Análisis de los efectos explotativos en integraciones empresariales a partir del modelo de Cournot: el caso de mercados con bienes homogéneos

Herrera Saavedra, Juan Pablo and Sánchez Navarro, Dennis (2013): Análisis de los efectos explotativos en integraciones empresariales a partir del modelo de Cournot: el caso de mercados con bienes homogéneos.

Abstract

This paper models the possible effects over the market price of a homogeneous good when there is a merger. The analysis will be made with two scenarios: (i) using technologies homogenous between firms, (ii) and with any degree of heterogeneity. It is assumed an linear inverse function of demand which represents the preferences of the consumers, technologies with constant returns to scale and an environment in which competition is made a la Cournot.

Este artículo modela los posibles efectos que sobre el precio de un mercado de un bien homogéneo se puede producir ante una integración empresarial. El análisis se realizará a partir de dos escenarios, (i) considerando tecnologías similares entre firmas y (ii) con algún grado de heterogeneidad por grupos de empresas. Se asume una función inversa de demanda lineal que representa las preferencias de los consumidores, tecnologías con rendimientos constantes a escala y un ambiente de competencia, en el cual las empresas compiten a la Cournot.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Analysis of the exploitative effects of a merger based on a Cournot’s model: a case of homogeneous good markets
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: oligopoly, Cournot, homogeneous goods, firm behavior, production, non-cooperative.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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