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**GLOBAL INSECURITY, TRANSPARENCY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
AFRICAN CHALLENGES**

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

As far back as 1944, delegates from forty-five countries gathered at Bretton woods to consider the economic causes of the world war that was then still raging; and how to secure the peace. They therefore agreed to create the international Bank for Reconstruction and development, on the ground that programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere as well as aiding political stability and fostering peace.

Unfortunately, over the past five decades, the recurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty and violence have played many laws. In fact, not one low-income country coping with these problems has yet achieved a single millennium development goal. Again, the problems of fragile state spread easily. That is, they drag down neighbors with violence. Here, economic political and security factors can all exacerbate the risks of violence. Some of these factors are domestic such as low incomes, high unemployment and inequality of different sorts. Yet, some factors may originate outside the state, such as external economic shocks or the infiltration of international drug cartels or foreign fighters. Clearly, table 1.1

TABLE 1.1 STRESSES: ECONOMIC / POLITICAL/ SECURITY

STRESSES	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC	LOW INCOME LEVELS, LOW OPPORTUNITY COST OF REBELLION YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH SEVERE CORRPTION RAPID URBANIZATION	PRICE SHOCKS CLIMATE CHANGE
POLITICAL	ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS OR REGIONAL COMPETITION REAL OR PERCIEVED DISCRIMINATION HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES	PERCIEVED GLOBAL INEQUITY AND INJUSTICE IN THE TREATMENT OF ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS


SECURITY	LEGACIES OF VIOLENCE AND TRAUMA	INVASION, OCCUPATION EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC REBELS CROSS- BORDER CONFLICT SPILLOVERS TRANSITIONAL TERRORISM INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS
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Refers to these triggers of violence as security economic and justice stresses (World Bank, 2011); Here, internal security stresses can arise when particular elites or groups feel threatened (often as a result of past oppression) and organize to defend themselves. Again, external threats to security can heighten internal pressures and many states face pressure or incursions from outside state and non-state actors. In fact, outside resources and armed intervention may tip the scales in favor of on actor, allowing it to renege on agreements with other actors. This can come in the form attacks from safe havens in neighboring countries or from the activities of drug traffickers or transitional terrorist. Regrettably, some African countries have had the misfortune of experiencing all these forms of external security stress as well as internal stresses. In other words, areas with cross-border ethnic links and low civilian government presence have long been subject to insecurity and remain at present.

Furthermore, external security threats can develop out of violence in neighboring countries. That is the neighborhood effect can both increase the risk of civil war in countries with neighbors at war and have detrimental development effects over borders. Thus, the movement of persons trained in violence; the displacement of person who may cross borders and become refugees; the disruption of trade; the expansion of animal networks through globalization (trafficking); and the safe haven that rebels often seek by crossing borders suggest that violence cannot be easily contained (given weak suggestions). In other words, all societies' face stresses, but only some succumb to repeated violence. In fact,


unemployment, income shocks, rising inequalities between social groups, external security threats and international organized crime have plausible casual relationships with violence. Thus, stresses related to security economics and politics can increase the risk of violence; and they tend to combine and precipitate actual violence. However, societies that rely on elite pacts, coercion and patronage to control violence risk repeating a vicious cycle. In fact, where agreements among elites to end fighting do not result in a transformation in state-society institutions and better governance outcomes; they remain vulnerable to the same stresses that precipitated fighting. In these circumstance, any stresses that shift the balance of power (such as the death of a leader, external security threats or economic and demographic pressures) risk further violence. Yet, at some point, this violence will be ended through other elite pacts; but without broader and deeper institutional transformation, the cycle will repeat as shown in figure 1.1

FIGURE 1.1 VICIOUS CYCLE TRAP: REPEATED VULNERABILITY



Indeed, this vicious cycle can become more difficult to escape overtime, as each successive round of violence to escape further weakens institutions and destroys social capital. Historically, the large scale episodes of violence have been a feature of all human societies. Regrettably, this cycle is doomed to repeat until societies find collective institutions to mediate and control violence. Thus, the challenge for these societies remains that of escaping vicious cycle of repeated violence (especially in Africa) yet, international actors know that fast engagement, long-term commitments and support to national institutions are central to preventing repeated cycles of violence. Unfortunately, these actors are slow to change because of dual accountability dilemma as shown in figure 1.2

FIGURE 1.2 DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY DILEMMAS



In other words, these actors (bilateral or multilateral) are accountable (first) to their domestic constituencies and share holders; and only (second) to their counterparts or to the citizens of recipient states. In fact, this had led to emphasize one set of risks (the risks of action and of engagement with weak counterpart institutions) at the expense of the risks of in action or lack of long-term institution building

outcomes for which there is less accountability (world bank, 2011). Here, the consequences are twofold: privileging the reputational risks of action over the consequential risks of delay and hesitations channel financing and assistance through the budget of fragile national institutions.

In fact, working in fragile states necessarily involves uncertainty, fluidity, and high risk. Yet, there are risks of action and risks of in action. Here, there is no certainty that development interventions will save lives and prevent the spread of violence but hasty interventions often are less likely to succeed. However, donors confront a dilemma, that is, assistance to weak institutions is needed if they are ever to become strong; but their weakness in itself poses political (fiduciary) risks. Regrettably, in these high risk engagements, the international community is therefore prone to rely on bilateral (multilateral) organizations to perform functions normally performed by the state (in order to avoid being associated with the corrupt use of resources or the violence or human rights abuses by the parties being supported.)

Indeed, corruption is not just a local challenge; international male factors are significant in corruption dynamics and can pose a substantial obstacle to national efforts at transformation. Notably, corruption produces human rights violation and affects many lives. When individuals and families have to pay bribes to access food, housing, property, education, jobs and the right to participate in the cultural life of community basic human rights is clearly violated. Therefore, in tackling these ills, there can be no doubt of the forging closer ties between those working for human rights and those fighting against corruption (transparency international, 2004). But it is also clear that to work most effectively together, the question (just what have human rights to do with corruption) is one that needs further reflection. Obviously corruption hits hardest at the poorest in society. That is, those with limited or no possibilities to defend themselves. But corruption affects the whole of society as

well. In other words, decisions supposed by taken for the public good are in truth motivated by a desire for private gain and result in policies and projects that impoverish rather than enrich a country.

Yet, in order for a corrupt system to prevail; numerous other rights are likely to be restricted in the areas of political participation and access to justice. Here, the need for the corrupt to protect themselves and their cronies undermines the electoral process, leads to intimidation and manipulation of the press and compromises the independence of the Judiciary. However, if human rights are violated by corruption, respect for human rights can be a powerful tool in fighting corruption as well as insecurity in Africa. Therefore, this paper is driven by the conviction that in order to build a world in which security is **underpinned** by sustainable development and social justice; and where globalization works to the benefit of all the world's people, multilateralism and respect for international law (such as international human rights law) are vital in Africa. The rest of this paper is divided into eight sections. Section two presents Global terrorism status while Global corruption status is the theme of Section three. Section four examines the African Regional Conflict While Nigerian Disintegration movement is the sub topic of section five. Revolutionary security implications are the subject matter of section six. Section seven presents institutional reform strategies while resilience policy measures are discussed in section eight. Section nine concludes the paper.

2.0 GLOBAL TERRORISM STATUS

Regrettably, traditional values for hard work, morals and integrity have been abandoned for pursuit of wealth by any means leading to constant conflict, aggression, violence, attack and counter attack among others. Therefore, investigations have revealed that the major factors responsible for these anti-social behaviors are the brutal experiences brought by civil wars, protracted era of military

dictatorship and bad governance. Consequently, these precipitating factors breeds impurity and unethical culture of drug abuse, cyber crime, sexual harassment, corruption, violent crimes, ideological crimes etc investigations have also revealed that these crisis are general phenomena that cut across nations, societies, disciplines, gender and other dispositions of life. Clearly, the perpetrators may be found among every class and nationality while none can be exonerated by the attacks.

Indeed, the problems of threat (violent terror) is universal (dynamic) and antecedents have shown that terrorist utilities wide varieties of methods and styles to achieve their goals such as bombing, kidnapping, hostage, armed attack, assassination, etc. Basically, threat is the major weapon used by terrorist to intimidate their targets and the various types of threat include physical, verbal, insider as well as outsider.

In general, terrorism refers to the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act. On the other hand, terrorist can be defined as anyone involved or causes attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to government or public facility; transport system, infrastructural facility including information system; a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss. It also include the seizure of an air craft, ship or other means of public or goods transport as well as the use of such means of terrorist actions have started in the ancient times through merciless killings, intimidations, rituals, and other barbaric forms; they were not specifically referred to as terrorism until much later. Thus, international terrorism has become a global problem which presents a threat to the world stability and the consequences may determine world community future. Clearly, terrorism maybe in various forms depending on the motives and motivation of the actors. These forms

include domestic terrorism, International terrorism and Quasi-terrorism. In all ramifications, terrorism is designed to threaten the personal safety of the targeted audience as well as the creation of insecurity. Thus, the general effect of these actions may be classified into economical, political, social and physiological categories.

As at today, the known foreign terrorist organizations A (F.T.O) are shown in table 2.1 (United States, 2012). Constitutionally, an F.T.O must be foreign organization. It must engage in terrorist activity or terrorism or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. Again, the organization terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of the United States nationals or the national security (National Defense, foreign relations or economic interests) of the United States (and allies). Indeed, non proliferation efforts have been a top United States national security priority for decades. That is, reducing the amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (C.B.R.N) material produced and stored.

TABLE 2.1 FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (F.T.O): CLASSIFICATION STATUS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
S/ N	FTO	ALTERNATE IDENTITY	DATING IDENTIFICA TION	ACTIVITIES	STRENGHT	LOCATIONAL OPEATION	FUNDING AID
1	ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES (AAB)	ZIYARD AL- JAMAH BATTALIONS	MAY 30 2012	ROCKET ATTACKS BOMING ATTACKS	UNKNOWN	LEBANON ARABIAN PENNISULA	UNKNOWN
2	ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATI ON (ANO)	ARAB REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL	OCTOBER 08 1997	PLANE HIJACKING ASSASINATIO NS	UNKNOWN	LEBANON	LIBYA/SYRIA/IRA N DECLINED SUPPORT

3	ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT	OCTOBER 08 1997	KIDNAPPINGS BEHEADINGS EXTORTION	ABOUT 400 MEMBERS	SULU ARCHIPELAGO ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA	KIDNAPPING FUND JEMAAH ISLAMIYA
4	AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE (AAMB)	AL-AQSA MARTYRS BATTALION	MARCH 27 2002	ARMS ATTACK SUICIDE BOMBINGS ROCKET MISSILES	ABOUT 400 MEMBERS	GAZA LEBANON REFUGEE CAMPS	IRAN HIZBALLAH FACILITATORS
5	ANSAR AL-ISLAM (AAI)	SOLDIERS OF ISLAM	MARCH 22 2004	KIDNAPINGS EXECUTIONS ASSASINATIONS	LARGEST SUNNI TERRORIST GROUPS	NORTHERN IRAQ WESERN AND CENTRAL IRAQ	EUROPEAN/MIDDLE EAST NETWORK OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
S/ N	FTO	ALTERNATE IDENTITY	DATING IDENTIFICATIO N	ACTIVITIES	STRENGTH	LOCATION AL OPEATION	FUNDING AID
6	ARMY OF ISLAM (AOI)	JAISH AL- ISLAM	MAY 19 2011	KIDNAPPINGS ARMED ATTACK	ABOUT 100 MEMBERS	GAZA EGYPT/ISRE AL ATTACKS	GAZA-BASED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
7	ASBAT AL- ANSAR (AAA)	GATHERING OF SUPPORTERS	MARCH 27 2002	ASSASINATION BOMBING	ABOUT 2,000 MEMBERS	LEBANON- PALESTINIA N REFUGEE CAMP	INTERNATIONAL SUNN/EXTERMIST NETWORKS
8	AUM SHINRIKYO (AUM)	AUM SUPREME TRUTH	OCTOBER 08 1997	CHEMICAL WARFARE SARIN GAS ATTACK BOMB THREAT	ABOUT 40,000 MEMBERS	JAPAN RUSSIA	MEMBERSHIP CONTRIBUTION
9	BAQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY (ETA)	EUSKAI HERRITARRO K	OCTOBER 08 1997	DEADLY BOMBING ARM ATTACKS ASSASINATION	ABOUT 750 MEMBERS	NORTHERN SPAIN SOUTHWEST ERN FRANCE CUBA/VENES ULA	EXTORTION INCOME REVOLUTIONARY TAXES DISCONTINUATION
10	COMMUNIST OF PHILLIPINES EW PEOPLE'S ARMY (CCP/NPA)	NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY	AUGUST 09 2002	EXPLOSIVE DEVICES EXTORTION ACTS ARMS RALDING	ABOUT 4,000 MEMBERS	RURAL LUZON VISAYAS MINDANAO	EXTORTION FUNDS
11	CONTINUITY IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (CIRA)	CONTINUITY ARMY COUNCIL	JULY 13 2004	HIJACKINGS ROBBERIES ASSASINATIONS	ABOUT 50 MEMBERS	NORTHERN ISLAND IRISH REPUBLIC	CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES SMUGGLING BASED FUNDING
12	GAMA'S AL- ISLAMIYYA	ISLAMIC GROUP	OCTOBER 08 1997	ARMED ATTACKS ASSASINATION	ABOUT 1000 MEMBERS	AFGHANIST AN YEMEN IRAN	UNKNOWN
13	HAMAS	ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT	OCTOBER 08 1997	ROCKET LAUNCHES SUICIDE BOMBINGS EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	ABOUT 9,000 MEMBERS	WEST BANK GAZA LEBENON	IRAN PERSIAN GULF PALESTIAN EXPATRIATES
14	HAQQANI NETWORK (HQN)	HQN	SEPTEMBER 19, 2012	SUICIDE BOMB KIDNAPPING	ABOUT 100 MEMBERS	AFGHANIST AN PAKISTAN BORDER	PAKISTAN GULF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
15	HARAKAT LILJIHAD-I- ISLAMI (HUJI)	MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC HOLY WAR	AUGUST 06 2010	SUICIDE BOMBING ARMS ATTACK	ABOUT 700 MEMBERS	SOUTH ASIA INDIA AFGHANIST AN	UNKNOWN
16	HARAKAT LIL-	HARAKATULJI	MARCH 05 2010	GRENADE ATTACK	ABOUT 400	BANGLADES	INTERNATIONAL

	JIHADI ISLAM/BANGLADESH (HUJIB)	HAD AL ISLAMI			MEMBERS	H INDIA	MUSLIM NGDS
17	HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN (HUM)	JAMA'AT IL-ANSAR	OCTOBER 06 1997	HIJACKING CIVILIAN ASSAULT	SEVERAL HUNDREDS SUPPORTERS	AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN	PAKISTAN WEALTHY/GRASSROOT DONORS
18	HIZBALLAH	ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION	OCTOBER 08 1997	SUICIDE BOMBING KIDNAPPING ASSASSINATION	SEVERAL THOUSANDS SUPPORTERS	BEIRUT SOUTHERN LEBENON	IRAN SYRIA ILLEGAL BUSINESSES
19	INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN (M)	ISLAMIC SECURITY FORCE (ISF)	SEPTEMBER 19 2011	BOMBING ATTACKS	SEVERAL THOUSAND SUPPORTERS	INDIA	FTO PAKISTAN MIDDLE EAST

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
20	ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION (IJU)	LIBYAN SOCIETY	JUNE 17 2005	ARMS ATTACK SUICIDE BOMBING	ABOUT 200 MEMBERS	PAKISTAN EUROPE AFGHANISTAN	UNKNOWN
21	ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU)	IMU	SEPTEMBER 25 2000	SUICIDE ATTACK	ABOUT 300 MEMBERS	SPOTHS ASIA CENTRAL ASIA IRAN	UZBEK DIASPORA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION EUROPEAN DONORS
22	JAISH-E-MOHAMMED (JEM)	MOHAMMED'S ARMY	DECEMBER 26 2001	SUICIDE CAR BOMBING	SEVERAL HUNDRED ARMED SUPPORTERS	KASH MIR-INDIA AFGHANISTAN	BUSINESS INVESTMENTS
23	JEMMAH ANAHARUT TAUHID (JAT)	LASKAR	MARCH 13 2012	SUICIDE BOMBING DETONATED EXPLOSIVES	SEVERAL THOUSAND SUPPORTERS	INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILLIPINES	MEMBERSHIP DONATIONS BANK ROBBERIES CYBER HACKING

24	JEMMAH ISLAMIYA (JI)	JEMAA	OCTOBER 23 2002	SUICIDE BOMBING EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS	MALAYSIA PHILIPINES	MEMBERSHIP DONATION CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
25	JUNDALLAH	PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF IRAN (PMRI)	NOVEMBER 04 2010	SUICIDE BOMB ATTACK	ABOUT 2000 MEMBERS	AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN IRAN	UNKNOWN
26	KAHANE CHAI	JUDEA POLICE	OCTOBER 08 1997	SUICIDE BOMB ATTACK	ABOUT 100 MEMBERS	ISREAL WEST BANK HERBON	UNITED STATES/EUROPEAN SYMPATHIZERS
27	KATA'IB HIZBALLAH (KH)	ISLAMIC RESISTANCE IN IRAQ	JULY 02 2009	ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE ATTACKS EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	ABOUT 400 INDIVIDUALS	IRAQ SYRIA	IRAN SUPPORTERS LEBENESE-HIZBALLAH
28	KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)	PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCE	OCTOBER 08 1997	BOMBING ATTACK	ABOUT 5000 MEMBERS	TURKEY IRAQ EUROPE	EUROPEAN KURDISH DIASPORA CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
29	LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA (LT)	ARMY OF THE PURE AND RIGHTEOUS	DECEMBER 26 2001	ASSAULT RIFLES MORTARS ROCKET-PROPELLED	SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS	SOUTH ASIA PAKISTAN	PAKISTAN/GULF/EUROPEAN DONATIONS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
30	LASHKAR I. JHANGVI (LJ)	ARMY OF JHANGVI	JANUARY 30 2003	ARMED ATTACKS BOMBINGS	ABOUT 100 MEMBERS	PUNJAB KARACHI BALUCHISTAN	PAKISTAN/SAUDI/ARABIA DONATIONS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
31	LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL ECLEM (LTTE)	TAMIL TIGERS	OCTOBER 08 1997	SUICIDE BOMBERS SEATIGERS AIR TIGERS	UNKNOWN	SRI LANKA INDIA	TAMILDIASPORA CHARITIES
32	LIBYAN	LIFG	DECEMBE	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

	ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP (LIFG)		R 17 2004				
33	MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP (GICM)	GICM	OCTOBER 11 2005	SUICIDE ATTACK MADRID BOMBINGS	UNKNOWN	MORROCO WESTERN EUROPE AFGHANISTAN	NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
34	NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN)	EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NATIONAL	OCTBER 08 1997	HIJACKINGS KIDNAPPINGS EXTORTION ACTIVITIES	ABOUT 2000 MEMBERS	COLOMBIA VENEZUELA	NARCOTICS TRADE OIL/GAS COMPANIES EXTORTIONS
35	PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD-SHAQAQL FACTION (PLF)	ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALSTINE	OCTOBER 08 1997	ROCKET ATTACKS EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DETONATED BOMB	ABOUT 1000 MEMBERS	GAZA/WEST BANK ISREAL/SYRIA LEBENON/MIDDLE EAST	IRAN
36	PALESAINI LIBERATION FRONT-ABU ABBA-S FACTION (PLF)	ABU ABBAS	OCTOBER 08 1997	ARMS ATTACK	ABOUT 500 MEMBERS	DAMASCUS LEBANON GAZA	SYRIA IRAN
37	POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)	PALESTINE POPULAR RESISTANCE FORCES	OCTOBER 08 1997	SUICIDE BOMBINGS ROCKET ATTACKS MORTAR	UNKNOWN	SYRIA/LEBANON ISREAL/WEST BANK, GAZA	SYRIA SAFE HAVEN
38	POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATIO OF PALESTINE GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC)	PFLP-GC	OCTOBER 08 1997	HOT-AIR BALLONS MOTORIZED JANG GAIDERS ROCKET ATTACK	SEVERAL HUNDRED	DAMASCUS LEBANON GAZA	SYRIA SAFE HAVEN IRAN FINANCE
39	AL-QA'IDA (AQ)	USAMA BIN-LADEN ORGANIZATI ON BASE FOR JIHAD	OCTOBER 09 1999	PLANE HYJACK FIRED MISSLES SUICIDE BOMBING	TOO NUMEROUS UNKNOWN	AFGHANISTAN SYRIA/IRAQ YEMEN/SOMAU A	HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
40	AL-QAIDA IN THE AABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)	ANSAR AL-SHARIF	JANUARY 19 2010	EXPLOSIVE-LADEN PACKAGES ASSASINATION	ABOUT 1000 MEMBERS	YEMEN	ROBBERIES KIDNAP DONATIONS
41	AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ (AQ)	AL-QAIDA GROUP OF JIHAD	DECEMBER 17 2004	IMPOVERISHED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES/ROCKET ATTACKS/BOMBING	ABOUT 2000 MEMBERS	IRAQ SYRIA NORTH AFRICA	CRIMINAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
42	AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)	GROUP FOR CALL AND COMBAT	MARCH 27 2002	IMPOVERISHED EXPLOSIVES DEVICES BOMBING/KIDNAPPING	ABOUT 1000 MEMBERS	ALGERIA MALI/NIGER MAURITANIA	CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES AFRICAN/EUROPEAN DIASPORA
43	REAL IRA (RIRA)	REAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY	MAY 16 2001	BOMBING SHOOTING ASSAULTS	ABOUT 100 MEMBERS	NORTHERN ISLAND GREAT BRITAIN IRISH REPUBLIC	UNITED STATES SYMPATHIZERS BALIKANS/IRISH
44	REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)	FUERZAS ARMEDAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA	OCTOBER 08 1997	MORTAR ATTACKS SNIPER ATTACKS HIJACKING	ABOUT 9000 MEMBERS	COLOMBIA	CUBA ECUADOR VENEZUELA
45	REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER (17N)	EPAN ASTNKI ORGANOSI 17	OCTOBER 08 1997	BOMBING ASSASINATION	UNKNOWN	ATHENS GREECE	UNKNOWN
46	REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES LIBERATION PARTY FRONT (DHKP/C)	DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY	OCTOBER 08 1997	SUICIDE BOMBING ASSASINATIONS IMPOVERISHED EXPLOSIVES	SEVERAL DOZEN MEMBERS	TURKEY ANKARA INSTABUL	DONATIONS EXTORTIONS EUROPEAN FUNDS

47	RVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE(RS)	EPANASTATIK OS AGHONAS	MAY 18 2009	IMPOVERISHED EXPLOSSIVE DEVICE ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE BOMB ATTACK	UNKNOWN	ATHENS GREECE	UNKNOWN
48	AL-SHABAAB (AS)	MOJAHIDIN YOUTH MOVEMENT	MARCH 18 2008	IMPOVERISHED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES ASSASINATION SUICIDE BOMBING	SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS	JUBBA REGIONS BAY/BAKOL REGIONS SOMALIA	GLOBAL SOMALI DIASPORA
49	SHINNING PATH (SL)	PEOPLE GUERRILA ARMY	OCTOBER 06 1997	KIDNAPPING	SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS	PERU	NARCOTICS TRADE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
50	TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKSTAN	PAKISTAN TALIBAN	SEPTEMBER 01 2010	SUICIDE BOMBING ASSASINATION EXPLOSSIVE DEVICE	SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS	PAKISTAN	ILLEGAL BUSINESSES KIDNAPPING
51	UNITED SELF-DEFENCE FORCES OF COLOMBIA (AUC)	AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA	SEPTEMBER 10 2001	POLITICAL KILLINHS KIDNAPPINGS	UNKNOWN	NORTHWEST COLOMBIA	NONE

by states; restricting the diversion of materials and expertise for illicit use; and preventing the trafficking of CBRN weapons and related material. Yet, CBRN materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat as evidenced by; terrorists' stated intent to acquire and used these materials; the nature of injury and damage these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics now flows; as well as dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and material. While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely successful, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists (including instances involving highly

enriched uranium (I 2010/11). Therefore, these facts suggest that caches of dangerous material may exist on the black market and that we must complement the efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to detect, investigate and secure CBRN materials that have been fallen outside of regulatory control.

Globally, over 10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2011 affecting nearly 45,000 victims in 70 countries and resulting in over 12,500 deaths (United States, 2011). However, the total number of worldwide attacks dropped by almost 12 percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007. Although the 2011 numbers represent five-year lows, they also underscore the human toll and geographic reach of terrorism specifically, Africa experienced 978 attacks in 2011) which was equivalent to an 11.5 increase over 2010). This is attributable in large part to the more aggressive attack tempo of the Nigeria-based terrorist group Boko Haram. Regrettably, this group carried out 136 attacks and killed 590 people in 2011. Yet, in contrast to 2011 reports, Taliban killed 1,842 people in 525 attacks and came top on the infamous ranking while Boko Haram took second killing 1,132 in 364 attacks. This terrorism report also revealed that of the top 10 countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2012, Nigeria came fifth because of the activities of Boko Haram. She ranked fourth in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks. In fact, there a total number of 546 terror attacks in Nigeria with 1,386 killed in 2012 alone. Thus, the average lethality of terrorist attacks in Nigeria is more than 50 percent higher than the global average of 1.64 notably; Abubakar Shekau (Nigerian) is the leader of Boko Haram

(Which means western education is forbidden). It is a Nigeria-based terrorist organization that seeks to overthrow the Nigerian democratic government and

replace it with a regime based on Islamic law. Indeed, there are reported communications, training and weapon links between Boko Haram, Al-Qaida in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-shabaab, and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which may strengthen Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. Operationally, the group set off its first vehicle borne improvised explosive device (IED) in June 2011; and has increasingly utilized IEDs in attacks against soft targets. However, the Boko Haram's (August 26, 2011) vehicle-bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters (Abuja, Nigeria) marked the group's first lethal operation against western interests. Here, at least 23 people were killed and 80 people were injured. Notably, a purported Boko Haram spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack and promised future targeting of United States and Nigerian government interests designated as one of the state sponsor of terrorism, Syria continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond (even amid significant internal unrest). Obviously, Syria provided political and weapons support to Lebanese Hezbollah and continued to allow Iran to re-arm the terrorist organization. In fact, the Syrian regime's relationship with Hezbollah and Iran appears to have gotten stronger over the course of the conflict in Syria. Regrettably, statements supporting terrorist groups (particularly Hezbollah) were often in Syrian government speeches as well as press statements. Yet, other state sponsors of terrorism include Cuba, Iran and Sudan (United States, 2012).

3.0 GLOBAL CORRUPTION STATUS

Indeed, corruption produces human rights violations and affects many lives. When individuals and families have to pay bribes to access food, housing, property, education, jobs and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community; basic human rights are clearly violated. In order for a corrupt system to prevail, numerous other rights are likely to be restricted in the area of political participation and access to justice. Therefore, political corruption is the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or wealth. Regrettably, political corruption involves a wide range of crimes and illicit acts committed by political leaders before, during and after leaving office. In contrast to petty or bureaucratic corruption, political corruption is perpetrated by political leaders or elected officials who have been vested with public authority and who bear the responsibility of representing the public interest in fact the loss of faith in politics and lack of trust in Politicians as well as parties challenge democratic values; a trend that has deepened with the exposure of corruption in the past decades. In other words, political corruption threatens the very viability of democracy as it makes the newer institutions of democracy vulnerable. Clearly, corruption in political finance takes many forms; from the use of donations for personal enrichment to the abuse of state resources.

That corruption adversely affects economic development has become a common place assertion in general discussions. However, ascertaining the precise reasons for this is not easy. Obviously, investments are often sunk and cannot be redeployed if investors are disillusioned about the institutional environment of a country. Here, railroads cannot be moved, pipelines cannot be relocated and real estate cannot possibly be used in a different region. That is, politicians and bureaucrats may misuse their position once investments are sunk. In fact, they can

delay necessary permits and hold up investors until offered a bribe. Again, governments with a reputation for corruption find it difficult to commit to effective policies and to convince investors of their achievements. As a result of such failures, capital inflows determine with levels of corruption. Traditionally, the absence of corruption can be assessed through four government indicators (Law and order, bureaucratic quality, government stability and civil liberties). Analytically, it can be shown that the crucial means by which corruption adversely affects capital inflows is through an absence of law and order. Corruption can also be shown to lower capital productivity and the relationship with productivity can be traced to a variety of channels. Precisely, the mechanism through which corruption reduces productivity is the undermining of government stability. That is politician's search for corrupt income is commonly in contrast to their declared programmes; reducing their popular support and threatening their ability to stay in office. In fact, when office holders devote themselves to obtaining illegal (additional) payoffs, the allocation of capital goods will be not be optimal, because they prefer projects that promise large side payments and low risks of detection to those benefit the public at large. Thus, reduced productivity is the result. Another mechanism is the link between corruption and restricted civil liberties. Regrettably, these restrictions tend to distort markets while inducing the search for illegal ways to circumvent them. In other words, distorting markets can be lucrative when corrupt politicians have the power to manage the resulting bottle necks. Yet, the crucial reason why corruption has an adverse impact on productivity is related to accompanying low levels of bureaucratic quality. Here corruption may imply that servants are appointed on the basis of nepotism or bribes, without regard to efficiency and capacity concerns. Furthermore, the effort level of public servants may suffer from adverse incentives because creating artificial bottlenecks can increase the need to pay 'speed money.'

Indeed, corruption can happen anywhere and when politicians put their own interests above those of the public as well as when officials demand money and favors from citizens for services that should be free.

Therefore, corruption is not an envelope filled with money. Unfortunately, these people make decisions that affect our lives. Although, corruption is a global problem some attempts have been made to measure it consequently, corruption perceptions index (CPI) measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries worldwide (transparency international, 2012). Based on expert opinion, countries are scored from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Table 3.1 shows that some countries score well without any country scoring perfect 100, in fact, 2/3 of the 176 countries ranked in the reported 2012 index score below 50, showing that public institutions need to be more transparent while powerful officials more accountable. Clearly, the CPI scores and ranks countries (territories) based on how corrupt a country's sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index (Combination of surveys and assessments of corruption) collected by a variety of reputable institutions. As shown in table 3.1, a country territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 – 100. Here, zero means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt while a hundred means that a country is perceived as very clean. For a detailed disaggregation, scores 0 – 25 = very dirty country, scores 26 – 49 = dirty country; scores 50 – 75 = clean country and scores 76 – 100 = very clean country specifically, a country's rank indicates its position relative to other countries/territories included in the index. Generally, ranks can change merely if the number of countries included in the index changes. However, the corruption perceptions index is an indicator of perceptions of public sector corruption (administrative and political corruption). Perhaps, it may not be verdict on the levels of corruption of entire nations or societies (or of their policies) or the activities of their private sector. In other words, citizens of those countries

(territories) that score at the lower end of the CPI may often show the same concern about and condemnation that perform strongly. Furthermore, the country (territory) with the lowest score is the one where public sector corruption is perceived to be the greatest among those included in the list.

TABLE 3.1 GLOBAL CORRUPTION RECEPTIONS

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
S/N	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CONTINENT/REGION	SCORE	RANK	TRANSPARENCY STATUS	INCOME STATUS
1	DENMARK	NORTHERN EUROPE	90	1	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
2	FINLAND	NORTHERN EUROPE	90	1	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
3	NEW ZEALAND	OCEANIA	90	1	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
4	SWEDEN	NORTHERN EUROPE	88	4	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
5	SINGAPORE	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	87	5	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
6	SWITZERLAND	WESTERN EUROPE	86	6	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
7	AUSTRALIA	OCEANIA	85	7	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
8	NORWAY	NORTHERN EUROPE	84	7	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
9	CANADA	NORTHERN EUROPE	84	9	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
10	NETHERLANDS	WESTERN EUROPE	84	9	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
11	ICELAND	NORTHERN AMERICA	82	11	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
12	LUXEMBOURG	WESTERN EUROPE	80	12	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
13	GERMANY	WESTERN EUROPE	80	13	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD

14	HONG KONG	EASTERN ASIA	77	14	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
15	BARBADOS	CARIBBEAN	76	15	VERY CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
16	BELGIUM	WESTERN EUROPE	75	16	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
17	JAPAN	EASTERN ASIA	74	17	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
18	UNITED KINGDOM	NORTHERN ASIA	74	17	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
19	UNITED STATES	NORTHERN AMERICA	73	19	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
20	CHILE	SOUTH AMERICA	72	20	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
21	URUGUAY	SOUTH AMERICA	72	20	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
22	BAHAMAS	CARIBBEAN	71	22	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
23	FRANCE	WESTERN EUROPE	71	22	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
24	SAINT LUCIA	CARIBBEAN	71	22	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
25	AUSTRIA	WESTERN EUROPE	69	25	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
26	IRELAND	NORTHERN EUROPE	69	25	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
27	QATAR	WESTERN ASIA	68	25	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
28	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	WESTERN ASIA	68	27	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
29	CYPRUS	WESTERN ASIA	66	29	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
30	BOTSWANA	SOUTHERN AFRICA	65	30	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
31	SPAIN	SOUTHERN EUROPE	65	30	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
32	ESTONIA	NORTHERN EUROPE	64	32	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME

						OECD
33	BHUTAN	SOUTHERN ASIA	63	33	CLEAN	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
34	PORTUGAL	SOUTHERN EUROPE	63	33	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
35	PUERTO RICO	CARIBBEAN	63	33	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
36	SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	CARIBBEAN	62	36	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
37	SLOVENIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	61	37	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
38	TAIWAN	ASIA	61	37	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
39	CAPE VERDE	WEST AFRICA	60	39	CLEAN	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
40	ISREAL	WESTERN ASIA	60	39	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
41	DOMINICA	CARIBBEAN	58	41	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
42	POLAND	EASTERN EUROPE	58	41	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
43	MALTA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	57	43	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
44	MAURITIUS	EASTERN AFRICA	57	43	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
45	KOREA (SOUTH)	EASTERN ASIA	56	45	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
46	BRUNEI	SOUTH-EATERN ASIA	55	46	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
47	HUNGARY	EASTERN EUROPE	55	46	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME OECD
48	COSTA RICA	CENTRAL AMERICA	54	48	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
49	LITHUANIA	NORTHERN EUROPE	54	48	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
50	RWANDA	EASTERN AFRICA	53	50	CLEAN	LOWER INCOME
51	GEORGIA	WESTERN ASIA	52	51	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
52	SEYCHELLES	EASTERN AFRICA	52	51	CLEAN	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
53	BAHARAIN	WESTERN ASIA	51	53	CLEAN	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD

54	CZECH REPUBLIC	EASTERN EUROPE	49	54	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME OECD
55	LATVIA	NORTHERN EUROPE	49	54	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
56	MAYLASIA	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	49	54	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
57	TURKEY	WESTERN ASIA	49	58	DIRTY	LOW MIDDLE INCOME
58	CUBA	CARIBBEAN	48	58	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
59	JORDAN	WESTERN ASIA	48	58	DIRTY	

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
60	NAMBIA	SOUTHERN AFRICA	48	58	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
61	OMAN	WESTERN ASIA	47	61	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
62	CROATIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	46	62	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
63	SLOVAKIA	EASTERN EUROPE	46	62	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME OECD
64	GHANA	WEST AFRICA	45	64	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
65	LESOTHO	SOUTHERN AFRICA	45	64	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
66	KUWAIT	WESTERN ASIA	44	66	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
67	ROMANIA	EASTERN EUROPE	44	66	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
68	SAUDI ARABIA	WESTERN ASIA	44	66	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
69	BRAZIL	SOUTH AMERICA	43	69	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
70	FYR MACEDONIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	43	69	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
71	SOUTH AFRICA	SOUTHERN AFRICA	43	69	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
72	BOSINIA/HERZEGOVINA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	42	69	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
73	ITALY	SOUTHERN EUROPE	42	72	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME

						OECD
74	SAD TOME/ PRINCIPLE	CENTRAL AFRICA	42	72	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
75	BULGARIA	EASTERN EUROPE	41	75	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
76	LIBERIA	WESTERN AFRICA	41	75	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
77	MONTENEGRO	SOUTHERN EUROPE	41	75	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
78	TUNISIA	NORTHERN AFRICA	41	75	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
79	SRI LANKA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	40	79	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
80	CHINA	EASTERN ASIA	39	80	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
81	SERBIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	39	80	DIRTY	LOW INCOME
82	TRINIDAD/TOBAGO	CARIBBEAN	39	80	DIRTY	-----
83	BURKINA FASO	WESTERN AFRICA	38	83	DIRTY	LOW INCOME
84	EL SALVADOR	CENTRAL AMERICA	38	83	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
85	JAMAICA	CARIBBEAN	38	83	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
86	PANAMA	CENTRAL AMERICA	38	83	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
87	PERU	SOUTH AMERICA	38	83	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
88	MALAWI	EASTERN AFRICA	37	88	DIRTY	LOW INCOME
89	MOROCCO NORTHERN	NORTHERN AFRICA	37	88	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
90	SURINAME	SOUTH AMERICA	37	88	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
91	SWAZILAND	SOUTHERN AFRICA	37	88	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
92	THAILAND	SOUTHERN ASIA	37	88	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
93	ZAMBIA	EASTERN AFRICA	37	88	DIRTY	LOW INCOME

94	BENIN	WESTERN AFRICA	36	94	DIRTY	LOW INCOME
95	COLOMBIA	SOUTH AMERICA	36	94	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
96	DJIBOUTI	EASTERN AFRICA	36	94	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
97	GREECE	SOUTHERN EUROPE	36	94	DIRTY	HIGH INCOME OECD
98	INDIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	36	94	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
99	MOLDOVA	EUROPE ASIA	36	94	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
100	MONGOLIA	EASTERN ASIA	36	94	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
101	SENEGAL	WEST AFRICA	36	94	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
102	ARGENTINA	SOUTH AMERICA	35	102	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
103	GABON	CENTRAL AFRICA	35	102	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
104	TANZANIA	EASTERN AFRICA	35	105	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
105	ALGERIA	NORTHERN AFRICA	34	105	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
106	ARMENIA	EUROPE/ASIA	34	105	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
107	BOLIVIA	SOUTH AMERICA	34	105	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
108	GAMBIA	WESTERN AFRICA	34	105	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
109	KOSOVO	EUROPE/ASIA	34	105	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
110	MALI	WEST AFRICA	34	105	DIRTY	LOW INCOME
111	MEXICO	CENTRAL AMERICA	34	105	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
112	PHILLIPPINES	SOUTH EASTERN ASIA	34	113	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
113	ALBANIA	SOUTHERN EUROPE	33	113	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
114	ETHIOPIA	EASTERN AFRICA	33	113	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
115	GUATEMALA	CENTRAL AMERICA	33	113	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
116	NIGER	WESTERN AFRICA	33	113	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME

117	TIMOE-LESTE	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	33	113	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
118	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	CARIBBEAN	32	118	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
119	ECUADOR	SOUTH AMERICA	32	118	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
120	EGYPT	NORTHERN AFRICA	32	118	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
121	INDONESIA	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	32	118	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
122	MADAGASCAR	EASTERN AFRICA	32	118	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
123	BELARUS	EASTERN EUROPE	31	123	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
124	MAURITANIA	WESTERN AFRICA	31	123	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
125	MOZAMBIQUE	EASTERN AFRICA	31	123	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
126	SIERRALEONE	WESTERN AFRICA	31	123	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
127	VIETNAM	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	31	123	DIRTY	-----
128	LEBENON	WESTERN ASIA	30	128	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
129	TOGO	WESTERN AFRICA	30	128	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
130	COTE D'IVOIRE	WESTERN AFRICA	29	130	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
131	NICARAGUA	CENTRAL AMERICA	29	130	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
132	UGANDA	EASTERN AFRICA	29	130	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
133	COMOROS	EASTERN AFRICA	28	133	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
134	GUYANA	SOUTH AMERICA	28	133	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
135	HONDURAS	CENTRAL AMERICA	28	133	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
136	IRAN	CENTRAL ASIA	28	133	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
137	KAZAKHSTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	28	133	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
138	RUSSIA	EASTERN EUROPE	28	133	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME

139	AZERBAIJAN	WESTERN ASIA	27	139	DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
140	KENYA	EASTERN AFRICA	27	139	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
141	NEPAL	SOUTHERN ASIA	27	139	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
142	NIGERIA	WESTERN AFRICA	27	139	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
143	PAKISTAN	WESTERN ASIA	27	139	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
144	BANGLADASH	SOUTHERN ASIA	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
145	CAMEROUN	CENTRAL AFRICA	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
146	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CENTRAL AFRICA	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
147	CONGO REPUBLIC	CENTRAL AFRICA	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
148	SYRIA	WESTERN ASIA	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
149	UKRAINE	EASTERN EUROPE	26	144	DIRTY	LOWER INCOME

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
150	ERITREA	EASTERN AFRICA	25	150	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
151	GUINEA-BISSAU	WESTERN AFRICA	25	150	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
152	PAPAU NEW GUINEA	MELANESIA OCEANIA	25	150	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
153	PARAGUAY	SOUTH AMERICA	25	150	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
154	GUINEA	WESTERN AFRICA	24	154	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
155	KYRGYZSTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	24	154	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
156	YEMEN	WESTERN ASIA	23	156	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
157	ANGOLA	CENTRAL AFRICA	22	157	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
158	CAMBODIA	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	22	157	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
159	TAJIKISTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	22	157	VERY DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
160	CONGO DEM REP	CENTRAL AFRICA	21	160	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
161	LAOS	EAST ASIA/PACIFIC	21	160	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
162	LYBIA	NORTH AFRICA	21	160	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
163	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	WESTERN AFRICA	20	163	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
164	ZIMBABWE	EASTERN AFRICA	20	163	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
165	BURUNDI	EASTERN AFRICA	19	165	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
166	CHAD	CENTRAL AFRICA	19	165	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
167	HAITI	CARIBBEAN	19	165	VERY DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
168	VENEZUELA	SOUTH AMERICA	19	165	VERY DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
169	IRAQ	WESTERN ASIA	19	165	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
170	TURKMENISTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	17	170	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
171	UZBEKISTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	17	170	VERY DIRTY	-----
172	MYANMAR	SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	15	172	VERY DIRTY	UPPER MIDDLE INCOME

173	SUDAN	NORTHERN AFRICA	13	173	VERY DIRTY	LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
174	AFGHANISTAN	CENTRAL ASIA	8	174	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
175	KOREA(NORTH)	EASTERN ASIA	8	174	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME
176	SOMALIA	EASTERN AFRICA	8	174	VERY DIRTY	LOWER INCOME

As shown in table 3.1, it is important to note that the income status column (World Bank, 2010) classifies all World Bank member economies as appropriate. Here, economies are divided among income groups according to 2008 GNI per capital that was calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. These groups are low income (LIC) = \$975 or less; lower middle income (LMC) = \$976 - \$3855; and high income = \$11,905 or more.

Again, the real impact of corruption any economy can be depicted very clearly using the failed state index (Fund for peace, 2012). Strictly, a failed state has several attributes and common indicators include a state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services wide spread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations as well as sharp economic decline. Empirically, these are about twelve factors that are used to ascertain the health status of a country and these include social, economic and political factors. Specifically, the social factors include mounting demographic pressures; massive displacement of refugees and creating severe humanitarian emergencies; widespread vengeance seeking group grievance; chronic and sustained human flight. On one hand, the economic factors include uneven economic development along group lines as well as severe economic decline. On the other hand, the political factors include criminalization or delegitimization of the state; deterioration of public services; suspension or arbitrary application of law; widespread human

right abuses; security apparatus operating as a “state within a state”; rise of fractionalized elites as well as intervention of external political agents. Table 3.2 shows the detailed classification of failed state status of the various countries of the world. Evidently, it is very clear that most of the failed states belong to the most corrupt nations as well as terrorist nations of the world

TABLE 3.2 GLOBAL CORRUPTION IMPACTS: FAILED STATES STATUS

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
S/N	COUNTRY	FAILED STATE INDEX	DANGER ALERT STATUS	WARNING STATUS	SUSTAINABLE STATUS	RANK	REGION
1	SOMALIA	114.9	DANGER	-----	-----	1	EAST AFRICA
2	CONGO, DEM. REP	111.2	DANGER	-----	-----	2	WEST AFRICA
3	SUDAN	109.4	DANGER	-----	-----	3	NORTH AFRICA
4	SOUTH SUDAN	108.4	DANGER	-----	-----	-----	NORTH AFRICA
5	CHAD	107.6	DANGER	-----	-----	4	CENTRAL AFRICA
6	ZIMBABWE	106.3	DANGER	-----	-----	5	EAST AFRICA
7	AFGHANISTAN	106.0	DANGER	-----	-----	6	SOUTH ASIA
8	HAITI	104.9	DANGER	-----	-----	7	CARIBBEAN
9	YEMEM	104.8	DANGER	-----	-----	8	WEST ASIA
10	IRAQ	104.3	DANGER	-----	-----	9	WEST ASIA
11	CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC11	103.8	DANGER	-----	-----	10	CENTRAL AFRICA
12	IVORY COAST	103.6	DANGER	-----	-----	11	WEST AFRICA
13	GUINEA	101.9	DANGER	-----	-----	12	WEST AFRICA
14	PAKISTAN	101.6	DANGER	-----	-----	13	SOUTH

							ASIA
15	NIGERIA	101.1	DANGER	-----	-----	14	WEST AFRICA
16	GUINEA BISSAU	99.2	DANGER	-----	-----	15	WEST AFRICA
17	KENYA	98.4	DANGER	-----	-----	16	EAST AFRICA
18	ETHIOPIA	97.9	DANGER	-----	-----	17	EAST AFRICA
18	BURUNDI	97.5	DANGER	-----	-----	18	EAST AFRICA
20	NIGER	96.9	DANGER	-----	-----	19	WEST AFRICA
21	UGANDA	96.5	DANGER	-----	-----	20	EAST AFRICA
22	MYANMAR	96.2	DANGER	-----	-----	21	SOUTH-EAST ASIA
23	NORTH KOREA	95.5	DANGER	-----	-----	22	EAST ASIA
24	ERITREA	94.5	DANGER	-----	-----	23	EAST AFRICA
25	SYRIA	94.5	DANGER	-----	-----	24	WEST ASIA
26	LIBERIA	93.3	DANGER	-----	-----	25	WEST AFRICA
27	CAMEROUN	93.1	DANGER	-----	-----	26	CENTRAL AFRICA
28	NEPAL	93.0	DANGER	-----	-----	27	SOUTH ASIA

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
29	EAST TIMOR	92.7	DANGER	-----	-----	28	SOUTH-EAST ASIA
30	BANGLADSEH	92.2	DANGER	-----	-----	29	SOUTH ASIA
31	SRI LANKA	92.2	DANGER	-----	-----	30	AOUTH ASIA
32	SIERRA LEONE	90.4	DANGER	-----	-----	31	WEST

							AFRICA
33	EGYPT	90.4	DANGER	-----	-----	32	NORTH AFRICA
34	CNGO REP	90.1	DANGER	-----	-----	33	CENTRAL AFRICA
35	IRAN	89.6	-----	WARNING	-----	34	SOUTH AFRICA
36	RWANDA	89.3	-----	WARNING	-----	35	EAST AFRICA
37	MALAWI	88.8	-----	WARNING	-----	36	EAST AFRICA
38	CAMBODIA	88.7	-----	WARNING	-----	37	SOUTH EAST ASIA
39	MAURITANIA	87.6	-----	WARNING	-----	38	WEST AFRICA
40	TOGO	87.5	-----	WARNING	-----	39	WEST AFRICA
41	UZBEKISTAN	87.5	-----	WARNING	-----	40	CENTRAL AFRICA
42	BURKINA FASO	87.4	-----	WARNING	-----	41	WEST AFRICA
43	KYRGYZSTAN	87.4	-----	WARNING	-----	42	CENTRAL ASIA
44	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	86.3	-----	WARNING	-----	43	WEST AFRICA
45	ZAMBIA	85.9	-----	WARNING	-----	44	EAST AFRICA
46	LEBENON	85.8	-----	WARNING	-----	45	WEST AFRICA
47	TAJIKISTAN	85.7	-----	WARNING	-----	46	CENRTRAL ASIA
48	SOLOMON ISLANDS	85.6	-----	WARNING	-----	47	MELANESIA
49	LAOS	85.5	-----	WARNING	-----	48	
50	ANGOLA	85.1	-----	WARNING	-----	49	CENTRAL AFRICA
51	LIBYA	84.9	-----	WARNING	-----	50	NRTH AFRICA
52	GEORGIA	84.8	-----	WARNING	-----	51	
53	COLOMBIA	84.4	-----	WARNING	-----	52	SOUTH AMERICA

54	DJIBOUTI	83.8	-----	WARNING	-----	53	EAST AFRICA
55	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	83.7	-----	WARNING	-----	54	MELANASIA
56	SWAZILAND	83.5	-----	WARNING	-----	55	SOUTHERN AFRICA
57	PHILLIPPINES	83.2	-----	WARNING	-----	56	SOUTH-EAST ASIA
58	COMOROS	83.0	-----	WARNING	-----	57	EASTERN AFRICA

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
59	MADAGASCAR	82.5	-----	WARNING	-----	58	EAST AFRICA
60	MOZAMBIQUE	82.4	-----	WARNING	-----	59	EAST AFRICA
61	BHUTAN	82.4	-----	WARNING	-----	60	SOUTH ASIA
62	ISREAL/WEST BANK	82.2	-----	WARNING	-----	61	WEST ASIA
63	BOLIVIA	82.1	-----	WARNING	-----	62	SOUTH AMERICA
64	INDONESIA	80.6	-----	WARNING	-----	63	SOUTH EAST ASIA
65	GAMBIA	80.6	-----	WARNING	-----	64	WEST AFRICA
66	FIJI	80.5	-----	WARNING	-----	65	MELANESIA
67	TANZANIA	80.4	-----	WARNING	-----	66	EAST AFRICA
68	ECUADOR	80.1	-----	WARNING	-----	67	SOUTH AMERICA
69	AZERBAIJAN	79.8	-----	WARNING	-----	68	WEST ASIA
70	NICARAGUA	79.6	-----	WARNING	-----	69	CENTRAL AMERICA
71	GUATEMALA	79.4	-----	WARNING	-----	70	CENTRAL AMERIA
72	SENEGAL	79.3	-----	WARNING	-----	71	WEST AFRICA

73	LESOTHO	79.0	-----	WARNING	-----	72	SOUTH AFRICA
74	MOLDOVA	78.7	-----	WARNING	-----	73	
75	BENIN	78.6	-----	WARNING	-----	74	WEST AFRICA
76	HONDURAS	78.5	-----	WARNING	-----	75	CENTRAL AMERICA
77	CHINA	78.3	-----	WARNING	-----	76	EAST ASIA
78	ALGERIA	78.1	-----	WARNING	-----	77	NORTH AFRICA
79	INDIA	78.0	-----	WARNING	-----	78	SOUTH ASIA
80	MALI	77.9	-----	WARNING	-----	79	WEST AFRICA
81	BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA	77.9	-----	WARNING	-----	80	SOUTH EUROPE
82	TURKMENISTAN	77.4	-----	WARNING	-----	81	CENTRAL ASIA
83	VENEZUELA	77.3	-----	WARNING	-----	82	SOUTH AMERICA
84	RUSSIA	77.1	-----	WARNING	-----	83	EAST EUROPE
85	THAILAND	77.0	-----	WARNING	-----	84	SOUTH EAST ASIA
86	TURKEY	76.6	-----	WARNING	-----	85	WEST ASIA
87	BELARUS	76.6	-----	WARNING	-----	86	EAST EUROPE
88	MOROCCO	76.1	-----	WARNING	-----	87	NORHERN AFRICA

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
89	MALDIVES	75.1	-----	WARNING	-----	88	
90	SERBIA (ONLY)	75.0	-----	WARNING	-----	89	SOUTH EUROPE
91	JORDAN	74.8	-----	WARNING	-----	90	WEST ASIA
92	CAPE VERDE	74.7	-----	WARNING	-----	91	WEST AFRICA
93	GABON	74.6	-----	WARNING	-----	92	WEST

							AFRICA
94	ELSALVADOR	74.4	-----	WARNING	-----	93	
95	TUNISIA	74.2	-----	WARNING	-----	94	NORTH AFRICA
96	DUMINICAN REPUBLIC	74.1	-----	WARNING	-----	95	CARIBBEAN
97	VIETNAM	74.0	-----	WARNING	-----	96	SOUTH EAST ASIA
98	SAD TOME/PRINCIPE	73.9	-----	WARNING	-----	97	CENTRAL AFRICA
99	MEXICO	73.9	-----	WARNING	-----	98	CENTRAL AMERICA
100	PERU	73.5	-----	WARNING	-----	99	SOUTH AMERICA
101	SAUDI ARABIA	73.4	-----	WARNING	-----	100	WEST ASIA
102	CUBA	73.1	-----	WARNING	-----	101	CARIBBEAN
103	ARMENIA	72.2	-----	WARNING	-----	102	WEST ASIA
104	MICRONESIA (F.S)	71.9	-----	WARNING	-----	103	MICRONESIA
105	GUYANA	71.4	-----	WARNING	-----	104	SOUTH AMERICA
106	SURINAME	71.2	-----	WARNING	-----	105	SOUTH AMERICA
107	NAMIBIA	71.0	-----	WARNING	-----	106	SOUTH AFRICA
108	PARAGUAY	70.9	-----	WARNING	-----	107	SOUTH AMERICA
109	KAZAKHSTAN	70.9	-----	WARNING	-----	108	CENTRAL ASIA
110	MACEDONIA (REP)	69.1	-----	WARNING	-----	109	SOUTH EUROPE
111	SAMOA	68.5	-----	WARNING	-----	110	POLYNESIA
112	MALAYSIA	68.5	-----	WARNING	-----	111	SOUTH EAST ASIA
113	GHANA	67.5	-----	WARNING	-----	112	WEST AFRICA
114	UKARINE	67.2	-----	WARNING	-----	113	EAST EUROPE
115	BELIZE	67.2	-----	WARNING	-----	114	CENTRAL AMERICA

116	SOUTH AFRICA	66.8	-----	WARNING	-----	115	SOUTHERN AFRICA
117	CYPRUS	66.8	-----	WARNING	-----	116	WEST ASIA
118	BOTSWANA	66.5	-----	WARNING	-----	117	SOUTHERN AFRICA

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
119	ALBANIA	66.1	-----	WARNING	-----	118	SOUTH EUROPE
120	JAMAICA	65.8	-----	WARNING	-----	119	CARIBBEAN
121	SEYCHELLES	65.1	-----	WARNING	-----	120	EAST AFRICA
122	GRENADA	65.0	-----	WARNING	-----	121	EAST AFRICA
123	TRINIDAD	64.4	-----	WARNING	-----	122	CARIBBEAN
124	BRAZIL	64.1	-----	WARNING	-----	123	
125	BRUNEI	64.1	-----	WARNING	-----	124	SOUTH AMERICA
126	BAHRAIN	62.2	-----	WARNING	-----	125	
127	ROMANIA	59.5	-----	WARNING	-----	126	SOUTH EAST ASIA
128	ANTIGUA/BARBUDA	58.9	-----	WARNING	-----	127	CARIBBEAN
129	KUWAIT	58.8	-----	WARNING	-----	128	WEST ASIA
130	MONGOLIA	58.7	-----	WARNING	-----	129	EAST ASIA
131	BULGARIA	56.3	-----	WARNING	-----	130	EAST EUROPE
132	CROATIA	56.3	-----	WARNING	-----	131	SOUTH EUROPE
133	PANAMA	56.1	-----	WARNING	-----	132	CENTRAL AMERICA
134	MONTENEGRO	55.5	-----	WARNING	-----	133	SOUTH EUROPE
135	BAHAMAS	55.1	-----	WARNING	-----	134	CARIBBEAN

136	BARBADOS	52.0	-----	WARNING	-----	135	CARIBBEAN
137	LATVIA	51.9	-----	WARNING	-----	136	NORTH EUROPE
138	OMAN	51.7	-----	WARNING	-----	137	WEST ASIA
139	GREECE	50.4	-----	WARNING	-----	138	SOUTH EUROPE
140	COSTA RICA	49.7	-----	WARNING	-----	139	CENTRAL AMERICA
141	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	48.9	-----	WARNING	-----	140	WEST ASIA
142	HUNGARY	48.3	-----	WARNING	-----	141	EAST EUROPE
143	QATAR	48.0	-----	WARNING	-----	142	WEST ASIA
144	ESTONIA	47.5	-----	WARNING	-----	143	NORTH EUROPE
145	SLOVAKIA	47.4	-----	WARNING	-----	144	EAST EUROPE
146	ARGENTINA	46.5	-----	WARNING	-----	145	SOUTH AMERICA
147	ITALY	45.8	-----	WARNING	-----	146	SOUTH EUROPE
148	MAURITIUS	44.7	-----	WARNING	-----	147	EAST ,AFRICA

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
149	POLAND	44.3	-----	WARNING	-----	148	EAST EUROPE
150	LITHUNIA	44.2	-----	WARNING	-----	149	NORTH EUROPE
151	MALTA	43.8	-----	WARNING	-----	150	SOUTH EAUROPE
152	CHILE	43.5	-----	WARNING	-----	151	SOUTH AMERICA
153	JAPAN	43.5	-----	WARNING	-----	152	EAST ASIA
154	SPAIN	42.8	-----	WARNING	-----	153	SOUTH AMERICA
155	URUGUAY	40.5	-----	WARNING	-----	154	SOUTH AMERICA
156	CZECH REPUBLIC	39.5	-----	WARNING	-----	155	EAST EUROPE

157	SOUTH KOREA	37.6	-----	WARNING	-----	156	EAST ASIA
158	SINGAPORE	35.6	-----	WARNING	-----	157	SOUTH EAST ASIA
159	UNITED KINGDOM	35.3	-----	WARNING	-----	158	NORTH EUROPE
160	UNITED STATES	34.8	-----	WARNING	-----	159	NORTH AMERICA
161	PORTUGAL	34.2	-----	WARNING	-----	160	SOUTH EUROPE
162	SLOVENIA	34.0	-----	WARNING	-----	161	SOUTH EUROPE
163	FRANCE	33.6	-----	WARNING	-----	162	WEST ,EUROPE
164	BELGIUM	33.5	-----	WARNING	-----	163	WEST EUROPE
165	GERMANY	31.7	-----	WARNING	-----	164	WEST EUROPE
166	AUSTRALIA	29.2	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	165	OCEANIA
167	ICELAND	29.1	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	166	NORTH EUROPE
168	NETHERLANDS	28.1	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	167	WEST EUROPE
169	AUSTRIA	27.5	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	168	WEST EUROPE
170	CANADA	26.8	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	169	NORTH AMERICA
171	IRELAND REP	26.5	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	170	NORTH EUROPE
172	NEW ZEALAND	25.6	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	171	OCEANIA
173	LUXEMBORG	25.5	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	172	WEST EUROPE
174	NORWAY	23.9	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	173	NORTH EUROPE
175	SWITZERLAND	23.3	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	174	WEST EUROPE
176	DENMARK	23.0	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	175	NORTH EUROPE
177	SWEDEN	21.3	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	176	NORTH EUROPE
178	FINLAND	20.0	-----	-----	SUSTAINABLE	177	NORTH EUROPE

4.0 AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Indeed, Africa is the second largest of the earth's continents and it comprises about twenty two percent of the world's total land area. Most of the Africa's population lives in the region south of the Sahara (that is known as sub-Sahara Africa). The continent was home to one of the world's first great civilizations (Egyptian empire) that were unified more than five thousand years ago. However, the last five hundred years in Africa have been dominated by foreign colonization, political and ethnic struggles that have hampered socio-industrial development. Perhaps, Africans are the most culturally diverse of any continent's inhabitants (with thousands of ethnic groups as well as thousands of different languages). With ethnicities that often cross national boundaries and continual political upheavals, African national identity is not as strong as racial ties or local kin group affiliations. However, since the 1950s, most African nations have gained independence from their former colonial powers. Regrettably, conflict (especially in the form of civil war) is not a new phenomenon in Africa. In fact, the last four decades have seen many civil wars and coups d'états. Yet, the last twenty years have seen a disturbing escalation in the violence. Specifically, over these decades, there have been at least twenty major conflicts in Africa (Addison et al, 2001; Annan, 1998; Clarke and Herbst, 1997; Gourevitch, 1998). Here, one feature clearly stands out and there are economic factors which play a large role in determining the action of actual and potential belligerents. In fact, table 4.1 shows that in a number of cases, war is closely associated with economies relying on natural resource exploitation (Balencie and Grange, 1999). In other words, the war economies sustaining belligerents depend on revenues from natural resources and reach a point at which economic (rather than political) motives become dominant. Thus, the revenue from fertile land

capable of producing an export crop (bananas) was one of the prizes that Somalia's war lords sought to capture. Indeed, the nature and location of natural resources affects the occurrence of war. Consequently, two main type of resource can be identified. On one hand, there are point resources such as minerals that are non-renewable, geographically concentrated; and their extraction requires little labor input. On the other hand, there are diffuse resources such as soils and water that are renewable, geographically spread; and are usually used in the production of crops and livestock while mobilizing large amounts of labor. Therefore, countries that are abundant in point resources are more likely to experience conflict than countries that possess only state of affairs in most other African countries was nearly as bleak. As marauding gangs were raiding villages, rebels were

TABLE 4.1 AFRICAN CONFLICTS: NATIONAL RESOURCES ROLE

A	B	C	D	E	F
S/N	COUNTRY	DATE	DEATHS	POINT RESOURCES	DIFFUSE RESOURCES
1	ALGERIA	1992	70,000	OIL/GAS	
2	ANGOLA	1975	500,000	OIL/DIAMONDS	TIMBER/IVORY
3	CAMEROUN	1997	< 1,000	OIL	
4	CHAD	1980 – 94	300,000	OIL/URANIUM	
5	CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE	1993 1997	9,000	OIL	
6	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO/ZAIRE	1993 -	200,000	COPPER/COBALT/ DIAMONDS/GOLD	TIMBER
7	KENYA	1991 -	2,000		CATTLE
8	LIBERIA	1989 – 96	175,000	IRON/DIAMONDS/RUBBER	TIMBER/DRUGS
9	MOZAMBIQUE	1976 – 95	1,000,000		SHRIMPS9/IVORY/TIMBER
10	RWANDA	1990 -	650,000		COFFEE
11	SENEGAL	1997 -	< 1,000		DRUGS
12	SIERRA LEONE	1991 – 1999	80,000	DIAMONDS/RATTLE BAUXITE	TIMBER
13	SOMALIA	1988 -	-----		BANANAS/CAMELS
14	SOUTH AFRICA	1990s	200, 000		DRUGS
15	SUDAN	1983 -	1,6000,000	OIL	CATTLE/TIMBER
16	WESTERN SAHARA	1976 -	-----	PHOSPHATES	

plundering and carrying out sexual assaults across borders. As illegal miners are poaching gold and diamond mines, killing and maiming to have their way, so also refugees and displaced people are besieging neighboring towns and countries like locusts. Yet, on their part, political leaders are either busy looting their country's treasures or maneuvering to rule for life.

Thus, in Africa, wars and conflicts have not only helped over ambitious leaders to perpetuate themselves in office but (worst still) they have become a policy for economic sustenance of both the ruling and the opposition parties within the same country as well as of governments of warring nations in cross-border conflicts. Unfortunately, the political history of Africa could easily be written as a running tale of struggles, civil war and armed conflicts. These vices are closely linked to the unwillingness or inability of social groups and their leaders to move beyond the boundaries of religion, ethnicity and race. In fact, researchers have found out that Africa has the highest incidence of civil wars among world regions. While war incidence has fallen or remained constant in other regions in the last three decades, it has actually increased in Africa. More than the inter-state wars, the war within the countries created more problems for the regions in Africa. And besides the influx of refugees, which tasks the treasuries of the neighbors of the warring states, the security of the neighbors is threatened. Here, the victims are not only the millions who died on the battle sacked by fighters. That is, even those who are alive are equally victims. Thus, the effects of civil war on economic growth can be identified as follows: destruction of physical and human capital, reduction of savings, diversion of portfolios from domestic investment to capital flight, disruption of economic transactions and distortion of government expenditure from the provision of public services to military expenditure. Even after the war, many of the rebels have constituted themselves into ethnic armies this ugly development may be because of a permanent insecurity created by conflicts. Notably, the trend in these countries

that are not fighting war is the uprising of ethnic armies rising to defend their clans. Yet, the tendency to see violence as interstate warfare and major civil war obscures the variety and prevalence of organized violence and underestimates its impact on people's lives. Here, the organized violence that disrupts governance and compromise development also includes local violence involving militias or between ethnic groups, gang violence, local resource-related violence and violence linked to trafficking (such as drug trafficking) as well as violence associated with global ideological struggles.

As shown in table (4.2), this violence is often recurrent, with many African countries now experiencing repeated cycles of civil conflicts and criminal violence (World Bank, 2011). For instance, countries rich in oil and other minerals that can be illegal trafficked are much more likely to have a civil war (and longer one) with rebels financing their activity through the sale of lootable resources. In other cases, violence may be linked through underlying institutional weakness. But violence between political rivals, quasi-political extortion and criminal gang activity has increased markedly since the civil war. Yet, the modern landscape of violence also includes terrorist attacks by movements that claim ideological motives and recruit internationally. In fact, where conflict has ended, recovery and the creation of resilient institutions take time, and the weakness of governance in post – conflict environments attracts transnational criminal networks. Clearly, organized crime networks engage in a wide variety of illicit activities, including trafficking drugs, people, small arms and light weapons; financial crimes and money laundering. These illicit activities require the absence of rule of law and often thrive in countries affected by other forms of violence. In other words, countries affected by political violence that have weak institutions are susceptible to trafficking. Regrettably, the costs of violence for citizens, communities, countries and the region are enormous both in terms of human suffering as well as socio-economic consequences. Here,

the costs are both direct (loss of life, disability and destruction) as well as indirect (prevention, instability and displacement). While some of these losses can be directly measured and quantified in economic terms, others are not easily measured (trauma, loss of social capital and trust, prevention cost, forgone investment and trade). Notably, the most vulnerable groups in society are frequently most affected by violence. Tied to their homes or places of work, the vulnerable have little of the protection that money or well placed contacts afford. In fact, poor child nutrition for those displaced or unable to earn incomes due to violence has lasting effects; impairing physical and cognitive functioning. Again, violence destroys school infrastructure, displaces teachers and interrupts schooling; often for an entire generation of poor children. Similarly, war looting and crime destroy the household assets of the poor while fear of violent attacks prevent them from tilling their field or traveling to schools, clinics, work places and markets. In particular, for poor people in poor African countries, extended families are often their only insurance while deaths in the family often leave them alone and up rotated.

In addition to the human suffering, organized

TABLE 4.2 MULTIPLE VIOLENCE FORMS: AFRICAN CASE

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
S/N	COUNTRY (REGION)	LOCAL INTER GROUP CONFLICT	“CONVENTIONAL” CONFLICT/CONSTESIS FOR STATE POWER OR FOR AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE	WIDESPREAD GONG RELATED VIOLENCE	ORGANISED CRIME OR TRAFFICKING WITH ACCOMPANYING VIOLENCE	LOCAL CONFLICTS WITH TRANSNATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS
1	MALI (WEST AFRICAN)	Rebel infighting (1994): ethnic violence in GAO, Kayes, and Kindal regions (1998-99)	Rebel groups in Northern Mali (1990-present)		Transnational trafficking of illicit goods, principally drugs and weapons	AL-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
2	KENYA	Clan and ethnic	Election violence	Widespread	Drug trafficking	

		group violence (2005-2008)		gang activity (1980s-present)	hub, particularly for heroin	
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Violence poses social and economic costs that can dwarf the impact of other events of concern, such as economic shocks and natural disasters. In fact, the development consequences of violence (like its origin) spill across borders, with implications for neighbors and for the region. In other words, violence in one country can create a “bad neighborhood”. Notably, nearly 75 percent of the world’s refugees are hosted by neighboring countries. For example, refugees from Liberia and Togo have sought shelter in Ghana for extended periods; straining the state’s ability to deliver services and opening tensions with the local population.

Obliviously, political and criminal violence both disrupt development and occur in repeated cycles. It is therefore essential to look across that spectrum and to consider local conflicts, social protest, gang violence, organized crime, and transnational terrorism alongside the major civil war that have been the focus of most researchers. Thus, this interlocking landscape raises questions about the coherence of the approaches to deal with these various forms of violence/approaches often divorced from one another as well as the treatment of post-conflict reconstruction and prevention as separate problems. Definitely, the risks of violence and the responses to it are shared by countries across divides of income, national identity, religion, and ideology in Africa. Thus, the way forward remains a continental challenge.

5.0 NIGERIA DISINTEGRATION MOVEMENT

From the time of amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates along with the colony of Lagos in 1914, the earliest political structure of Nigeria was predicated on unitarism. However, the chronology of British Governor General of the Nigeria federation is identified as follows: Sir Fredrick Lugard (1912-1919), Sir Hugh Clifford (1919-1925), Sir Creamer Thompson (1925-1931), Sir Cameron (1931-1935), GR.B. Bourdillion (1935-1943), Sir A. Richard (1943-1945), Sir John Machperson (1945-58) and Sir James Roberson (1958-1960). In fact, a quasi-federal structure by way of regionalism was established in Nigeria under the 1946 Richard's constitution, which closed the era of the colonial unitary arrangement specifically, events in the early 1950s (which prompted a demand for dissolution of Nigeria as a political entity) led to the immediate inception of the Lyttleton constitution (Nwokocha, 2007). During this period, two Southern regions (East and west) demanded for self government, but the motion was opposed by the Northern delegation. Despite several disagreements, eastern and Western region became self-governing in 1957 while the Northern region followed in 1959. However, the 1958 London conference reached decisions on holding of a general election in 1959 and the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, 1960. With this independence, a new constitutional Monarch in the person of the Queen, who was represented in Nigeria by a native (Governor- General Nnamdi Azikiwe). Again, it established a National parliament made up of the Queen, the Senate and House of Representatives. Here, each of the three regions was to have a house of assembly and House of Chiefs. Thus, on October 1, 1963, a new constitution known as the Republican constitution came into force; thereby, giving the country a republican status under the federal arrangement.

Subsequently, the civil bureaucracy (which had largely transited from the colonial overhands to indigenous hands) consisted of a federal service and a civil service for each of the four regions (inclusive of mid – western Region).

Regrettably, from 1962 to 1965, the federation of Nigeria was in a constant state of tumult as it was marked by crisis and conflicts manifest in the western crisis of 1962; 1963 census fiasco; 1964 general election malpractices as well as fraudulent western regional elections. Rather than address its mid to the internal problems, the incumbent Nigeria prime minister (**Sir Abubakar Belewa**) was only interested in hosting the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting. Consequently, the persisting crisis culminated in the military takeover of government in January 1966 with General Ironsi as head of state. Indeed, the return to the federal structure under **General Gowon** (after General Ironsi's overthrow in July 1966) gave federalism a new impetus. On the continuity of the Eastern Nigeria to opt out of the Nigerian Union was stopped by force of arms and economic blockade as well as states creation Decree NO. 14 (1967). Under this decree, Nigeria has divided into eleven states with military governors (except for East central state that has a civilian administrator). However, Gowon's leadership was challenged by the military Governor of Easter Nigeria (**Lt. Col. Ojukwu**) who argued that on Ironsi's exit, it was the most senior army officer that should take over the government. Unfortunately, the resultant strained relationship between the central government and Eastern Nigeria (among other reasons) culminated in a very devastating civilian war between 1967 and 1970. Yet, with the fall of Gowon in July, 1975 and the arrival of **General Murtala**, the federal structure was given further impetus by the addition of seven more states.

In this era, General Murtala replaced thousands of civil servants and around a time table for the resumption of civilian rule. But he was assassinated on February 13, 1976 in an abortive coup and his Chief of staff (**Gen Olusegun Obasanjo**) became the new head of state. Subsequently, a constituent was elected in 1977 to draft a new constitution while the ban on political party was lifted in 1978. Thus, in 1979, five political parties competed in a series of elections in which **Alhaji Shehu**

Shagari was elected president. Again in August 1983, **Shehu Shagari** and his party (NPN) were returned to power with a majority of seats in the National Assembly. However, the elections were marred by violence and allegations of widespread vote rigging as well as electoral malpractices. Therefore on December, 1983, the military overthrew the incumbent government and **General Buhari** emerged as the leader of Supreme Military Council (SMC). And yet, in August 1985, the Buhari government was overthrown by General **Ibrahim Babangida**, who cited the government's failure to deal with the country's deepening economic crisis as the major takeover, justifications. In 1989, a constituent assembly completed a constitution as well as the establishment of two political parties by the government. After several years of preparation, the presidential election was eventually held on June 12, 1993 with the inauguration of the new president scheduled to take place on August 27, 1993 (**with M.K.O. Abiola** as President elect in contest). However, on June 23, Babangida (using several pending law suits as pretence) annulled the election and thereby throwing Nigeria into an uncontrollable turmoil. Against his wish, Babangida was forced to hand over to **Ernest Shonekan** (on August 27, 1993) to form an interim government. As planned, Ernest was to rule until elections scheduled for February 1994. Notably, General Babangida created additional eleven states during his administrative era.

With the country sliding into a chaos **General Sani Abacha** assumed power and forced Shonekan's resignation on November 17, 1993. Although promising restoration of civilian rule, he refused to announce a transitional timetable until 1995. Abacha created additional six states and eventually died of heart attack on June 8, 1998. Thus, table 5.1 shows disaggregated information on the thirty – six states of Nigeria as created. On replacing Abacha, **General Abdulsalami Abubakar** (in August 1998) appointed the independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct elections for local government councils, state

legislatures, governors, national assembly and president. Subsequently, former military head of state Olusegun **Obasanjo** (freed from prison by Abubakar) ran as a civilian candidate and won the presidential election. In this era, the provisional ruling council also promulgated a new constitution based largely on the suspended 1979 constitution (before the inauguration of the new civilian president on May 29, 1999). Here, the new constitution also includes provisions for a bicameral legislative. National Assembly: 360 House of Representatives members and 109 senate members.

TABLE 5.1 NIGERIA FEDERATIONS: 36STATES STRUCTURE

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
S/N	STATE NAME	FOUNDAT ION DATE	STATE CAPITAL	REGIONAL ZONE	L.G.A. NUMBERS	LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA (LGA) NAMES
1	ABIA (ABI)	1991	UMUAHIA	SOUTH EAST (SE)	17	ABA NORTH, ABA SOUTH, AROCHUKWU, BENDE, IKWUANO, ISIALA-NGWA SOUTH, ISUIKWUATO, OBI NGWA, OHAFIA, OSISIOMA NGWA, UGWUNAGBO, UKWA EAST, UKWA WEST, UMUAHIA NORTH, UMUAHIA SOUTH, UMU-NNEOCHI.
2	ADAMAWA (ADA)	1976	YOLA	NORTH EAST (NE)	21	DEMSA, FUFURE, GANYE, GIREI, GOMBI, GUYUK, HONG, JADA, LAMURDE, MADAGALI, MAIHA, MAYO-BELWA, MICHIKA, MUBI NORTH, MUBI SOUTH, NUMAN, SHELENG, SONG, TOUNGO, YOLA NORTH, YOLA SOUTH.
3	AKWA-IBOM (AKW)	1987	UYO	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	31	ABAK, EASTERN OBOLO, EKET, ESIT EKET, ESSIEN UDIM, ETIM EKPO, ETINAN, IBENO, IBESIKPO ASUTAN, IBIONO IBOM, IKA, IKONO, IKOT ABASI, IKOT-EKPENE, INI, ITU, MBO, MKPAT ENIN, NSIT ATAI, NSIT IBOM, NSIT UBIUM, OBOT AKARA, OKOBO, ONNA, ORON, ORUK ANAM, UDUNG UKA, UKANAFUN, URUAN, URUE-OFFONGJORUKO, UYO.
4	ANAMBRA (ANA)	1991	AWKA	SOUTH EAST (SE)	21	AGUATA, ANAMBRA EAST, ANAMBRA WEST, ANAOCHA NORTH, AWKA SOUTH, AYAMELUM, DUNUKOFIA, EKWUSIGO, IDEMILI NORTH, IDEMILI SOUTH, IHIALA, NJIKOKA, NNEWI NORTH, NNEWI SOUTH, OGBARU, ONITSHA NORTH, ONITSHA SOUTH, ORUMBA NORTH, ORUMBA SOUTH, OYI.
5	BAUCHI (BAU)	1976	BAUCHI	NORTH EAST (NE)	20	ALKATERI, BAUCHI, BOGORO, DAMBAN, DARAZO, DASS, GARNAWA, GANJUWA, GIADE, ITAS/GADAU, JAMA ARE, KATAGUM, KIRFI, MISAU, NINGI, SHIRA, TAFAWA-BALEWA, TORO,

						WARJI, ZAKI.
6	BAYELSA (BAY)	1996	YENGOA	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	32	BRASS, EKEREMOR, KOLOKUMA-OPOKUMA, NEMBE, OGBIA, SAGBAMA, SOUTHERN IJAW, YENGOA.
7	BENUE (BEN)	1976	MARKURDI	NORTH CENTRAL (NC)	23	ADO, AGATU, APA, BURUKU, GBOKO, GUMA, GWER-EAST, GWER WEST, KATSINA-ALA, KONSHISHA, KWANDE, LOGO, MAKURDI, OBI, OGBADIBO, OJU, OKPOKWU, OHIMINI, OTURKPO, TARKA, UKUM, USHONGO, VENDEIKYA.
8	BORNO (BOR)	1967	MAIDUGURI	NORTH EAST (NE)	27	ABADAM, ASKIRA/UBA, BAMA, BAYO, BIU, CHOBOK, DAMBOA, DIKWA, GUBIO, GUZAMALA, GWOZA, HAWUL, JERE, KAGA, KALA/BALGE, KONDUGA, KUKAWA, KWAYA, KUSAR, MAFA, MAGUMERI, MAIDUGURI, MARTE, MOBBAR, MONGUNO, NGALA, NGANZAI, SHANI.
9	CROSS RIVER (CRR)	1967	CALABAR	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	18	ABI, AKAMKPA, AKPABUYO, BAKASSI, BEKWARA, BIASE, BOKI, CALABAR-MUNICIPAL, CALABAR SOUTH, ETUNG, IKOM, OBANLIKU, OBUBRA, OBUDU, ODUKPANI, OGOJA, YAKURR, YALA.
10	DELTA (DEL)	1991	ASABA	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	25	ANIOCHA NORTH, ANIOCHA SOUTH, MONADI, BURUTU ETHIOPE EAST, ETHIOPE WEST, IKA NORTH EAST, IKA SOUTH, ISOKO NORTH, ISOKO SOUTH, NDOKWA EAST, NDOKWA WEST, OKPE, OSHIMILI NORTH, OSHIMILI SOUTH, PATANI, SAPELE, UDU, UGHELLI NORTH, UGHELLI SOUTH, UKWUANI, UWWIE, WARRI NORTH, WARRI SOUTH, WARRI SOUTH WEST
11	EBONYI (EBO)	1996	ABAKILIKI	SOUTH EAST (SS)	13	ABAKALIKI, AFIKPO NORTH, AFIKPO SOUTH, EBONYI, EZZA NORTH, EZZA SOUTH, IKWO, ISHIELU, IVO, IZZI, OHAOZARA, OHAIKWU, ONICHA.
12	EDO (EDO)	1963/67	BENIN CITY	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	18	AKOKO-EDO, EGOR, ESAN CENTRAL, ESAN NORTH EAST, ESAN SOUTH EAST, ESAN WEST, ETSAKO CENTRAL, ETSAKO EAST, ETSAKO WEST, IGUEBEN, IKPOBA-OKHA, OREDO, ORHIONMWON, OVIA NORTH EAST, OVIA SOUTH WEST, OWAN EAST, OWAN WEST, UHUNMWONDE.
13	EKITI(EKI)	1996	EDO-EKITI	SOUTH WEST (SW)	16	ADO EKITI, AIYEKIRE, EFON, EKITI EAST, EKITI SOUTH WEST, EKITI WEST, EMURE, IDO-OSI, IJERO, IKERE, IKOLE, LLEJEMEJI, IREPODUN/IFELODUN, ISE/ORUN, MOBA, OYE.
14	ENUGU (ENU)	1946/67	ENUGU	SOUTH EAST (SE)	17	ANINRI, AWGU, ENUGU EAST, ENUGU NORTH, ENUGU SOUTH, EZEAGU, IGBO-ETITI, IGBO-EZE NORTH, IGBO-EZE SOUTH, ISI-UZO, NKANU EAST, NKANU WEST, NSUKKA, OJI-RIVER, UDENU, UDI, UZO-UWANI.
15	GOMBE (GOM)	1996	GOMBE	NORTH EAST (NE)	10	AKKO, BALANGA, BILLIRI, DUKKU, FUNAKAYE, GOMBE, KALTUNGO, KWAMI, NAFADA, SHOMGOM, YAMALTU/DEBA.

16	IMO (IMO)	1976	OWERRI	SOUTH EAST (SE)	27	ABOH-MBAISE, AHIAZU-MBAISE, EHIME-MBANO, EZINIHITE, IDEATO NORTH, IDEATO SOUTH, IHITTE/UBOMA, IKEDURU, ISIALA MBANO, ISU, MBAITOLI, NGOR-OKPALA, NJABA, NWANGELE, NKWERRE, OBOWO, OGUTA, OHAJI/EGBEMA, OKIGWE, ORLU, ORSU, ORU EAST, ORU WEST, OWERRI-MUNICIPAL, OWERRI NORTH, OWERRI WEST, UNUIMO.
17	JIGAWAA (JIG)	1991	DUBE	NORTH WEST	27	AUYO, BABURA, BIRNIN, KUDU, BIRINIWA, BUJI, DUTSE, GAGARAWA, GARKI, GUMEL, GURI, GWARAM, GWIWA, HADEJIA, JAHUN, KAFIN HAUSA, KAUGAMA, KAZATJRE, KIRI-KASAMMA, KIYAWA, MAIGATARI, MALAM MADORI, MIGA, RINGIM, RONI, SULE-TANKARKAR, TAURA, YANKWASHI,
18	KADUNA (KAD)	1946/67	KADUNA	NORTH WEST (NW)	23	BIRNIN,-GWARI, CHIKUN, GIWA, IGABI, IKARA, JABA, JEMA'A, KACHIA, KADUNA NORTH, KADUNA SOUTH, KAGARKO, KAJURU, KAURA, KAURU, KUBAU, KUDAN, LERE, MAKARFI, SABON-GARI, SANGA, SOBA, ZANGON-KATAF, ZARIA.
19	KANO (KAN)	1976	KANO	NORTH WEST (NW)	44	AJINGI, ALBASU, BAGWAI, BEBEJI, BICHI, BUNKURE, DALA, DAMBATTA, DAWAKIN KUDU, DAWAKIN TOFA, DOGUWA, FAGGE, GABASAWA, GARKO, GARUM MALLAM, GAYA, GEZAWA, GWALE, GWARZO, KABO, KANO-MUNICIPAL, KARAYE, KIBIYA, KIRU, KUMBOTSO, KUNCHI, KURA, MADOBI, MAKODA, MINJIBIR, NASARAWA, RANO, RIMINGADO, ROGO, SHANONO, SUMAILA, TAKAI, TARAUNI, TOFA, TSANYAWA, TUDUN WADA, UNGOGO, WARAWA, WUDIL.
20	KATSINA	1991	KASTINA	NORTH WEST (NW)	34	BAKORI, BATAGARAWA, BATSARI, BAURE, BINDAWA, CHARANCHI, DANDUME, DANJA, DAN MUSA, DAURA, DUTSI, DUTSIN-MA, FASKARI, FUNTUA, INGAWA, JIBIA, KAFUR, KAITA KANKARA, KANKIA, KATSINA, KURFI, KUSADA, MAI' AUDA, MALUMFASHI, MANI, MASHI, MATA, ZU, MUSAWA, RIMI, SABUWA, SAFANA, SANDAMU, ZANGO.
21	KEBBI (KEB)	1991	LOKOJA	NORTH WEST (NW)	21	ALEIRO, AREWA-DANDI, ARGUNGU, AUGIE, BAGUDO, BIRNIN-KEBBI, BUNZA, DANDI, FAKAI, GWANDU, JEGA, KALGO, KOKO/BESSE, MAIYAMA, NGASKI, SAKABA, SHANGA, SURU, WASAGU/DANKO, YAURI, ZURU.
22	KOGI (KOG)	1991	LOKOJA	NORTH CENTRAL (NC)	21	ADAVI, AJAOKUTA, ANKPA, BASSA, DEKINA, IBAJI, IDAH, IGALAMELA-ODOLU, IJUMU, KABBA/BUNU, KOGI, LOKOJA, MOPA-MURA, OFU, OGORI/MAGONGO, OKEHI, OKENE, OLAMABOLO, OMALA, YAGBA EAST, YAGBA WEST.

23	KWARA (KWA)	1967	ILORIN	NORTH CENTRAL (NC)	16	ASA, BARUTEN, EDU, EKITI, IFELODUN, ILORI EAST, ILORI SOUTH, ILORI WEST, IREPODUN, ISIN, KAIAMA, MORA, OFFA, OKE-ERO, OYUN, PATEGI.
24	LAGOS (LAG)	1976	LAGOS	SOUTH WEST (SW)	20	AGEGE, AJEROMI IFELODUN, ALIMOSHO, AMUWO ODOFIN, APAPA, BADAGRY, EPE, ETI-OSA, IBEJU/LEKKI, IFAKO-IJAYE, IKEJA, IKORODU, KOSOFE, LAGOS ISLAND, LAGOS MAINLAND, MMUSHIN, OJO, OSHODI- ISOLO, SHOMOLU, SURULERE.
25	NASSARA WA (NAS)	1996	LAFIA	NORTH CENTRAL (NC)	13	AKWANGA, AWE, DOMA, KARU, KEANA, KEFI, KOKONA, LAFIA, NASARAWA, NASARAWA-EGGON, OBI, TOTO, WAMBA.
26	NIGER (NIG)	1976	MINNA	NORTH CENTRAL (NC)	25	AGAIE, AGWARA, BIDA, BORGU, BOSSO, CHANCHAGA, EDATI, GBAKO, GURARA, KATCHA, KONTAGORA, LAPAI, LAVUN, MAGAMA, MARIGA, MASHEGU, MOKWA, MUYA, PAIKORO, RAFI, RIJAU, SHIRORA, SULEJA, TAFI, WUSHISHI.
27	OGUN (OGU)	1976	IABEOKUTA	SOUTH WEST (SW)	20	ABEOKUTA NORTH, ABEOKUTA SOUTH, ADO-ODO/OTA, EGBADO NORTH, EGBADO SOUTH, EWOKORO, IFO, IJEBU-EAST, IJEBU NORTH, IJEBU NORTH EAST, IJEBU ODE, IKENNE, IMEKO-AFON, IPOKIA, OBAFEMI- OWODE, OGUN-WATERSIDE, ODEDA, ODOGBOLU, REMO NORTH, SHAGAMU.
28	ONDU (OND)	1987	AKURE	SOUTH WEST (SW)	18	AKOKO NORTH EAST, AKOKO NORTH WEST, AKOKO SOUTH-EAST, AKOKO SOUTH WEST, AKURE NORTH, AKURE SOUTH, ESE-ODO, IDANRE, IFEDORE, LLE-OLUJI-OKEIGBO, IRELE, ODIGBO, OKITIPUPA, ONDO EAST, ONDO WEST, OSE, OWO.
29	OSUN (OSU)	1991	OSHOBO	SOUTH WEST (SW)	30	AIYEDADE, AIYEDIRE, ATAKUMOSA EAST, ATAKUMOSA WEST, BOLUWADURA, BORIPE, EDE NORTH, EDE SOUTH, EGBEDORE, EJIGBO, IFE CENTRAL, IFE EAST, IFE NORTH, IFE SOUTH, IFEDAYO, IFELODUN, LLA, LLESHA EAST, LLESHA WEST, IREPODUN, IREWOLE, ISOKAN, IWO, OBOKUN, ODO-OTIN, OLA-OLUWA, OLORUNDA, ORIADE, OROLU, OSOGBO.
30	OYO (OYO)	1946	IBADAN	SOUTH WEST (SW)	33	AFIJIO, AKINYELE, ATIBA, ATIGBO, EGBEDA, IBADAN CENTRAL, IBADAN NORTH, IBADAN NORTH WEST, IBADAN SOUTH EAST, IBADAN SOUTH WEST, IBARAPA CENTRAL, IBARAPA EAST, IBARAPA NORTH, IDO, IREPO, ISEYIN, ITESIWAJU, IWAJOWA, KAJOLA, LAGELU, OGBOMOSO NORTH, OBOMOSO SOUTH, OGO OLUWA, OLORUNSOGO, OLUYOLE, ONA-ARA, ORELOPE, ORI IRE, OYO EAST, OYO WEST, SAKI EAST, SAKI WEST, SURULERE.
31	PLATEAU	1967	JOS	NORTH	17	BARIKIN LADI, BASSA, BOKKOS, JOS

	(PLA)			CENTRAL (NC)		EAST, JOS NORTH, JOS SOUTH, KANAM, KANKE, LANGTANG NORTH, LANGTANG SOUTH, MANGU, MIKANG, PANKSHIN, QUA' AN PAN, RIYOM, SHENDAM, WASE.
32	RIVERS (RIV)	1967	PORTHARCOURT	SOUTH SOUTH (SS)	23	ABUA/ODUAL, AHOADA EAST, AHOADA WEST, AKUKU TORU, ANDONI, ASARITORU, BONNY, DEGEMA, EMOHUA, ELEME, ETCHE, GOKANA, IKWERRE, KHANA, OBIJAKPOR, OGBA/EGBEMA/NDONI, OGU/BOLA, OKRIKA, OMUMMA, OPOBO/NKORA, OYIGBO, PORT-HARCOURT, TAI.
33	SOKOTO (SOK)	1976	SOKOTO	NORTH WEST (NW)	23	BINJI, BODINGA, DANGE-SHUNI, GADA, GORANYO, GUDU, GWADABAWA, LLIELA, ISA, KWARE, KEBBE, RABAH, SABON BIRNI, SHAGARI, SILAME, SOKOTO NORTH, SOKOTO SOUTH, TAMBUIWAL, TANGAZA, TURETA, WAMAKKO, WURNO, YABO.
34	TARABA (TAR)	1996	JALINGO	NORTH EAST (NE)	16	ARDO-KOLA, BALI, DONGA, GASHAKA, GASSOL, IBI, JALINGO, KARIM-LAMIDO, KURMI, LAU, SARDAUNA, TAKUM, USSA, WUKARI, YORRA, ZING.
35	YOBE (YOB)	1991	DAMATURU	NORTH EAST (NE)	17	BADE, BURSARI, DAMATURU, FIKA, FUNE, GEIDAM, GUJBA, GULANI, JAKUSKO, KARASUWA, MACHINA, NANGERE, NGURU, POTISKUM, TARMUA, YUNUSARI, YUSAFARI.
36	ZAMFARA (ZAM)	1996	GASAU	NORTH WEST (NW)	14	ANKA, BAKURA, BIRNIN MAGAJI, BUKKUYUM, BUNGUDU, GUMMI, GUSAU, KAURA NAMODA, MARADUN, MARU, SHINKAFI, TALATA, MAFARA, TSAFE, ZURMI.
37	FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (FCT)	2 ND REPUBLIC	ABUJA	NORTHERN CENTRALIZED	6	ABAJI, ABUJA MUNICIPAL, BWARI, GWAGWALADA, KUJE, KWALI.

NB:

- (i) NE + NW + NC + N + SW + SS = 6 GEO-POLITICAL ZONES (REGIONS) OF NIGERIA
- (ii) NE(6) + NW(7) + NC(6) = 19 NORTHERN STATES OF NIGERIA
- (iii) SE(5) + SW(6) + SS(5) = 17 SOUTHERN STATES OF NIGERIA
- (iv) ABI(17) + ADA(21) + AKW(31) + ANA(21) + BAU(20) + BAY(32) + BEN(23) + BOR(27) + CRR(18) DEL(25) + EBO(13) + EDO(18) + EKI(16) + ENU(17) + GOM(10) + IMO(27) + JIG(27) + KAD(23) +

KAN(44) + KAT(34) + KEB(21) + KOG(21) + KWA(16) + LAG(20) +
NAS(13) + NIG(25) + OGU(20) + OND(18) + OSU(30) + OYO(33) +
PLA(17) + RIV(23) + SOK(23) + TAR(16) + YOB(17) + ZAM(14)
=774 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS OF NIGERIA.

Indeed, the emergence of a democratic Nigeria (in May 1999) ended sixteen years of consecutive military rule. On the completion of his four years tenure in 2013, Obasanjo was re-elected as the new Nigeria president (until 2007) which serves as his second tenure.

Yet, in the presidential election held on 21 April 2007, **Umaru Yar'adua** was elected as president. However, the election was highly controversial and strongly criticized by observers. In other words, the election was marred by electoral fraud and denounced by other candidates and international observers. Despite numerous petitions by opponents, Yar'Adua's new cabinet were sworn in on 26 July, 2007. But as nature determines, Umaru Yar' Adua left Nigeria on 23 November, 2009 for medical treatment. Consequently, on a February, 2010, the Nigeria Senate determined that presidential power should be transmitted to the Vice President. Thus, DR. **Goodluck Jonathan** was appointed to serve as Acting President (with all the accompanying powers) until when and if Yar' Adua returned to full health. Regrettably, Yar' Adua died on 5th May 2010 and Jonathan was sworn in as new President on 6th May, 2010. As part of his mandate, Jonathan was to serve as President until the next General Election in 2011. As recorded, **President Goodluck Jonathan** polled over 22 million votes to beat 17 other contestants to win the presidential race held on April 16, 2011; and subsequently sworn in as the new president on May 29, 2011. Indeed, the failures, successes and challenges of Jonathan's administration are still debatable. Yet, one may ask why is Nigeria unable to justify the cardinal

elements of its motto (Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress) which speak volumes about the dreams of the country's founding fathers? In fact, these four cardinal elements are essential building blocks for the construction of a viable country. Here, it was expected that a united country with a strong faith in its abilities would not have difficulty achieving peace and progress that will make it a force to reckon with in the comity of nations. Regrettably, after fifty – three years of independent existence, these dreams of country's founding fathers have sadly remained tall dreams as the country (buffeted by cross-current of opposing influences) appears dangerously away from the set goals.

Specifically, the results of the House of Representative public sessions on the amendment of the 1999 constitution is the equivalent of a civilian coup; as it appears to have produced a predetermined end. Indeed, the House first took a democratic ride by having public sessions in the 360 federal constituencies to examine the proposed amendments to the constitution and make their inputs. However, those who understand the tides and tempers of Nigeria politics predicted that the results would not really be the representatives of wishes of the people. Rather, it would be an opportunity for the North to reinforce the political advantage gained under successive military regimes by blocking amendments that may be considered as favorable the Southern Nigerian. As predicted, the results of the public sessions showed that the North refuse to shift grounds on almost all the major of interest to the South. Particularly, the South-East has been very eloquent about its structural marginalization since the end of Biafra civil war. Evidently this manifested in the South- East geo-political zone having the least number of states and local governments in the Nigeria Federation. Therefore, the general view has been that a state should be created for South- East so as to be at par with other regions. However, the results collated by the constitution review committee

showed that the proposed state created was technically rejected (among other sensitive issues). Again, since the 1999 constitution did not provide for a referendum to affirm constitution amendment; it then implies that the issue of Northern domination of the South might remain unresolved for some times. Therefore, it is clear that Nigeria is neither unique nor sacrosanct as we are made to believe.

Yet, in addressing the futility of the 1914 Amalgamation as well as the content of the secret document with its existence span, Achebe (2012) termed it elapse able. Notably, the 1914 Amalgamation document described Nigeria as a figment and has conspicuously remained hidden from the inquisitive Nigerians. Clearly, a peep into the hidden document of 1914 Amalgamation shows startling revelations that make Nigeria's existence beyond January 2014 illegal. In other words, the Amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria (by the British through the instrumentality of Lord Lugard) was to be experimented for 100 years to ascertain its workability or otherwise. It also allows disinterested units to opt out after the agreed period. Going by the letters of the secret document, the implication is that Nigeria will no longer (legally) exist by 2014 and the country will be back to pre-1914 status of the two states of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria (both legally and technically). But the ruling elites (class) may choose to ignore this reality except there is strong agitation for its implication or revolution from the people. Consequently, the distinct people in the original Southern and Northern Nigeria will by 2014 be at liberty to assert their political autonomy when this happens. In other words, all indigenous people will become self-governed as they were before the inception of British colonization.

In the preparation (actualization) of the above Amalgamation status, there are recent (new) development in the nation's security and religious

challenges. In fact, a strange factor in the worrisome insurgency problem being tackled by the government was introduced with the revelation linking the Hezbollah terrorist group of Lebanon with assault on Nigeria. This linkage was not just by accident. Obviously, just like the **Boko haram terrorist organization Hezbollah (Lebanese terrorist group)** are neck-deep in the spate **of insurgency in Nigeria (as at today)**. As revealed by international scholars on terrorism, Nigeria Hezbollah has been in the making for some time. It is allegedly called the **ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF NIGERIA (IMN)** which is a much more representative and active organization. Indeed, the IMN is most identified with its leader (SHEIKH OBRAHIM ZAKZABY) who began his political career as a Sunni fundamentalist student leader influenced by the workers of SAYYID QUTB (Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood radical ideologue) whose ideas provided the basis for AL-QAEDA's ideology. Much later, he moved to shiaism and his movement grew rapidly because of IRAN support. In fact, Zakzaky's opportunistic association with the Iranian regime was rewarded with substantial funds and training (both religious and military). His movement is indeed operating in Nigeria's Northern states of Kano and Kaduna. Specifically, Zakzaky fights for the full implementation of the Sharia Law and also demands that Nigeria abandons secularism and become an Islamic State of Iran model. Presently IMN's popularity is growing among the impoverished Nigeria Muslims and it is challenging the country Muslim leaders. Zakzaky has actually argued that the current wave of attacks in the name of Boko harm is a deliberate agenda to suppress ISLAMIC RESURGENCE in Nigeria (with special focus on the Islamic Movement in Nigeria). Consequently, there is a global fear and apprehension of the superpowers on the current agitation for ISLAMIC REVIVAL in Nigeria; that the country will eventually become ISLAMIC, and in particular 'SHIA ISLAM'. Indisputably, BOKOHARAM

can therefore be classified as SUNNI JIHA DIST terrorist organization which has grave consequences for the continued existence of the Nigeria Unity.

Therefore, imagine for a moment Nigeria dissolving or collapsing into smaller countries like **'REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA', OODUA NATION', REPUBLIC OF ARAWA' OR THE 'IJAW NATION'**. Is it then possible for the fifty two year- old country to fail and in the alternative fragment to pieces? Again, can Nigeria go the way of India (from which Pakistan was excised) or the Soviet Union that produced smaller countries like Russia, Ukraine or Uzbekistan? Can Nigeria also go like Sudan that has just had a breakaway Southern Sudan? Again, in the event that the country breaks up, will there be peace, harmony and progress in the new emerging entities? What exactly will be the gains or losses of a disintegrated Nigeria? Clearly, these are questions that demand urgent answers. Perhaps, amongst former British colonies, three nations (Nigeria, Sudan and India) were created contradictions that made them impossible to function by particularly lumping significant Muslim populations with other ethnic religious groups. Unfortunately, out of these countries, India and Sudan has disintegrated while Nigeria. She is a nation consumed by injustice, hatred and self destruction. Also, she is one of the most failed nations on earth that is incapable of providing the needed fundamental human right (which is the right to life) as well as basic essentials of life. Clearly, any careful observer will realize that the concept of one Nigeria has always been a scam that remains unbelievable. It is only being a convenient way to look the nation's treasury. In anticipation of the nation's eventual collapse, most of the Nigerian leaders are busy building their future empire outside Nigeria. **Indeed, one may be tempted to conclude that Nigeria is already a disintegrated nation.** In other words, how can one explain a nation where ethnic groups are returning to their enclaves because of ethno-

religious crisis? Similarly, how can one explain a nation where a section of the country introduces Sharia laws in violation of the constitution? Again, how can one explain a nation where terrorists bomb and kill innocent people in churches and other locations (without any reason)?

Consequently, Nigeria might be a might mare and we need to finally confront the reality of its impossibility (as a viable nation) and break it up. Perhaps, the following causes of disintegration in the world could be referenced as appropriate:

- (A) the Scottish scheduled independence referendum for September 2014 after centuries of British union;
- (B) the soviet union (1991) nuclear world power disintegration;
- (C) the Pakistan (1947) secession from India by seeking a separate nation for Muslims;
- (D) the Eritrea (1993) secession from Sudan by using referendum;
- (E) the Yugoslavia (1992) disintegration into more than eight new nations;
- (F) the Czechoslovakia (1993) disintegration;
- (G) the Bangladesh (1971) secession from Pakistan;
- (H) the East Timor (2002) secession from Indonesia; and
- (I) the South Sudan (2011) secession from Sudan.

Thus, there is a long precedent of self determination by many nations around the world and none of the new nations have ever regretted their decisions to separate from their former nations (in spite of any confronting challenges). Perhaps, the single greatest gain of Nigeria's breakup may be the possibility to hold leaders accountable in a new nation freed from Nigeria's contradictions.

6.0 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM STRATEGIES

Indeed, leadership actions to restore confidence of stakeholders and citizens in collective capacities for change are very crucial steps in moving away from the brink of violence. In other words, the trust that the population and stakeholders have in state institutions to deal with violence can become shaky when insecurity is rising (or in the aftermath of repeated bouts of conflict). Thus, there is great need to accept the importance of building inclusive-enough coalitions and identifying the signals and commitment mechanisms that can galvanize support for change. Again, national reformers have to deliver results on the ground to build confidence in citizen security, justice and economic prospects. That is, they are expected to consider coalitions (inclusive enough) and the signals, commitment mechanisms as well as early results that can help achieve momentum for later institutional transformations. Notably, building coalitions at the local level (where the state works with community leaders to combat violence) can be an important part of responses to criminal violence as well as political violence. Regrettably, violence shortens the time horizons of consumers, producers, traders and policy makers. Outreach to the private sector can therefore help build a sense of the long-term, which is critical for planning future investment and sustainable growth. The inclusion of civil society (informal and traditional institutions) in inclusive-enough coalitions helps in acquiring broader societal legitimacy and in ensuring that citizen security, justice and jobs reach all segments of society. Also, community, traditional and civil society structures can be crucial partners for the delivery of early results, where state reach and trust with violence-affected communities is low. In fact, by drawing on nonstate capacity, governments can stretch their ability to deliver public goods and signal an inclusive partnership between the state and other parts of society. Common to successful leadership (whether individual or collective) is

the ability to redefine citizen and elite expectation; to move them then beyond negative frames of reference; and **to transform public policies and institutions** in ways that will enable the state to address immediate and long-term sources of discord.

Given the link between corruption and violence; judicious, rapid transparency and anti-corruption measures can help restore stakeholder and citizen confidence. Yet, consolidating and coordinating security services is a fundamental first step in institutional reforms to prevent violence. Making security reform a top priority does not mean fully comprehensive reform and modernization across all aspects of these systems. Here, basic reforms that improves citizen security (that prevents outright capture of the system, can enable reforms to move forward in other political and economic areas, thereby allowing more gradual comprehensive reform and professionalization. Again, transparency of budget and expenditure information is an easy change to put in place early on and can be crucial to stem illegal flows of funds into violent activities. In fact, **Social accountability approaches** draw on the incentives for citizens and communities to monitor the expenditures most directly affecting their welfare. Basically, these tools include citizen report cards, community score cards, participatory public budgeting, and public expenditure tracking surveys as well as community-driven development approaches (where expenditures are publicized transparently at the local level). However, in fragile situations, such social accountability tools can contribute to building citizens' trust in the state at the national and local levels. And yet, the essential building blocks of international support to successful international transformation are time and patience, best-fit approaches appropriate to the local political context; and supporting capacity for critical institutional reform in the areas of citizen, security justice (and jobs).

Empirically, countries go through multiple transitions over a period of at least a generation before achieving institutional resilience. Because trust is low in high-risk environments, building confidence and political support among stake holders in each round of change is a prelude to institutional transformation. Thus, managing these complex dynamics and multiple transitions is the basis of state craft; and there is no substitute for the judicious blend of political judgment, deep knowledge of actors, innovation, and tactical calculus that only national reformers can viewed. In general, when confronted with a rising crisis or transition opportunity, national reformers and their international partners have a variety of tools available for confidence-building and the development of “inclusive-enough” coalitions (based on lessons from a range of country experiences). Table (6.1) highlights the core tools for restoring confidence (World Bank, 2011). Here, key stakeholder groups whose support has often been sought in coalition-building include the leaders and populations affected and targeted by violence, security actors, combatants, political leaders, business, civilian and international partners.

TABLE 6.1 CONFIDENCE RESTORATION: THE CORE TOOLS

A	B	C	D
SIGNALS: FUTURE POLICY AND PRIORMES	SIGNALS: IMMEDIATE ACTIONS	COMMITMENT MECHANISMS	SUPPORTING ACTIONS
1. CITIZEN SECURITY GOALS	1. PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES	1. KEY EXECUTING AGENCIES INDEPENDENCE	1. RISK AND PRIORITY ASSESSMENTS
2. KEY PRINCIPLES AND REALISTIC TIMELINES FOR ADDRESSING POLITICAL REFORM, DECENTRALIZATION	LOCAL SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND DEVELOPMENT RESULTS	2. THIRD PARTY INDEPENDENT MONITORING	2. INACTION COMMUNICATION COSTS

CORRUPTION, BASIC JUSTICE SERVICES, AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE			
3. UTILIZE STATE, COMMUNITY, NGO, AND INTERNATIONAL CAPACITIES	3. CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS	3. DUAL KEY SYSTEMS	3. SIMPLE PLAN AND PROGRESS MEASURES BASED ON EARLY RESULTS
	4. EXPENDITURES TRANSPARENCY	3. INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONS EXECUTION	4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
	5. SECURITY FORCES REDEPLOYMENT		
	6. DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES REMOVAL		

Clearly, the particular mix of transition opportunities, stresses, stakeholders, and institutional challenges makes a difference in selecting types of confidence-building approaches. On one hand, where political power is contested and opposition groups have the potential to derail progress, developing collaborative capacities among political parties is crucial. On the other hand, where political leadership is uncontested, more focused approaches to building coalitions between the ruling party and key stakeholders whose support is needed can be inclusive enough to create momentum for change. But where the engagement of external partners can provide additional support or help manage external stresses, signals that build their confidence become more important.

Operationally, the way programs are designed must vary according to country circumstances, but experience suggests a core set of basic program tools/delivered at scale either nationally or sub nationally) that can be adapted to different country contexts from low to high income and with different mixes of criminal and political violence. Table (6.2) shows the various core tools for transforming institutions.

Clearly, these are programs based on the concept of building a rhythm of repeated successes, linking regular early results for confidence-building with longer-term institutional transformation. In other words, confidence-building through collaborative approaches and early results and the foundational reform that can deliver citizen security, justice and jobs have some elements in common. But they need to be well adapted to the local political context. Therefore, the task of national reformers and international representatives in the field is made easier (or harder) by the supporting environments in global policy and in the headquarters of bilateral actors and the global institutions. For the international partners, there is need to move away from simply tweaking current practices toward a fundamentally new practical set of tools to link development and security, development and mediation as well as development and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, new tools should aim to have a catalytic effect in supporting (confidence-building and longer-term institutional transformation).

TABLE 6.2 TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS: THE CORE TOOLS

A CITIZEN SECURITY	B JUSTICE	C JOBS/ASSOCIATED SERVICES
<p>1. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM</p> <p>I) Designed to deliver citizen security benefits</p> <p>II) Capacity increases linked to repeated realistic performance outcomes and justice functions</p> <p>III) Dismantling of criminal networks through civilian oversight, vetting and budget</p>	<p>1. JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM</p> <p>I) Independence and links to security reforms</p> <p>II) Strengthening of basic case load processing</p> <p>III) Extending of justice services, drawing on traditional/community mechanisms</p> <p>2. PHASING ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES</p>	<p>1. MULTISECTORAL COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMS: Combining citizen security, employment, justice, education and infrastructure</p> <p>2. EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS:</p> <p>I) Regulatory simplification and infrastructure recovery for private sector job creation</p> <p>II) Long-term public programs</p>

<p>expenditure transparency</p> <p>IV) Use of low-capital systems for rural and community policing</p> <p>V) Phased capacity and accountability in specialized security functions</p>	<p>I) Demonstration that national resources can be used for public good before dismantling rent systems</p> <p>II) Control of capture of rents</p> <p>III) Use of social accountability mechanisms</p> <p>IV) Political and electoral reform</p> <p>V) Decentralization</p> <p>VI) Transitional Justice</p> <p>VII) Comprehensive anti-corruption Reforms</p>	<p>III) Asset Expansion</p> <p>IV) Value chain programs</p> <p>V) Informal sector support</p> <p>VI) Labor migration</p> <p>VII) Women's economic empowerment</p> <p>3. HUMANITARIAN DELIVERY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: with planned transition from international provision</p> <p>4. MACROECONOMIC POLICY: focus on</p> <p>I) Consumer price, volatility and employment</p> <p>II) Structural economic reforms such as privatization</p> <p>III) Education and health reforms</p> <p>IV) Inclusion of Marginalized groups</p>
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Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of human life, or on international legal rules, there are some universally accepted norms that are reflected in the charter of the United Nations and other international instruments. Notably, these norms are not self-implementing, and because they include the right to cultural diversity; their interpretation must reflect local, national and regional diversity. Thus, regional institutions can bridge the distance between universal norms and local customs. Yet, those customs or practices must conform (in substance) to the core international principles from which the international community derives its cohesion. Otherwise, cultural diversity can simply override as well as undermine the international framework. In their assistance to development, international actors must resist the exportation of form over substance and accept

the regionalization of norms that enhance rather than impede their true universal character. In the same spirit, regional actors must translate in a culturally relevant way, international norms and repudiate-non conforming practices. However, all must concede that the standards set by universal norms are aspirations and measures of performance should reflect progress, stagnation or regression toward a common universal ideal. In this regard, African countries are expected to create intelligent fusion cell that would combine information from the military, spy services, police, federal and local agencies. This cell should coordinate counter-terrorism activities and serve as a contact for foreign intelligence services. However, it is evident that some problems are beyond the capacity of individual states to deal with effectively and therefore requires a global governance system. Thus, there are two elements of global governance that are critical to human development: democratic accountability and institutional experimentation. Here, democratic accountability requires that global institutions adequately represent the views of people and countries around the world and do not reinforce the deep inequalities in the distribution of economic and political power. It also requires broader representation of Africa countries in the governance of international financial institutions. On the other hand, institutional experimentation requires opening up policy and institutional spaces to allow people and societies to adjust, adapt and frame their own development strategies. Of course, solutions must be adapted to the institutions needing reform and the problems being addressed. Yet, the basic principles can be broadly applied: a global governance system that promotes democratic accountability, transparency and inclusion of the poor Africa countries; a stable and sustainable global economic climate as well as financial stability. In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread; a job that was not cut; **an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence** as well as a dissident who was not silenced. Consequently, there is no tension between

human development and sustainable development. Sincerely, both concepts are strongly rooted on the universalism of life claims as dignified by Almighty God.

7.0 RESILIENCE POLICY MEASURES

Precisely, human development is the expansion of people's freedoms to give long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to engage activity in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. Thus, people are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human development (as individuals and in groups). Notably, the policies and reforms compatible with progress vary widely across institutional settings and depend on structural and political constraints. Therefore, attempts to transplant institutional and policy solutions across countries with different conditions often fail. Typically, policies must be informed by the prevailing institutional setting to bring about change. In other words, putting people at the center of development means progress that is equitable. That is, enabling people to be active participants in change and ensuring that current achievements are not attained at the expense of future generations. Hence, the emergence of new economics (an economics of human development) in which the objective is to further human well-being and in which growth and other policies are evaluated and pursued vigorously to the extent that they advance human development in the short and long term. Indeed, **people are the real wealth of a nation.** Hence, the basic objective of sustainable development is to **create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy and creative righteous lives.** This may appear to be a simple truth that is often forgotten in the immediate concern with materialism.

Individuals, groups and leaders who promote human development operate under strong institutional structural and political constraints that affect policy options. But experience suggests broad principles for shaping an appropriate agenda for human development. Here, strategies may yield good results in some contexts but not others; making flexibility a critical aspects of policy and institutional design. Hence, all policies and programmes require effective state capacity. Regrettably, many officials face hard trade-offs (every day) working in difficult, uncertain and under- resourced circumstances and bearing responsibility for controversial outcomes. Beyond skill and infrastructure, capacity also reflects less tangible factors. It is shaped by the levels and types of power and organizational ability of people and institutions. It also reflects how people accept or resist the status quo; how institutions support or constrain a desire for change as well as the spread of information open critical debate. Critically, this recognition takes us directly to a critique of two common approaches to policy design: the technocratic fix (which assumes a well functioning state and regulatory system) and the transplanted-institution solution (which assumes that successful institutions in developed countries can be transplanted to developing countries). In both cases, institutions are likely to be distorted by prevailing social and political forces; and neither approach is likely to succeed. Unfortunately, the history of development projects that have pursued these routes shows a high likelihood of failures.

In fact, there are many ways to conduct institutional functions and no single intervention is likely to have the power and traction to shift a complex system. Again, there are limits to how quickly capacity can be developed and increased; and attempting to drive changes faster than the underlying consensus will support can provide social and political resistance. Particularly,

this so when trying to redress power imbalances in favor of marginalized individuals (groups). Thus, organizations and institutions trend to evolve at different speeds through phases and in patterns that shape their capacity. And this way conflict with donor timelines and the need to show results. Clearly, a better understanding of local specificities and local power structures and of appropriate designs and time lines can help avoid such missteps. Evidently, there is no single policy mechanism that can be presented as the way to stop or prevent conflict. Nonetheless, the scope for policies that can help lessen the policy makers need to address the underlying causes systematically (especially horizontal inequalities in political, economic and social dimensions). Yet, effective prevention strategies require simultaneous action on political and economic fronts. Other words, any attempt to introduce political change without addressing deep-seated economic inequalities in the society are doomed to failure.

Therefore, the general direction of policy change must be reducing group inequalities. Essentially, this requires inclusive government (politically, economically and socially). Here, politically inclusive government means that all major groups in a society participate in political power, administration, army and police. Economically inclusive government implies that horizontal inequality in economic aspects (assets, employment and incomes) is moderate. Certainly, these conditions would limit the private incentives to leaders and followers to engage in conflict. However, further specific programmes may be required in this respect. Thus, the general objective of inclusivity and moderate horizontal inequality will translate (differently) into specific policy recommendations in different country circumstances (as appropriate and justifiable). Yet, actions to specifically address external

stresses can be taken in security, justice and development areas. Table (7.1) shows the adaptable core tools for national action to address external stresses confronting African economies (World Bank, 2011). In fact, some of the actions to address potential external stresses and opportunities fall in the purely diplomatic and security sphere. Here, border cooperation, redeployment of troops to signal non-interference or engagement in shared security approaches (or simple diplomatic signals) can all form an important part of the basic tools for restoration of confidence.

TABLE 7.1 NATIONAL POLICIES AND EXTERNAL STRESSES: ENABLING TOOLS

CITIZEN SECURITY	JUSTICE	JOBS (ASSOCIATED SERVICES)
1. BORDER COOPERATION 2. MILITARY, POLICE AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE	1. COORDINATION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND SIDE RESPONSES 2. JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ACROSS JURISDICTIONS 3. BUILDING OF LINKS BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEM	1. POOLED SUPPLEMENTARY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 2. CROSS BORDER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING 3. SOCIAL PROTECTION TO MITIGATE GLOBAL ECONOMIC STRESSES.

Again, cross-border programs to link security and development approaches can be initiated by national governments. In other words, openness to discussing both security and development cooperation across insecure border regions based on shared goals of citizen security, justice, and jobs has the potential to deliver results.

8.0 CONCLUSION

Obviously, there have been a number of episodes of state-sponsored violence undertaken with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power. Since the government has access to an organized force (police/ army) and to finance, state terrorism can be an important source of humanitarian emergencies and degradation. Again, deliberate state policies were a critical internal political source of vulnerability during the past decades. This is in addition to factionalism coupled with intolerance of political opposition and state sanctioned terrorism (including purges) in response to dissent. In other words, elite factionalism was sustained by a high level of corruption to maintain allegiances, while lack of fiscal capacity on the part of the government increased the significance of local patronage systems. Indeed, the disintegration of the state is usually a long-term degenerative process; which may be brought about or enhanced by economic decline (as in several African countries such as Nigeria). Such situations are also often characterized by predatory rule or rent seeking. In particular and regrettably, the regimes in Nigeria operated on the bases of coercion, material inducement and personality politics (a combination that tends to degrade the institution of the state further). This adversely affected the efficiency of traditional state activities in the provision of basic infrastructure and creation of enabling environment for sustainable development.

However, the weak long term association between income growth and change in human welfare requires vigorous exploitation. Critically, economists and social scientists need to better understand the dynamics and interconnections. Critically, such studies would complement the extensive literature on economic growth and create a richer awareness of human development advances. Analytically, the economics of growth and its relationship with the study of development requires radical rethinking. Traditionally, a vast theoretical and empirical literature almost uniformly equates economic growth with economic development. Unfortunately, this

bias is extended to growth econometrics, where estimates of the growth effects of policies are the basis of policy recommendations. Here, the assumption (often explicit) is that maximizing growth should be the policy maker's objective. In contrast, the central contention of the human development approach is the well being is about much more than money. Precisely, because we care about so many different aspects of life, therefore we need an economics of development that explicitly recognizes its multi dimensionality. Again, measuring sustainability requires considerably more work, since many current measures differ (radically) in their conceptual basis and conclusions. However, addressing sustainability increases tensions between **intragenerational and intergenerational** equity, because not every policy will benefit poor people today as well as future generations. The time to act (equitably and sustainably) is now. Indeed, it is a shared and collective responsibility of the 21st century.

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