Cellini, Roberto and Cuccia, Tiziana (2007): Information externality in the arts and the public intervention: a brief note.
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The presence of information externality, and the consequent necessity of public intervention to amend the effect of market failure, has been deeply analysed in the case of scientific research. In this Note we argue that the same point is particularly appropriate also in the case of arts: the presence of information externality concerning the personal skills of artists can represent a valid reason to believe that purely private funding of arts is inefficient, and to call for public intervention in this sector.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||University of Catania|
|Original Title:||Information externality in the arts and the public intervention: a brief note|
|Keywords:||Arts; Experimentation; Financing; Incomplete Information; Bayes theorem|
|Subjects:||Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Roberto Cellini|
|Date Deposited:||07. Oct 2007|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 08:24|
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