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The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type.

Sokolovskyi, Dmytro and Sokolovska, Olena (2013): The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type.

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Abstract

The article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction of risks of investment activity in economy. The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it follows from the behavior of interactive parties. Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the established conclusion.

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