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Abstract

In this study, we develop a search-and-matching monetary growth model to analyze the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare by introducing endogenous economic growth via capital externality into a two-sector search-and-matching model. We find that the channel through which inflation affects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is different from the traditional cash-in-advance model. To facilitate the calibration, we obtain an empirical estimate of the effects of inflation on economic growth using panel regressions. In the simulation analysis, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare effect of inflation in the search-and-matching endogenous growth model and compare it to a search-and-matching exogenous growth model. We find that the welfare effect of inflation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, we find that the welfare cost of inflation under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of inflation under exogenous growth.

JEL classification: E41, O41, O42.
Keywords: economic growth, inflation, money, random matching.

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1 Introduction

In this study, we analyze the effects of inflation and monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. Although this important issue in monetary economics has received much attention and careful analysis in previous studies, our analysis provides novel elements and results. To highlight the novelty of this study, it is helpful to first discuss two related branches of literature in monetary economics. First, this study relates to the search-and-matching literature on money and capital formation; see for example, Shi (1999), Menner (2006), Williamson and Wright (2010), Aruoba et al. (2011), Bencivenga and Camera (2011) and Waller (2011). This branch of literature analyzes the relationship between money and capital formation in a search-theoretic framework without considering economic growth as an endogenous process. Second, this study also relates to the branch of literature on inflation and economic growth; see for example, Wang and Yip (1992), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Mino (1997) and more recently, Itaya and Mino (2003, 2007) and Lai and Chin (2010).¹ This branch of literature analyzes the growth and welfare effects of inflation by modeling money demand based on the classical approach, such as a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, money in utility and transaction costs, without considering a search-and-matching framework. In this study, we attempt to provide a bridge between these two branches of literature by analyzing the growth and welfare effects of inflation in a search-and-matching monetary growth model. In summary, we introduce endogenous economic growth via capital externality as in Romer (1986) into a two-sector search-and-matching model based on Lagos and Wright (2005), Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).² In this search-and-matching monetary growth model, we obtain the following results that have novel implications to the two abovementioned branches of literature.

In a canonical monetary growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, inflation affects economic growth via the consumption-leisure tradeoff. In other words, in the case of inelastic labor supply, inflation has no effect on economic growth in the CIA model. In contrast, in the search-and-matching monetary growth model, the growth effects of inflation operate through a consumption effect in the decentralized market. Intuitively, a higher inflation rate increases the cost of holding money and reduces consumption in the decentralized market that requires the use of money for transactions. As a result of lower consumption in the decentralized market, capital demand decreases causing a reduction in capital accumulation and economic growth regardless of whether or not labor supply is elastic.

To facilitate the calibration of the model, we use cross-country panel data to provide an empirical estimation and find that inflation has a statistically significant negative direct effect on economic growth as well as a statistically significant negative indirect effect on economic growth through the reduction of capital investment. Then, we use these estimates as an empirical moment to calibrate the model in order to quantitatively evaluate the welfare effects of inflation. We compare the welfare effects of inflation under the search-and-matching endogenous growth model to those from a search-and-matching exogenous growth model.

¹There is also a sub-branch of this literature that analyzes the relationship between inflation and innovation-driven economic growth; see for example, Marquis and Reffett (1994), Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu and Cozzi (2013).

²A recent study by Chiu et al. (2011) also provides an interesting analysis on the effects of financial and search frictions on economic growth, but they do not consider money and inflation.
similar to Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) in order to highlight the importance of modelling economic growth as an endogenous process. We find that the welfare effect of inflation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model,\(^3\) whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. We discuss the intuition of this result in the main text.\(^4\) Interestingly, we also find that the welfare cost of inflation under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of inflation under exogenous growth partly because reducing inflation increases the long-run growth rate in the endogenous growth model but not in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, given that the welfare effect of inflation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model, the difference in the welfare costs of inflation across the two models is increasing in the size of the change in the money growth rate.

The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the search-and-matching monetary growth model. Section 3 analyzes the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis. The final section concludes.

2 A search-and-matching monetary growth model

The two-sector search-and-matching model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005). Aruoba et al. (2011) extend the Lagos-Wright model by introducing capital accumulation, whereas Waller (2011) further extends the model in Aruoba et al. (2011) by allowing for exogenous technological progress. Our model is based on Waller (2011), but we introduce capital externality into his model to generate endogenous economic growth. In what follows, we describe the basic features of the search-and-matching monetary growth model.

2.1 Households

There is a unit measure of identical and infinitely-lived households in discrete time. In each period, households engage in economic activities first in the decentralized market (hereafter DM) and then in the centralized market (hereafter CM). The DM and the CM are distinguished as follows. In each period \(t\), households first enter the DM where they consume or produce special goods \(q_t\). In this market, each meeting is random and anonymous so that money becomes essential.\(^5\) Once the round of DM trade is completed, households proceed

\(^3\)Chiu and Molico (2010) also find that in a modified version of the Lagos-Wright model with endogenous participation in the centralized market, the welfare effect of inflation is nonlinear in contrast to the linear welfare effect of inflation in the original Lagos-Wright model.

\(^4\)See Section 4.3 for a discussion. In an earlier version of this paper (see Chu et al. (2012)), we compare quantitatively the welfare effects of inflation between the search-and-matching model and a CIA model. We find that the welfare effect is in fact linear in the CIA model even with endogenous growth. Therefore, the nonlinear welfare effect in our model is due to a combination of endogenous growth and the search-and-matching structure.

\(^5\)Following the standard approach in the literature, we assume that capital cannot serve as a medium of exchange; see Williamson and Wright (2010) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion. Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) show that even when capital serves as a competing medium of exchange, fiat money can still be valued and used as a medium of exchange.
to the CM where they consume and produce general goods as in standard growth models. Following the common approach in the literature, we assume that there is no discounting between the DM and the CM within each period, and the discount factor between any two consecutive periods is $\beta \in (0, 1)$. In what follows, we first discuss households’ optimization in the CM.

\subsection{Households’ optimization in the CM}

In the CM, households have an instantaneous utility function $u_t = B \ln x_t - Ah_t$, which is increasing in the consumption of general goods $x_t$ and decreasing in the supply of labor $h_t$. The parameters $A > 0$ and $B > 0$ determine respectively the disutility of labor supply and the importance of consumption.\(^6\) Let $W(m_t, k_t)$ and $V(m_t, k_t)$ denote the period-$t$ value functions for households in the CM and the DM respectively. $m_t$ is the nominal money balance and $k_t$ is the capital stock owned by households in period $t$. The maximization problem of households in the CM can be expressed as

$$W(m_t, k_t) = \max_{x_t, h_t, m_{t+1}, k_{t+1}} [B \ln x_t - Ah_t + \beta V(m_{t+1}, k_{t+1})] \quad (1)$$

subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by

$$k_{t+1} + \frac{m_{t+1}}{p_t} = w_th_t + (1 + r_t - \delta)k_t + \frac{m_t}{p_t} + \tau_t - x_t. \quad (2)$$

$p_t$ is the price of general goods. $w_t$ is the real wage rate (denominated in units of general goods). $r_t$ is the rental price of capital. The parameter $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is the depreciation rate of capital. $\tau_t$ is a real lump-sum transfer from the government.

From standard optimization, the optimality condition for consumption in the CM is

$$\frac{B}{x_t} = \frac{A}{w_t}. \quad (3)$$

Equation (3) implies that all households consume the same amount of general goods $x_t$ in the CM regardless of their holdings of capital and money. This useful property results from the quasi-linear utility function, which is a standard simplifying assumption in this branch of model to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings that arises from trades in the DM.\(^7\)

The standard intertemporal optimality conditions for the accumulation of capital and money are respectively

$$\frac{B}{x_t} = \beta V_k(m_{t+1}, k_{t+1}), \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{B}{p_t x_t} = \beta V_m(m_{t+1}, k_{t+1}). \quad (5)$$

\(^6\)Following Aruoba et al. (2011), we include the parameter $B$ in order to match the money-consumption ratio in the calibration.

\(^7\)See for example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion.
Equations (3) to (5) imply that all households enter the DM in the next period with the same holdings of capital and money. In addition, the familiar envelope conditions are
\[ W_k(m_t, k_t) = \frac{B (1 + r_t - \delta)}{x_t}, \]  
\[ W_m(m_t, k_t) = \frac{B}{p_t x_t}. \]  

2.1.2 Households’ optimization in the DM

In the DM, a household either becomes (a) a buyer, (b) a seller or (c) a nontrader. The probability of becoming a buyer is \( \sigma \in (0, 0.5) \), and the probability of becoming a seller is also \( \sigma \in (0, 0.5) \). The probability of becoming a nontrader is \( 1 - 2\sigma > 0 \). As \( \sigma \to 0 \), monetary policy would have no effects on economic growth and social welfare. This taste-and-technology-shock specification shows a random matching technology that buyers meet with sellers and is a standard feature of the Lagos-Wright model.\(^8\) As a result of this taste-and-technology shock, the value of entering the DM is
\[ V(m_t, k_t) = \sigma V^b(m_t, k_t) + \sigma V^s(m_t, k_t) + (1 - 2\sigma)W(m_t, k_t), \]  
where \( V^b(.\) and \( V^s(.\) are the values of being a buyer and a seller respectively.

To analyze \( V^b(.) \) and \( V^s(.) \), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers’ preference and the sellers’ production technology. In the DM, each buyer’s utility \( \ln q^b_t \) is increasing and concave in the consumption of special goods. Each seller produces special goods \( q^s_t \) by combining her capital \( k_t \) and effort \( e_t \) subject to the following Cobb-Douglas production function.
\[ q^s_t = z_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^\alpha e_t^\eta, \]  
where \( z_t \) denotes aggregate technology. To achieve endogenous growth, we will follow Romer (1986) to assume that capital has a positive externality effect on aggregate technology such that \( z_t = \bar{z}^\alpha \), where \( \bar{z}^\alpha \) is the aggregate holding of capital in the economy.\(^9\) The parameter \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) determines capital share. To ensure constant returns to scale, we will impose \( \eta = 1 - \alpha \) on labor share; however, it would be useful for us to first present the analysis with \( \eta \) in order to isolate the effects of capital and labor shares.

Rewriting equation (9), we can express the utility cost of production as
\[ e\left(\frac{q^s_t}{z_t}, \frac{k_t}{z_t}\right) = \left(\frac{q^s_t}{z_t}\right)^{1/\eta} \left(\frac{k_t}{z_t}\right)^{-\alpha/\eta}. \]  
Buyers purchase special goods \( q^b_t \) by spending money \( d^b_t \), whereas sellers earn money \( d^s_t \) by producing special goods \( q^s_t \).\(^10\) Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a

\(^8\)See Corbae et al. (2002) for a model of endogenous matching as an alternative to random matching.

\(^9\)It is useful to note that \( k_t = \bar{k}_t \) in equilibrium.

\(^10\)As a result of these different money holdings at the end of the DM, households supply different amounts of labor in the CM to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings.
seller are respectively
\[
V^b(m_t, k_t) = \ln q^b_t + W(m_t - d^b_t, k_t),
\]  
(11)
\[
V^s(m_t, k_t) = -e \left( \frac{q^s_t}{z_t}, \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right) + W(m_t + d^s_t, k_t).
\]  
(12)
Differentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following envelope condition for \( m_t \).
\[
V_m(m_t, k_t) = (1 - 2\sigma)W_m(m_t, k_t) + \sigma \left[ \frac{1}{q^b_t} \frac{\partial q^b_t}{\partial m_t} + W_m(m_t - d^b_t, k_t) \left( 1 - \frac{\partial d^b_t}{\partial m_t} \right) \right]
\]  
(13)
\[
+ \sigma \left[ -e_1 \left( \frac{q^s_t}{z_t}, \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right) \frac{1}{z_t} \frac{\partial q^s_t}{\partial m_t} + W_m(m_t + d^s_t, k_t) \left( 1 + \frac{\partial d^s_t}{\partial m_t} \right) \right],
\]
where \( W_m(m_t, k_t) = W_m(m_t - d^b_t, k_t) = W_m(m_t + d^s_t, k_t) = B/(p_t x_t) \) from (7). Similarly, we can obtain the following envelope condition for \( k_t \):
\[
V_k(m_t, k_t) = (1 - 2\sigma)W_k(m_t, k_t) + \sigma \left[ \frac{1}{q^b_t} \frac{\partial q^b_t}{\partial k_t} - W_m(m_t - d^b_t, k_t) \frac{\partial d^b_t}{\partial k_t} + W_k(m_t - d^b_t, k_t) \right]
\]  
(14)
\[
+ \sigma \left[ -e_1 \left( \frac{q^s_t}{z_t}, \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right) \frac{1}{z_t} \frac{\partial q^s_t}{\partial k_t} - e_2 \left( \frac{q^s_t}{z_t}, \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right) \frac{1}{z_t} + W_m(m_t + d^s_t, k_t) \frac{\partial d^s_t}{\partial k_t} + W_k(m_t + d^s_t, k_t) \right],
\]
where \( W_k(m_t, k_t) = W_k(m_t - d^b_t, k_t) = W_k(m_t + d^s_t, k_t) = B(1 + r_t - \delta)/x_t \) from (6).

To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a competitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011). Under price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the price \( \tilde{p}_t \) of special goods, buyers choose \( q^b_t \) to maximize
\[
V^b(m_t, k_t) = \max_{q^b_t} [\ln q^b_t + W(m_t - \tilde{p}_t q^b_t, k_t)]
\]  
(15)
such that the money constraint implies that
\[
d^b_t = \tilde{p}_t q^b_t \leq m_t.
\]  
(16)
In the DM, buyers spend all their money, so that the money constraint implies that
\[
q^b_t = m_t/\tilde{p}_t.
\]  
(17)

---

11 Adding a disutility parameter to the supply of effort in the DM would not change our qualitative and quantitative results. Therefore, we follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) to normalize this parameter to unity.

12 In addition to the competitive equilibrium with price taking, Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) also consider bargaining between buyers and sellers to determine the terms of trade. In this study, we focus on the competitive equilibrium with price taking because of economic growth. In the case of generalized Nash bargaining as in Aruoba et al. (2011) or proportional bargaining as in Waller (2011), the bargaining condition is incompatible with balanced growth because the buyers’ utility, which determines their surplus, is increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas the sellers’ disutility of effort is stationary on a balanced growth path. In Appendix A, we demonstrate this problem under proportional bargaining and show that only a special case in which buyers gain all surplus is consistent with balanced growth; however, under this special case, inflation has no effect on economic growth because sellers obtain zero surplus in the DM.

13 See Appendix B for a proof. Intuitively, due to the opportunity cost of holding money and the possibility of not being a buyer in the DM, households do not carry a sufficient amount of money to the DM. Therefore, if a household turns out to be a buyer in the DM, it would be optimal to spend all the money on \( q^b_t \).
As for sellers’ maximization problem in the DM, it is given by

\[
V^s(m_t, k_t) = \max_{q_t} \left[ -e \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t}, k_t \right) + W(m_t + \tilde{p}_t q_t, k_t) \right].
\]  

(18)

Sellers’ optimal supplies of special goods can be obtained from the following condition.

\[
e_1 \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t}, k_t \right) \frac{1}{z_t} = \tilde{p}_t W_m(m_t + \tilde{p}_t q_t, k_t) \iff \frac{1}{\eta} e \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t}, k_t \right) = B \frac{\tilde{p}_t q_t}{p_t x_t},
\]  

(19)

where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).

Using (17) and (19), we can obtain

\[
\frac{\partial q}{\partial t} = \frac{\sigma}{\tilde{p}_t q_t}, \quad \frac{\partial d}{\partial t} = \frac{\delta}{\tilde{p}_t q_t}.
\]  

(20)

Intuitively, (20) states that the marginal benefit of holding money is the sum of the marginal utility from being able to consume special goods with probability \(1 - \sigma\) (i.e., the household becomes a buyer in the DM) and the marginal utility from spending the money, which is also a valuable asset in the CM, on general goods with probability \(1 - \sigma\) (i.e., the household does not become a buyer in the DM). Equation (21) states that the marginal benefit of holding capital is the sum of the marginal utility from spending the capital return \(1 + r_t - \delta\) on general goods in the CM and the expected marginal utility from having to exert less effort (recall that \(e_2 < 0\)) in producing special goods in the DM with probability \(\sigma\) (i.e., the household becomes a seller in the DM).\(^{14}\)

\[14\text{Following Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011), we assume that the stock of capital does not depreciate within a period even upon usage in the DM. Capital depreciation only occurs at the end of a period after usage in the CM.}

2.2 Firms in the CM

General goods are produced by using capital \(k_t\) and production labor \(h_t\) with the following Cobb-Douglas production function.

\[
y_{x,t} = z_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^\alpha h_t^\eta,
\]  

(22)

where aggregate technology is \(z_t = \bar{k}_t\) as before. The producers act competitively by taking output and input prices as given. The conditional demand functions for capital and production labor are respectively

\[
r_t = \alpha z_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^{\alpha-1} h_t^\eta,
\]  

(23)

\[
w_t = \eta z_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^{\alpha} h_t^{\eta-1}.
\]  

(24)
2.3 Monetary authority

Let \( \mu_t = (m_{t+1} - m_t)/m_t \) denote the growth rate of money supply that is exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given the definition of real money balance \( m_t/p_t \) (denominated in units of general goods), its evolution can then be expressed as

\[
\frac{m_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} = \left( \frac{1 + \mu_t}{1 + \pi_t} \right) \frac{m_t}{p_t},
\]

where \( \pi_t \) is the inflation rate that is endogenous and determines the cost of holding money. In each period, the monetary authority issues money to finance a lump-sum transfer that has a real value of \( \tau_t = (m_{t+1} - m_t)/p_t = \mu_t m_t/p_t \).

2.4 Competitive equilibrium

The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations \( \{h_t, x_t, y_{xt}, q_t, d_t, m_{t+1}, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), a sequence of prices \( \{w_t, r_t, p_t, \bar{p}_t, \pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and a sequence of policies \( \{\mu_t, \tau_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \). Also, in each period, the following conditions hold.

- In the CM, households choose \( \{h_t, x_t, m_{t+1}, k_{t+1}\} \) to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking \( \{w_t, r_t, p_t, \bar{p}_t, \pi_t\} \) as given;
- In the DM, buyers and sellers choose \( \{q_t, d_t\} \) to maximize utility taking \( \{\bar{p}_t\} \) as given;
- Competitive firms in the CM produce \( \{y_{xt}\} \) to maximize profit taking \( \{w_t, r_t\} \) as given;
- The real value of aggregate consumption includes consumption in the CM and the DM such that \( c_t \equiv (p_t x_t + \sigma \bar{p}_t q_t)/p_t \);
- The real value of aggregate output includes output in the CM and the DM such that \( y_t \equiv (p_t y_{xt} + \sigma \bar{p}_t q_t)/p_t \);
- The capital stock accumulates through investment from general goods such that \( k_{t+1} = y_{xt} - x_t + (1 - \delta) k_t \);
- The monetary authority balances its budget such that \( \tau_t = \mu_t m_t/p_t \).

2.5 Balanced growth path

In this subsection, we consider the dynamic properties of the model. Given that the monetary authority sets a stationary growth rate of money supply (i.e., \( \mu_t = \mu \) for all \( t \)), Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path. The proof is relegated to Appendix C. Given this balanced growth behavior of the model, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path in the next section.

**Proposition 1** Given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., \( \mu_t = \mu \) for all \( t \)), the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
3 Growth and welfare effects of monetary policy

In this section, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path along which the supply of labor is stationary. Given the equilibrium condition $k_{t+1} = k_t$, variables, such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, exhibit a common growth rate $g$. Using (4), (10) and (21), we obtain

$$g = \frac{x_{t+1}}{x_t} - 1 = \beta \left( 1 + r + \delta + \frac{\sigma \alpha}{B \eta} f_c f_d^{1/\eta} \right) - 1,$$

(26)

where $r = \alpha h^\eta$ from (23). The variables $f_c \equiv x/k$ and $f_d \equiv q/k$ denote the consumption-capital ratios in the CM and the DM respectively.

We first make use of (5), (10), (19), (20) and (25) to derive the steady-state consumption-capital ratio in the DM. We obtain

$$f_d = \left( \frac{\sigma \eta}{(1 + \mu)/\beta - (1 - \sigma)} \right)^\eta.$$

(27)

$f_d$ must be positive because $\mu > \beta - 1 > \beta(1 - \sigma) - 1$.\(^{15}\) Equation (27) shows that the consumption-capital ratio in the DM is decreasing in the growth rate of money supply, and this result can be shown as follows.

$$\frac{\partial f_d}{\partial \mu} = -\eta \frac{(\sigma \eta)^\eta}{\beta [(1 + \mu)/\beta - (1 - \sigma)]^{\eta+1}} < 0.$$

(28)

Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases inflation, which in turn increases the cost of consumption in the DM, where money is needed for transactions.

As for the steady-state consumption-capital ratio in the CM, we make use of (23), (24), (26) and the capital-accumulation equation $k_{t+1} = y_{x,t} - x_t + (1 - \delta) k_t$ to derive

$$f_c = \frac{(1 - \alpha \beta) h^\eta + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)}{1 + \sigma \alpha \beta f_d^{1/\eta} / (B \eta)},$$

(29)

where aggregate labor $h$ is still an endogenous variable and can be determined with the following condition.

$$Ah^{1-\eta} f_c = B \eta,$$

(30)

which uses (3) and (24). We use (30) to derive

$$\frac{\partial f_c}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{B \eta(1 - \eta)}{Ah^{2-\eta}} \frac{\partial h}{\partial \mu}.$$

(31)

As for the derivative of $h$, we substitute (27) and (30) into (29) and then take the differentials of $h$ with respect to $\mu$ to obtain

$$\frac{dh}{d\mu} = -\frac{\alpha (f_d^{1/\eta}/\eta)^2}{A(1 - \alpha \beta) + (1 - \eta) \left( B + \sigma \alpha \beta f_d^{1/\eta}/\eta \right)/h} < 0.$$

(32)

\(^{15}\)It can be shown that as $\mu \to \beta - 1$, the nominal interest rate approaches the lower bound of zero. Here the nominal interest rate refers to the nominal rate of return on a conventional interest-bearing bond that pays interests in the CM (but not in the DM) of each period.
Substituting (32) into (31) shows that \( \partial f_c / \partial \mu > 0 \). In summary, a higher money growth rate induces households to increase leisure and shift consumption from the DM to the CM.

Substituting (29) into (26), we obtain

\[
g = \alpha \beta h^n + \frac{(1 - \alpha \beta)h^n + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)}{1 + B\eta/(\sigma \alpha \beta f_d^{1/\eta})} + \beta(1 - \delta) - 1. \tag{33}
\]

From (33), it is easy to see that the growth rate \( g \) is decreasing in \( \mu \) because \( \partial h / \partial \mu < 0 \) and \( \partial f_d / \partial \mu < 0 \). Intuitively, inflation affects consumption in the DM, which in turn affects capital accumulation via two channels. The first channel is the consumption-capital ratio \( f_d \) in the DM. Intuitively, a higher inflation increases the cost of holding money, thereby reducing the real money balance held by households and the value of goods traded in the DM. As a result, capital demand is depressed reducing the growth rate.

The second channel is endogenous labor supply, which is standard in traditional monetary growth models. Intuitively, a decrease in labor supply reduces the marginal product of capital thereby reducing capital accumulation and economic growth. To separate the consumption and labor-supply effects, we consider the limiting case \( \eta \to 0 \).

\[
\lim_{\eta \to 0} g = \alpha \beta + \frac{1 - \alpha \beta + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)}{1 + B[(1 + \mu)\alpha \beta - (1 - \sigma)]/(\sigma^2 \alpha \beta)} + \beta(1 - \delta) - 1, \tag{34}
\]

where we have used \( f_d^{1/\eta} / \eta = \sigma / [(1 + \mu)\alpha \beta - (1 - \sigma)] \) from (27). Therefore, even when the search-and-matching monetary growth model approaches the case with inelastic labor supply, inflation continues to have a detrimental effect on economic growth via the consumption-capital ratio in the DM. This result stands in stark contrast to the canonical endogenous growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, in which inflation has no effect on economic growth under inelastic labor supply.\(^{16}\)

**Proposition 2** A higher money growth rate \( \mu \) reduces economic growth through the consumption-capital ratio \( f_d \) in the DM.

Before we proceed to analyze the welfare effects of inflation, it would be helpful to briefly present the equilibrium allocations under a special case of complete capital depreciation (i.e., \( \delta = 1 \)). In this case, the DM consumption-capital ratio \( f_d \) in (27) remains unchanged; however, aggregate labor \( h \) in (30) nicely simplifies to

\[
h = \frac{\eta}{A(1 - \alpha \beta)} \left( B + \frac{\alpha \beta^2 \sigma^2}{1 + \mu - \beta + \sigma \beta} \right), \tag{30a}
\]

which is increasing in \( \sigma \) because \( 1 + \mu - \beta > 0 \). Given (30a), we can simply express the CM consumption-capital ratio as \( f_c = B\eta/(Ah^{1-\eta}) \), which is decreasing in \( \sigma \). Finally, the growth rate \( g \) in (33) simplifies to

\[
g = \alpha \beta \left[ 1 + \frac{(1 - \alpha \beta)\sigma^2 \beta}{\alpha \sigma^2 \beta^2 + B(1 + \mu - \beta + \sigma \beta)} \right] h^n - 1, \tag{33a}
\]

\(^{16}\)In the previous version of this study, we provide an example of this model; see Chu et al. (2012).
which is increasing in $\sigma$. Intuitively, as the matching probability $\sigma$ increases, households have more incentives to accumulate capital, which in turn increases the equilibrium growth rate.

Next, we examine the welfare effects of monetary policy under the general case of incomplete capital depreciation (i.e., $\delta \in (0,1)$). In this two-sector search model, households engage in two types of economic activities in the DM and the CM every period. On the balanced growth path, the lifetime utility $U$ of households that includes the utility from the CM and the expected utility from the DM can be expressed as

$$(1 - \beta)U = \sigma \ln q_0 - \sigma \left( \frac{q_0}{k_0} \right)^{1/\eta} + B \ln x_0 - Ah + \frac{\beta(B + \sigma)}{1 - \beta} \ln(1 + g). \quad (35)$$

Substituting $q_0 = f_d k_0$ and $x_0 = f_c k_0$ into (35) and then normalizing initial $k_0$ to unity, (35) simplifies to

$$(1 - \beta)U = \sigma \ln f_d - \sigma f_d^{1/\eta} + B \ln f_c - Ah + \frac{\beta(B + \sigma)}{1 - \beta} \ln(1 + g). \quad (36)$$

Differentiating (36) with respect to $\mu$ yields

$$(1 - \beta) \frac{\partial U}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\sigma}{f_d} \left( 1 - \frac{f_d^{1/\eta}}{\eta} \right) \frac{\partial f_d}{\partial \mu} + \frac{B}{f_c} \frac{\partial f_c}{\partial \mu} - A \frac{\partial h}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\beta(B + \sigma)}{(1 - \beta)(1 + g)} \frac{\partial g}{\partial \mu}. \quad (37)$$

where $f_d^{1/\eta}/\eta < 1$ from (27) because $\mu > \beta - 1$. A higher money growth rate (a) decreases the consumption-capital ratio $f_d$ in the DM, (b) increases the consumption-capital ratio $f_c$ in the CM, (c) decreases labor supply $h$ in the CM, and (d) decreases economic growth $g$. Effects (a) and (d) hurt welfare, whereas effects (b) and (c) improve welfare. Although it appears that the overall effect of money growth on welfare is ambiguous, we show below that higher money growth is in fact detrimental to social welfare.

Comparing the equilibrium allocations and the first-best allocations, we find that (a) $f_d < f_d^*$, (b) $f_c > f_c^*$, (c) $h < h^*$, and (d) $g < g^*$, where the variables with superscript * denote first-best allocations.\(^{17}\) In other words, there is too little consumption in the DM due to the cost of holding money. In the CM, there is too much consumption and too little labor supply due to capital externality. Finally, the equilibrium growth rate is also suboptimally low. Therefore, increasing the money growth rate that forces the equilibrium allocations to deviate further from the first-best allocations is detrimental to welfare. In other words, decreasing the money growth rate improves welfare, and the Friedman rule (given by $\mu \rightarrow \beta - 1$) is optimal in this model. However, although the Friedman rule is optimal, it does not achieve the first-best allocations due to the presence of capital externality.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\)In Appendix D, we derive the first-best allocations of the search model and prove these inequalities.

\(^{18}\)It is useful to note that the Friedman rule is not always optimal under price taking in the search model. For example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) show that the Friedman rule is not optimal when there exist search externalities.
Proposition 3 A higher money growth rate $\mu$ reduces social welfare, and the Friedman rule is optimal but does not achieve the first-best allocations due to capital externality.

4 Quantitative analysis

In this section, we calibrate the model in order to perform a numerical investigation on the effects of inflation on social welfare. We consider two policy objectives (a) price stability (or equivalently, zero inflation) and (b) the Friedman rule. Both of these policy objectives are commonly analyzed in the literature; see for example, Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lucas (2000), Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011). Furthermore, we compare the welfare effects of inflation from the endogenous growth model to those from an exogenous growth model. To consider exogenous growth, we follow Waller (2011) to assume an exogenous technological progress; in other words, $z_t$ in (9) increases according to an exogenous growth rate $g_z \equiv \dot{z}_t/z_t$.\(^{19}\)

4.1 Empirical estimation

To facilitate the subsequent calibration, we first provide an empirical estimation of the effects of inflation on economic growth. Early studies by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), De Gregorio (1993) and Fischer (1993) provide empirical evidence to show that inflation has a direct negative effect on long-run economic growth as well as an indirect negative effect via the reduction of capital investment. Here we use recent cross-country panel data\(^{20}\) to estimate the following regressions:

\[
g_{it} = \gamma_1 I_{it} + \gamma_2 \pi_{it-1} + \Gamma X_{it} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

\[
I_{it} = \omega_1 \pi_{it-1} + \Omega X_{it} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where $g_{it}$ denotes the growth rate of real GDP in country $i$ at time $t$, $I_{it}$ denotes capital investment as a percentage of GDP, and $\pi_{it-1}$ denotes the inflation rate of consumer price index.\(^{21}\) $X_{it}$ is a vector of the following control variables: (a) a constant, (b) country fixed effects, (c) year fixed effects, (d) export as a percentage of GDP, and (e) government spending as a percentage of GDP. We consider data of 172 countries from 1981 to 2011. The total effects of inflation on economic growth is $\partial g_{it}/\partial \pi_{it-1} = \gamma_2 + \gamma_1 \omega_1$, where $\gamma_2$ captures the direct effect of $\pi_{it-1}$ on $g_{it}$, and $\gamma_1 \omega_1$ captures the indirect effect of $\pi_{it-1}$ on $g_{it}$ via $I_{it}$. Upon obtaining an estimate of $\partial g_{it}/\partial \pi_{it-1}$, we will then include this empirical moment in our calibration in the next subsection. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data. Table 2 reports the regression results. The estimate of $\gamma_2$ is -0.0130 with a $t$-statistics of -3.101, whereas the estimate of $\gamma_1 \omega_1$ is -0.0043 with a $t$-statistics of -5.002.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\)In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix E), we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations under exogenous growth.

\(^{20}\)Data source: The World Bank DataBank.

\(^{21}\)We lag inflation by one period in order to reduce the problem of reverse causality.

\(^{22}\)This $t$-statistics is computed using the delta method.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth (%)</td>
<td>2.343</td>
<td>4.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Inflation (%)</td>
<td>11.486</td>
<td>19.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP (%)</td>
<td>23.214</td>
<td>8.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Expenditure/GDP (%)</td>
<td>15.783</td>
<td>6.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export/GDP (%)</td>
<td>39.366</td>
<td>27.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Cross-country panel regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Real GDP Growth</th>
<th>Investment/GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP (%)</td>
<td>0.1304***</td>
<td>-0.0326***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Inflation (%)</td>
<td>-0.0130***</td>
<td>-0.0326***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Expenditure/GDP (%)</td>
<td>-0.1180***</td>
<td>0.0081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export/GDP (%)</td>
<td>0.0419***</td>
<td>-0.0223**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.3684*</td>
<td>27.7857***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall $R^2$</td>
<td>0.1487</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3550</td>
<td>3550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** , respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.

4.2 Calibration

We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, in which each structural parameter is either set to a conventional value or matched to an empirical moment computed using long-run data from 1959 to 2011 in the US economy. In the endogenous growth model, the discount factor $\beta$ is set to 0.952 to match an annual discount rate $\rho$ of 5%. The capital-share parameter $\alpha$ is set to 0.3, which implies a labor share $\eta = 1 - \alpha$ of 0.7. We consider an initial money growth rate of 7.3%, so that the annual inflation rate of consumer price index is 4.0% when the economy grows at an annual growth rate of 3.2%. As for the capital depreciation rate, we calibrate $\delta$ by matching the investment-capital ratio of 0.07. The leisure parameter $\theta$.

23 We consider a relatively high discount rate in order to be conservative. If we consider a lower discount rate, the difference in the welfare cost of inflation between the endogenous-growth and exogenous-growth models would be even more dramatic because decreasing the discount rate magnifies the positive effect of a higher growth rate on social welfare.
$A$ is set to 5.042, so that the long-run growth rate is 3.2%. The consumption parameter $B$ is set to 1.588 to match the money-consumption ratio of 0.257 in the US using M1 as the measure of money as is standard in the literature. As for the matching probability $\sigma$, we calibrate it by matching $\partial g / \partial \pi = \gamma_2 + \gamma_1 \omega_1 = -0.0173$ from our regression estimates. The calibrated value of $\sigma = 0.091$ is within the range of values considered in the literature; for example, Aruoba et al. (2011) consider a value of $\sigma = 0.10$. Given this calibrated value of $\sigma$, the interest elasticity of money demand is $\xi = -0.566$, which is also within the range of values considered in the literature; for example, Berentsen et al. (2011) consider $\xi = -0.556$.

As for the exogenous growth model, we consider a similar set of parameter values. In this case, the exogenous growth model is also able to match the same set of empirical moments. Table 3a summarizes the parameter values. As for equilibrium values of the key variables, we report them in Table 3b. The consumption-capital ratio of 0.335 and the capital-output ratio of 2.467 from the calibration are in line with empirical moments in the US economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3a: Benchmark parameter values$^{24}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3b: Benchmark values of variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Numerical results

Given the above parameter values, we consider the following policy experiments. First, we lower $\mu$ from 0.073 to a value that achieves zero inflation. This value is 0.033 in the endogenous growth model and 0.032 in the exogenous growth model. In this case, the inflation rate decreases from 4.0% to 0% in both models. As for the Friedman rule, we lower $\mu$ from 0.073 to -0.048, so that the nominal interest rate decreases and approaches zero. In Table 4, we report the results, which are expressed in percent changes of the variables, except for $g$ and $U$. The changes in $g$ are expressed in percentage point, and the changes in $U$ are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in consumption.

---

$^{24}$Because the growth rate of technology $g_z$ is a parameter under exogenous growth, we choose a value of $A$ such that the calibrated value of $h$ is the same as in the endogenous growth model. As for the matching probability, we choose a value of $\sigma$ such that the calibrated value of $\xi$ is also the same as in the endogenous growth model.
Table 4: Growth and welfare effects of a lower $\mu$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\Delta f_d$ (%)</th>
<th>$\Delta f_c$ (%)</th>
<th>$\Delta h$ (%)</th>
<th>$\Delta g$ (%)</th>
<th>$\Delta U^c$ (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zero inflation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous growth</td>
<td>16.438</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>1.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous growth</td>
<td>16.068</td>
<td>-0.580</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Friedman rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous growth</td>
<td>84.149</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>7.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous growth</td>
<td>78.705</td>
<td>-3.159</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4, we see that reducing the money growth rate has the following effects. First, it raises the supply of labor $h$ in both models; however, the labor-supply effect is much larger in the endogenous growth model than in the exogenous growth model. Second, it also raises the consumption-capital ratio $f_d$ in both models. The larger labor supply $h$ and the higher consumption-capital ratio $f_d$ serve to increase economic growth in the endogenous growth model, but they do not increase economic growth in the exogenous growth model.

Comparing $\Delta f_d$ and $\Delta h$ under zero inflation and the Friedman rule, we see that the increases in both $f_d$ and $h$ are disproportionately larger under Friedman rule than under zero inflation. From (27) and (30a), we see that both $f_d$ and $h$ are decreasing and convex functions in $\mu$, and this property has the following implications on the growth and welfare effects of inflation. We find that the convexity carries over to the growth rate $g$, which is also a decreasing and convex function in $\mu$. In Figure 1, we plot welfare changes against the money growth rate and see that the convexity in $g$ in the endogenous growth model is also reflected in welfare $U$ because the growth effect is numerically the most important component of the welfare effect in the endogenous growth model.

Given that the welfare effect of inflation is approximately linear in the exogenous growth model, the difference in the welfare costs of inflation across the two models is increasing in the size of the change in the money growth rate. In the case of zero inflation, we find that the welfare gain of 1.589% in the endogenous growth model is almost three times as large as
the welfare gain of 0.572% in the exogenous growth model. In the case of Friedman rule, the welfare gain of 7.884% in the endogenous growth model is over four times as large as the welfare gain of 1.790% in the exogenous growth model. The reasons why the endogenous growth model features a much larger welfare effect of inflation than the exogenous growth model are as follows. First, the equilibrium growth rate increases as the money growth rate decreases, whereas the balanced growth rate is constant in the exogenous growth model. Second, Table 4 shows that as a result of a higher money growth rate, the consumption-capital ratio \( f_c \) in the CM falls by much more in the exogenous growth model than in the endogenous growth model. Finally, Table 4 also shows that labor supply \( h \) increases by much less under exogenous growth than under endogenous growth.

Given that the matching probability \( \sigma \) is the key parameter in determining the magnitude of the welfare effects of inflation, we perform a robustness check by varying the value of \( \sigma \) while holding other parameter values constant. We report the results for \( \sigma \in \{0.05, 0.2\} \) in Figures 2 and 3, in which we see a similar pattern as before. In fact, considering a wide range of values of \( \sigma \in (0, 0.5) \), we find that the endogenous growth model features larger welfare effects of inflation than the exogenous growth model in all cases. Furthermore, we find that the welfare effect of inflation is more sensitive to the value of \( \sigma \) under endogenous growth than under exogenous growth.

![Figure 2: The welfare effects of inflation under \( \sigma = 0.05 \)](image)

**5 Conclusion**

In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare effects of inflation in a search-and-matching monetary endogenous growth model. We find that modelling economic growth as an endogenous process amplifies the welfare effect of inflation. Furthermore, the channel through which inflation affects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is different.

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25 We focus on steady-state welfare in the exogenous growth model. Taking into account transition dynamics in the exogenous growth model would make its welfare effects even smaller.

26 In the exogenous growth model, it is the balanced growth level of capital that is affected by the money growth rate, but this level effect is not as strong as the growth effect under endogenous growth.
from the traditional CIA model. Therefore, given the relative tractability of recent vintages of the search-and-matching model, it could be a fruitful direction for future research to further revisit the interesting implications of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in variants of the search model. For example, it would be interesting to consider the welfare effects of inflation under different pricing mechanisms in a search-and-matching monetary endogenous growth model.\footnote{See Craig and Rocheteau (2008) for an interesting analysis of the welfare effects of inflation under different pricing mechanisms in a search model without endogenous growth.} Finally, we acknowledge that by having a degenerate distribution of money held by households, our numerical results on the welfare effects of inflation could be biased upwards;\footnote{Chiu and Molico (2010) show that moderate inflation can potentially improve social welfare by relaxing the liquidity constraint of some households.} therefore, it would also be interesting to take into account the distributional effect of inflation in future studies.

References


Appendix A: Bargaining in the search model

In this appendix, we show that proportional bargaining is incompatible with balanced growth unless we focus on a special case in which buyers obtain all surplus.\(^{29}\) If a buyer with state \((m^b_t, k^b_t)\) is matched with a seller with state \((m^s_t, k^s_t)\), then a proportional bargaining problem, in which the buyer’s gains from trade are a fixed share \(\theta\) of the trade surplus can be expressed as

\[
\max_{q_t} \ln q_t + W(m^b_t - d_t, k^b_t) - W(m^s_t, k^s_t) = \theta \left[ \ln q_t - e \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t}, \frac{k^s_t}{z_t} \right) \right], \quad (A1)
\]

subject to the budget constraint \(d_t \leq m^b_t\). Using (7) and substituting \(d_t = m^b_t\) into (A1), the bargaining condition for special goods is

\[
(1 - \theta) \ln q_t = \frac{A m^b_t}{p_t w_t} - \theta e \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t}, \frac{k^s_t}{z_t} \right). \quad (A2)
\]

In (A2), \(q_t\) is increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas \(m^b_t/(p_t w_t)\), \(q_t/z_t\) and \(k^s_t/z_t\) are stationary on a balanced growth path. As a result, the bargaining condition is incompatible with balanced growth unless the buyer obtains all surplus (i.e., \(\theta = 1\)); however, under this special case, inflation has no effect on economic growth because sellers obtain zero surplus in the DM.

Appendix B: Consumption in the DM

In this appendix, we show that it is optimal for the buyers to spend all their money to consume special goods in the DM. Differentiating (15) with respect to \(q_t^b\) yields

\[
\frac{\partial V^b(m^b_t, k_t)}{\partial q_t^b} = \frac{1}{q_t^b} - \tilde{p}_t W(m_t - \tilde{p}_t q_t^b, k_t) = \frac{1}{q_t^b} - \frac{B \tilde{p}_t}{p_t x_t}, \quad (B1)
\]

where the second equality follows from (7). The second-order condition shows that \(V^b(.)\) is globally concave in \(q_t^b\) and reaches a maximum at \(q_t^b = p_t x_t/(B \tilde{p}_t)\). In what follows, we show that \(q_t^b = m_t/\tilde{p}_t < p_t x_t/(B \tilde{p}_t)\) implying that the money constraint must be binding because \(q_t^b < p_t x_t/(B \tilde{p}_t) \iff \partial V^b(.)/\partial q_t^b > 0\). Setting \(q_t^b = q_t^* = q_t\) and \(z_t = \bar{k}_t = k_t\) in (10) and (19), we have

\[
B \tilde{p}_t q_t = \frac{1}{\eta} \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t} \right)^{1/\eta}, \quad (B2)
\]

where \(q_t/z_t = f_d\). From (27), we know that \(f_d^{1/\eta} < 1\) because \(\mu > \beta - 1\). Therefore, \(\tilde{p}_t q_t = m_t < p_t x_t/B\).

\(^{29}\) The same result can be shown for the case of generalized Nash bargaining.
Appendix C: Dynamic properties of the search model

In this appendix, we show that the economy in the search model always jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., \( \mu_t = \mu \) for all \( t \)). Combining (17) and (19) and using (10), we can obtain

\[
B \frac{m_t}{p_t x_t} = \frac{1}{\eta} \left( \frac{q_t}{k_t} \right)^{1/\eta}.
\]  

(C1)

Here we define \( f_{d,t} \equiv q_t/k_t \) as the ratio between consumption and capital in the DM and make use of (5), (17), (20), (25) and (C1) to derive

\[
(1 + \mu) \left( \frac{f_{d,t}}{f_{d,t+1}} \right)^{1/\eta} = \beta \left[ 1 + \sigma + \frac{\sigma \eta}{f_{d,t+1}^{1/\eta}} \right].
\]  

(C2)

Combining (3), (5), (21), (23) and (24) and using (10) to yield

\[
\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} \left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\eta-1} = \beta \left[ 1 + \alpha h_{t+1} - \delta + \frac{(\alpha \sigma)}{A} h_{t+1}^{\eta-1} f_{d,t+1}^{1/\eta} \right].
\]  

(C3)

In addition, the capital-accumulation equation is

\[
k_{t+1} = k_t + x_{t+1} - x_t + \frac{B \eta h_t^{\eta-1}}{A} + 1 - \delta.
\]

Applying this equation to (C3) yields

\[
\left( h_t^\eta - \frac{B \eta h_t^{\eta-1}}{A} + 1 - \delta \right) \left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\eta-1} = \beta \left[ 1 + \alpha h_{t+1} - \delta + \frac{(\alpha \sigma)}{A} h_{t+1}^{\eta-1} f_{d,t+1}^{1/\eta} \right].
\]  

(C4)

Log-linearizing (C2) and (C4) around the steady-state equilibrium yields the following deterministic system:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\log(h_{t+1}/h) \\
\log(f_{d,t+1}/f_d)
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
a_{11} & a_{12} \\
a_{21} & a_{22}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\log(h_t/h) \\
\log(f_{d,t}/f_d)
\end{bmatrix},
\]  

(C5)

where

\[
a_{11} = \frac{\eta h^\eta + \beta (1 - \eta) (1 - \delta + \alpha h^\eta) + (1 - \eta) \left( B \eta + \alpha \beta \sigma h_{t+1}^{\eta-1} f_{d,t+1}^{1/\eta} \right) h_{t+1}^{\eta-1}/A}{(\alpha \beta \eta) h^\eta + \beta (1 - \eta) (1 - \delta + \alpha h^\eta)} > 1,
\]

\[
a_{12} = -\frac{(\alpha \beta \sigma) h_{t+1}^{\eta-1} f_{d,t+1}^{1/\eta}/A \eta}{(\alpha \beta \eta) h^\eta + \beta (1 - \eta) (1 - \delta + \alpha h^\eta)} \left[ \frac{1 + \mu}{\beta (1 - \sigma)} \right] < 0,
\]

\[a_{21} = 0,\]

\[a_{22} = \frac{1 + \mu}{\beta (1 - \sigma)} > 1,\]

where we have used \( \mu > \beta (1 - \sigma) - 1 \). Let \( \zeta_1 \) and \( \zeta_2 \) be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system. The trace and determinant of Jacobian are given by
\begin{align*}
\text{Tr} &= \zeta_1 + \zeta_2 = a_{11} + a_{22} > 0, \\
\text{Det} &= \zeta_1 \zeta_2 = a_{11} a_{22} > 0.
\end{align*}
\tag{C6}
\tag{C7}

As indicated in (C6) and (C7), the dynamic system exists two unstable characteristic roots ($\zeta_1 = a_{11} > 1$ and $\zeta_2 = a_{22} > 1$). Given $h$ and $f_d$ are jump variables, two unstable characteristic roots imply that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path.

**Appendix D: First-best allocations of the search model**

In this appendix, we derive the first-best allocations of the search model and compare them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner chooses all quantities directly, taking all relevant information into account. Here money is not essential. The planner’s problem is

\begin{align*}
J(k_t) &= \max_{q_t, x_t, h_t, k_{t+1}} \left\{ \sigma \ln q_t - \sigma \left( \frac{q_t}{k_t} \right)^{1/\eta} + B \ln x_t - Ah_t + \beta J(k_{t+1}) \right\}, \\
\text{subject to the capital-accumulation equation} \\
&\quad k_{t+1} = k_t h_t^\eta - x_t + (1 - \delta)k_t. 
\end{align*}
\tag{D1}
\tag{D2}

From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for $q_t$ and $h_t$ are respectively

\begin{align*}
\frac{q_t}{k_t} &= \eta^\eta, \\
Ah_t^{1-\eta} \left( \frac{x_t}{k_t} \right) &= B\eta.
\end{align*}
\tag{D3}
\tag{D4}

The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is

\begin{align*}
\frac{B}{x_t} &= \beta J_k(k_{t+1}), 
\end{align*}
\tag{D5}

and the envelope condition is

\begin{align*}
J_k(k_t) &= \frac{\sigma}{\eta k_t} \left( \frac{q_t}{k_t} \right)^{1/\eta} + \frac{B}{x_t} (1 - \delta + h_t^\eta). 
\end{align*}
\tag{D6}

Combining (D5) and (D6), we can derive the first-best balanced growth rate $g^*$ given by

\begin{align*}
g^* &= \frac{x_{t+1}}{x_t} - 1 = \beta \left[ 1 + (h^*)^\eta - \delta + \frac{\sigma}{B\eta^\eta} f_c^* (f_d^*)^{1/\eta} \right] - 1, 
\end{align*}
\tag{D7}

where $f_c^* \equiv (x/k)^*$ and $f_d^* \equiv (q/k)^*$ denote the first-best consumption-capital ratios for general goods and special goods respectively. From (D3), we can obtain
As for \( f_c^* \), combining (D7) and (D2) yields

\[
\frac{ (f_d^*)^{1/\eta} }{ \eta } = 1. \tag{D8}
\]

Rewriting (D4) yields

\[
A(h^*)^{1-\eta} f_c^* = B\eta. \tag{D10}
\]

Equations (D7), (D8), (D9) and (D10) determine the first-best allocations \( \{ g^*, f_d^*, f_c^*, h^* \} \).

Comparing (D8) and (27) shows that \( f_d < f_d^* \) because \( \mu > \beta - 1 \). Substituting (D10) into (D9) yields

\[
f_c^* = \frac{ (1 - \beta) [h^*/(Af_c^*)]^{\eta/(1-\eta)} + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta) }{ 1 + \sigma \beta (f_d^*)^{1/\eta} / (B\eta) }, \tag{D11}
\]

where \( (f_d^*)^{1/\eta} / \eta \) is determined by (D8). Substituting (30) into (29) yield

\[
f_c = \frac{ (1 - \alpha \beta) [h^*/(Af_c)]^{\eta/(1-\eta)} + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta) }{ 1 + \sigma \alpha \beta f_d^{1/\eta} / (B\eta) }, \tag{D12}
\]

where \( f_d^{1/\eta} / \eta \) is determined by (27). Comparing (D11) and (D12) shows that \( f_c > f_c^* \) because \( f_d < f_d^* \) and \( \alpha < 1 \). Given \( f_c > f_c^* \), (D10) and (30) imply that \( h < h^* \). Rewriting (D2) yields

\[
g = k_{t+1} - 1 = h^\eta - f_c - \delta. \tag{D13}
\]

Given that \( h < h^* \) and \( f_c > f_c^* \), it must be the case that \( g < g^* \).
Appendix E (not for publication): Exogenous technological progress

In this unpublished appendix, we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations under exogenous growth. We follow Waller (2011) to assume an exogenous technological progress; in other words, \( z_t \) in (9) increases according to an exogenous growth rate \( g_z \equiv (z_{t+1} - z_t) / z_t \). Based on (4), (10) and (21), the balanced growth rate of \( x_t \) can be expressed as

\[
g_x \equiv \frac{x_{t+1}}{x_t} - 1 = \beta \left[ 1 + r - \delta + \frac{\sigma \alpha}{B \eta} f_d f_d^{1/\eta} s^{(1-\alpha)/\eta} \right] - 1, \tag{E1}
\]

where \( r = \alpha s^{\alpha-1} h^\eta \) from (23). On the balanced-growth path, variables such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, grow at the same rate as \( z_t \) (i.e., \( g_x = g_z \)).

The variable \( s \equiv k/z \) denotes the capital-technology ratio and can be determined using the following condition

\[
s^{\alpha-1} h^\eta = f_c + \delta + g_z, \tag{E2}
\]

which uses the capital-accumulation equation \( k_{t+1} = y_{x,t} - x_t + (1 - \delta) k_t \).

As for \( f_d \) and \( f_c \), we use analogous inference as in section 3 to obtain

\[
f_d = s^{\alpha-1} \left( \frac{\sigma \eta}{R + \sigma} \right)^\eta, \tag{E3}
\]

where \( R \) denotes the nominal interest rate and is given by \( R = (1 + \mu) / \beta - 1 \) at the steady state. We make use of (E1), (E2) and (E3) to derive

\[
f_c = \frac{B}{\alpha} \left( \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma^2 / (R + \sigma)} \right), \tag{E4}
\]

which is positive because \( (1 + g_z) / \beta > 1 + g_z > 1 + \alpha g_z - (1 - \alpha) \delta \).

Using (3) and (24), equation (E2) can be rearranged as

\[
s^{\alpha-1} h^\eta = \frac{\delta + g_z}{1 - \eta B / (Ah)}, \tag{E5}
\]

Combining (E2), (E4) and (E5), the equilibrium allocation of \( h \) is

\[
h = \frac{\eta B}{A} \left\{ 1 + (\delta + g_z) \left( \frac{\alpha}{B} \right) \frac{B + \sigma^2 / (R + \sigma)}{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]} \right\}, \tag{E6}
\]

which is also positive. We substitute (E4) and (E6) into (E2) to obtain the equilibrium allocation of \( s \) as

\[
s = \left\{ \left( \frac{B}{\alpha} \right) \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma^2 / (R + \sigma)} + \delta + g_z \right\}^{1/(\alpha-1)} \tag{E7}
\]

\[
\times \left( \frac{\eta B}{A} \right)^{\eta/(1-\alpha)} \left\{ 1 + (\delta + g_z) \left( \frac{\alpha}{B} \right) \frac{B + \sigma^2 / (R + \sigma)}{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]} \right\}^{\eta/(1-\alpha)}.
\]

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Substituting (E7) into (E3), the equilibrium allocation of $f_d$ can be expressed as

$$f_d = \left\{ \frac{B}{\alpha} \frac{(1 + g_z)}{\beta} - \frac{[1 - \beta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma^2 / (R + \sigma)} + \delta + g_z \right\} \times \left\{ \frac{\sigma A}{B} \left\{ \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{(R + \sigma) [(1 + g_z) / \beta - (1 - \delta)] + \alpha (\delta + g_z) \sigma^2 / B} \right\}^\eta. \right.$$ (E8)

As for social welfare, the lifetime utility of households on the balanced growth path is

$$(1 - \beta)U = \sigma \ln q_0 - \sigma \left( \frac{q_0}{k_0} \right)^{1/\eta} \left( \frac{k_0}{z_0} \right)^{(1 - \alpha)/\eta} + B \ln x_0 - Ah + \frac{\beta (B + \sigma)}{1 - \beta} \ln (1 + g_z). \right.$$ (E9)

Substituting $q_0 = sf_d z_0$ and $x_0 = sf_c z_0$ into (E9) and then normalizing initial $z_0$ to unity, we simplify (E9) to

$$(1 - \beta)U = (\sigma + B) \ln s + \sigma \ln f_d - \sigma f_d^{1/\eta} s^{(1 - \alpha)/\eta} + B \ln f_c - Ah,$$ (E10)

where we have dropped the exogenous growth rate $g_z$.

In the rest of this appendix, we consider the first-best allocations under exogenous growth and compare them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner’s problem is

$$J(k_t) = \max_{q_t, x_t, h_t, k_{t+1}} \left\{ \sigma \ln q_t - \sigma \left( \frac{q_t}{z_t} \right)^{1/\eta} \left( \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{-\alpha/\eta} + B \ln x_t - Ah_t + \beta J(k_{t+1}) \right\}, \right.$$ (E11)

subject to the capital-accumulation equation $k_{t+1} = z_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^\alpha h_t^\eta - x_t + (1 - \delta) k_t$. From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for $q_t$ and $h_t$ are respectively

$$\left( \frac{q_t}{k_t} \right) \left( \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} = \eta^\eta, \right.$$ (E12)

$$Ah_t^{1-\eta} \left( \frac{x_t}{k_t} \right) \left( \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} = B \eta. \right.$$ (E13)

The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is

$$\frac{B}{x_t} = \beta J_k(k_{t+1}), \right.$$ (E14)

and the envelope condition is

$$J_k(k_t) = \sigma A \frac{\alpha}{\eta k_t} \left( \frac{q_t}{k_t} \right)^{1/\eta} \left( \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{(1 - \alpha)/\eta} + \frac{B}{x_t} \left[ 1 + \alpha \left( \frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{\alpha-1} h_t^\eta - \delta \right]. \right.$$ (E15)

Combining (E14) and (E15), we can obtain the balanced growth rate of $x_t$ given by

$$g_x = \frac{x_t^{t+1}}{x_t} - 1 = \beta \left[ 1 + \alpha (s^*)^{\alpha-1} (h^*)^\eta - \delta + \frac{\sigma A}{B \eta} f_c (f_d^{1/\eta} (s^*)^{(1 - \alpha)/\eta}) \right] - 1. \right.$$ (E16)
where \( s^* \equiv (k/z)^* \), \( f_c^* \equiv (x/k)^* \) and \( f_d^* \equiv (y/k)^* \) denote the first-best capital-technology ratio and the first-best consumption-capital ratios for general goods and special goods respectively. On the balanced growth path, the growth rate of \( x_t \) is equal to the growth rate of \( z_t \) (i.e., \( g_x = g_z \)). Using (E12), we obtain

\[
(f_d^*)^{1/\eta} (s^*)^{(1-\alpha)/\eta} = \eta. \tag{E17}
\]

In addition, the capital-accumulation equation can be rearranged as

\[
(s^*)^{\alpha^{-1}} (h^*)^\eta = f_c^* + \delta + g_z. \tag{E18}
\]

Based on (E16), (E17) and (E18), the first-best consumption-capital for general goods can be expressed as

\[
f_c^* = \frac{B}{\alpha} \left( \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma} \right). \tag{E19}
\]

Combining (E13), (E18) and (E19) yields

\[
h^* = \frac{\eta B}{A} \left\{ 1 + (\delta + g_z) \left( \frac{\alpha}{B} \right) \frac{B + \sigma}{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]} \right\}. \tag{E20}
\]

Substituting (E19) and (E20) into (E18), we obtain

\[
s^* = \left\{ \left( \frac{B}{\alpha} \right) \left( \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma} \right) + \delta + g_z \right\}^{1/(\alpha^{-1})} \times \left( \frac{\eta B}{A} \right)^{\eta/(1-\alpha)} \left\{ 1 + (\delta + g_z) \left( \frac{\alpha}{B} \right) \frac{B + \sigma}{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]} \right\}^{\eta/(1-\alpha)}. \tag{E21}
\]

As for \( f_d^* \), we make use of (E21) and (E17) to obtain

\[
f_d^* = \left\{ \frac{B}{\alpha} \left( \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{B + \sigma} \right) + \delta + g_z \right\}^{\eta} \times \left( \frac{A}{B} \right)^{\eta} \left\{ \frac{(1 + g_z) / \beta - [1 - \delta + \alpha (\delta + g_z)]}{[(1 + g_z) / \beta - (1 - \delta)] + \alpha (\delta + g_z) \sigma / B} \right\}^{\eta}. \tag{E22}
\]

Comparing the first-best allocations with equilibrium allocations, we find that \( f_d = f_d^* \), \( f_c = f_c^* \), \( s = s^* \) and \( h = h^* \) if the nominal interest rate \( R \) is equal to zero; therefore, the Friedman rule holds in the exogenous growth model.