Islam, Jamal and Mohajan, Haradhan and Moolio, Pahlaj (2009): Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure. Published in: KASBIT Business Journal , Vol. 2, No. 2 (31 December 2009): pp. 4266.

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Abstract
Mathematical Economics, Social Science and Political Science are interrelated. In this paper, an attempt has been made to describe aspects of these subjects by introducing examples, definitions, mathematical calculations and discussions. Game Theory is included in this paper to study mathematical models in economics and political science especially to study Nash equilibrium. Success and failure of democracy are interpreted as different equilibria of a dynamic political game with cost of changing leadership. Unitary democracy can be frustrated when voters do not replace corrupt leaders. Federal democracy cannot be consistently frustrated at both national and provincial levels. Arrow’s theorem indicates that the aggregate of individuals’ preferences will not satisfy transitivity, indifference to irrelevant alternatives and nondictatorship, simultaneously to enable one of the individuals becomes a dictator. In this paper both social welfare functions and social choice correspondence are considered in economical environments.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure 
English Title:  Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Preference Relation; Pure and Mixed Strategies; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice; Unitary and Federal Democracy. 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory 
Item ID:  50671 
Depositing User:  Haradhan Kumar Mohajan 
Date Deposited:  16 Oct 2013 07:58 
Last Modified:  27 Sep 2019 20:38 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/50671 