for gradual reduction over a 12-year period, exports enjoyed the same tariffs with those in the six countries that comprised the EU at the time. The agreement created a gradually declining comparative advantage, which was designed to bring about two results. First, to give the Greek economy time to start growing through increased exports to the community, and hence with lesser constraints from the balance of payments, and, second, to adjust to the more competitive countries of the EU, and thus enable it to stand on its own in the face of the demanding conditions within the community. Were these two objectives achieved? My view is that they were not and I base it on the following considerations.

Eichengreen (2007, 25) informs us that during the period 1950-1973 Greek exports to the EU and the rest of the world increased at average annual rates of 12.5% and 12.3%, respectively. Hence, the favourable impact other researchers found was probably due to the sample period of the data they used. This explanation is reinforced considerably from the research that Papantoniou (1979, 40) conducted with data covering the period 1967-1973 from the Annual Industrial Surveys, published by the National Statistical Service of Greece. He found that, even though exports did shift from the world to the EU due to the preferential treatment given to Greek products in the EU markets, total exports did not increase.

However, his results also showed that the Agreement of Association was not utterly without favourable effects, since it helped the products of tradi-
tional industrial sectors gain shares in the EU markets. In particular, he found that the growth rate of such exports to the EU was extremely high (65.2%) compared to modern consumer goods (43.6%), basic metals (5.6%), and mechanical and other products (29.6%). Perhaps it is in this light that Georgakopoulos (2002, 2), more recently, arrived at the assessment that the country’s association with the European Economic Community in the early 1960s was an important contributing factor to the country’s high growth during this period. But it fell short of the expected results for the following reason. When the usefulness of the association with the EU was discussed in the late 1950s, the aspect of interest was not if and by how much exports would increase. The main focus was whether through appropriate structural reforms the Greek economy could become strong enough to withstand the keen competition that prevailed within the EU. That this was the main issue there is no doubt, because here it is how Papandreou (1962, 25), ending the controversy and the recriminations, summed up the challenge Greece faced:

"Greece has recently concluded an Association Agreement with the European Common Market with the prospect of full membership some 22 years hence. It is fair to say that, given the terms of the association, Greece has a small margin of time in which to achieve the structural transformations needed for survival in the European Common Market."

Consequently, the issue is whether Greece, in the window of 22 years that the Agreement of Association allowed, did introduce the necessary structural reforms. Unfortunately, while after 1960 Greek governments knew full well that the main objective was to adjust the economy to the more competitive ones of the EEC, not only they did nothing, but they went even a step further. At all costs they: (a) kept alive failing enterprises; (b) mindlessly closed markets to actual and potential competition; (c) gave in to the cartelization of hundreds of professions, and (d) against all rational thinking, they increased the size of the public sector to such an extent that the problems Greece faces today became almost certain.

1981-2000: Agreement of Accession

In the late 1970s the economy was converging to the economies of the EU. Despite the slowdown in many macroeconomic aggregates, it was gaining ground in all areas and rather despite the reduction in tariffs under the Agreement of Association. This does not mean that there existed no problems. There existed and I pointed them out above. But while these problems slowed down economic growth and ceteris paribus would have pushed the economy into prolonged recession, from Tables 5 and 6 it turns out that their
adverse influences were glossed over by the acceleration in productivity and in competitiveness relative to the EU. That is why the government which emerged from the elections of 1981 correctly negotiated a new adjustment period during which Greek tariffs towards EU countries would be reduced later and at a slow pace. In practice, however, neither this new transition period nor the huge financial assistance, which began to flow from various EEC Structural Funds, proved sufficient to stem the undesirable developments that followed.

In Section 2 we saw that economic growth, productivity, competitiveness and many other key metrics of the economy deteriorated significantly after 1981. For example, referring to the impact on exports from the accession to the EU, Table 7 shows how two main components of the balance of payments evolved. While until 1980 the surplus in the balance of services was rising, afterwards it followed a downward trend, which continues to the present day. At the same time, albeit with some lag, the balance of trade started from 1990 to deteriorate, so ever since the deficit in the balance of current transactions widened.

Πίνακας 7: Εξέλιξη του εμπορικού ισοζυγίου, δις. Ευρώ, σταθερές τιμές 2000

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In view of these developments, many researchers tried to detect the direction and severity of the effects that the accession to the EU exerted on the Greek economy. For example, Georgakopoulos, Paschos (1985), Georgakopoulos (1988) and Baltas (1997) explored the effects in the agricultural sector. Katsoulakos, Tsoumis (2002) turned their attention to the industry, whereas Georgakopoulos (1993) and Oltheten, Pinteris, Sougiannis (2003) assessed the overall impact. The main conclusions from this literature are as follows: Despite the twenty year of preparatory period, in 1981 the Greek economy was unprepared to join and progress in the competitive environment of the EU. Private enterprises in all sectors survived thanks to the high
tariff protection and considerable subsidies. The markets were regulated centrally by administrative controls, stifling competition and reducing the flexibility of the economy to adjust to domestic and external shocks. The narrow public sector was oversized and operated as inefficiently as presently, whereas the broader public sector was dominated by powerful labour unions, often holding the government and the citizens hostage. In general, in the late 1980s the structure of the Greek economy was further than the model envisioned in the Treaty of Rome than it was in 1960. Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the lower prices of Greek agricultural products reached parity with the higher ones in the EU. As a result, this development: (a) reduced the competitiveness of Greek farm products relative to those of the community, (b) slowed exports, (c) increased farmers’ incomes, and (d) quashed farmers’ incentives to increase productivity so as to preserve some measure of competitive advantage. The rise in farmers’ incomes, due to the CAP, as well as in the incomes of other social classes, due to the generous assistance from the EU, increased the aggregate demand in the economy, accelerated imports, and destabilized the balance of current transactions (See last row of Table 7 above). As expected, to address the widening gap in the balance of current transactions, governments resorted to successive devaluations of the national currency. These, while on the one hand stimulated inflation, on the other became increasingly ineffective because they failed to increase the competitiveness of the economy, since the demand for imports was fuelled by the EU aid and the reduction in the propensity to save. EU assistance was not used effectively. For example, subsidies to farmers aimed at supporting their income and not to reduce their production costs. Investments to restructure crops, increase the size of farm lots, improve farm organization and management, etc., were neglected. In other words, the warning by Georgakopoulos (1988, 138) that the offsetting of the costs of accession would depend on the use of EU assistance was ignored. Due to the EU Single Market Programme many researchers expected that the gradual reduction in tariffs as well as the high differential inflation would reduce the competitiveness of industrial products and lead to a serious shrinkage of industry. Table 3 shows that in terms of gross value added this expectation did not materialize. By contrast, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, despite the adverse macroeconomic environment, the bulk of the industry survived because it managed to remain competitive.

From the above it follows that the accession of Greece to full membership in the EU was accompanied by high costs because governments: (a) left the Greek economy institutionally and structurally unprepared to face suc-

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9 Various studies like, for example, the one by Brissimis, Leventakis (1989) have confirmed that the devaluations of the national currency in the 1980s did not improve the balance of payments. In the short run, devaluations had some small positive effects, but over the long haul the competitiveness of the Greek product and services returned to the pre devaluation level.
cessfully the challenges to which it was exposed, and (b) failed to make effective use of the generous EU aid, since they channelled it more to consumption than investment.

2001–to date: Accession to the Economic and Monetary Union
In 1992 the countries which participated in the EU decided to proceed to the next phase of the European integration and for this purpose they adopted the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. As several of the countries did not meet one or more of these criteria, their governments took steps to converge. So when in 1999 they decided which countries had achieved adequate convergence and would be included in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Greece was found unprepared, whereas the United Kingdom and Denmark chose not to participate.

The blocking of Greece from the EMU made it clear that, for reasons having to do with the organization of its economy and its preparedness to introduce the necessary structural changes, it did not qualify. But the decision left the window open for Greece to enter later, that is after it managed to meet the Maastricht criteria. However, the improvement in the macroeconomic imbalances, which enabled Greece’s to enter into the EMU in 2001, were short lived because it was solely based on macroeconomic adjustments and left the structure of the economy unchanged. The prime ministers who served afterwards understood the urgency of structural reforms and in their speeches expressed repeatedly their resolve to take bold action. But to no avail. For reasons of short-sighted political expediency they forgot their commitments, their governments adopted structural policies which worsened the functioning of institutions and markets, and soon after the celebrated entry of Greece into the EMU the deficits and the macroeconomic imbalances became uncontrolable. Thus, deprived in the Eurozone of the ability to deal with external imbalances through currency devaluation, inevitably Greece arrived on the brink of bankruptcy.10

4. Assessment
From the first section it follows that prior to 1974 Greece achieved: high economic growth rates (≈ 7%), enviable price stability (<2.5%), which enhanced the international competitiveness of Greek products and services and maintained the balance of payments under manageable control, enviable reduction of unemployment (<2.5%), improvement and expansion of social services, and all with very limited public debt (<12.5% of GDP in 1974). After 1974, economic growth fell to about one third (≈ 2.4%), the unem-

10 Bitros (1992) and Bitros, Korres (2002) had warned well in advance what would be the awful predicament, if governments failed to introduce the necessary structural reforms.
ployment rate, which more than doubled in the period 1980-2000 (≈ 6%), in the decade of 2000 nearly quadrupled (≈ 9%), the explosive deficits in the balance Payment were contained only thanks to the huge EU aid, and the budget deficits pushed public debt to an unsustainable ratio (≈ 150% of the GDP in 2011). So now Greece is under the supervision and tutelage of its creditors. Due to this this extraordinary setback, I raised and attempted to answer the following question: What did happen and Greece, from the phase of spectacular economic expansion before 1974, regressed afterwards and now stands on the verge of bankruptcy?

Prior to 1974 the political and social climate was friendly to entrepreneurship, domestic and foreign. The public administration was significantly dysfunctional, but as it was organized hierarchically it had limited excuses to delay decision making and built corrupt relationships with the citizens. Fiscal policies, although oriented towards public consumption, covered adequately the needs for public infrastructure. Monetary policies aimed at price stability, whereas the inefficiencies that stemmed from the highly distortionary credit policies were subdued. As a result, at least the institutions and the macroeconomic policies were friendly towards economic growth and contributed results which offset by far the adverse effects from the public administration and the distortions of microeconomic and structural policies.

After 1974 the social sentiment became inhospitable, if not utterly hostile, towards business. In the first place, responsible for this turnaround were certain key policies enacted by the government which took over from the military regime. Exemplary among them were: (a) the drafting and the authorization of a new constitution in 1975, which opened widely the doors to socialism; (b) several nationalizations of big banks and large enterprises, and (c) numerous structural reforms, which signalled the establishment of a centrally administered and controlled economy. As these were inspired by a supposedly conservative government, they were perceived by business people as “regime change” and they started to act analogously. In the second place, regime change was all advocated by the socialist party, whose leader and main protagonists lost no opportunity to reiterate that their intentions were to install a socialist regime of the “third road”. Unfortunately, after 1974, all institutions and macroeconomic policies, which previously favoured economic growth, reversed, whereas the public administration and the structural policies, which hitherto inhibited economic growth, were reinforced by party politics. If on top of the above we reckon that after 1974, and especially after 1981, governments did nothing to prepare the country for survival within the competitive environment of the EU, Greece’s decline was all but certain.

In my view, the path to the current crisis started long before 1974. It began in the early 1950s, when the authorities decided to pursue the model of economic development with import substitution. Because of this choice, ex-
cept of maritime and tourism, in which entrepreneurs by necessity had to struggle in international markets to gain shares, the ambitions, the plans and the prospects of Greek entrepreneurs were confined in the narrow markets of the Greek economy. From this remark it follows that the model of development which was adopted nurtured over time entrepreneurs with claustrophobic and defensive reflexes and with deep dependencies from the political system and the state banks.

In closing I wish to stress that it is only now, i.e. after having spent considerable amount of time to study the post war economic history, that I realized that my recommendations, on how Greece might have avoided its present predicament, were all in vain. For example, in the light of the two oil crises in the 1970s, the rising inflation and interest rates, etc., in numerous articles and public speeches I recommended that it was high time for the governments to introduce deep structural reforms. What did I propose? I proposed that the number of civil servant and the operating cost of the narrow public sector ought to be reduced significantly. Through extensive privatizations public enterprises ought to be transferred to the private sector or at least be exposed to competition. In network industries such as electricity, telecommunications, transport, etc., governments ought to limit the injurious influences of labour unions and promote the technological modernization of public enterprises through self-financing, etc. etc. However, I did not know the true agendas of those who governed Greece in the post war period. I learned of them only more recently when I came to realize that the 1975 constitution was based on the constitution that had be drafted in 1944 by the high priests of the Hellenic Socialist Union, most of whom played key governments roles. The tragedy that befell on Greece did not happen fatefully. It was made artificially fateful by the sortsighted and self-interested choices of neo-socialists politicians and intellectuals who shared the erroneous view that the market economy is not conceivable with democracy. Now that Greece succumbed to the supervision and guardianship of its creditors, perhaps they may repent and open their eyes to the truth of the theorem that democracy without a free market economy is impossible.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


