What Limits Indirect Appropriability?

Waldman, Michael (2013): What Limits Indirect Appropriability? Forthcoming in: Handbook on the Economics of Copyright

Abstract

One argument concerning copyright protection is that the returns to copyright protection are limited because of indirect appropriability, where indirect appropriability is the idea that original producers receive returns from copying because the buyers of original units are willing to pay more when they can sell copies. This paper argues that indirect appropriability is limited in most real world markets and explores in a series of theoretical models why this is the case.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: copyright, indirect appropriability
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; K - Law and Economics > K0 - General

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