Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type.

Sokolovskyi, Dmytro and Sokolovska, Olena (2013): The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_44745.pdf

Download (475kB) | Preview

Abstract

The article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction of risks of investment activity in economy. The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it follows from the behavior of interactive parties. Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the established conclusion.

Logo of the University Library LMU Munich
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the University Library LMU Munich in Germany.