Deep or aggregate habit formation? Evidence from a new-Keynesian business cycle model

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Deep or Aggregate Habit Formation? Evidence From a New-Keynesian Business Cycle Model

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Abstract

Habit formation is a fixture of contemporary new-Keynesian models. The vast majority assume that agents form habits strictly over consumption of an aggregate good, leaving open the question of whether it might be preferable to have them form habits over differentiated products instead—an arrangement known as deep habits. I answer this question by estimating a model that nests both habit concepts as special cases. Estimates reveal that the data favor a specification in which consumption habits are stronger at the product level than at the aggregate level. A mix of significance tests and simulation results indicate that including deep habits greatly improves model fit, most notably with regard to inflation dynamics.

Keywords: Deep Habits, Nominal Rigidities, Inflation Persistence

JEL Classification: E31, E32

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1 Introduction

Habit formation in consumption is a prominent feature of the microeconomic apparatus that underlies modern new-Keynesian models of the business cycle (e.g., Fuhrer, 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007). A standard assumption in this class of models is that households derive utility by consuming an aggregate good that is comprised of numerous differentiated products. A basic question then is whether habits develop at the level of the aggregate good or at the level of individual good varieties. Until recently this literature has only considered cases where agents become addicted to the overall consumption bundle despite empirical evidence suggesting that shoppers form habits over product categories and even specific brands (e.g., Chintagunta, Kyriazidou, and Perktold, 2001). Motivated by these findings, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006) propose a “deep habits” model in which habitual consumption develops exclusively on a good-by-good basis. In such an environment the demand function for each product will depend on past sales, causing equilibrium mark-ups of price over marginal cost to be time-varying and to move countercyclically with output. The authors go on to show that by inducing countercyclical mark-up behavior, deep habits can account for the observed procyclical responses of both consumption and real wages to various demand shocks. In contrast, a traditional habit-persistence model employing the exact same calibration fails to capture this dynamic.

The comparisons between deep and aggregate habit formation made in Ravn et al. (2006) take place in an economy with purely flexible product prices. As a result, the model is limited in its ability to match the broad correlations among nominal and real variables that define postwar US business cycles. New-Keynesian models, on the other hand, are better suited to this task (e.g., Ireland, 2003). A relevant question then is whether incorporating deep habits into these models could improve their fit with the data when compared to standard versions that assume habits thrive only at the composite good level. I try to answer that question here by estimating a small-scale DSGE model with sticky product prices, which I then use as a laboratory for testing the implications of the two habit concepts described above. The main goal is to examine whether aggregate habits are sufficient to explain the observed correlations in an economy where nominal frictions play a leading role, or whether deep habits can account for additional features of the data, thereby strengthening model fit.

To assess the merits of deep vs. aggregate habit formation, the paper begins by presenting a simple new-Keynesian model whose preference structure nests both types as special cases.

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1Both observations are consistent with the predominant empirical findings on the cyclical properties of mark-ups in US data (e.g., Bils, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).
The advantage of employing a nested utility function is that it enables one to consider several different modeling choices in the course of estimation. These include cases in which only the composite good is habit forming, only the individual goods are habit forming, both are addictive with possibly different habit intensities, or neither. Estimating a model that can accommodate any one of these arrangements makes it easier to infer from the data which mode of habit persistence is the more empirically compelling.

The paper proceeds by estimating three versions of the model using a maximum-likelihood procedure with quarterly US data on consumption, inflation, and a nominal interest rate. Each estimation imposes different restrictions on the utility function. One leaves the preference parameters unconstrained, allowing the data to ascertain the strength of habit formation at both levels. The second permits deep habit formation but sets aggregate habit intensity equal to zero prior to estimation. The third restricts deep habit intensity to zero while leaving the aggregate parameter free. Likelihood ratio tests then provide a basis for comparing the fit of the two constrained models to an unrestricted alternative that allows both types of consumption habits to coexist. Estimates reveal that the data favor a model featuring a large amount of persistence at the level of individual goods along with a modest amount at the composite good level. When examined side-by-side, however, it is clear that deep habits do a better job of explaining the broad correlations embodied by the likelihood function. In fact, the exclusion restriction on aggregate habits is not easily rejected at standard significance levels, but it is rejected with a high degree of confidence when imposed on deep habits.

Likelihood comparisons, while useful for assessing model fit, are uninformative about the precise features of the data captured by deep habits but not by aggregate habits. Further complicating this analysis is the fact that point estimates change from one model variant to the next, making it difficult to distinguish the empirical effects of habit formation from the effects of changes in the parameter values. To isolate the role of the habit mechanism from these other elements, I compare simulations of the restricted model containing only deep habits to those from an identically-parameterized model with deep habits replaced by aggregate habits. Simulations reveal that deep habits are superior mainly because they impart greater persistence on the inflation process. Correlations between current and lagged inflation, for example, decay more slowly when habits are deeply rooted and are much closer to the sample correlations. This dynamic is also reflected in the model’s impulse response functions, which show inflation reacting more sluggishly to both demand and supply shocks.

To gain insight into the persistence mechanism, it is helpful to examine how the shadow value of sales for individual producers responds to economic shocks. This quantity, repre-
sented by the lagrange multiplier on the firm’s product demand function, turns out to be much less volatile under deep habits. Smaller fluctuations in the marginal value of sales motivate firms to smooth out their price adjustments over a longer horizon, imparting more inertia on the dynamics of aggregate inflation. This characteristic of the deep habits model derives from price-elasticity and intertemporal effects found by Ravn et al. (2006) to be the source of countercyclical mark-ups under flexible prices. With deep habits an increase in aggregate spending boosts the demand elasticity for each product, causing equilibrium mark-ups to fall. At the same time, firms recognize that consumption habits make future demand conditions dependent on current sales, creating an (intertemporal) incentive to squeeze prices further in an effort to expand future profits. Of course, most new-Keynesian models generate countercyclical mark-ups by virtue of nominal stickiness alone. Nevertheless, these two effects, which vanish under aggregate habits, help discourage the swift price increases that would otherwise follow expansionary demand shocks as well as the abrupt declines that typically follow shocks to total factor productivity.

1.1 Related Studies

This paper contributes to a recent literature, originated by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2004), that studies the empirical implications of incorporating deep habits into sticky-price models of the business cycle. Using generalized method of moments, Lubik and Teo (2011) estimate a new-Keynesian Phillips curve derived from an optimizing model featuring deep habit preferences. In their setup the forcing process for inflation depends on expected future consumption growth in addition to real marginal cost. The authors construct a synthetic time series for this process using real unit labor cost along with conditional expectations obtained from a reduced-form forecasting model for consumption. A central finding is that deep habits improve the fit of the Phillips curve while making it less reliant on backward-looking components such as indexation or rule-of-thumb pricing.

One of the drawbacks of the single-equation estimation strategy employed by Lubik and Teo (2011) is that it does not account for all of the general equilibrium restrictions on the joint dynamics of the endogenous variables. By contrast, the maximum-likelihood approach adopted here imposes all of these restrictions by estimating simultaneously the full system of equilibrium difference equations contained in the model. In efforts to compare the fit of deep habits to aggregate habits, a systems-based approach is useful because the two specifications have different testable implications for the co-movement of the endogenous variables. Despite these methodological differences, it is encouraging that the studies report
some common findings, most notably regarding point estimates of the deep habit parameter, improvements in model fit, and lagged indexation as a trivial source of inflation persistence. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, Uribe, and Uuskula (2010) is an example of a recent study that utilizes a complete model for estimation. A key difference from this paper, however, is that parameters are chosen by minimizing a weighted discrepancy between the dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock implied by the model and the empirical ones obtained from a structural vector autoregression. Statistical inference is therefore based on limited information contained in the impulse responses to a single identified shock rather than full information provided by the likelihood function. The authors show that deep habits can resolve the so-called “price puzzle” (the brief deflation that follows an expansionary monetary shock) as well as generate the observed persistence in the inflation response without relying on implausible levels of exogenous nominal rigidity. An alternative model featuring aggregate habits instead of deep habits is shown to perform worse in these specific areas.

2 The Model

The economy is inhabited by identical households and a continuum of imperfectly competitive firms that produce differentiated goods and face costs of changing prices. What sets it apart from the textbook new-Keynesian model is a preference structure that allows consumption habits to be formed at the level of differentiated goods as well as the composite final good.

2.1 Households

Households are indexed by \( j \in [0, 1] \). Each household \( j \) values consumption of differentiated goods \( c_{j,t}(i) \), with distinct varieties indexed by \( i \in [0, 1] \), but experiences disutility from supplying labor \( h_{j,t} \). Following Ravn et al. (2006), preferences feature external habit formation on a good-by-good basis. This so-called “deep habits” specification assumes that household \( j \)’s period utility function depends on a composite good \( x_{j,t} \) given by

\[
x_{j,t} = \left[ \int_0^1 \left( c_{j,t}(i) - b^d c_{t-1}(i) \right)^{1-1/\eta} di \right]^{1/(1-1/\eta)},
\]

where \( c_{t-1}(i) = \int_0^1 c_{j,t-1}(i) dj \) denotes the population mean consumption of good \( i \) at date \( t - 1 \) and \( \eta > 1 \) is the substitution elasticity across (habit-adjusted) varieties. Parameter \( b^d \in [0, 1] \) measures the intensity of habit formation in consumption of each variety.
Before making intertemporal decisions, household \( j \) minimizes total consumption expenditure, \( \int_0^1 P_t(i) c_{j,t}(i) \text{d}i \), subject to the aggregation constraint (1). \( P_t(i) \) is the nominal price of good \( i \) at date \( t \). In solving its minimization problem, the household treats \( c_{t-1}(i) \) as exogenous.\(^2\) The first-order conditions imply demand functions for each variety of the form

\[
c_{j,t}(i) = \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} x_{j,t} + b^d c_{t-1}(i),
\]

where \( P_t \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 P_t(i) \text{d}i \right]^{1/(1-\eta)} \) is the unit price of the final good. The demand for good \( i \) has the usual property of being negatively related to its relative price \( P_t(i)/P_t \) and positively related to consumption of the final good \( x_{j,t} \). Note, however, that deep habits give rise to an additional component that depends positively on past aggregate sales \( c_{t-1}(i) \) when \( b^d > 0 \).

As shown in the next section, firms internalize this feature when setting prices. In particular, they recognize that consumption habits make future demand conditions a function of the current sales volume. This complementarity creates an incentive to moderate price increases in order to expand the customer base and hence procure higher profits in subsequent periods.

Household \( j \) maximizes the expected lifetime utility function

\[
V_{j,0} = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t a_t \left[ \log(x_{j,t} - b^a x_{t-1}) - \frac{h_{j,t}^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} \right], \tag{2}
\]

where \( E_0 \) is a date-0 conditional expectations operator, \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is a subjective discount factor, and \( 1/\chi > 0 \) is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Preference shocks \( a_t \) follow the autoregressive process \( \log a_t = \rho_a \log a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t} \), with \( \rho_a \in (-1, 1) \) and \( \varepsilon_{a,t} \sim \text{i.i.d. } N(0, \sigma_a^2) \). Movements in \( a_t \) shift the marginal utility of final consumption as well as the marginal disutility of labor. In equilibrium these disturbances perturb the consumption Euler equation.

In addition to differentiated goods \( c_{j,t}(i) \), the preferences described in (2) permit households to form habits directly over the composite good \( x_{j,t} \). Specifically, household \( j \) values quasi differences between \( x_{j,t} \) and \( x_{t-1} \equiv \int_0^1 x_{j,t-1} \text{d}j \), the population average consumption of the composite good at date \( t-1 \). Following Abel (1990), \( x_{t-1} \) is perceived as an external reference variable in that its evolution is taken as exogenous during optimization. Parameter \( b^a \in [0, 1) \) measures the strength of external habits in consumption of the final good.\(^3\)

\(^2\)Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) provide an example in which households internalize past consumption demand for each variety when allocating expenditure on individual goods.

\(^3\)This specification, often referred to as “catching up with the Joneses,” is different from internal habit formation in which households value consumption relative to their own past consumption. Dennis (2009) studies the empirical consequences of internal vs. external habit formation from a new-Keynesian perspective.
The utility function in (2) is appealing because it nests both forms of habit persistence examined in this paper as special cases. When \( b^a = 0 \) preferences become time separable in \( x_{j,t} \), and the model collapses to a strictly deep habits specification. Alternatively, setting \( b^d = 0 \) causes the deep habits mechanism in (1) to vanish. In this case habits develop only at the level of the final good now given by \( \left[ \int_0^1 c_{j,t}(i)^{1-1/\eta}di \right]^{1/(1-1/\eta)} \), which is just a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator commonly used in models with imperfectly competitive markets. Henceforth, I refer to this restricted version as the “aggregate habits” specification.

In each period \( t \geq 0 \), household \( j \) supplies labor to firms at a competitive nominal wage rate \( W_t \). It also has access to riskless one-period bonds \( B_{j,t} \) that pay a gross nominal interest rate \( R_t \) at date \( t + 1 \). Together with bond wealth and labor income, household \( j \) receives an aliquot share of profits from ownership of firms, \( \Phi_{j,t} \). The flow budget constraint is

\[
P_t x_{j,t} + \varpi_t + B_{j,t} \leq R_{t-1} B_{j,t-1} + W_t h_{j,t} + \Phi_{j,t},
\]

where \( \varpi_t \equiv b^d \int_0^1 P_t(i) c_{t-1}(i) di \).\(^4\) Sequences \( \{x_{j,t}, h_{j,t}, B_{j,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty \) are chosen to maximize \( V_{j,0} \) subject to (3) and a borrowing limit that rules out Ponzi schemes. In evaluating its optimal sequence problem, the household takes as given \( \{P_t, \varpi_t, R_t, W_t, \Phi_{j,t}\}_{t=0}^\infty \) as well as the initial composite good \( x_{-1} \) and bond holdings \( B_{j,-1} \). The first-order necessary conditions imply

\[
h_{j,t} \left( x_{j,t} - b^a x_{t-1} \right) = w_t
\]

and

\[
1 = \beta E_t \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \frac{a_{t+1}(x_{j,t} - b^a x_{t-1})}{a_t(x_{j,t+1} - b^a x_t)},
\]

where \( w_t \equiv W_t/P_t \) is the real wage and \( \pi_t \equiv P_t/P_{t-1} \) is the gross inflation rate.

### 2.2 Firms

Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms. Each variety \( i \) is associated with a distinct firm and is manufactured using household labor according to the production function \( y_t(i) = z_t h_t(i) \), where \( y_t(i) \) denotes the output of firm \( i \) and \( h_t(i) \) is its labor input. Aggregate technology shocks \( z_t \) follow the autoregressive process \( \log z_t = (1 - \rho_z) \log z + \rho_z \log z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{zt} \), with \( \rho_z \in [0, 1) \), \( z > 0 \), and \( \varepsilon_{zt} \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_z^2) \).

Firm \( i \) selects its price \( P_t(i) \) to maximize the present discounted value of nominal profits.

\(^4\)Household \( j \)'s efforts to minimize the period-by-period cost of assembling each unit of \( x_{j,t} \) implies that, at the optimum, \( \int_0^1 P_t(i) c_{j,t}(i) di = P_t x_{j,t} + b^d \int_0^1 P_t(i) c_{t-1}(i) di \).
Constraining the firm’s price-setting decision is the market demand curve for good $i$

$$c_t(i) = \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} x_t + b^d c_{t-1}(i), \quad (6)$$

obtained by integrating $c_{j,t}(i)$ over all $j \in [0,1]$ households. Here it is understood that firm $i$ will always meet this demand at the posted price, implying that $z_t h_t(i) \geq c_t(i)$ for all $t \geq 0$. Following Rotemberg (1982), firms also face a quadratic cost of adjusting nominal prices of the form $(\alpha/2) (P_t(i)/\pi P_{t-1}(i) - 1)^2 y_t$, where $\alpha \geq 0$ measures the degree of price rigidity. Adjustment costs are expressed in units of aggregate output, $y_t \equiv \int_0^1 y_t(i) di$, and are incurred whenever growth in $P_t(i)$ deviates from the long-run mean inflation rate $\pi$.

The Lagrangian of firm $i$’s problem can be written as

$$\mathcal{L} = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_{0,t} \left\{ P_t(i) c_t(i) - W_t h_t(i) - P_t \frac{\alpha}{2} \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{\pi P_{t-1}(i)} - 1 \right)^2 y_t + P_t \gamma_t(i) [z_t h_t(i) - c_t(i)] + P_t \nu_t(i) \left[ \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} x_t + b^d c_{t-1}(i) - c_t(i) \right] \right\},$$

where $q_{0,t}$ is a stochastic discount factor determining the date-0 value of additional profits in period $t$.\footnote{In equilibrium the stochastic discount factor satisfies $q_{0,t} P_t = \beta^t a_t/(x_t - b^a x_{t-1})$.} In maximizing $\mathcal{L}$, firm $i$ takes as given $\{q_{0,t}, W_t, P_t, y_t, z_t, x_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ as well as initial sales $c_{-1}(i)$ and price $P_{-1}(i)$. First-order conditions with respect to $\{h_t(i), c_t(i), P_t(i)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ are

$$w_t = \gamma_t(i) z_t, \quad (7)$$

$$\nu_t(i) = \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} - \gamma_t(i) + b^d E_t q_{0,t+1}^0 \pi_{t+1} \nu_{t+1}(i), \quad (8)$$

$$c_t(i) = \nu_t(i) \eta \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta-1} x_t + \alpha \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{\pi P_{t-1}(i)} - 1 \right) \frac{P_t y_t}{\pi P_{t-1}(i)}$$

$$- \alpha E_t q_{0,t+1}^0 \pi_{t+1} \frac{P_{t+1}(i)}{\pi P_t(i)} - 1 \frac{P_{t+1}(i) P_t y_t + 1}{\pi P_t(i)^2}. \quad (9)$$

The multiplier $\gamma_t(i)$ in (7) corresponds to real marginal cost. With a linear technology, marginal cost is invariant across firms and equal to the ratio of the real wage to the marginal product of labor. The multiplier $\nu_t(i)$ in (8) can be interpreted as the shadow value of selling an additional unit of good $i$ in the current period. It is the sum of two parts; the first is
the short-run profit from the sale, \( P_t(i)/P_t - \gamma_t(i) \), and the second is the discounted value of all future profits that the sale is expected to generate, \( b^\delta E_t \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi_t} \nu_{t+1}(i) \).

Equation (9) describes conditions that must be satisfied by the firm’s optimal price. Specifically, the marginal revenue from a unit increase in relative price, \( c_t(i) \), must equal the marginal loss resulting from the fall in demand, \( \nu_t(i) \eta \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta-1} x_t \), plus an adjustment cost when \( \alpha > 0 \).

### 2.3 Monetary Policy

Following Ravn et al. (2010), the monetary authority sets \( R_t \) according to a Taylor rule

\[
\log(R_t/R) = \theta_r \log(R_{t-1}/R) + (1 - \theta_r) \left[ \theta_\pi \log(\pi_t/\pi) + \theta_y \log(y_t/y) \right] + \varepsilon_{r,t}.
\]

where \( \theta_\pi \) and \( \theta_y \) capture the long-run policy response to fluctuations in gross inflation and aggregate output. Parameter \( \theta_r \in [0, 1) \) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing.\(^7\) Positive constants \( R, \pi, \) and \( y \) denote the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate, inflation, and output. The purely random element of policy is summarized by \( \varepsilon_{r,t} \sim \text{i.i.d.} \ N(0, \sigma_r^2) \).

### 2.4 Competitive Equilibrium

I consider a symmetric competitive equilibrium in which all households make identical consumption and labor supply decisions and all firms charge the same price. It follows that the subscript \( j \) and the function argument \( i \) can be dropped from variables appearing in the household’s and firm’s optimality conditions.

Equilibrium requires that both labor and product markets clear at prevailing prices. This is accomplished in the labor market by imposing

\[
\int_0^1 h_{j,t} dj = \int_0^1 h_t(i) di \equiv h_t
\]

for \( t \geq 0 \). In product markets, output of the final good must be allocated to total consumption expenditure and to resource costs originating from the adjustment of prices:

\[
y_t = c_t + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 y_t.
\]

\(^6\)Due to habit formation, selling a unit of good \( i \) in the current period raises sales by \( b^\delta \) units in the following period, the present discounted value of which equals \( b^\delta E_t \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi_t} \nu_{t+1}(i) \).

\(^7\)The policy coefficients \( \{\theta_r, \theta_\pi, \theta_y\} \) are jointly restricted to guarantee a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium. See Zubairy (2012) for a discussion of how deep habits modify the local determinacy conditions of an otherwise standard new-Keynesian model.
3 Econometric Strategy

In the absence of shocks, the equilibrium conditions of the model imply that all prices and quantities converge to a unique steady state. I log-linearize each equation around this fixed point and compute a rational expectations equilibrium using methods developed by Klein (2000). The solution has a state-space representation given by

\[ s_t = \Pi s_{t-1} + \Omega \varepsilon_t, \]
\[ f_t = Us_t, \]

where vector \( s_t \) contains both exogenous and endogenous state variables, \( \varepsilon_t \) holds the gaussian innovations, and vector \( f_t \) contains the model’s forward-looking variables. Elements of matrices \( \Pi, \Omega, \) and \( U \) are functions of the structural parameters governing the preferences and technologies of households, firms, and the monetary authority.

As shown by Kim (2000), models with solutions of the form (10) and (11) can be estimated via maximum likelihood using standard Kalman filtering techniques (e.g., Harvey, 1989). With data on the observable variables, the Kalman filter compiles a history of innovations \( \{\varepsilon_t\}_{t=1}^{T} \) that are used to evaluate sample log likelihood. Since these innovations depend on \( \Pi, \Omega, \) and \( U \), structural parameters may be estimated by maximizing log likelihood.

I estimate the model with quarterly US data on consumption, inflation, and a nominal interest rate. The sample period is 1965:Q3 to 2012:Q1. Consumption is real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) divided by the civilian noninstitutional population. Inflation is the first-differenced log of the PCE (chain-type) price index. The interest rate is the log of the gross yield on three-month Treasury bills. To harmonize the data with the model, I demean the inflation and interest rate series prior to estimation. Consumption data, however, exhibits a secular trend. To induce stationarity I regress the log of per capita consumption against a constant and a linear time trend. Least squares residuals are used for estimation.

4 Estimation Results

Of the model’s fourteen parameters, three are held fixed prior to estimation. The discount factor \( \beta \) is set to 0.9965, which equals the ratio of the sample means of inflation and the nominal interest rate. The substitution elasticity \( \eta \) across (habit-adjusted) goods is set equal to 6. In the absence of deep habits \( (b^d = 0) \), this value implies an average mark-up of 20 percent and is consistent with the evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997). When deep habits
are present, the steady-state mark-up is given by
\[ \mu = \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{1}{\eta} \right) \left( \frac{1 - b_d}{1 - \phi} \right) \right]^{-1} \]
and depends on both \( \eta \) and \( b_d \). Point estimates of \( b_d \) discussed below put \( \mu \) in the 21-22 percent range.

Preliminary attempts to estimate the adjustment cost parameter \( \alpha \) returned values that point to extreme levels of price rigidity. As a result, I follow Monacelli (2009) by calibrating \( \alpha \) so that the model is consistent with a price-change frequency of one year in a Calvo-Yun framework. Letting \( 1 - \phi \) denote the Calvo reset probability, \( \phi = 0.75 \) implies an average contract duration of \( (1 - \phi)^{-1} = 4 \) quarters (e.g., Woodford, 2003). To obtain \( \alpha \), I set the key slope coefficient in the linearized version of (9), which turns out to be \( (\eta - 1)/\alpha \), equal to the Phillips curve slope in the standard Calvo-Yun model given by \( (1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi)/\phi \).

This restriction implies that the adjustment cost term satisfies \( \alpha = \phi(\eta - 1)/(1 - \phi)(1 - \beta \phi) \) for fixed values of \( \eta \), \( \beta \), and \( \phi \). Price contracts lasting one year are common in the new-Keynesian literature and are compatible with recent micro-level evidence on the volatility of consumer goods prices (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).

Table 1 displays maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors for the nested habits model as well as the two restricted models that consider deep and aggregate habits separately. Standard errors correspond to the square roots of the diagonals of the inverse Hessian matrix.

Looking first at the nested model, point estimates of \( b^a \) and \( b^d \) reveal that the data favor a specification in which consumption habits are strongest at the level of individual goods. The estimate of \( b^d \) is 0.94 and is close to the value of 0.85 reported by Lubik and Teo (2011) and Ravn et al. (2010). The estimate of \( b^a \), on the other hand, is only 0.61, which is near the range of estimates in Christiano et al. (2005) (0.65) and Smets and Wouters (2007) (0.71).

Finally, notice that the standard error associated with \( b^d \) is an order of magnitude smaller than the one for \( b^a \), indicating far more precision in the estimate of deep habits.\(^8\)

Concerning the Taylor rule parameters, the estimate of \( \theta_r \) is high (0.90), reflecting the Federal Reserve’s penchant for adjusting the interest rate gradually in response to shocks. The estimate of \( \theta_\pi \), measuring the long-run policy response to inflation, is 1.54. This value ensures that policy is stabilizing and satisfies the Taylor principle over the sample period. By contrast, policy does not appear to have reacted strongly to fluctuations in output. The estimate of \( \theta_y \) is low (0.07) and not significantly different from zero. Other studies that report small estimates of \( \theta_y \) in US data include Ireland (2003) and Ravn et al. (2010).

Turning next to the shocks, estimates of \( \sigma_a \), \( \sigma_z \), and \( \sigma_r \) indicate that innovations to preference shocks are more volatile than technology and monetary policy innovations. More-

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\(^8\)Using nondurable consumption data in a model that also accounts for investment dynamics and government spending, Ravn et al. (2004) obtain estimates of \( b^d \) spanning 0.93 to 0.95.
over, estimates of $\rho_a (-0.30)$ and $\rho_z (0.93)$ suggest that while technology shocks are highly persistent, preference shocks are not persistent and may even be negatively autocorrelated.

The lack of persistence and high volatility surrounding preference shocks is somewhat atypical of most DSGE models. To provide some intuition for why it appears in the present model, I consider a log-linear approximation of the consumption Euler equation (5) given by

$$\hat{c}_t = \left( \frac{b^a + b^d + b^d b^d}{1 + b^a + b^d} \right) \hat{c}_{t-1} - \left( \frac{b^a b^d}{1 + b^a + b^d} \right) \hat{c}_{t-2} + \left( \frac{1}{1 + b^a + b^d} \right) E_t \hat{c}_{t+1} \tag{12}$$

$$- \left( \frac{(1 - b^a)(1 - b^d)}{1 + b^a + b^d} \right) \left( \hat{R}_t - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - (1 - \rho_a) \hat{a}_t \right),$$

where $\hat{X}_t \equiv \log X_t - \log X$ denotes the log deviation of a variable $X_t$ from steady state $X$. It is clear that positive values of $b^a$ and $b^d$ lower the impact effect of a given realization of $\hat{a}_t$ on consumption $\hat{c}_t$. Explaining the historical variation in US consumption data therefore requires larger innovations to the preference shock, all else equal, than would be necessary in the absence of deep or aggregate habit formation (see below). The autocorrelation coefficient $\rho_a$ plays a similar role in the transmission of preference shocks, but its estimate is also likely being influenced by the presence of two consumption lags in the Euler equation. When either habit type is dropped from the utility function ($b^d = 0$ or $b^a = 0$), the second lag vanishes, forcing the model to rely more heavily on persistent shocks rather than its own internal structure to replicate the time-series properties of aggregate consumption (see below).

Estimates of the deep habits model are obtained by maximizing log likelihood under the restriction $b^a = 0$. The contribution that aggregate habits make to the overall fit of the model can be tested by comparing these results to the nested specification. Imposing $b^a = 0$ evidently has little effect on the majority of parameter estimates, most notably the degree of deep habits $b^d$, which is nearly unchanged at 0.94. Obvious exceptions are the persistence and volatility of preference shocks. For reasons discussed above, the estimate of $\sigma_a$ falls by over half (0.12) while the estimate of $\rho_a$ becomes significantly positive (0.50). Omitting aggregate habits also lowers maximized log likelihood from 2380.41 to 2377.65. To see whether this decline is statistically significant, I perform a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that $b^a = 0$. The $p$-value of the relevant chi-square statistic is 0.0189, implying that the exclusion restriction is rejected by the data at the 5% level but not the 1% level.

To evaluate the contribution of deep habits to model fit, I also report estimates from the aggregate habits model obtained by restricting $b^d = 0$. Eliminating deep habits does

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9The chi-square statistic from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis $\rho_a = 0$ has a $p$-value of 0.0084.
not greatly affect estimates of \( b^a \) (0.65), but it has a big impact on how one interprets the preference shocks. Estimates of \( \rho_a \) (0.95) and \( \sigma_a \) (0.02) suggest that they are highly persistent but not significantly more volatile than technology shocks over the sample period. Along with these parameter changes, the maximized value of log likelihood drops all the way to 2343.57. The \( p \)-value for the likelihood ratio test of \( b^d = 0 \) is less than 0.0001. Thus compared to previous results concerning aggregate habit formation, the new-Keynesian model suffers a greater loss of explanatory power when deep habits are excluded.

5 Examining the Role of Deep Habits

Although evidence based on the likelihood function points to deep habits as the more empirically compelling, it is unclear precisely which aspects of the data are responsible for the improvement in model fit. To answer this question and gain further insight into the role of consumption habits per se, I compare simulations of the deep habits model estimated in the previous section to those from an aggregate habits model that uses the exact same parameter values (i.e., \( b^a = b^d = 0.9414 \)). The ensuing differences in model dynamics are therefore driven entirely by the habit mechanism and not by variation in the parameter estimates.

5.1 Volatilities and Correlations

In Table 2 and Fig. 1 I report standard deviations and autocorrelation functions for the observable variables—detrended consumption, inflation, and the nominal interest rate—generated from the deep habits model as well as an identically-parameterized aggregate habits model. To see which one has superior business cycle properties, I also report the corresponding set of moments observed in the US data. Following Fuhrer (2000), moments from the data are computed on the basis of an unrestricted, fourth-order vector autoregression.

The deep habits model does a better job of accounting for the joint volatility of \( \hat{c}_t \), \( \hat{\pi}_t \), and \( \hat{R}_t \). For each variable the model-implied standard deviation is well-within the 90% confidence interval around the VAR-based estimate, so differences between the two are insignificant at the 10% level. This is not true of the aggregate habits model, which tends to understate consumption volatility but greatly overstate inflation volatility. In fact, the standard deviation of \( \hat{\pi}_t \) under aggregate habits is more than double the value obtained under deep habits.

Fig. 1 reveals that deep habits are also better at replicating some of the key dynamic interactions reflected in the autocorrelation functions. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the own correlation of inflation. The VAR results show inflation to be highly persistent with
a correlation “half-life” of about seven quarters. Under deep habits the correlation between inflation and its own lag still exceeds 0.50 after one year and stays positive for up to three years. By contrast, there is almost no inflation persistence under aggregate habits. The correlation half-life is less than one quarter and turns slightly negative after just one year.

Another feature of the correlogram best captured by deep habits is the persistence in the own correlation of the nominal interest rate and its cross correlation with inflation at both leads and lags. In each case the autocorrelations are generally inside the VAR’s 90% confidence bands for the deep habits model but not for the aggregate habits model. These findings, however, may simply reflect the policymaker’s fixed response in the Taylor rule to a more persistent inflation process under deep habits. The other correlations reported in the figure are similar for both models and are broadly consistent with the data.\textsuperscript{10}

5.2 Impulse Response Analysis

What factors drive the persistence and volatility of inflation observed under deep habits? To shed light on the key mechanisms, I now characterize quantitatively the dynamic responses of the economy to demand and supply shocks. Specifically, in Figs. 2 and 3 I report impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation increase in the preference shock $a_t$ and the technology shock $z_t$ (both in logs). The path of the estimated deep habits model is depicted with a solid line and, for comparison, the aggregate habits model is shown with a dotted line.

Absent from this discussion are the responses to a policy innovation $\varepsilon_{r,t}$. Because they originate on the demand side of the model, monetary shocks produce short-run dynamics that are qualitatively similar to preference shocks. Moreover, Ravn \textit{et al}. (2010) only consider monetary shocks in their analysis of deep habits. Emphasizing preference and technology shocks therefore shifts the orientation of this paper towards findings that have not received as much attention in the literature. Finally, variance decompositions of the two models reported in Table 3 indicate that policy shocks have a small impact on $\hat{c}_t$, $\hat{\pi}_t$, and $\hat{R}_t$. Preference and technology shocks, by contrast, account for over 90% of the variability in most cases.

Consider the effects of a preference shock in Fig. 2. A positive innovation to $a_t$ lifts consumption in both models because it increases households’ marginal utility of habit-adjusted

\textsuperscript{10}Confidence intervals for the autocovariance functions are obtained using Monte Carlo methods as follows. First, I take the joint distribution of the VAR coefficient estimates and the residual covariance matrix to be asymptotically normal with mean given by the sample estimates and covariance given by the sample covariance matrix of those estimates. Second, I draw 10,000 random vectors from this multivariate normal distribution and compute the corresponding autocovariance functions for each draw. Third, I rank the autocovariances for each variable pair and for each lag in descending order. The 90% confidence intervals are bounded by the 5\textsuperscript{th} and 95\textsuperscript{th} percentiles of the ordered autocovariances.
consumption. Meanwhile, the shock also boosts the demand for labor as firms try to satisfy the temporary consumption boom. This raises equilibrium work hours and the real wage along a fixed labor supply curve since preference shocks do not affect households’ marginal rate of substitution in (4). With productivity $z_t$ unchanged, the wage increase implies an equal percentage increase in real marginal cost given by the lagrange multiplier $\gamma_t$ in (7).

The adjustment paths described so far are similar for the two habit specifications. Where they depart is in the response of the shadow value of sales. Recall that this quantity, represented by the multiplier $\nu_t$ on the consumer demand function, measures the value to the firm of selling an extra unit in the current period. According to the figure, it falls sharply on impact under aggregate habits—by about 53%—compared to only 5% under deep habits.

The manner in which consumption habits affect the shadow value of sales can be seen more clearly by expressing $\nu_t$ in terms of the present value of expected future per-unit profits. Iterating (8) forward and imposing the various symmetric equilibrium conditions yields

$$
\nu_t = E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta^d)^j \frac{\lambda_{t+j}}{\lambda_t} (1 - \gamma_{t+j}),
$$

(13)

where $\lambda_t$ is the date-$t$ marginal utility of habit-adjusted consumption. Two observations are worth noting. First, when $b^d$ is close to one, $\nu_t$ depends heavily on expectations of per-unit profits in the distant future. Because the shocks are transitory, long-run profit forecasts do not deviate much from the steady state. Consequently, even large changes in marginal cost over the short run have only a small percentage effect on the entire present value expression. Second, when $b^d = 0$, as is true of the aggregate habits model, (13) collapses to $\nu_t = 1 - \gamma_t$. The value of selling an additional unit in this case is just the current-period marginal profit since the sale is not expected to induce future sales when deep habits are absent. It follows that large shifts in real marginal cost will have a comparable percentage effect on $\nu_t$.

Returning to Fig. 1, movements in the value of sales strongly influence how firms react to the increase in marginal cost. With aggregate habits, the large drop in $\nu_t$ motivates firms to pass these cost increases on to consumers via higher prices. As a result, annualized inflation surges to 9.4% on impact and recedes quickly as the effects on marginal cost subside. With deep habits, the small decline in $\nu_t$ encourages firms to shield their customers from higher costs by keeping prices low. In this case inflation actually falls slightly below the steady state in the initial period but rises gently to a peak of 4.3% three quarters later.

The reason why the shadow value of sales is more rigid and thus inflation less volatile and more persistent under deep habits is partly due to the *intertemporal* effect identified
by Ravn et al. (2006). This effect emerges because firms recognize that current sales affect future consumption demand if $b^d > 0$. When faced with rising demand and cost conditions, firms have a powerful incentive to broaden their market share by holding down prices. The resulting growth in the habit stock enables firms to smooth out price increases over several quarters rather than front-load all of them as seen in the aggregate habits model.

The other channel through which deep habits affect inflation dynamics is the price-elasticity effect. As explained by Ravn et al. (2006), shocks that lift aggregate spending increase the relative size of the price-elastic component of the firm’s demand schedule (6) when $b^d > 0$. This raises the short-run price elasticity of demand, which in a symmetric equilibrium can be expressed as $\epsilon_t \equiv \eta(1-b^d c_{t-1}/c_t)$. Following an expansionary preference shock, firms will therefore seek to limit any price increase in an effort to preserve market share. The same incentives do not exist in the aggregate habits model. When $b^d = 0$ the demand elasticity is constant and equal to $\eta$ regardless of the spending level. Fig. 1 affirms this result. Under deep habits $\epsilon_t$ climbs by 10.7% on impact. This drives mark-ups even lower and bolsters the inertia already present in inflation from the intertemporal effect.

The joint impact that these two channels have on the inflation process is also evident in the optimal price-setting condition (9) when expressed in log-linear form. The relevant steady-state approximation produces a forward-looking Phillips curve

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + (1/\alpha) (\hat{c}_t - \hat{\nu}_t - \hat{x}_t).$$

Solving (14) forward and recognizing that $\hat{x}_t = (\hat{c}_t - b^d \hat{c}_{t-1})/(1 - b^d)$ gives

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -(1/\alpha) E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left( \hat{\nu}_{t+j} + \left(b^d/(1 - b^d)\right) \left(\hat{c}_{t+j} - \hat{c}_{t+j-1}\right) \right),$$

revealing inflation to be solely a function of the expected future paths of consumption growth and the shadow value of sales. As described above, the intertemporal effect of deep habits is best captured by variation in $\nu_t$ and the price-elasticity effect by changes in the short-run demand elasticity $\epsilon_t$. A log-linear approximation of the demand elasticity yields $\hat{\epsilon}_t = \left(b^d/(1 - b^d)\right) (\hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_{t-1})$, which is precisely the second term in the forward solution for $\hat{\pi}_t$. This way of dissecting inflation makes clear how both mechanisms impart inertia. Following a preference shock, intertemporal effects choke off inflation by preventing a collapse in the

---

11The price elasticity of demand for good $i$ is $\epsilon_t(i) \equiv -(P_t(i)/P_t) \frac{\partial q_t(i)}{\partial P_t(i)} = \eta \left(c_t(i) - b^d c_{t-1}(i)\right)/c_t(i)$.  

---

15
shadow value of sales. Price-elasticity effects also stamp out inflation to the extent that positive consumption growth in (15) offsets any contemporaneous declines in $\nu_t$.

Fig. 3 displays the equilibrium responses to a technology shock. A positive innovation to $z_t$, all else constant, relaxes the lifetime budget constraint and allows consumption to increase through a wealth effect channel. Meanwhile, the real interest rate (not shown) temporarily rises in both models because monetary policy reduces the nominal rate by less than the fall in expected inflation. Higher real rates, in turn, mitigate some of the expansionary effects on consumption in the short run. Facing only modest growth in consumption demand, the increase in productivity enables firms to roll back their demand for labor, pushing hours of work, real wages and marginal cost lower in periods immediately after the shock.\footnote{In sticky-price models, work hours will contract after an increase in total factor productivity whenever monetary policy does not fully accommodate the rise in aggregate spending (e.g., Galí and Rabanal, 2004).}

For reasons made apparent by (13), the decline in real marginal cost has disparate effects on the shadow value of sales in the two models considered. According to the figure, the impact-period rise in $\nu_t$ under aggregate habits is 12.7% compared to 2.5% under deep habits. It follows that firms are not as eager to slash prices when habits are deeply rooted. Indeed, quantitative results show that annualized inflation in this case only drops to 2.3% (down from 3.9%), whereas it plunges to 1.1% under aggregate habits. Thus contrary to a preference shock, here intertemporal effects help to discourage the large price cuts (instead of the price hikes) that would otherwise follow an increase in total factor productivity.

Price elasticity effects also influence the path of inflation. Unlike the response depicted in Fig. 2, however, these effects tend to undermine rather than reinforce the intertemporal effects described above. Because the technology shock leads to a gradual increase in consumption, short-run demand elasticities in the deep habits model rise and then fall in a hump-shaped pattern. During periods with high demand elasticities, firms have an incentive to lower their prices in an effort to capture a bigger share of the market. This actually intensifies the downward pressure on inflation and counteracts the upward pull that is being exerted by the intertemporal effects. The same result can be seen in (15). Technology shocks, because they increase both $\nu_t$ and $\epsilon_t$, amplify the disinflation experienced under deep habits. Yet despite the extra push given by the price-elasticity effect in this case, the intertemporal effect is evidently strong enough to prevent inflation from falling as much as it would if deep habits were absent from the model altogether.
6 Additional Sources of Persistence

Most of the improvements in fit associated with the deep habits model come from its ability to capture the persistence observed in US inflation. One could conclude then that the aggregate habits model is deficient simply because it has no internal source of inflation persistence other than serial correlation inherited from preference and technology shocks. But this raises the possibility that the case for deep habits may not be as compelling if they were evaluated within the context of a larger model that includes plausible alternative sources of persistence.

To help guard against this possibility, I modify the original setup by incorporating two ad hoc elements capable of generating some persistence irrespective of deep habits. The first one borrows from Ireland (2007) by placing a backward-looking term in the adjustment cost function. Specifically, firms are assumed to face quadratic adjustment costs of the form 

\[ \alpha / 2 \left[ \left( \pi_{t-1}^\varrho \pi_{t-1}^{1-\varrho} P_t(i) \right) - 1 \right]^2 \eta_t, \]

where \( \varrho \in [0, 1] \) measures the degree to which lagged inflation serves as a reference value for price setting. If \( \varrho = 1 \) firms incur costs only to the extent that growth in \( P_t(i) \) deviates from \( \pi_{t-1} \). If \( \varrho = 0 \) adjustment costs reduce to the benchmark case where steady-state inflation is the reference point. A log-linear approximation of the optimal pricing condition produces an augmented Phillips curve

\[ \hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t (\hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{\pi}_t) + (1/\alpha) (\hat{c}_t - \hat{\nu}_t - \hat{x}_t). \]

Inflation now has two sources of persistence. One is the persistence inherited from the forcing variable, \( \hat{c}_t - \hat{\nu}_t - \hat{x}_t \), and the other is the “built-in” persistence imparted by lagged inflation when \( \varrho > 0 \). The second modification allows for serial correlation in the policy shock by modeling \( \varepsilon_{r,t} \) as an AR(1) process with autoregressive coefficient \( \rho_r \in [0, 1] \). Due to sticky prices, greater persistence in the nominal interest rate translates into greater persistence in consumption. This in turn strengthens inflation persistence via the forcing process in (16).

I now re-estimate the nested habits model along with the two restricted versions while accounting for the additional features described above. Because the maximum-likelihood procedure is free to select values for \( \varrho \) and \( \rho_r \), the estimates should help determine whether the benchmark results falsely attribute inflation persistence to deep habits when at least some of that persistence is actually the result of backward-looking components in the Phillips curve or serial correlation in the policy shocks. The new estimates are reported in Table 4.

The changes made in this section have little effect on inferences of the nested model or the deep habits model. In fact, none of the parameter estimates for either model are significantly different from the original estimates in Table 1. I also find no evidence of lagged inflation
in the Phillips curve. Estimates of $\varrho$ lie up against the zero lower bound, indicating that the data prefer to have persistence derive from deep habits rather than backward-looking frictions in price setting. There is some evidence of serial correlation in the policy shocks. Estimates of $\rho_r$ range from 0.21 to 0.25 and are significantly different from zero.\footnote{The chi-square statistic from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that $\rho_r = 0$ has a $p$-value of 0.0010 in the nested habits model and 0.0035 in the deep habits model.}

Estimates of the aggregate habits model do not exhibit the same level of stability. Imposing $b^d = 0$ drives up the estimate of $\rho_r$ to 0.66 but pushes down estimates of $\theta_r$ and $\theta_\pi$ to 0.31 and 1.17, signaling that the data favor a policy rule with less interest rate smoothing, a weaker response to inflation, and more serial correlation in the shock. Inferences about habit formation are also affected. The estimate of $b^a$ is now 0.79, almost 22% higher than the corresponding value in Table 1. Despite these parameter changes, the aggregate habits model still does not attribute any persistence to lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. The point estimate of $\varrho$ is near zero and statistically insignificant.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper reports estimates from a small-scale new-Keynesian model with habit formation in consumption. Central to the model is a utility function that nests both aggregate and deep consumption habits as special cases. Maximum likelihood estimates reveal that the data prefer an arrangement in which habits over differentiated products are stronger than habits over the aggregate finished good. Although separate likelihood ratio tests formally reject the hypothesis that either type should be excluded (at the 5% level), results show that the deterioration in model fit is far greater when deep habits are missing.

I trace this conclusion to the ability of deep habits to shape the time series properties of inflation in a manner consistent with US data. As argued in the paper, product-level habit formation motivates firms to smooth out their price adjustments over time. This feature derives from well-known intertemporal and price-elasticity effects that coalesce with nominal frictions to produce a model capable of imparting substantial inertia on inflation dynamics. Simulations indicate that deep habits are indeed critical for matching the kind of volatility and persistence observed in the sample. The same behavior is evident in the impulse response functions, which show inflation reacting sluggishly to preference and technology shocks when deep habits are preserved but swiftly and less persistent when replaced by aggregate habits.
Appendix

A. Symmetric Equilibrium Conditions

\[ a_t / (x_t - b^a x_{t-1}) = \lambda_t \] (A.1)

\[ h_t^T (x_t - b^a x_{t-1}) = w_t \] (A.2)

\[ \lambda_t = \beta R_t E_t (\lambda_{t+1} / \pi_{t+1}) \] (A.3)

\[ x_t = c_t - b^d c_{t-1} \] (A.4)

\[ w_t = \gamma_t z_t \] (A.5)

\[ \nu_t = 1 - \gamma_t + \beta b^d E_t (\lambda_{t+1} / \lambda_t) \nu_{t+1} \] (A.6)

\[ c_t = \eta_t x_t + \alpha (\pi_t / \pi - 1) (\pi_t / \pi) y_t - \alpha \beta E_t (\lambda_{t+1} / \lambda_t) (\pi_{t+1} / \pi - 1) (\pi_{t+1} / \pi) y_{t+1} \] (A.7)

\[ y_t = z_t \hat{a}_t \] (A.8)

\[ y_t = c_t + (\alpha / 2) (\pi_t / \pi - 1)^2 y_t \] (A.9)

\[ \log (R_t / R_t) = \theta_r \log (R_{t-1} / R_t) + (1 - \theta_r) [\eta \log (\pi_t / \pi) + \theta_y \log (y_t / y_t)] + \epsilon_{r,t} \] (A.10)

\[ \log a_t = \rho_a \log a_{t-1} + \epsilon_{a,t} \] (A.11)

\[ \log z_t = (1 - \rho_z) \log z + \rho_z \log z_{t-1} + \epsilon_{z,t} \] (A.12)

B. Log-linear Approximation

\[ \hat{a}_t - (\hat{x}_t - b^a \hat{x}_{t-1}) / (1 - b^a) = \hat{\lambda}_t \] (B.1)

\[ \hat{h}_t + (\hat{x}_t - b^a \hat{x}_{t-1}) / (1 - b^a) = \hat{w}_t \] (B.2)

\[ \hat{\lambda}_t = \hat{R}_t + E_t \hat{\lambda}_{t+1} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \] (B.3)

\[ \hat{x}_t = (\hat{c}_t - b^d \hat{c}_{t-1}) / (1 - b^d) \] (B.4)

\[ \hat{w}_t = \hat{\gamma}_t + \hat{z}_t \] (B.5)

\[ \hat{\nu}_t = - (\eta (1 - b^d) - (1 - \beta b^d)) \hat{\gamma}_t + \beta b^d E_t \left( \hat{\lambda}_{t+1} - \hat{\lambda}_t + \hat{\nu}_{t+1} \right) \] (B.6)

\[ \hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + (1 / \alpha) (\hat{c}_t - \hat{\nu}_t - \hat{x}_t) \] (B.7)

\[ \hat{y}_t = \hat{z}_t + \hat{h}_t \] (B.8)

\[ \hat{y}_t = \hat{c}_t \] (B.9)

\[ \hat{R}_t = \theta_r \hat{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \theta_r) [\theta_n \hat{\pi}_t + \theta_y \hat{y}_t] + \epsilon_{r,t} \] (B.10)

\[ \hat{a}_t = \rho_a \hat{a}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{a,t} \] (B.11)

\[ \hat{z}_t = \rho_z \hat{z}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{z,t} \] (B.12)
References


Table 1
Parameter Estimates (1965:Q3 - 2012:Q1)

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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>markup</td>
<td>1.2142</td>
<td>1.2136</td>
<td>1.2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0019)</td>
<td>(0.0019)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln L$</td>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>2380.4089</td>
<td>2377.6548</td>
<td>2343.5735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>likelihood ratio test</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the nested model, the deep habits model ($\beta^d = 0$), and the aggregate habits model ($\beta^a = 0$). Standard errors are in parentheses. Italicized numbers denote values that are imposed prior to estimation.
### Table 2
Standard Deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>SD($\hat{c}_t$)</th>
<th>SD($\hat{\pi}_t$)</th>
<th>SD($\hat{R}_t$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep Habits</td>
<td>0.0320</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.0070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Habits</td>
<td>0.0275</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR(4)</td>
<td>0.0373 [0.0300, 0.0781]</td>
<td>0.0066 [0.0056, 0.0127]</td>
<td>0.0075 [0.0059, 0.0174]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Simulations of the deep and aggregate habits models use the same parameter values. Numbers in squared brackets correspond to 90% confidence intervals for the standard deviations implied by an unconstrained VAR(4) on $\hat{c}_t$, $\hat{\pi}_t$, and $\hat{R}_t$.

### Table 3
Variance Decompositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deep Habits</th>
<th>Aggregate Habits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\hat{c}_t$</td>
<td>$\hat{\pi}_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preference shock</td>
<td>59.56</td>
<td>11.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technology shock</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>85.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy shock</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Simulations of the deep and aggregate habits models use the same parameter values. The numbers correspond to the percentage of the unconditional variances of $\hat{c}_t$, $\hat{\pi}_t$, and $\hat{R}_t$ attributed to each shock.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Parameter</th>
<th>Parameter Description</th>
<th>Nested Habits</th>
<th>Deep Habits</th>
<th>Aggregate Habits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_a$</td>
<td>preference shock</td>
<td>0.2795</td>
<td>0.1181</td>
<td>0.0120</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>(0.0181)</td>
<td>(0.0073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_z$</td>
<td>technology shock</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0032)</td>
<td>(0.0096)</td>
<td>(0.0140)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_r$</td>
<td>policy shock</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_a$</td>
<td>AR preference shock</td>
<td>-0.3007</td>
<td>0.4919</td>
<td>0.9651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0926)</td>
<td>(0.0748)</td>
<td>(0.0182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_z$</td>
<td>AR technology shock</td>
<td>0.9273</td>
<td>0.8866</td>
<td>0.9956</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td>(0.0663)</td>
<td>(0.0060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_r$</td>
<td>AR policy shock</td>
<td>0.2488</td>
<td>0.2143</td>
<td>0.6626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0756)</td>
<td>(0.0726)</td>
<td>(0.0503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_r$</td>
<td>interest rate smoothing</td>
<td>0.8790</td>
<td>0.8911</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0243)</td>
<td>(0.0243)</td>
<td>(0.1166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_\pi$</td>
<td>inflation response</td>
<td>1.3909</td>
<td>1.3251</td>
<td>1.1683</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.3014)</td>
<td>(0.3895)</td>
<td>(0.1496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_y$</td>
<td>output response</td>
<td>0.0513</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
<td>-0.0245</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0419)</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
<td>(0.0164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_a$</td>
<td>aggregate habit</td>
<td>0.6080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.7865</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0543)</td>
<td>(0.0726)</td>
<td>(0.0503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_d$</td>
<td>deep habit</td>
<td>0.9400</td>
<td>0.9390</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0079)</td>
<td>(0.0090)</td>
<td>(0.0081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>Frisch elasticity</td>
<td>1.6564</td>
<td>0.8568</td>
<td>0.6279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.4672)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>lagged inflation</td>
<td>6.9e-8</td>
<td>3.8e-8</td>
<td>1.2e-7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0884)</td>
<td>(0.0938)</td>
<td>(0.0463)</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>price adjustment cost</td>
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<td>59.3778</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>discount factor</td>
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<td>substitution elasticity</td>
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<td>markup</td>
<td>1.2133</td>
<td>1.2130</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0019)</td>
<td>(0.0021)</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\ln L$</td>
<td>log likelihood</td>
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<td>2381.9230</td>
<td>2355.2368</td>
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<td>p-value</td>
<td>likelihood ratio test</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the nested model, the deep habits model ($b^d = 0$), and the aggregate habits model ($b^a = 0$). Standard errors are in parentheses. Italicized numbers denote values that are imposed prior to estimation.
Fig. 1. The autocorrelation function for consumption $c_t$, inflation $\pi_t$, and the interest rate $R_t$ is drawn for the US data (solid line), the estimated deep habits model (dashed line), and an aggregate habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter values. Correlations for the US data are obtained from a VAR(4), and the shaded areas correspond to 90% confidence bands.
Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a preference shock are drawn for the estimated deep habits model (solid line) and an aggregate habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter values. Inflation and the nominal interest rate are measured in annualized percentage points. All other variables are expressed as percent deviations from the steady state.
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to a technology shock are drawn for the estimated deep habits model (solid line) and an aggregate habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter values. Inflation and the nominal interest rate are measured in annualized percentage points. All other variables are expressed as percent deviations from the steady state.