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Competitive Selection In Non-Competitive Structure– Some Methodological Issues

Sen, Subir Kumar and Roy, Chinmoy (2011): Competitive Selection In Non-Competitive Structure– Some Methodological Issues. Published in: International Journal of Business Policy and Economics , Vol. 4, No. 2 (December 2011): pp. 193-200.

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The principal aim of this paper is to select a contractor who offers the best value for money. This will nearly always involve a process of competitive tendering. The final decision as to which contractor offers the best value for money will be determined by the factors like quality/price mechanism based on a numerical scoring and weighting system. However, in a political-emotional state of nature, this type of numerical scoring and weighting system, sometimes, faces the question of lack of transparency on the one hand and potential loss of resources of the authority on the other hand. This type of situation could have been resolved if the authority apply the reverse Delphi method. The advantage of this method is manifold- maintains transparency in the selection process; authority can achieved the least cost economic efficiency and, thereby, saves resources by utilising the competitive environment among the shortlisted contractors.

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