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Abstract

This paper examines the influence of monetary shocks in China on the U.S. economy over 1996-2012. The influence on the U.S. is through the sheer scale of China’s growth through effects in demand for imports, particularly that of commodities. China’s growth influences world commodity/oil prices and this is reflected in significantly higher inflation in the U.S. China’s monetary expansion is also associated with significant decreases in the trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar that is due to the operation of a pegged currency. China manages the exchange rate and has extensive capital controls in place. In terms of the Mundell–Fleming model, with imperfect capital mobility, sterilization actions under a managed exchange rate permit China to pursue an independent monetary policy with consequences for the U.S.

Keywords: International monetary transmission, China’s monetary aggregates

JEL Codes: E52, F41, F42

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Chinese monetary expansion and the U.S. economy

1. Introduction

This paper examines the influence of monetary policy shocks in China on the U.S. economy over 1996-2012. The topic is of interest given the growing importance of China in the world economy. In 2009 China’s M2 measured in U.S. dollars surpassed that in the U.S. for the first time and by the end of 2012 exceeded that in the U.S. by 50%. The growing importance of China’s money supply is illustrated in Figure 1. Given these developments, does a monetary expansion in China affect the U.S. economy?

Intertemporal models by Svensson and Van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) suggest that monetary expansion in a large open economy such as the U.S. will decrease world real interest rates and stimulate global aggregate demand in the U.S. and non-U.S. countries. Support for an interest rate mechanism of monetary expansion in the U.S. causing economic expansion in the non-U.S. G-6, Canada, and Latin America is confirmed by Kim (2001a), Holman and Neumann (2002), and Canova (2005), respectively.

China operates a dollar peg and has extensive capital controls in place. How then would China’s monetary policy influence the U.S. economy? In Keynesian models with prices inflexible in labour or goods markets, as in the Mundell–Fleming model, a fixed exchange rate ties domestic to foreign interest rates when there is arbitrage in asset markets. A monetary expansion starts a temporary fall in the domestic interest rate relative to foreign interest rates, with the resulting loss of foreign exchange reserves leading to a reversal in the fall of the domestic interest rate. The impossible trinity holds, in that it is not possible to simultaneously have a fixed exchange rate, perfect capital movement and autonomous monetary policy. In the Mundell–Fleming model with imperfect capital mobility, sterilization

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1 China’s nominal M2 (in USD) increased on average by 19.5% per year from 1996 to 2011. The behaviour of China’s nominal GDP is also strongly upward. From 1996 to 2011 China’s nominal GDP (in USD) increased on average by 15% per year. China’s real M2 also has a strong upward trend. Based on an index of 100 in 1996, by 2011:12 China’s real M2 index (the deflator is the U.S. PPI index for commodities) is 340.
actions under a fixed exchange rate permit an independent monetary policy for as long as foreign exchange reserves permit.

Goodfriend and Prasad (2007) argue that capital controls provide room for monetary policy independence in China even though the central bank manages the exchange rate. Sun (2009) argues that China operated an independent monetary policy during the fixed exchange rate period 1998 to 2005. Up until 2005 China’s renminbi was pegged to the U.S. dollar. Since 2005 the renminbi has been allowed to float in a narrow margin around a fixed base rate determined with reference to a basket of major currencies with undisclosed weights. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with a tendency for a fall in the China/U.S. exchange rate since 2005 as the U.S. dollar weakened against other currencies.

The influence on the U.S. is through the sheer scale of China’s growth through effects in demand for imports, particularly that of commodities. China’s growth influences world commodity prices and this is reflected in significantly higher inflation in the U.S. China’s monetary expansion is also associated with significant decreases in the trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar. With domestic expansion and an increase in imports, China intervenes in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange rate and sells foreign currency. Pre 2005 with the Renminbi pegged to the U.S. dollar, the effect of a monetary expansion in China is stabilized by the net sale of U.S. dollars. Recent empirical studies by Cai et al. (2012) and Fang et al. (2012) show that post 2005, consideration of the parity of the exchange rate of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar dominates the influence of the other currencies in determining the overall value of the renminbi with reference to a basket of major currencies.

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2 China has a 6% annual growth rate in petroleum consumption since 1998. Hamilton (2011) notes that the newly industrialized economies, among which China has a leading role, have absorbed over two-thirds of the increase in world oil consumption since 1998. Radetzki (2006) notes that between 2000 and 2005 China’s share of global demand growth for petroleum was 28%, for aluminium was more than 50%, for steel was more than 84%, and for copper was 95%. Radetzki (2006) surmises that in developing Asian countries a dollar added to the GDP uses more than twice the quantity of commodities as does a dollar added to the GDP in OECD countries. China’s oil intake is forecast to be 17.5 million barrels per day by 2030, overtaking the United States as the world’s largest oil consumer (World Energy Outlook 2012). World Energy Outlook to be found at: [http://iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf](http://iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf).
We find that monetary expansion in China is associated with a statistically significant decline in the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate.

The following results are found to be robust across a number of model specifications. A positive innovation in China’s M2 is associated with a positive, significant and persistent effect on oil price (and on commodity prices); a positive, significant and persistent effect on U.S. CPI inflation; a significant and persistent depreciation of the real trade-weighted U.S. currency; a significant and persistent depreciation of the U.S. terms of trade; positive, significant and persistent increases in price deflators for U.S. exports and imports; positive, significant and persistent increases in U.S. exports, imports; reduction in real U.S. trade deficit. Shocks to China’s M2 have stronger impact on U.S. variables since about 2005. This is consistent with the growth of China’s economy. The cumulative contribution of China M2 shocks on the U.S. consumer price index and on oil price are much larger in the last half of sample. The increase in import prices (attendant on a decline in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate) together with the increase in oil prices account for the association of innovations to China’s M2 with increases in U.S. consumer price inflation.

In this investigation we use a number of structural vector autoregressive models to examine the effects of monetary policy shocks in China on U.S. output, inflation, monetary aggregates, interest rate, exchange rate, terms of trade and trade variables. The model is discussed in section 2, empirical results are presented in section 3 and section 4 concludes.

2. The Methodology

Using monthly macroeconomic variables for the U.S. economy, we introduce the effect of Chinese monetary aggregates by constructing a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). Monthly variables selection is based on Sims and Zha (1995) and Kim and Roubini (2000) to the extent possible given that the impact of China’s monetary expansion on
the U.S. is being considered. The variables are: China’s M2 (\( \text{China M2}_t \)) in U.S. dollars, the short term U.S. interest rate (\( \text{US IR}_t \)), U.S. M2 (\( \text{US M2}_t \)), the U.S. consumer price index (\( \text{US CPI}_t \)), the U.S. industrial production (\( \text{US IP}_t \)), oil prices in U.S. dollars (\( \text{OP}_t \)) (or global commodity price index in U.S. dollars), the real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate (\( \text{US TWI}_t \)).

Fan et al. (2011) observe that the central bank of China maintains that the money supply is the main monetary tool in China. Fan et al. (2011) confirm that the growth rate in money supply (M2) plays a crucial role in fine-tuning China’s economy, while official interest rates played a very passive role. Kozłuk and Mehrotra (2009) and Johansson (2012) use M2 as the measure of China’s monetary policy in studies on the influence of China on East and Southeast Asian economies.

The exchange rate policy of China is of crucial importance in assessing the impact of China’s monetary expansion on the U.S. economy. A rise in China’s M2 facilitates domestic growth and increases demand for imports. The currencies of the countries supplying imports to China experience upward pressure. To stabilize the pegged exchange rate, China must intervene in the foreign exchange market and sell foreign currency.\(^3\) Prior to 2005, with the renminbi pegged to the U.S. dollar, the consequence of an increase in China’s M2 would be a devaluation of the U.S. dollar relative to other countries. Since July 21, 2005 the value of renminbi has been determined with regard to a basket of currencies among which the dollar has been pre-eminent. Indeed, over an extended period from 2008 to 2010 the renminbi/dollar rate didn’t vary from 6.8 (as illustrated in Figure 2). It is hypothesized that positive innovations in China’s M2 will depress the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate.

\(^3\) The net effect of these actions on the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate depends on the countries of origin of imports to China, the foreign currencies sold by China in the foreign exchange market, and the weights assigned to currencies in the reference basket of major currencies (dominated by the U.S. dollar, Euro, Japanese yen and South Korean won) to which the renminbi is allowed to float within a narrow margin.
The SVAR model is expressed in matrix form as (for simplicity the constant term is omitted):

$$B_0X_t = \sum_{i=1}^{j} B_i X_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} \varphi_i EIP_{cej,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} \gamma_i EM2_{ej,t-i} + \varepsilon_t$$

(1)

Where:

$$X_t = \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \text{log}(\text{China } M2_t), \text{US } IR_t, \Delta \text{log}(\text{US } M2_t), \Delta \text{log}(\text{US } CPI_t), \\ \Delta \text{log}(\text{US } IP_t), \Delta \text{log}(\text{OP}_t), \Delta \text{log}(\text{US } TWI_t) \end{bmatrix}$$

(2)

where $j$ is the optimal lag length, determined by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (two lags in this case), $X_t$ is vector of endogenous variables, $EIP_{cej}$ are the individual vectors of country-individual industrial production of China, Euro area and Japan ($cej$) and $EM2_{ej}$ are vectors of the country-individual M2 for Euro area and Japan ($ej$). Those exogenous vectors are introduced to the model to tackle the possible problem of omitted variables bias as U.S. industrial production may be correlated with largest economies such as; China, Euro area and Japan industrial production and both China and U.S. M2 may be correlated with Euro area and Japan’s M2. Equation (2) is shown with oil price representing commodity prices. Results are not affected if a global commodity price index replaces oil price in the SVAR. Finally, $\varepsilon_t$ is an error term vector, which is serially and mutually independent.

2.1. Identification strategy

In line with Bernanke (1986), Sims and Zha (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000) and Kim (2001a; 2001b) non-recursive identify restrictions are proposed in the contemporaneous structure. The contemporaneous matrix $B_0X_t$ can be express as:

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The restrictions in equation (3) are essentially those in Kim and Roubini (2000) but with China’s M2 entered as contemporaneously exogenous to the other variables. Kim and Roubini (2000) assume real output and oil prices (in the fifth and sixth equations respectively) are contemporaneously exogenous to all variables in the model due to information delay. The delay in the transition of the Chinese M2 and oil prices are substantiated by the fact that these variables are exogenous to the U.S. economy. However, previous studies have restricted real output in two different ways; Kim and Roubini (2000) and Kim (2001b) allows real output to depend contemporaneously on oil prices while Bagliano and Favero (1998) and Anzuini et al. (2012) treats real output as contemporaneously exogenous of all variables.\(^5\) Using a log likelihood ratio test for over-identification restrictions, results for our data support restrictions in favour of real output to be contemporaneously exogenous.\(^6\)

Consistent with Sims and Zha (1995)’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, the monetary policy feedback rule is based on the recognition of information delays that do not allow the monetary policy to respond within the month to price level and output events. The monetary policy rule only responds contemporaneously to U.S. M2, oil prices and the real effective trade-weighted U.S. exchange rate. Following the literature, the M2 monetary aggregate responds contemporaneously to the domestic interest rate, inflation and industrial production implying that real demand for money depends on the interest rate and real income.

\(^5\) Note that Bagliano and Favero (1998) use commodity prices instead of oil prices.

\(^6\) The Chi-square value for treating real output as contemporaneously exogenous is 10.5, while the Chi-square value for assuming real output depends contemporaneously on oil prices is 9.98.
In line with Kim and Roubini (2000) and Kim (2001a; 2001b) inflation is affected contemporaneously by real output and oil prices consistent with the notion of contemporaneous demand pull and cost push inflation forces. The real effective trade-weighted U.S. exchange rate responds contemporaneously to all variables but Chinese M2 given its forward-looking properties and the fact that exchange rates operate daily looking at current data and economic activity.\textsuperscript{7} Alternative identification strategies are explored in examination of the robustness of results.

\textbf{2.2. The Data and unit root test}

The data are monthly from 1996:1 to 2012:12. The starting date is dictated by the first monthly observation of Chinese M2 reported by People’s Bank of China. The People’s Bank of China stopped bank credit targeting in 1998 and started concentrating on balance sheet adjustment for the conduct of monetary policy (Johansson (2012)). Monetary aggregates, industrial production indexes, U.S. CPI, interest rate, oil prices (West Texas Intermediate crude oil) and commodity price data are from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED), while Chinese M2 is from People’s Bank of China. The U.S. trade prices and variables are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

To avoid spurious regression problem, we test the data for unit root process. Table 1 reports test results for unit roots in the variables over 1996:1-2012:12. The null hypothesis for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is that the variable has a unit root and the null hypothesis for the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test is that the variable is stationary. The first difference of the series is indicated by $\Delta$. The lag selection criteria for the ADF test is based on Schwarz information Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the Newey-West Bandwidth with constant and linear trend. In table 1, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) unit root tests reveals that the logs of all endogenous variables in the model are only

first difference stationary. These results are confirmed by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), where the inverse null hypothesis is tested. Consequently, and following the literature using mostly data the model is estimated in first difference.

3. Empirical Results

3.1. The impulse response results

Figure 3 shows the dynamic response or impulse response function of the U.S. variables in the SVAR in equation (3) to a one per cent change in China M2 shocks. The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions.

In the first row in Figure 3, the short term U.S. interest rate does not respond significantly to innovations in China’s M2. An unanticipated positive increase in China’s M2 has a negative effect on U.S. M2 that is statistically significant. This latter result is consistent with a defensive response by the U.S. to a stimulus by China, which boosts U.S. CPI inflation and industrial production and weakens the U.S. dollar as discuss later. A positive innovation in China’s M2 has statistically significant positive effect on the U.S. CPI. The effect builds up over five months and then persists. In the second row in Figure 3, U.S. industrial production is positively affected by positive innovations in China’s M2, but the effect is not statistically significant.

A positive shock in China’s M2 has a positive and statistically significant effect on oil price that builds up rapidly over three months and then persists for twenty months in the second row in Figure 3. The effect of China’s growth on real oil price has been documented in the literature. Hamilton (2011) notes that rapid growth in oil consumption in China and in

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8 Results are also supported by the Dickey Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) and the Phillip-Perron (PP) which are available upon request. In addition, all exogenous variables in the model are also first different stationary (data available upon request).

9 The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.
other emerging countries is the most important factor influencing oil prices in recent years. Kilian and Hicks (2012) associate the rise in real oil price over 2003-2008 with unexpected growth in emerging economies (primarily China and India). Ratti and Vespignani (2013) find a large cumulative impact of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil over the last fifteen years. In results not shown, if a global commodity price variable replaces the oil price variable in the SVAR in equation (2) results are similar. A positive innovation in China’s M2 has a positive and statistically significant effect on commodity price that rises sharply over three months, peaks at about five months, and then persists for twenty months.

The response effects of the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar to shocks to China’s M2, is shown in the last diagram in Figure 4. A rise in China’s M2 is associated with a statistically significant negative effect on the real trade-weighted U.S. currency after two months that persists for twenty months. The effect of an increase in China’s M2 might be expected to be less marked on the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate since 2005 (with the renminbi tied to a band around a basket of world currencies rather than being pegged to the dollar). However, it should be noted that the scale of China’s influence on the global economy in the last half of the sample is much greater than in the first half of the sample and that considerable weight has been given to the U.S. dollar in the basket of major currencies around which central parity the value of renminbi is allowed to vary since 2005. In results not reported, it is found that when the sample is broken in July 2005, a positive innovation in China’s M2 is associated with a statistically significant negative effect on the real trade-weighted U.S. foreign exchange rate post July 2005.

3.2. Responses of U.S. trade variables to China M2 shocks

Given the finding that a positive shock to China’s M2 leads to a statistically significant and persistent depreciation of the real trade-weighted value of U.S. currency, the impact of shocks to China’s M2 on U.S. trade and trade price variables will be examined.
Following a procedure in Kim (2001a) the price deflator for U.S. exports, price deflator for U.S. imports, and U.S. terms of trade variable (U.S. export price/U.S. import price) are now added one variable at a time as an additional variable in the SVAR system (equation 2 and 3). The impulse response functions of the U.S. trade price variables to a one per cent change in China M2 shocks are shown in Figure 4. An unanticipated rise in China’s M2 significantly raises the price deflator for U.S. exports and the price deflator for U.S. imports. The rise in both price deflators is completed after five months and then persists over the twenty months shown. The rise in the price deflator for U.S. exports is consistent with the finding that a positive innovation in China’s M2 has a positive and statistically significant effect on U.S. CPI inflation that builds up over several months and then persists. The rise in the U.S. price deflator for U.S. imports in response to a positive innovation in China’s M2 ties in with the statistically significant depreciation of the real trade-weighted value of U.S. exchange rate. A positive shock in China’s M2 results in a rise in the U.S. dollar price of imports for U.S. consumers.

The impulse response of the U.S. terms of trade to a positive shock in China’s M2 is shown in the third diagram in Figure 4. The U.S. terms of trade decline following a positive shock to China’s M2. The decline in the terms of trade is statistically significant after three months, achieves maximum effect at four months, and then persists almost unchanged. Although a positive shock in China’s M2 significantly raises export prices, the effect on import prices is so much greater that the terms of trade significantly decline. This is an important result since changes to the terms of trade affect consumption decisions, the composition of output across industries and welfare, and channel international shocks.

In figure 5 the impulse response function of Chinese M2 shocks on the U.S. trade variables: nominal exports, imports and trade balance and real exports, imports and trade balance are reported. These results are obtained from SVAR models in which these variables
are added one variable at a time as an additional variable in the SVAR model in equations (2) and (3).

In Figure 5 a positive shock to China’s M2 significantly expands both U.S. nominal and real exports. Foreign demand for U.S. goods is stimulated by the fall in the U.S. dollar. The effect of a shock to China’s M2 on real U.S. exports is statistically significant after three months, with the rise in real exports completed after six months after which the effect persists. A positive innovation in China’s M2 has a negative effect on real U.S. imports that (with the exception of a significant effect at three months) is not statistically significant. U.S. demand for foreign goods is relatively price inelastic with the result that the nominal dollar value of U.S. imports is significantly increased. The net consequences of these effects on exports and imports are that a positive shock to China’s M2 does not significantly impact the U.S. nominal trade balance, but does significantly improve the U.S. trade balance in real terms.\(^\text{10}\) In Figure 5 a positive shock to China’s M2 has a significant effect on the U.S. trade balance in real terms from three months onwards. The effect is highly persistent.

An interesting issue that arises is whether the effects of shocks to China’s M2 on U.S. trade variables are driven by bilateral China/U.S. trade effects or non-China/U.S. trade effects or both. In Figure 6 it is shown that except in the second month, a positive shock to China’s M2 does not significantly impact U.S. nominal exports to China or U.S. nominal imports from China. The significant rise in U.S. nominal exports in response to a positive shock to China’s M2 is driven by a significant rise in U.S. exports to countries other than China. The impulse response results for the effect of a positive shock to China’s M2 on U.S. nominal exports excluding exports to China are shown in Table 6. U.S. dollar exports to the rest of the world (exclusive of China) rise significantly after three months and the effect persists. In response to a positive shock to China’s M2, U.S. dollar imports from the rest of the world

\(^{10}\) As in Kim (2001b) real exports (export volume) minus real imports (import volume) is used as a proxy for the U.S. trade balance in real terms.
(exclusive of China) also rise significantly after three months and the effect persists. However, the rise in U.S. dollar exports is significantly greater than the rise in U.S. dollar imports with respect to the world exclusive of China as shown in Figure 6.

3.3. Historical decomposition of the effects of China’s M2

The cumulative contribution of the structural shocks to China’s M2 to the U.S. consumer price index, oil prices, the real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate, the U.S. terms of trade, real trade balance variables and short term U.S. interest rate are shown in Figure 7. These results are obtained from estimating the SVAR model in equation (3), with the exception of those for the real trade balance and the terms of trade. Results for the latter variables are obtained from modifying the model in equation (3) by adding the real trade balance and the terms of trade variables once at the time to this system. The cumulative contributions of structural shocks to the variables reported in Figure 7 are annual averages of the monthly data (the moving average of the last 12 months) to improve the readability of the plot. The data are not annualized.

Striking facts from Figure 7 are that the cumulative contribution of China’s M2 to the U.S. variables shown appears to differ in the second half of the sample from the first half of the sample. Consistent with the growth of China’s economy, shocks to China’s M2 have stronger impact of China on U.S. variables since about 2005. The cumulative contribution of China M2 shocks on the consumer price index and on oil price are much larger (more positive) in the last half of sample. The rapid increase in oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associated with a positive contribution from China’s M2. The cumulative impact of China’s M2 on the price of oil is also positive in the strong recovery of oil price since 2009. China’s monetary expansion has a positive cumulative contribution to the U.S. consumer price index since 2005 in contrast to a largely negative cumulative contribution to the U.S.
consumer price index before 2005. In 2005 the annualized contribution of China’s M2 to US CPI is up to 0.3%.

The cumulative effect of China M2 shocks on the real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate is largely negative since 2005. In the last half of the sample China’s M2 shocks have tended to contribute to a decline in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. The effect of China M2 shocks on worsening the terms of trade for the U.S. in the latter half of the sample is also quite marked in Figure 7. In Figure 7 the cumulative effect of China M2 shocks on the U.S. trade balance in real terms is largely negative over 2005 to 2011, i.e. China M2 shocks tended to result in an improved U.S. trade balance in real terms over these years. This outcome is consistent with the movements in the terms of trade. The increase in import prices (attendant on a decline in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate) together with the increase in oil prices account for the association of innovations to China’s M2 with increases in U.S. consumer price inflation.

The contribution of China’s M2 to U.S. short-term interest rate in Figure 7 show large positive contributions that overlap with the U.S. recession periods March 2001 to November 2001 and December 2007 to June 2009. During these times global demand was also weak, but China’s economy and M2 continues to expand. For this reason we observe the pattern of positive contributions by innovations to China’s M2 to U.S. short-term interest rate in the two periods indicated.\(^{11}\)

3.5. Robustness and alternative identification strategies

We now investigate the robustness of the results using alternative specifications to the SVAR reported in equation (3). We investigate four alternative non-recursive identification

\(^{11}\) In 2001 period there is the collapse of the speculative dot-com bubble and fall in business outlays and investments, and in the 2007-2009 period there is the subprime mortgage crisis and collapse of the U.S. real estate bubble. Global demand was weak during these periods in that both U.S. real export volume and U.S. real import volume decline sharply during 2001-2002 and 2008-2009.
restrictions in the contemporaneous matrix restriction to that shown for \( B_0X_t \) in equation (3).

The alternative identification schemes based on equations (1) and (2) are the following:

\[
B_0X_t = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & a_{10} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{10} & 1 & a_{12} & 0 & a_{14} & 0 & a_{16} & 0 & 0 & a_{18} \\
a_{20} & a_{21} & 1 & a_{24} & a_{25} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{30} & 0 & 0 & 1 & a_{34} & a_{35} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{40} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{50} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{60} & a_{61} & a_{62} & a_{63} & a_{64} & a_{65} & 1 & \end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\Delta \log(\text{China } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IR_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } CPI_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IP_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{OP}_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US TWI}_t) \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] (4)

\[
B_0X_t = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & a_{01} & 0 & a_{03} & a_{04} & 0 & 0 \\
a_{10} & 0 & 1 & a_{12} & 0 & a_{14} & 0 & a_{16} \\
a_{20} & 0 & a_{21} & 1 & a_{24} & a_{25} & 0 & 0 \\
a_{30} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & a_{34} & a_{35} & 0 \\
a_{40} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{50} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
a_{60} & a_{61} & a_{62} & a_{63} & a_{64} & a_{65} & 1 & \end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\Delta \log(\text{China } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IR_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } CPI_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IP_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{OP}_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US TWI}_t) \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] (5)

\[
B_0X_t = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & a_{01} & a_{02} & a_{03} & a_{04} & a_{05} & a_{06} \\
a_{10} & 0 & 1 & a_{12} & 0 & a_{14} & 0 & a_{16} \\
a_{20} & 0 & a_{21} & 1 & a_{24} & a_{25} & 0 & 0 \\
a_{30} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & a_{34} & a_{35} & 0 \\
a_{40} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{50} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
a_{60} & a_{61} & a_{62} & a_{63} & a_{64} & a_{65} & 1 & \end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\Delta \log(\text{China } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IR_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } CPI_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IP_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{OP}_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US TWI}_t) \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] (6)

\[
B_0X_t = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & a_{12} & 0 & a_{14} & 0 & a_{16} \\
0 & a_{21} & 1 & a_{24} & a_{25} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & a_{34} & a_{35} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
a_{60} & a_{61} & a_{62} & a_{63} & a_{64} & a_{65} & 1 & \end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\Delta \log(\text{China } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IR_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } M2_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } CPI_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US } IP_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{OP}_t) \\
\Delta \log(\text{US TWI}_t) \\
\end{bmatrix}
\] (7)

In system (4), the U.S. variables respond contemporaneously to China’s M2. In system (5), China’s M2 responds to U.S. domestic variables in the same way that U.S. M2 does. In system (6), China’s M2 responds contemporaneously to all U.S. domestic variables. Finally, in system (7) the real trade-weighted U.S. dollar responds contemporaneously to China’s M2.

The estimation of the SVAR models outlined in equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) results in impulse response of the U.S. economic variables to positive shocks to China’s M2 that are
very similar to those shown in Figure 3. In all models a positive innovation in China’s M2 is associated with:

1. a positive and statistically significant effect on oil price (or on commodity prices) that builds up rapidly over three months and then persists for twenty months;
2. a positive and statistically significant effect on U.S. CPI inflation that builds up over about six months or so and then persists;
3. a statistically significant depreciation of the real trade-weighted U.S. currency after about two or three months that achieves maximum absolute value after five to eight months and that then persists.

In Table 2, the log likelihood ratio for over-identification test Chi-square values are reported for each of the five models shown in equations (3) – (7). The highest value for over-identification test restriction is for our model of choice in equation (3), indicating that the restriction cannot be rejected at a higher significance level than for the other models.

4. Conclusion and discussion

The major finding of the paper is that China’s monetary expansion has a spill over effect on the U.S. through the effects on world commodity markets and through the exchange rate regime followed by China. Increases in monetary aggregates in China significantly increase the world prices of oil and commodities, significantly increases U.S. CPI inflation, and significantly decreases the real trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar and the terms of trade for the U.S. In response to a shock to China’s M2 the increase in the price deflator for U.S. imports is significantly greater than the increase in the price deflator for U.S. exports. The increase in import prices due to decline in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar and the increase in oil (and commodity) prices account for the association of innovations to China’s M2 with increases in U.S. consumer price inflation. These findings are robust to a number of model specifications including different assumptions about whether commodity or oil prices appear
in the model, when U.S. variables to respond contemporaneously to Chinese M2, when China’s M2 may respond to all U.S. domestic variables, and when the real trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar responds contemporaneously to China’s M2.

The inclusion of China variables in analysis of the international transmission of monetary shocks is an appropriate specification given the tremendous impact of China on the global economy in recent years. It is now clear that China’s economy has achieved a scale such that China’s monetary policy and exchange rate policy have influence on the U.S. economy. China’s growth influences world commodity/oil prices and this is reflected in significantly higher inflation in the U.S. China’s monetary expansion is also associated with significant decreases in the real trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar that is due to the operation of a pegged currency. China pegs its currency to a basket of currencies in which the U.S. dollar has considerable weight and also has extensive capital controls in place. To maintain the value of its currency at a time of monetary expansion, China in effect takes steps that result in a devaluation of real trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar. In terms of the Mundell–Fleming model, with imperfect capital mobility, sterilization actions under a fixed exchange rate permit China to pursue an independent monetary policy with consequences for the U.S.

References


Table 1: Test for unit roots 1996:1-2012:12:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>ADF</th>
<th>KPSS</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>ADF</th>
<th>KPSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log(China M2&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.793***</td>
<td>△log(China M2&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.0399***</td>
<td>0.312</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.IR&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>1.022***</td>
<td>U.S.IR&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.068</td>
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<tr>
<td>log(U.S.M2&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1.796***</td>
<td>△log(U.S.M2&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(U.S.CPI&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>1.805***</td>
<td>△log(U.S.CPI&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.062</td>
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<tr>
<td>log(U.S.IP&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.946***</td>
<td>△log(U.S.IP&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.234</td>
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<tr>
<td>log(OP&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>1.639***</td>
<td>△log(OP&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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<tr>
<td>log(U.S.TWI&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>1.343***</td>
<td>△log(U.S.TWI&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.194</td>
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</table>

Notes: The variables are China M2, short term U.S. interest rate (U.S. IR), U.S. M2, U.S. consumer price index (U.S. CPI), U.S. industrial production (U.S. IP), global oil price (OP), and real effective trade-weighted U.S. foreign exchange rate (U.S. TWI). The null hypothesis for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is the variable has a unit root and the null hypothesis for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test is the variable is stationary. The first difference of the series is indicated by Δ. The lag selection criteria for the ADF is based on Schwarz information Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the Newey-West Bandwidth. ***, **, * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance.

Table 2: Log likelihood ratio test for over-identification restrictions

Null Hypothesis: Restrictions are valid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model restrictions</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square value</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Log likelihood ratio for over-identification test Chi-square values are reported for each of the five models shown in equations (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). The test is for non-recursive identification restrictions in the contemporaneous matrix restrictions in equations (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), based on equations (1) and (2). The highest value for over-identification test restriction is for model of choice in equation (3), indicating that the restriction cannot be rejected at higher significant level than for the other models.
Figure 1: Monetary aggregate M2 in billions of U.S. dollars for China and the U.S.

![Graph showing M2 in billions for China and the U.S.]

Notes: U.S. M2 data are from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED) and China M2 data are from People’s Bank of China.

Figure 2: China/U.S. exchange rate and real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar

![Graph showing China/U.S. exchange rate and real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar]

Notes: China/U.S. exchange rate and real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar (U.S. TWI) from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED).
Figure 3: Response of U.S. economy to China M2 shocks: 1996:1-2012:12

Notes: Figure 3 shows the dynamic response or impulse response function of the U.S. variables in the SVAR model equation (3) to positive China M2 shocks. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. The variables are China M2, short term U.S. interest rate (USIR), U.S. M2 (USM2), U.S. consumer price index (US CPI), U.S. industrial production (US IP), global oil price (OP), and real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate (US TWI).

Figure 4: Response of U.S. trade prices to China M2 shocks: 1996:1-2012:12

Notes: Figure 4 shows the dynamic response or impulse response function of the U.S. trade price variables from an SVAR model based on equation (3) to positive China M2 shocks. The variables in Figure 4 are China M2, the price deflator for U.S. exports, price deflator for U.S. imports, and U.S. terms of trade variable (U.S. export price/U.S. import price).
Figure 5: Response of U.S. trade variables to China M2 shocks: 1996:1-2012:12

Notes: Figure 5 shows the dynamic response or impulse response function of the U.S. trade variables from a SVAR model based on equation (3) to positive China M2 shocks. The variables in Figure 5 are China M2, nominal U.S. exports, nominal U.S. imports, nominal U.S. trade balance, real U.S. exports, real U.S. imports, and real U.S. trade balance.

Figure 6: Response of bilateral U.S.-China and U.S.-non-China bilateral trade variables

Notes: Figure 6 shows the dynamic response or impulse response function of the U.S. variables from a SVAR model based on equation (3) to positive China M2 shocks. The variables in Figure 6 are China’s M2, and variables given by bilateral exports, imports, and net nominal trade balance between either the U.S. and China or the U.S. and the world exclusive of China.
Figure 7: Historical decomposition on Chinese monetary shocks on U.S. economy: 1997:1 to 2012:12

Notes: Figure 7 shows the cumulative contribution of structural shocks to China’s M2 to U.S. economic variables. The variables are short term U.S. interest rate (USIR), U.S. M2 (USM2), U.S. consumer price index (US CPI), U.S. industrial production (US IP), global oil price (OP), real effective trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate (US TWI), the real trade balance (RTB) and the terms of trade (TOT). The cumulative contributions of structural shocks to the U.S. variables reported in Figure 7 are annual averages of the monthly data (the moving average of the last 12 months) to improve the readability of the plot. The data are not annualized.