La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario

Fuentes Castro, Daniel (2007): La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario. Published in: Principios / Revista de Economía Política No. 8 (2007): pp. 5-19.

Abstract

The sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Bienes colectivos; bienes comunes; bienes públicos; sobreexplotación; recursos naturales; externalidades
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q20 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q30 - General

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