Waiting to Cooperate?

Kaplan, Todd and Ruffle, Bradley and Shtudiner, Zeev (2013): Waiting to Cooperate?

Abstract

Sometimes cooperation between two parties requires exactly one to cede to the other. If the decisions whether to cede are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be avoided if a party can wait to see what the other does. We experimentally test whether adding a waiting option to such a two-player cooperation game enhances cooperation. Although subjects cede less overall with the waiting option, we show that they coordinate more and consequently achieve higher profits. Yet, a dark side overhangs waiting: the least cooperative pairs do worse with this option. They wait not to facilitate coordination but to disguise their entry.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: cooperation, endogenous timing, social dilemmas
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification

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