



Munich Personal RePEc Archive

# **Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China: Suggestion on the Construction of the Urban-Rural Integrated Medical Insurance System**

Sun, Jiawei and Ma, Chao and Song, Ze and Gu, Hai

2 December 2013

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52713/>

MPRA Paper No. 52713, posted 06 Jan 2014 10:21 UTC

Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China:  
Suggestion on the Construction of the Urban-Rural Integrated  
Medical Insurance System

(December, 2013)

Sun Jiawei  
School of Government,  
Nanjing University, China  
[sunjiawei.nju@gmail.com](mailto:sunjiawei.nju@gmail.com)

Ma Chao<sup>†</sup>  
Center for Health Management and Care Security Policy Research,  
Nanjing University, China  
[machao1954@hotmail.com](mailto:machao1954@hotmail.com)

Song Ze  
College of Finance and Statistics,  
Hunan University, China  
[songze@gmail.com](mailto:songze@gmail.com)

Gu Hai  
Center for Health Management and Care Security Policy Research,  
Nanjing University, China  
[guhais@nju.edu.cn](mailto:guhais@nju.edu.cn)

<sup>†</sup>**Corresponding author:** Ma Chao, PhD, Center for Health Management and Care Security Policy Research, Nanjing University, 22<sup>#</sup> Hankou Road, Gulou District, 210093, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China. [machao1954@hotmail.com](mailto:machao1954@hotmail.com)

# Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China: Suggestions on the Construction of the Urban-Rural Integrated Medical Insurance System

**Abstract:** This paper investigates the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care in China based on Roemer's (1998) theory of equality of opportunity (EOp). Following the *compensation principle* proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), this paper establishes a decomposition strategy of the *fairness gap* which we use to measure the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care in China. Empirical analysis using the CHNS data shows that the ratios of the urban-rural *fairness gap* to the urban-rural average difference in the use of health care are 1.167 during 1997-2000 and 1.744 during 2004-2006, which indicates that the urban-rural average difference observed directly from original statistical data may underestimate the degree of the essential inequity. Meanwhile, the increasing *fairness gap* and the decomposition results imply that generally leveling the urban-rural reimbursement ratios is probably not sufficient, and pro-disadvantage policies should be put in place in order to mitigate or even eliminate the inequality of opportunity in health care between urban and rural residents. This implication is also illuminating for the experiments and the establishment of the urban-rural integrated medical insurance system (URIMIS) in China. Under the background of the dual social structure and the evident income gap between the urban and the rural, the pro-disadvantage policies will be more appreciated and effective in the promotion of the equality of opportunity in health care. And such positive role of the pro-disadvantage policies is supported by data from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province.

**Key words:** Equality of opportunity; Health care; Fairness gap; Urban-rural integrated medical insurance system

**JEL Classification:** D12, D63, I18

---

Abbreviations: in this paper, we have used some abbreviations for convenience. Among these abbreviations, some are standard and commonly used; while some are not, such as URIMIS (urban-rural integrated medical insurance system), which refers to a newly developed medical insurance system at the service of both urban and rural residents.

## 1. Introduction

For a long time, there have been large urban-rural disparities in health and health care in China due to the urban-rural dual systems and the deficiency of rural medical insurance system. Unfortunately, these disparities haven't been effectively reduced in the early stage of health care reform. Although the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), which is specially established for rural residents, has almost realized a whole coverage, its insurance level is too low to reduce the out-of-pocket health care expenditure. Therefore, the current NCMS seems of little help to effectively protect the insureds from the catastrophic health expenditure or the poverty caused by diseases (Wagstaff *et al.*, 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009; Yip and Hsiao, 2009). Such situation will inevitably impede the human capital development in rural areas, thus being useless for the elimination of the *poverty trap* and *relative deprivation*, as well as for the equalization of public services.

There is an urgent need to build an urban-rural integrated medical insurance system (for short, URIMIS), which aims to promote the urban-rural balanced development in health and health care. Although the development of URIMIS is now one of the major topics in China and the pilot experiments have sprung up in the recent years, the most widely used policies merely focus on increasing the reimbursement ratio, especially for rural residents, in order to reach a unified medical insurance system between the urban and the rural. However, it is not enough to level the reimbursement ratios for both urban and rural residents to cope with the urban-rural disparities in health and health care. Meanwhile, it will also be misleading if the integrated policies are expected to realize a similar health care expenditure between urban and rural residents. Pursuing *outcome equality* (such as the same health care expenditure) and *reimbursement equality* (such as the same reimbursement ratio) may result in inefficiency and even inequity in the improvement of the current situation, since there are intrinsic differences between urban and rural residents due to their individual or circumstance characteristics<sup>1</sup>. Thus we should pay more attention to the realization of the equality of opportunity (EOp)—an expression referring to the essential equality in this paper—in health and health care. Unfortunately, there have been few discussions and researches on the EOp in the domain of health and health care in China. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate the urban-rural essential inequality in health care based on the theory of the EOp, and then provides our suggestions on the improvement of URIMIS policies.

---

<sup>1</sup> We do not intend to dig into this issue, but we've given several examples in Appendix A as a simple explanation.

Based on the theory of the EOp developed by Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002), and the *compensation principle* for the EOp analysis proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009, 2011), this paper calculates and decomposes the urban-rural *fairness gaps* in health care in China. By using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the analysis results show that: (1) during the two periods of 1997–2000 and 2004–2006, when we take urban circumstances as the “ideal” reference circumstances, the ratios of the urban-rural *fairness gap* to the urban-rural average difference (the *EOp ratio* of the *fairness gap*) in health care are 1.167 and 1.744 respectively, indicating that an underestimation would be made if we simply take urban-rural average difference, which can be directly observed from the original statistical data, as inequality; (2) although the *fairness gap* and its *EOp ratio* increase, the significance of the effect of reimbursement ratio decreases in the later period, which probably implies that we should not expect the urban-rural inequalities to be narrowed only by generally leveling the urban-rural reimbursement ratios. An inference drawn from the above is that in order to realize the EOp between urban and rural residents in health care, merely unifying the reimbursement policies is not enough, and the dual social structure and the widening urban-rural income gap should be taken into consideration. For the medical insurance itself, pro-disadvantage policies<sup>2</sup> are necessary according to the *maximin principle* of Roemer(1998). In order to prove this point of view, we have used the data from some URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province for a further discussion<sup>3</sup>. The results have well verified that pro-disadvantage policies indeed have superiorities in narrowing the urban-rural *fairness gap* in health care.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 is a simple description of URIMIS; theory of the equality of opportunity and the axiomatic frameworks are introduced in section 3, and the illustration of the EOp in health care and our decomposition strategy of the *fairness gap* are also established in this section; section 4 outlines data sources and variables; section 5 calculates and explains the urban-rural *fairness gaps* in health care by using the CHNS data, and gets some interesting results; in section 6, a further discussion, also a verification of our inference, is conducted by using data from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province; and section 7 concludes.

---

<sup>2</sup> We give the definition in Section 6.

<sup>3</sup> Although URIMIS construction policies are explored among pilot regions, there have been no unified standards for the policy evaluation and comparison yet. Therefore, we also hope that this paper can offer some practical suggestions on URIMIS construction and the improvement of health care fairness in China.

## 2. URIMIS<sup>4</sup>

URIMIS tries to overcome the household registration (*hukou*) restrictions, and integrates the two current separate medical insurance systems, the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) and NCMS<sup>5</sup>. With raising reimbursement ratios, especially for rural residents, as one of the necessary steps, URIMIS aims to ensure the same opportunities between urban and rural residents in health care and medical security, and to narrow or even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health and health care.

URIMIS is still at the exploring stage. Pilot experiments were set out first in some advanced regions, and various modes have been formed. It was reported that five provincial administrative regions—municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing, Qinghai province, Ningxia Hui autonomous region, and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps—and 41 prefecture cities, as well as 162 counties (districts, county-level cities), had already established URIMIS at the end of 2011<sup>6</sup>. Most of these URIMIS areas had drawn up integration strategies to bridge the gap between urban and rural medical insurance policies. The advantages of URIMIS have been affirmed by domestic researches, most of which, however, are just simple illustrations of the process of local URIMIS policies due to the short pilot time and lack of data resources. The qualitative researches are obviously deficient for the evaluations and comparisons of different URIMIS modes, and for the judgment about how URIMIS should be. Also, it may fail to understand the real effectiveness and efficiency of different modes of URIMIS, when intentionally or unintentionally selecting improper criteria.

## 3. Theories and methods

### 3.1. Equality of opportunity

During the development of the equality of opportunity, Rawls (1971), who values the *procedural equality* more than the *outcome equality*, has made a huge contribution. Rawls points out that the public opportunities should be equally open to all individuals regardless of their races, religions or other factors, which represent the

---

<sup>4</sup> In fact, China never gives up the urban-rural coordination and integration during her rapid development, and the new century sees her much greater efforts. URIMIS is just one part of the whole blueprint of the urban-rural integration.

<sup>5</sup> URIMIS is not simply to put URBMI and NCMS into one funding or one administration system. Usually a new basic medical insurance will be made to replace both of URBMI and NCMS, and its multilevel medical insurance policies can be freely chosen by urban and rural residents.

<sup>6</sup> The 2011 report are obviously a little outdated. The number of the URIMIS pilot regions is increasing rapidly in the recent two years. However, there has been no relevant official report published yet.

identities. This is written as one part of his second principle<sup>7</sup> of justice. Another part of the second principle is about the fair allocation and the overall efficiency. And it is usually called the *difference principle*. This principle implies that the most disadvantage group should be granted the maximal opportunity. Therefore, the *difference principle* is also called the *Rawls maximin principle*. Rawls's idea of the equality of opportunity has been further developed during the following decades. Sen (1980, 1999) emphasizes that people have the *capabilities* to choose the way of life they value most. Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) introduces the concepts of *equality of welfare* and *equality of resources*, suggesting that some disadvantages, which are out of individual control or without individual responsibilities, like circumstances and handicaps, should be compensated. Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) develop Dworkin's theory, and bring forward separately the concepts of *equality of opportunity for welfare* and *equality of access to advantage*. Based on these theories, Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002) proposes an axiomatic approach, which becomes a famous framework for empirical studies on the equality of opportunity in the social science domain.

According to Roemer's framework of the equality of opportunity (EOp), one's *advantage* ( $y$ ) is determined by two categories, *i.e.* *circumstances* ( $c$ ) and *effort* ( $e$ ); the former is beyond one's control, while the latter is not. The function is as follows:

$$y_i = y(c_i, e_i). \quad (1)$$

If we classify *circumstances* into  $J$  types and define that people in the same kind of *circumstances* belong to the same *type*, then given one's *effort*  $\tilde{e}$ , the *advantage* he attains is required to be fixed no matter which *type* he belongs to. Thus a fair society, as Roemer (1998) explains, is a society that will maximize the *advantage* of those who possess the least *advantage*<sup>8</sup>, *i.e.*

$$\max_c \min y(c, \tilde{e}). \quad (2)$$

Totaling the *advantage* of all individuals at each level of the *effort*, we obtain:

$$\max \int_e \min_c y(c, e) f(e) de, \quad (3)$$

where  $f(e)$  is the density function of the *effort*.

Roemer (1998, pp. 5—32) emphasizes that part of the *effort* can be affected by *circumstances*, which will indirectly affect the distribution characteristics of the *advantage*, and the society should take responsibility for this kind of interaction.

---

<sup>7</sup> The first principle is about the priority of freedom, namely, it should be prior considered, on the premise that all people have equal freedom, to maximize the freedom that each one can enjoy.

<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that Roemer puts forward a somewhat different proposal from that of Rawls, who cares about how to maximize the minimum level of *advantage*, however, across all individuals regardless of their *types*.

Therefore, the *advantage* one obtains should be in line with his (relative) *degree of effort* in his own *type* rather than the (absolute) *level of effort*. In other words, a fair society guarantees that people with the same *degree of effort* will obtain the same *advantage* irrespective of their *types*; or there is inequality of opportunity, and the society is no longer fair. As to the individual, one should take responsibility for, and only for, his *degree of effort* in his *type*; while one is not responsible for the distribution characteristics of the *effort*. In this way, Roemer defines the *degree of effort* using one's quantile  $\pi$  in the conditional distribution of his *type*. Thus the expression (3) can be rewritten as:

$$\max \int_{\pi} \min_c y(c, \pi) d\pi. \quad (4)$$

And (4) can be regarded as an explanation of the *maximin principle* of Roemer.

### 3.2. Inequality of opportunity in health and health care

The introduction of the equality of opportunity into the domain of health economics can be traced back to the 1980s. Daniels (1985, 1996) refers to Rawls' equality of opportunity and tries to make use of this theory into the analysis of health inequality. However, empirical work just sprang up during the last decade. Zheng (2006) introduces income-health matrix to measure the health opportunity and the inequality caused by unequal health security circumstances and socioeconomic structure. Rosa Dias (2009) proposes straight forward the empirical application of Roemer's EOp. Using data from the UK National Child Development Study, he finds that there is significant inequality of opportunity in health and that *circumstances*, such as parental socioeconomic status (SES) and childhood health, can affect the self-assessed health level in adulthood directly and indirectly (*e.g.* through *effort* such as education). Rosa Dias (2010) further improves and enriches the measurement of inequality of opportunity by combining Roemer's framework with the Grossman model of human capital and health demand, and discusses the *partial-circumstance problem*. Jusot *et al.* (2010) and Trannoy *et al.* (2010) do similar researches on the inequality of opportunity in adulthood health, with childhood condition as the important *circumstances*. Balia and Jones (2011) investigate a special case of health inequality, the inequality of opportunity in mortality risk among individuals who and whose parents smoke or ever smoked. These articles all emphasize both the importance of *circumstances* and the capabilities of change by *effort* for better conditions. Moreover, since health and education are two vital types of human capital and are interrelated, Jones *et al.* (2012) analyze primarily the role of education in the inequality of opportunity in health, and note that in some dimensions there are significant and economically sizable linkages between education and health.



As mentioned before, researches on the inequality of opportunity in the domain of health and health care are rather rare, let alone the relevant topics about China. This paper may be one of the first researches that combine the theory of the EOp and health care within the urban-rural dual social structure in China. We hope that our discussions in this paper will be helpful to the further understanding of the urban-rural health care disparities and the improvement of the URIMIS policy making.

### 3.3. Empirical strategy

#### 3.3.1. *Reward principle & compensation principle*

For the EOp analysis, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009, 2011), within their framework of selective egalitarianism, propose two principles—the *reward principle* and the *compensation principle*.

The *reward principle* encourages inequality caused by the *effort*, i.e. differences of the *advantage* are allowed if they are brought about by the *effort*. For this reason, when we measure the EOp, influences from the *effort* should be wiped off first. The typical method is to calculate the “corrected” advantage  $\tilde{y}_i$  of individual  $i$  by fixing the value of the *effort*  $\tilde{e}$ , i.e.  $\tilde{y}_i = y(c_i, \tilde{e})$ . In this way, we can obtain the *direct unfairness* by calculating the inequality in  $\tilde{y}$  using traditional indexes such as Gini index.

The *compensation principle* requires that the inequality caused by the *circumstances* should be compensated. In other words, for the same *effort*, each individual should obtain the same *advantage* whatever the *circumstances* he is in; or compensation should be given to those who attain less *advantage*<sup>9</sup>. The typical calculation procedure under the *compensation principle* is first to set an “ideal” distribution of  $c_i$  ( $c^*$ ), and then to obtain the fair distribution of  $y_i$  ( $y_i^*$ ) via  $y_i^* = y(c^*, e_i)$ . In this way, the unfair inequality of opportunity, i.e. the *fairness gap*, is  $(y_i - y_i^*)$ .

Though the two principles have something in common, they are in effect only compatible under one situation that  $c$  and  $e$  are completely independent, i.e. they are additively separable (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). Therefore, we need to choose between the two for empirical work.

This paper bases on the *compensation principle* in view of the following three reasons. First, what we care about is how to reimburse rural residents for their disadvantage of *circumstances*. This is much closer to the logic of the *compensation principle*. Second, the *reward principle* is usually used to explain inequalities within a certain group, while the *compensation principle*, between groups. We concern in this paper whether the same health need obtains the same health care between urban and

---

<sup>9</sup> Obviously, this principle has a close relationship with the horizontal equity which indicates that the same health need should receive the same health care regardless of one’s circumstances, such as income level, region or race.

rural residents, and this is more in line with the *compensation principle*. Third, the influence of  $c$  to  $e$  is actually very common in the real world, which in most cases we cannot ignore. The *compensation principle* can reflect such influence to some extent and thus is more applicable to our research.

### 3.3.2. When Roemer meets Oaxaca

Following Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), we define  $c$  as a dummy indicator of *hukou* of urban residents ( $c=1$ ) and rural residents ( $c=0$ ). The vector  $e$  includes all the other factors which, during the analysis, will be classified into two parts,  $e^1$  and  $e^2$ . The vector  $e^1$  is on behalf of factors whose correlation with  $c$  will bring about illegitimate urban-rural differences, e.g. income level and medical insurance types. Contrarily, the vector  $e^2$  is on behalf of factors which will not bring about illegitimate differences, e.g. health needs. In this way, the *advantage*, i.e. the use of health care  $hc$  in our empirical research, can be expressed as a function of  $c$ ,  $e^1$  and  $e^2$ :

$$hc_i = \alpha + \beta\varphi(c_i) + \gamma\psi(e_i^1) + \delta\chi(e_i^2) + \varepsilon_i, \quad (5)$$

where  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  are parameters,  $\alpha$  is the constant, and  $\varepsilon_i$  is an error item. What's more, in accordance with the definition of  $e^1$ , it is appropriate to regard  $e^1$  as a function of  $c$  and  $\pi$  (the *degree of effort*), i.e.

$$e_i^1 = \eta(c_i, \pi_i^1). \quad (6)$$

Thus the function (5) can be rewritten as

$$hc_i = \alpha + \beta\varphi(c_i) + \gamma\psi \circ \eta(c_i, \pi_i^1) + \delta\chi(e_i^2) + \varepsilon_i. \quad (7)$$

And a more general presentation of this function can be written as

$$hc_i = \alpha + \beta\varphi(c_i) + (\gamma + \mu c_i)\psi \circ \eta(c_i, \pi_i^1) + (\delta + \rho c_i)\chi(e_i^2) + \varepsilon_i, \quad (8)$$

where we add  $\mu$  and  $\rho$  to separately express the coefficient differences of  $\psi \circ \eta(c_i, \pi_i^1)$  and  $\chi(e_i^2)$  between urban and rural groups.

Defining  $\varphi(c)=c$  and taking urban circumstances ( $U$ ) as the “ideal” reference circumstances, then we obtain the *fairness gap*<sup>10</sup> between urban and rural residents as follows:

$$f.g. = \hat{\beta} + \hat{\rho}\chi(e_i^2 | R) + \hat{\gamma}[\psi \circ \eta(U, \pi_i^1 | R) - \psi \circ \eta(R, \pi_i^1 | R)] + \hat{\mu}\psi \circ \eta(U, \pi_i^1 | R). \quad (9)$$

The urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care can be measured according to (9). Here we also obtain a decomposition form similar to that proposed by Oaxaca (1973). At the right hand of (9), the constant term can be regarded as a coefficient of variable  $I$ , whose value is 1 invariably. Here we consider  $I$  as one of the

<sup>10</sup> According to Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), the *fairness gap* should be  $y(c_i, e_i) - y(c^*, e_i)$ . However, in order to obtain positive values of the *fairness gap* and most of the factors, we use the reverse value expression here, i.e.  $y(c^*, e_i) - y(c_i, e_i)$ . **What's more**, since  $y(c^*, e_i)$  and  $y(c_i, e_i)$  are the same for urban residents due to the construction of the equation, this *fairness gap* in effect is the difference between the counterfactual estimate of the rural residents' health care expenditure in the urban circumstances and the actual health care expenditure of the rural residents.

elements of  $e^2$ . In this way, the former two terms  $\hat{\beta} + \hat{\rho}\chi(e_i^2 | R)$  can be considered as the coefficient effect of  $e^2$ , namely the  $e^2$  *coefficient effect*. It indicates that part of the urban-rural health care *gap* is from the insufficient health care expenditure of rural residents. The third term of this equation  $\hat{\gamma}[\psi \circ \eta(U, \pi_i^1 | R) - \psi \circ \eta(R, \pi_i^1 | R)]$  can be regarded as the  $e^1$  *environmental characteristic effect*, which indicates that part of the urban-rural health care *gap* is from the difference between the counterfactual characteristics of  $e^1$ —the same rural residents with the same *degree of effort* and the same *effort* distribution characteristics but in the urban circumstances—and its actual characteristics when holding the coefficient of  $e^1$  as constant as that of rural residents. The fourth term  $\hat{\mu}\psi \circ \eta(U, \pi_i^1 | R)$  can be regarded as the  $e^1$  *environmental coefficient effect*, which indicates that part of the urban-rural health care *gap* is from the implacable urban-rural coefficient differences of  $e^1$ .

In our empirical research, we specify the linear form

$$hc_i = \alpha + \beta c_i + (\gamma + \mu c_i)e_i^1 + (\delta + \rho c_i)e_i^2 + \varepsilon_i \quad (10)$$

for (8), and

$$e_i^1 = a + bc_i + (d + lc_i)\pi_i^1 + \tau_i \quad (11)$$

for (6). In (11)  $a$  is the constant,  $b$ ,  $d$  and  $l$  are parameters, and  $\tau_i$  is an error item. The estimated results from (10) and (11) will then be taken into (12), *i.e.*

$$f.g. = \hat{\beta} + \hat{\rho}E(e_i^2 | R) + \hat{\gamma}[E(U, \pi_i^1 | R) - E(R, \pi_i^1 | R)] + \hat{\mu}E(U, \pi_i^1 | R), \quad (12)$$

for the calculation of the *fairness gap*.

It is worth noting that the methods of obtaining  $\pi$  (the *degree of effort*) are different between the continuous variable and the discrete variable. For continuous variable such as income, the  $\pi$  of individual can be obtained directly from his rank in urban or rural groups which he belongs to. However, for discrete variable such as self-reported health status, the method is more complicated. We need to know the propensity score of each individual in his group (urban group or rural group) with the help of logistic model, and then to obtain his  $\pi$  according to his score.

Meanwhile, this paper uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulation (Gates, 2007)<sup>11</sup>—an approach of full information maximum likelihood estimation—for the system estimation, allowing both the error terms of (10) and (11) to be serially correlated.

<sup>11</sup> As Gates (2007) explains, the GHK simulation has excellent features, and it is widely used in the health economics domain, e.g. Deb and Trivedi (2006), Rosa Dias(2010) and Balia and Jones(2011), *etc.* STATA has already developed the corresponding command *cmp*, which is detailedly introduced by Roodman (2011).

## 4. Data

### 4.1. Data sources

The sample is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) which is held by the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The CHNS, an ongoing research project, includes data waves in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009, covering urban and rural regions in nine provinces which vary substantially in geography, economic development, public resources and health indicators. Subsample in each of the provinces is drawn via a multistage, random cluster process.

This paper uses data waves from 1997 to 2006, among which data from waves of 1997 and 2000 constitutes the group of *period 1*, and data from waves of 2004 and 2006 constitutes the group of *period 2*. We make such data arrangement for the following reasons. First, in the analysis we only select the respondents who had suffered from illnesses during the past four weeks before surveyed<sup>12</sup>. Missing values in waves of 1989, 1991 and 1993 are too many to complete the estimation. Hence, we decide not to employ data from the three waves. Second, given that the URIMIS pilot actions have flourished since 2009, and there is no information that can help us to distinguish regions which are in the pilot experiments from those which are not, we have to drop data in the 2009 wave for safety. Third, the numbers of our target respondents are not big enough in some waves. If we estimate by using separately the rest four waves, it may discount the validity of our conclusions. Moreover, NCMS was established in 2003, offering a natural and reasonable boundary for pooling the data. As a result, the final data only includes respondents who had suffered from illnesses during the past four weeks before surveyed in waves of 1997, 2000, 2004 or 2006. And respondents from the former two waves are pooled to represent the characteristics of the group of *period 1*; while respondents from the latter two waves, the group of *period 2*.

### 4.2. Variables

For the measurement of the use of health care, we employ the health care expenditure<sup>13</sup>, the same as most literatures do. During the selection of independent variables and the estimation, the key is how to differentiate between illegitimate

---

<sup>12</sup> In the 2006 **wave**, the corresponding question in the **questionnaire** is “During the past 4 weeks, have you been sick or injured? Have you suffered from a chronic or acute disease”.

<sup>13</sup> In the 2006 **wave**, the corresponding question in the **questionnaire** is “How much did this treatment cost or has this treatment cost so far (including all registration fees, medicines, treatment fees, bed fees, etc.)”.

factors and legitimate factors (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). By referring to relative studies on racial/ethnic disparities of health and health care (e.g. Institute of Medicine, 2003; McGuire *et al.*, 2006; Cook *et al.*, 2010; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011), we define that  $e^1$ —the vector of illegitimate factors—includes variables describing individual SES, medical insurance policies and regional characteristics in health care, *etc.*, and that  $e^2$ —the vector of legitimate factors—includes variables describing health needs and individual preferences. Specifically, variables in  $e^1$  can be classified into three parts: (1) SES variables, including family per capita income and education; (2) policy variable, *i.e.* reimbursement ratio; and (3) environmental variables related to health care, including region, medicines availability and travel time for doctor visits. Variables in  $e^2$  are classified into four parts: (1) demographic variables, including age, sex and marital status; (2) general health variables, including self-reported health status and chronic disease history; (3) health variables reflecting situations of illness, *i.e.* types of illness one has suffered from and the severity of the illness, during the past four weeks; and (4) preference variables, including treatment preferences and lifestyle preferences such as whether smoke or drink.

As is known, the actual reimbursement ratio—the proportion of health care expenditure paid for by medical insurance<sup>14</sup>—may be the best indicator to measure the insuring level and the economic burden of health care, compared to indicators about whether one has participated in any medical insurance or what the name of the participated medical insurance is. However, this is only feasible for respondents whose health expenditures are not zero. In the process of data disposing, we have done some adjustment to cope with the zero problems. For respondents who do participate in medical insurances but spend zero on health care, we take their self-reported policy reimbursement ratios<sup>15</sup> as replacements. If one's self-reported policy reimbursement ratios are missing, then we replace the missing values with the average ratio of other matched respondents who are in the same city, enjoying the same medical insurance and having the same health status as him.

Meanwhile, the treatment preferences are usually ignored in the health care researches, especially in relevant researches in China. This paper controls the treatment preferences to some extent via the question of “*what did you do when you felt ill*”.

The final sample includes 4168 individuals, 1076 of which are from the group of *period 1*, and 3092 are from the group of *period 2*. In *period 1*, 412 respondents,

<sup>14</sup> In the 2006 wave, the corresponding question in the questionnaire is “What percentage of these costs was paid by insurance or may be paid by insurance”.

<sup>15</sup> In the 2006 wave, the corresponding questions are “What percentage of the fees for outpatient care does your insurance pay (not including registration fee)” and “What percentage of the fees for inpatient care does your insurance pay (not including food expenses)”.

making up 38.3% of the subsample, are from urban areas. And in *period 2*, there are 1283 urban respondents and 1809 rural respondents, with the proportion of urban residents increasing to 41.5%. The description of variables is shown in Table 1, in which we see obvious urban-rural differences in the four-week health care expenditure. The average differences are 225.096 *yuan*<sup>16</sup> and 268.149 *yuan* respectively in *period 1* and *period 2*, with the urban residents expending more in both periods. Urban-rural differences of SES variables (e.g. income and education) and policy variable (i.e. actual reimbursement ratio) are evident, too. The urban-rural medical environmental differences seem small, which are somewhat counter-intuitive. Maybe these available variables are not able to reflect the qualities of health care properly or completely, although they do show differences. However, they are still reserved for the analysis of the *fairness gap*.

[Please insert Table 1 here]

## 5. Results

How serious is the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care? We turn to the decomposition strategy in section 3.3.2 for analyzing each *fairness gap* in *period 1* and *period 2*. The results are shown in Table 2.

[Please insert Table 2 here]

When the urban circumstances are regarded as the “ideal” reference circumstances, just as Table 2 implies, the total *fairness gap* is 262.670 *yuan* in *period 1*. Given that the directly observed urban-rural average difference in health care in the same period is 225.096 *yuan*, the ratio of the *fairness gap* to the average difference (the *EOp ratio* of the *fairness gap*) in health care in *period 1* is 1.167. Intuitively, this ratio indicates if the original data shows that urban residents on average spend 100 *yuan* more than rural residents on health care, the truth is that urban residents should have spent averagely 16.7 *yuan* less than rural residents. In other words, the *fairness gap* will reach as much as 116.7 *yuan* if the data shows a 100-*yuan* average difference between urban and rural residents. Similarly, the urban-rural average difference in health care in *period 2* is 268.149 *yuan*, but the estimated *fairness gap* in the same period reaches as much as 467.521 *yuan*. Therefore, the *EOp ratio* of the *fairness gap* in *period 2* is as high as 1.744. This number indicates that if the average health care expenditure of rural residents is 100 *yuan* less than that of urban residents, according to the EOp, it should have been 74.4 *yuan* more than that of urban residents. Since the

---

<sup>16</sup> Prices involved in our study are inflated to the 2009 level according to relevant information supplied by CHNS.

*EOp ratios* of the *fairness gap* of the two periods both exceed 100%, the average differences have underestimated the essential inequities between the urban and the rural in both periods. Hence, we may say that compared to the outcome inequality, the inequality of opportunity implies a much worse situation of rural residents in health care. Moreover, the value of the *fairness gap* in *period 2* is bigger than that of *period 1*, which shows an increase of the inequality of opportunity as the time goes.

For the three decomposition parts of the *fairness gap*, Table 2 shows that the  $e^2$  *coefficient effect* is always predominant, accounting for 57.75% of the whole *fairness gap* in *period 1* and 67.25% in *period 2*. The *EOp ratios* of the  $e^2$  *coefficient effect* are 0.674 in *period 1* and 1.173 in *period 2*. We may think about this effect and its importance from the aspects of health consciousness and service qualities. There are ingrained differences between urban and rural residents in the consciousness of health and health care—urban residents prefer more to health investment. Meanwhile, there are differences in health service qualities between the urban and the rural—urban residents usually receive better medicine and medical techniques.

The  $e^1$  *environmental coefficient effect*, according to Table 2, does not play a big role. Its *EOp ratios* are 0.085 in *period 1* and 0.048 in *period 2*. Meanwhile, the *EOp ratios* of the  $e^1$  *environmental characteristic effect* are 0.408 and 0.522 respectively, making up 34.96% of the whole *fairness gap* in *period 1* and 29.93% in *period 2*. The absolute contribution of the  $e^1$  *environmental characteristic effect* to the *fairness gap* increases, while its relative contribution does in the opposite way.

Table 2 also shows interesting changes of the influential powers of some variables belonging to  $e^1$  (the vector of illegitimate factors), especially the reimbursement ratio and the family per capita income. The reimbursement ratio, which plays a big role in *period 1*, shows little importance in *period 2*, e.g. the *EOp ratio* of the reimbursement ratio in the  $e^1$  *environmental characteristic effect* is 0.236, but falls to as little as 0.003 in *period 2*. One possible interpretation is that before the establishment of NCMS (in *period 1*), many rural residents were lack of sufficient and efficient medical insurances, and participating in some medical insurances (e.g. UEBMI) —or more straightly speaking, enjoying a certain reimbursement in the outpatient or inpatient services—represented some kind of privilege. Such privilege in health care usually related to better health services and lower prices. On the one hand, the privilege encouraged insureds to seek health care. On the other hand, non-insureds, especially poor rural residents, would be reluctant to purchase health care unless they were seriously ill. As the urban residents—especially urban workers and government officers—and a few rich rural residents got most of the privilege in *period 1*, the effect of the reimbursement ratio cannot be overlooked. While in *period 2*, NCMS had been

already established. More and more rural residents had participated in NCMS and enjoyed the reimbursement benefit. The reimbursement ratio was not a privilege for just a certain group of people any longer, although there was still obvious difference in reimbursement between urban and rural residents due to different medical insurance policies of UEBMI, URBMI and NCMS. Therefore, the effect of the reimbursement ratio becomes so small that we can even ignore it in *period 2*.

Meanwhile, the effect of the family per capita income shows a distinct increase in *period 2*. A possible explanation is that the consumption of health care was becoming less passive after the establishment of NCMS. As mentioned above, in *period 1* when NCMS had not been established yet, many rural residents, especially the poor, were lack of sufficient and efficient medical insurances and health care services. As a result, the health care consumption in the rural was a kind of passive consumption. For most rural residents, they would not go to hospital until they had been seriously ill. Therefore, income was almost irrelevant to the health care expenditure in this period. While in *period 2* when NCMS had already been established, more and more rural residents participated in this medical insurance. The health-seeking behaviors and health perceptions changed gradually among rural residents, and the health care consumption became more and more active. Table 3 proves the above explanation by quantile regressions for rural residents. The health care expenditure is not significantly dependent on income in *period 1* (except at the 0.9 quantile); while this situation has been reversed in *period 2*. Therefore, the influence of income on the *fairness gap* increased during 2004-2006. And such influence probably continues.

[Please insert Table 3 here]

In view of the *index number problem* in the Oaxaca decomposition that the results from using different indexes may vary largely, following the advice of DeMurger *et al.* (2007), we re-conduct the *fairness gap* decomposition, with rural circumstances (*R*) as the “ideal” reference circumstances, as a robustness test. Our conclusions above can still hold true according to the results shown in Table B.1 of Appendix B.

## 6. Further discussion

### 6.1. Preliminary inference

We see in Table 2 an increase of the *fairness gap* between *period 1* and *period 2*, and this increase is faster than that of the urban-rural average difference. Although



there is a clear rise of the reimbursement ratio for rural residents, the effect the reimbursement ratio has made on narrowing the *fairness gap* is rather small, and decreases sharply in *period 2*. On the contrary, the effect of the family per capita income increases appreciably. Therefore, the big background of the increasing urban-rural income gap should be taken into consideration when improving medical insurance policies. Although it's not the main concern of the medical insurance system to narrow the urban-rural income gap, such gap has already worsened the performance of medical insurance policies.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the relevant government sectors, which are responsible for the medical insurance policy making and supervision, have made great effort to narrow the urban-rural difference in reimbursement. However, since the urban-rural income gap is widening, such effort may be counterproductive. Just as that described in the Example C in Appendix A, the income gap can only counteract the good intentions of current medical insurance policies, being a hindrance for URIMIS aims. Therefore, under the background of the widening income gap, only generally leveling reimbursement ratios between urban and rural residents, as we often see in the pilot URIMIS policies, is now obviously insufficient to mitigate the urban-rural inequalities in health care. On the basis of Roemer's EOp, the pro-disadvantage policies on reimbursement are highly desiderated.

The above is just our preliminary inference which needs further verification. Fortunately, in Jiangsu province, there are indeed some districts where the pro-disadvantage policies on medical insurance are implemented. We have made a special investigation from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province. The data will be helpful to the further argument.

## 6.2. Jiangsu pilot URIMIS data

The Jiangsu pilot URIMIS survey, adopting a multistage, random cluster method, had selected 6 districts<sup>17</sup> and lasted from December 2011 to April 2012. This survey aimed to estimate the efficiency and the differences in efficiency of various URIMIS modes in Jiangsu province. Here we classify the districts into two groups according to whether they had implemented the pro-disadvantage policies for URIMIS. For judgment, we consult Gu and Li (2013, pp. 200 — 205) and define the pro-disadvantage policies as policies that offer fiscal subsidies to those poor rural residents who want to participate in medical insurances with a higher security level. For instance, if lower-income rural residents who should have participated in NCMS want to and now have the chance to—with the help of premium subsidies—select

---

<sup>17</sup> They are Taicang, Wuxi, Wujin, Yixing, Xinghua and Jingjiang.

UEBMI, URBMI or some new medical insurance born after the URIMIS establishment, we will say that the local medical insurance policies are pro-disadvantage<sup>18</sup>.

We select respondents who had got sick during the past one year before surveyed<sup>19</sup>. At the mean time, respondents with missing values are dropped. The final sample includes 2065 individuals, among which 608 individuals are in districts where there are pro-disadvantage policies (*PD group*), while the rest 1457 individuals are not (*NPD group*). The *PD group* has 311 rural respondents and 297 urban respondents, while the *NPD group* has 766 and 691 respectively. Table B.2 of Appendix B shows the detailed information of the data.

### 6.3. Fairness-gap decomposition

Table 4 exhibits the decomposition of *fairness gaps* for both the *PD group* and the *NPD group* by using the similar strategy with that in Section 5. An important finding is that the *fairness gaps* of the *PD group* are far less than those of the *NPD group*, no matter whether we take U or R as the “ideal” reference circumstances. The main difference between the two groups is located in the  $e^l$  *environmental characteristic effect* which is only noticeable in the *NPD group*. The results imply that the influential power of the  $e^l$  *environmental characteristic effect* is directly challenged in the *PD group*, since rural residents, who are with higher needs for health care but at lower income levels, are able to afford more health care in an advanced medical insurance system. Therefore, the pro-disadvantage policies do improve the essential EOp between urban and rural residents in health care.

[Please insert Table 4 here]

Table 5 supports the pro-disadvantage policies by quantile regressions similar to those in Table 3. In the *NPD group*, the correlation between income and health care expenditure is significant for most quantiles; while such correlation in the *PD group* is not significant at all. It is not difficult to understand. Comparing the *NPD group* with the group of *period 1* or *period 2* in Table 3, we see an improvement of the reimbursement policies, since the health care use of the rural poorest (at the 0.1 quantile) becomes sensitive to their incomes, which is a sign of active consumption.

<sup>18</sup> Compared with the other two, NCMS reimbursement ratio is smaller. Since rural residents at the lowest income level usually need more health care but cannot pay the bill, such pro-disadvantage policies will improve their affordability and reduce the health risks brought about by passive health care consumption. Besides, such pro-disadvantage policies offer privilege to the rural poor, but we do not call them pro-rural policies, because the policies are only available for poor residents in the rural, not all rural residents.

<sup>19</sup> The questionnaire of this survey is a little different from relevant parts of the CHNS questionnaires. Therefore, we change a few variables for the *fairness gap* analysis in this section. Please see Appendix B Table B.2 for details.

However, the *NPD* strategy is not sufficient if URIMIS wants to reduce the inequality of opportunity in health care between the urban and the rural as much as possible. We find better results in the *PD group* in which the *fairness gaps* are much smaller (see Table 4) and in which the use of health care seems unrelated to income (see Table 5), reflecting to some extent a based-on-need allocation of health care. Therefore, the insignificant correlation between health care expenditure and income in the *PD group* shown in Table 5 does not tell the same thing as that in the group of *period 1* shown in Table 3. And compared with Table 3, the *PD group* also possesses a different explanation for the insignificance at the 0.1 quantile.

[Please insert Table 5 here]

Since this survey data is of cross section data, the *average effect of treatment on the treated* (ATT) of the *PD group* cannot be obtained from direct comparison with the *NPD group*. It is proved that under such non-randomized trial, the approach of *propensity score match* (PSM) may maximally mitigate the effect caused by the confounding bias and the sample selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Heckman *et al.*, 1998). Therefore, this paper conducts four methods of PSM for analyzing ATT. The results are shown in Table 6. When we take U as the “ideal” reference circumstances, the pro-disadvantage policies can reduce the *fairness gap* of the urban-rural health care by 27.2%. When we take R as the “ideal” reference circumstances, the reduction is 58.3%. At this moment, we believe we have proved our inference described in section 6.1 that the pro-disadvantage policies will greatly help to realize the EOp in health care between urban and rural residents.

[Please insert Table 6 here]

## 7. Conclusions

As one important part of the human capital, health is the basic premise for work, and is also vital to the human welfare (Schultz, 1961; Deaton, 2003). The health care inequalities would seriously harm the social welfare just as the income inequalities do. Thus it is of great importance to focus on the issue of equity in health care. Mooney (1986) points out that equality should enjoy the priority in the trade-offs of efficiency and equality in terms of health. Sen (2002) also proposes that the equity of health care is one of the major parts of justice for a country, and that the basic health care system should guarantee the civil rights to receive health care.

Rural residents have made great contribution to China’s economic development. However, what they share from the prosperity is far less than what they should obtain.

The inequality in health care is just one conspicuous aspect among the urban-rural illegitimate gaps. Since the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China has been improving the rural health and health care conditions with great effort, including the expansion of NCMS, the raise of NCMS reimbursement ratios, and the exploration of URIMIS. During the improvement, it is being heatedly discussed, but without an agreement, on how to effectively reduce even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health care. This paper suggests that focusing on the urban-rural inequality of opportunity is much more meaningful than focusing on the urban-rural *outcome equality* or *reimbursement equality* in health care. And generally leveling the reimbursement ratios between urban and rural residents is not sufficient to realize the EOp in health care. The pro-disadvantage policies are needed.

This paper analyzes the inequality of opportunity in health care between urban and rural residents from a broader perspective based on the theory of the EOp. We use the framework of the *compensation principle* proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011) as the base for empirical analysis, and the *fairness gap* as a measurement of the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care. The Oaxaca decomposition is established and we define three parts of the *fairness gap*, the  $e^2$  *coefficient effect*, the  $e^1$  *environmental characteristic effect*, and the  $e^1$  *environmental coefficient effect*. We first measure the *fairness gaps* using data from CHNS in 1997–2000 and 2004–2006. The results indicate that the urban-rural average differences which can be directly observed from original statistical data may underestimate the essential inequalities. In addition, we have noticed a dramatic change of the effect of reimbursement ratio and income during the two periods. Through further analysis, we infer that since the urban-rural income gap is widening, generally leveling reimbursement ratios between urban and rural residents becomes insufficient to mitigate the urban-rural inequalities in health care. Then a question may arise on how to make use of the medical insurance policies in URIMIS. We give our suggestion, which is in line with the idea of Roemer(1998)<sup>20</sup>, that the urban-rural income gap, which becomes wider and wider in recent years, should be taken into consideration in URIMIS. Therefore, under current situation, the pro-disadvantage policies should be made to help improve the affordability of the rural poor. Our suggestion is well verified by the pilot URIMIS data in Jiangsu province. The results show that the urban-rural *fairness gap* in health care can be narrowed significantly via the pro-disadvantage policies.

There are inevitably some limitations in our research. In the further discussion,

---

<sup>20</sup> According to Roemer, in an ideal equal world, resources should not be distributed on the basis of (absolute) *level of effort* of individuals especially when they are in different *types*, because *circumstances* may affect *effort*. Please see section 3 for details.

we use data from Jiangsu province as a supplementary support of our proposition. Although the data has covered the northern, middle and southern parts—the three major economic zones — of Jiangsu province and is able to represent the characteristics of the URIMIS modes in Jiangsu and other advanced provinces, it may not be on behalf of the URIMIS pilot conditions of the whole China. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, this paper is a preliminary study on China’s special medical insurance policies by using Roemer’s EOp theory, in order to provide some useful suggestions on the further improvement of the medical insurance systems. We hope that this paper will inspire more interest in the field of the health care justice in China and other countries.

## **Acknowledge**

This research uses data from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). We thank the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Carolina Population Center, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the NIH (R01-HD30880, DK056350, and R01-HD38700) and the Fogarty International Center, NIH for financial support for the CHNS data collection and analysis files from 1989 to 2006 and both parties plus the China-Japan Friendship Hospital, Ministry of Health for support for CHNS 2009 and future surveys.

This paper is part of the research programs “Study on the Urban-rural Integrated Medical Insurance Modes: Effect Assessment and the Optimal Mode Selection” (71073077) supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), “Study on the Capacity and Sustainability of Social Medical Insurances” (2011ZDIXM022) supported by Jiangsu College Philosophy and Social Science Major Research Foundation, and “Study on the Urban-Rural Integrated Medical Insurance Systems under the Theory of Equality of Opportunity” (CXLX13\_061) supported by Jiangsu College Graduates Research and Innovation Plan.

We thank Professor Allard E. Dembe (Division of Health Services Management and Policy, College of Public Health, The Ohio State University, USA) and Assistant Professor Chen Xi (Department of Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health, Yale University, USA) for their constant and professional guidance for us on the study of health economics, and Assistant Professor Qu Zhaopeng (Population Research Institution, School of Business, Nanjing University, China), Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer Li Jiajia (School of Public Health, Shandong University, China) and Mary Hong (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA) for their detailed and valuable comments.

## References

- Arneson, R. J. (1989). Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. *Philosophical Studies*, 56(1), 77–93.
- Balia, S., & Jones, A. M. (2011). Catching the habit: A study of inequality of opportunity in smoking-related mortality. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)*, 174(1), 175–194.
- Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H. G., & Marta, M. (2007). Inequality of opportunity in Brazil. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 53(4), 585–618.
- Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the currency of egalitarian justice. *Ethics*, 99(4), 906–944.
- Cook, B. L., McGuire, T. G., Lock, K., & Zaslavsky, A. M. (2010). Comparing methods of racial and ethnic disparities measurement across different settings of mental health care. *Health Services Research*, 45(3), 825–847.
- Daniels, N. (1985). *Just health care*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Daniels, N. (1996). Justice, fair procedures, and the goals of medicine. *The Hastings Center Report*, 26(6), 10–12.
- Deaton, A. (2003). Health, inequality, and economic development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41(1), 113–158.
- Deb, P., & Trivedi, P. K. (2006). Specification and simulated likelihood estimation of a non-normal treatment-outcome model with selection: Application to health care utilization. *The Econometrics Journal*, 9(2), 307–331.
- DeMurger, S., Fournier, M., & Chen, Y. (2007). The evolution of gender earnings gaps and discrimination in urban China, 1988–95. *The Developing Economies*, 45(1), 97–121.
- Dworkin, R. (1981a). What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 10(3), 185–246.

- Dworkin, R. (1981b). What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 10(4), 283–345.
- Ferreira, F. H. G., & Gignoux, J. (2011). The measurement of inequality of opportunity: Theory and an application to Latin America. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 57(4), 622–657.
- Fleurbaey, M., & Schokkaert, E. (2009). Unfair inequalities in health and health care. *Journal of Health Economics*, 28(1), 73–90.
- Fleurbaey, M., & Schokkaert, E. (2011). Equity in Health and Health Care, in: Pauly, M. V., McGuire, T. G., & Barros, P. P. (Eds.), *Handbook of Health Economics*, Vol. 2. Waltham, MA: North Holland.
- Gates, R. (2007). A mata Geweke--Hajivassiliou--Keane multivariate normal simulator. *Stata Journal*, 6(2), 190–213.
- Gu H., & Li, J. (2013). *Study on the integrating urban-rural health security systems in the urbanization: Mode selection and effects estimation*. Beijing: China Labor Social Security Publishing House (in Chinese).
- Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. (1998). Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 65(2), 261–294.
- Institute of Medicine. (2003). *Unequal treatment: Confronting racial and ethnic disparities in health care*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Jones, A. M., Rice, N., & Rosa Dias, P. (2012). Quality of schooling and inequality of opportunity in health. *Empirical Economics*, 42(2), 369–394.
- Jusot, F., Tubeuf, S., & Trannoy, A. (2010). Inequality of opportunities in health in Europe: Why so much difference across countries? *Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers* 10/26.
- Lei, X., & Lin, W. (2009). The new cooperative medical scheme in rural China: Does more coverage mean more service and better health? *Health Economics*, 18(2), 25–46.



- McGuire, T. G., Alegria, M., Cook, B. L., Wells, K. B., & Zaslavsky, A. M. (2006). Implementing the institute of medicine definition of disparities: An application to mental health care. *Health Services Research*, 41(5), 1979–2005.
- Mooney, G. (1986). *Economics, medicine, and health care*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets. *International Economic Review*, 14(3), 693–709.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Roemer, J. E. (1993). A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 22(2), 146–166.
- Roemer, J. E. (1998). *Equality of opportunity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roemer, J. E. (2002). Equality of opportunity: A progress report. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 19(2), 455–471.
- Roodman, D. (2011). Fitting fully observed recursive mixed-process models with cmp. *The Stata Journal*, 11(2), 159–206.
- Rosa Dias, P. (2009). Inequality of opportunity in health: Evidence from a UK cohort study. *Health Economics*, 18(9), 1057–1074.
- Rosa Dias, P. (2010). Modeling opportunity in health under partial observability of circumstances. *Health Economics*, 19(3), 252–264.
- Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. *The American Statistician*, 39(1), 33–38.
- Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. *The American Economic Review*, 51(1), 1–17.
- Sen, A. (1980). Equality of what? in: McMurrin, S. M. (Ed.), *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sen, A. (2002). Why health equity? *Health Economics*, 11(8), 659–666.
- Trannoy, A., Tubeuf, S., Jusot, F., & Devaux, M. (2010). Inequality of opportunities in health in France: A first pass. *Health Economics*, 19(8), 921–938.
- Wagstaff, A., Lindelow, M., Gao, J., Xu, L., & Qian, J. (2009). Extending health insurance to the rural population: An impact evaluation of China's new cooperative medical scheme. *Journal of Health Economics*, 28(1), 1–19.
- Yip, W., & Hsiao, W. (2009). China's health care reform: A tentative assessment. *China Economic Review*, 20(4), 613–619.
- Zhang, Y., & Eriksson, T. (2010). Inequality of opportunity and income inequality in nine Chinese provinces, 1989-2006. *China Economic Review*, 21(4), 607–616.
- Zheng, B. (2006). Measuring health inequality and health opportunity. Mimeo: Department of Economics, University of Colorado.

**Table 1**

Description of variables.

Variables	<i>Period 1</i>				<i>Period 2</i>			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	Mean	Sd.	Mean	Sd.	Mean	Sd.	Mean	Sd.
<i>y</i>								
Health care expenditure during the past 4 weeks	779.758	2201.553	554.663	2189.791	709.827	5039.766	441.677	2351.327
<i>e<sup>1</sup></i>								
Family per capita income (yuan/year)	6943.783	7030.383	4569.000	5328.661	10729.150	10548.700	5796.847	8870.297
Formal education years	7.124	4.730	5.066	4.031	7.836	4.819	5.516	4.181
Reimbursement ratio (%)	26.036	37.793	6.143	23.223	25.116	34.834	9.360	24.019
Region (1= the east region, 0= others)	0.383	0.487	0.325	0.469	0.486	0.500	0.411	0.492
Travel time (min.) by bike to health facility	17.197	20.373	16.089	18.706	14.499	14.464	13.439	17.789
Medicines availability(1=yes, 0=no)	0.951	0.215	0.967	0.179	0.988	0.111	0.985	0.121
<i>e<sup>2</sup></i>								
<i>Basic Demographic Information</i>								
Age (years)	53.008	16.252	52.322	15.692	54.145	15.897	55.435	14.686
Sex (1=male, 0=female)	0.422	0.495	0.438	0.497	0.434	0.496	0.423	0.494
Marital status (1= married, 0= others)	0.801	0.400	0.797	0.403	0.796	0.403	0.811	0.392
<i>General Health Information</i>								
Self-reported health status (4=excellent, 3=good, 2=fair, 1=poor)	2.138	0.750	2.056	0.819	2.228	0.797	2.061	0.785
Ever diagnosed High blood pressure (1=yes, 0=no)	0.182	0.386	0.148	0.355	0.246	0.431	0.170	0.376
Diabetes (1=yes, 0=no)	0.158	0.365	0.123	0.329	0.194	0.396	0.132	0.339

Myocardial infarction (1=yes, 0=no)	0.015	0.120	0.014	0.116	0.014	0.118	0.009	0.094
Apoplexy (1=yes, 0=no)	0.039	0.193	0.027	0.163	0.034	0.180	0.025	0.156
<i>Illness During the Past 4 Weeks</i>								
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases (1=yes, 0=no)	0.874	0.332	0.883	0.322	0.634	0.482	0.669	0.471
Got fever, sore throat or cough (1=yes, 0=no)	0.359	0.480	0.357	0.479	0.373	0.484	0.362	0.481
Got diarrhea or stomachache (1=yes, 0=no)	0.126	0.332	0.131	0.338	0.156	0.363	0.153	0.360
Got headache or dizziness (1=yes, 0=no)	0.306	0.461	0.283	0.451	0.253	0.435	0.265	0.441
Got joint pain or muscle pain (1=yes, 0=no)	0.165	0.372	0.181	0.385	0.260	0.439	0.281	0.450
Got rash or dermatitis (1=yes, 0=no)	0.032	0.175	0.024	0.153	0.036	0.186	0.024	0.152
Got eye/ear disease (1=yes, 0=no)	0.034	0.181	0.026	0.158	0.062	0.240	0.050	0.217
Got heart disease/chest pain (1=yes, 0=no)	0.102	0.303	0.069	0.254	0.112	0.316	0.082	0.274
Got other infectious disease (1=yes, 0=no)	0.032	0.175	0.032	0.175	0.047	0.211	0.050	0.217
Got noncommunicable disease (1=yes, 0=no)	0.158	0.365	0.149	0.356	0.244	0.430	0.187	0.390
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 2=somewhat severe, 1=not severe)	1.740	0.689	1.640	0.674	1.687	0.657	1.702	0.665
Inpatient visits (1=yes, 0=no)	0.092	0.290	0.074	0.262	0.031	0.174	0.030	0.170
<i>Preferences</i>								
What to do when felt ill (4=none, 3=saw a doctor, 2=saw the local health worker, 1=self care)	2.522	0.908	2.706	0.751	2.074	1.168	2.472	1.048
Ever smoked (1=yes, 0=no)	0.250	0.434	0.304	0.460	0.313	0.464	0.307	0.462
Drink alcohol last year (1=yes, 0=no)	0.316	0.465	0.280	0.449	0.341	0.474	0.280	0.449
<b>Number of sub-sample</b>	412		664		1283		1809	

Source: CHNS data (1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006).

Note: "Sd." denotes standard deviation.

**Table 2**

Decomposition of the fairness gaps using CHNS data.

Average difference directly observed	<i>Period 1</i>		<i>Period 2</i>	
	225.096		268.149	
	<i>Fairness gap</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	<i>Fairness gap</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
<i>e<sup>2</sup> coefficient effect:</i>				
Age	387.248	1.720	-801.470	-2.989
Male	76.158	0.338	251.163	0.937
Married	-123.302	-0.548	-105.519	-0.394
Self-reported health: fair	166.831	0.741	-593.614	-2.214
Self-reported health: good	56.920	0.253	-305.803	-1.140
Self-reported health: excellent	18.001	0.080	-29.494	-0.110
High blood pressure	54.396	0.242	0.897	0.003
Diabetes	-79.090	-0.351	51.664	0.193
Myocardial infarction	6.067	0.027	-4.507	-0.017
Apoplexy	7.781	0.035	-3.898	-0.015
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases	667.391	2.965	-165.665	-0.618
Got fever, sore throat or cough	-136.195	-0.605	90.036	0.336
Got diarrhea or stomachache	-28.023	-0.124	-44.276	-0.165
Got headache or dizziness	78.907	0.351	-48.257	-0.180
Got joint pain or muscle pain	-1.126	-0.005	41.766	0.156
Got rash or dermatitis	4.013	0.018	40.411	0.151
Got eye/ear disease	-42.756	-0.190	24.671	0.092
Got heart disease/chest pain	34.711	0.154	63.017	0.235
Got other infectious disease	39.230	0.174	17.924	0.067
Got noncommunicable disease	-64.060	-0.285	46.340	0.173
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe	111.614	0.496	-4.149	-0.015
Severity of the illness: quite severe	82.171	0.365	133.673	0.499
Inpatient	-8.388	-0.037	43.000	0.160
To see local health worker when felt ill	0.692	0.003	-20.647	-0.077
To see a doctor when felt ill	163.488	0.726	189.518	0.707
To do nothing when felt ill	31.194	0.139	55.693	0.208
Smoke	-3.613	-0.016	-54.234	-0.202
Drink	-165.846	-0.737	-103.918	-0.388
Wave	-27.906	-0.124	-99.114	-0.370
Intercept	-1154.844	-5.130	1649.307	6.151
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>151.663</b>	<b>0.674</b>	<b>314.513</b>	<b>1.173</b>
<i>e<sup>1</sup> environmental characteristic effect:</i>				
Family per capita income	-15.542	-0.069	147.014	0.548
Education	70.475	0.313	13.324	0.050
Reimbursement ratio	53.126	0.236	0.793	0.003
East China	-8.402	-0.037	-20.763	-0.077
Travel time to health facility	-9.245	-0.041	-0.729	-0.003
Medicines available	1.352	0.006	0.373	0.001

<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>91.763</b>	<b>0.408</b>	<b>140.011</b>	<b>0.522</b>
<i>e<sup>1</sup> environmental coefficient effect:</i>				
Family per capita income	-28.221	-0.125	87.714	0.327
Education	129.135	0.574	16.578	0.062
Reimbursement ratio	16.633	0.074	10.050	0.037
East China	-34.839	-0.155	-64.626	-0.241
Travel time to health facility	-68.028	-0.302	21.779	0.081
Medicines available	4.564	0.020	-58.499	-0.218
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>19.244</b>	<b>0.085</b>	<b>12.997</b>	<b>0.048</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>262.670</b>	<b>1.167</b>	<b>467.521</b>	<b>1.744</b>
<b>Number of sub-sample</b>	1076		3092	

Note: "Ratio" in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> column denotes the ratio of the decomposed *fairness gap* as well as the total *fairness gap*, i.e. each cell in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> column, to the directly observed average difference in the corresponding period.

**Table 3**

Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using CHNS data (rural residents).

Quantile	0.1	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.9	Number of sub-sample
<i>Period 1</i>	0.025 (0.036)	0.024 (0.022)	0.026 (0.021)	0.025 (0.020)	0.036* (0.021)	664
<i>Period 2</i>	0.015 (0.025)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)	1809

Note: the dependent variable is the log of family per capita income; the independent variable is the log of health care expenditure; other control variables listed in Table 1 are not shown here. shown in brackets is the standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* represent significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.

**Table 4**Decomposition of the *fairness gap* using Jiangsu data.

	U as the reference <i>c</i>		Robustness test: R as the reference <i>c</i>	
	<i>Fairness gap</i>	Ratio	<i>Fairness gap</i>	Ratio
<b><i>NPH group</i></b>				
Directly observed average difference		496.780		
<i>e<sup>2</sup> coefficient effect</i>	208.544	0.420	287.731	0.579
<i>environmental e<sup>1</sup> characteristic effect</i>	201.116	0.405	224.092	0.451
<i>environmental e<sup>1</sup> coefficient effect</i>	-182.754	-0.368	62.296	0.125
Total	226.907	0.457	574.118	1.156
Number of sub-sample		1457		
<b><i>PH group</i></b>				
Directly observed average difference		130.001		
<i>e<sup>2</sup> coefficient effect</i>	66.259	0.510	61.196	0.471
<i>environmental e<sup>1</sup> characteristic effect</i>	-17.271	-0.133	14.339	0.110
<i>environmental e<sup>1</sup> coefficient effect</i>	-24.159	-0.186	-0.803	-0.006
Total	24.829	0.191	74.732	0.575
Number of sub-sample		608		

Note: "Ratio" in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> column denotes the ratio of the decomposed *fairness gap* as well as the total *fairness gap*, i.e. each cell in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> column, to the directly observed average difference in the corresponding group.



**Table 5**

Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using Jiangsu data (rural residents).

Quantile	0.1	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.9	Number of sub-sample
<i>NPH group</i>	0.055*** (0.013)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.013*** (0.030)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.0003 (0.009)	766
<i>PH group</i>	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.0001 (0.002)	311

Note: The dependent variable is the log of family per capita income; the independent variable is the log of health care expenditure; other control variables listed in Appendix B Table B.2 are not shown here. shown in brackets is the standard errors. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* represent significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.

**Table 6***Fairness gaps under four PSM methods.*

		U as the reference circumstances				Robustness test: R as the reference circumstances			
		T size	C size	ATT (% of fairness gap)	Standard error	T size	C size	ATT (% of fairness gap)	Standard error
Nearest neighbor matching method	$e^2$ coefficient effect	311	157	0.040	0.062	297	199	-0.157***	0.045
	$e^1$ environmental characteristic effect	311	157	-0.475***	0.056	297	199	-0.350***	0.031
	$e^1$ environmental coefficient effect	311	157	0.162***	0.023	297	199	-0.127***	0.013
	Total	311	157	-0.272***	0.082	297	199	-0.634***	0.056
Radius matching method	$e^2$ coefficient effect	311	728	0.090**	0.043	297	679	-0.107***	0.032
	$e^1$ environmental characteristic effect	311	728	-0.534***	0.028	297	679	-0.340***	0.019
	$e^1$ environmental coefficient effect	311	728	0.180***	0.022	297	679	-0.132***	0.011
	Total	311	728	-0.263***	0.057	297	679	-0.579***	0.039
Layered matching method	$e^2$ coefficient effect	311	728	0.088*	0.056	297	679	-0.117***	0.036
	$e^1$ environmental characteristic effect	311	728	-0.531***	0.050	297	679	-0.337***	0.022
	$e^1$ environmental coefficient effect	311	728	0.176***	0.023	297	679	-0.133***	0.011
	Total	311	728	-0.267***	0.060	297	679	-0.587***	0.046
Kernel matching method	$e^2$ coefficient effect	311	728	0.085	0.057	297	679	-0.112***	0.036
	$e^1$ environmental characteristic effect	311	728	-0.530***	0.044	297	679	-0.339***	0.022
	$e^1$ environmental coefficient effect	311	728	0.173***	0.023	297	679	-0.132***	0.012
	Total	311	728	-0.272***	0.068	297	679	-0.583***	0.043

Note: “T size” denotes the sample size of treatment groups; “C size” denotes the sample size of control groups which include those living in where there are no pro-disadvantage policies; \*\*\*, \*\* and \* represent the significance level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.

## Appendix A

### Examples of the Misleading Aspects of the *Outcome Equality* and the *Reimbursement Equality* in the Health Care Analysis

In the introduction of this paper, we endorse the idea that we should focus on the essential equity, *i.e.* the equality of opportunity (EOp), rather than the *outcome equality* or the *reimbursement equality* of health care. Here we give three examples as a simple explanation. Example A and B explain the misleading use of the *outcome equality*, and Example C, the *reimbursement equality*.

Example A: Suppose the aging proportion is higher among urban residents, who involuntarily have more health need, and thus more health care expenditure, than rural residents. Such urban-rural differences due to demographic characteristics reflect the effective allocation of health resources, and are indeed reasonable and desirable. Under such situation, policies need no interfere, while purchasing the *outcome equality* may result in inefficiency.

Example B: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural areas. The health care expenditure of the rural resident should have been 1000 *yuan* because of his serious illness. However, as lack of money or effective medical security, his actual expenditure is only 500 *yuan*. Meanwhile, the urban resident, who enjoys a more generous medical insurance, spends the same 500 *yuan* for a health problem, such as flu, which could have been cured with the expense of only 100 *yuan*. There seems no inequality from straightforward the aspect of actual expenditure on health care. However, the essential inequality was concealed.

Example C: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural areas and enjoying the same reimbursement of 50%. One day, they both are attacked by a same disease, such as flu. However, the rural resident decides not to see a doctor because of lack of money, but the urban resident does. Then, the premium paid by the rural resident in effect is used to reimburse the urban resident, resulting in the phenomenon of *the rural help the urban* or *the poor help the rich*. Thus when we judge based on the *reimbursement equality*, such as whether there are unified reimbursement policies for both urban and rural residents, there may also be essential inequalities.

Therefore, if we judge the urban-rural equality or inequality from the viewpoint of the *outcome equality* or the *reimbursement equality*, we may miss the essential inequality. Policies based on these theories may lead to inefficiency even inequity. A broad view is needed in analyzing inequalities in the urban-rural health care, and the theory of equality of opportunity (EOp) can avoid such mistakes or disadvantages we illustrate in the above examples.

## Appendix B

**Table B.1**

Robustness test of Table 2: rural as the reference circumstances.

	<i>Period 1</i>		<i>Period 2</i>	
Directly observed average differences	225.096		268.149	
	<i>Fairness gap</i>	Ratio	<i>Fairness gap</i>	Ratio
<i>e<sup>2</sup> coefficient effect:</i>				
Age	392.324	1.743	-782.817	-2.919
Male	73.391	0.326	257.510	0.960
Married	-123.965	-0.551	-103.547	-0.386
Self-reported health: fair	192.867	0.857	-556.721	-2.076
Self-reported health: good	61.505	0.273	-410.789	-1.532
Self-reported health: excellent	13.187	0.059	-39.637	-0.148
High blood pressure	67.092	0.298	1.297	0.005
Diabetes	-101.040	-0.449	75.892	0.283
Myocardial infarction	6.518	0.029	-7.149	-0.027
Apoplexy	11.146	0.050	-5.252	-0.020
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases	660.779	2.936	-156.815	-0.585
Got fever, sore throat or cough	-137.071	-0.609	92.643	0.345
Got diarrhea or stomachache	-26.994	-0.120	-45.075	-0.168
Got headache or dizziness	85.231	0.379	-46.166	-0.172
Got joint pain or muscle pain	-1.028	-0.005	38.642	0.144
Got rash or dermatitis	5.254	0.023	60.954	0.227
Got eye/ear disease	-56.747	-0.252	30.534	0.114
Got heart disease/chest pain	51.078	0.227	86.451	0.322
Got other infectious disease	39.139	0.174	16.848	0.063
Got noncommunicable disease	-67.785	-0.301	60.327	0.225
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe	122.736	0.545	-4.157	-0.016
Severity of the illness: quite severe	103.797	0.461	124.753	0.465
Inpatient	-10.483	-0.047	44.911	0.167
To see local health worker when felt ill	0.367	0.002	-8.647	-0.032
To see a doctor when felt ill	151.617	0.674	124.701	0.465
To do nothing when felt ill	26.976	0.120	53.760	0.200
Smoke	-2.969	-0.013	-55.150	-0.206
Drink	-186.812	-0.830	-126.831	-0.473
Wave	-24.483	-0.109	-97.180	-0.362
Intercept	-1154.844	-5.130	1649.307	6.151
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>170.783</b>	<b>0.759</b>	<b>272.597</b>	<b>1.017</b>
<i>e<sup>1</sup> environmental characteristic effect:</i>				
Family per capita income	-0.874	-0.004	72.381	0.270
Education	18.030	0.080	6.352	0.024
Reimbursement ratio	16.448	0.073	-16.123	-0.060
East China	-2.170	-0.010	-9.087	-0.034

Travel time to health facility	-4.561	-0.020	-2.447	-0.009
Medicines available	2.793	0.012	0.519	0.002
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>29.667</b>	<b>0.132</b>	<b>51.594</b>	<b>0.192</b>
<i>e<sup>1</sup> environmental coefficient effect:</i>				
Family per capita income	-42.889	-0.191	162.347	0.605
Education	181.580	0.807	23.550	0.088
Reimbursement ratio	53.310	0.237	26.966	0.101
East China	-41.072	-0.182	-76.301	-0.285
Travel time to health facility	2.187	0.010	-58.644	-0.219
Medicines available	-72.712	-0.323	23.497	0.088
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>80.404</b>	<b>0.357</b>	<b>101.414</b>	<b>0.378</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>280.854</b>	<b>1.248</b>	<b>425.605</b>	<b>1.587</b>
<b>Number of sub-sample</b>	1076		3092	

Note: "Ratio" in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> column denotes the ratio of the decomposed *fairness gap* as well as the total *fairness gap*, i.e. each cell in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> column, to the directly observed average difference in the corresponding period.

**Table B.2**

Description of variables of the Jiangsu survey data.

Names of variables		<i>NPH Group</i>				<i>PH Group</i>			
		Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
		Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd
<b>y</b>	Health care expenditure in the past year	1798.922	6824.057	2295.702	7926.267	2541.514	7840.156	2671.515	8891.821
<b>e<sup>1</sup></b>	Family per capita income (yuan/year)	15155.300	9106.527	19132.640	10200.820	13206.500	6069.876	18156.630	9523.793
	Formal education years	6.759	4.008	9.065	4.497	5.797	3.998	8.862	4.663
	Reimbursement ratio (%)	0.201	0.325	0.317	0.410	0.333	0.313	0.415	0.381
	Walking time to the nearest health facility (h.)	0.301	0.481	0.296	0.427	0.329	0.675	0.213	0.149
	Insurance type(1=UEBMI,2=MIUR,3=NCMS)	2.086	0.837	1.508	0.500	1.540	0.499	1.498	0.501
<b>e<sup>2</sup></b>	age	44.556	18.973	42.253	19.540	54.235	19.363	44.949	19.733
	Sex(1=female, 0=male)	0.486	0.500	0.456	0.498	0.534	0.500	0.448	0.498
	Marital status (1= married, 0= others)	1.008	0.592	0.978	0.686	0.865	0.342	0.714	0.453
	Household size	3.414	1.192	3.449	1.042	3.386	1.257	3.694	1.141
	Self-reported health status(1=excellent, 2=good, 3=fair, 4=poor, 5=very poor)	3.354	1.217	3.467	1.183	2.916	1.172	3.155	1.195
	Whether have chronic diseases (1=yes, 0=no)	0.230	0.421	0.287	0.452	0.286	0.453	0.239	0.427
	Whether been in hospital last year (1=yes, 0=no)	0.110	0.313	0.107	0.309	0.125	0.332	0.135	0.342
	Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 2=somewhat severe, 1=not severe)	1.892	0.607	1.795	0.662	1.807	0.668	1.758	0.627
	Temporal disability days	12.764	55.217	13.187	55.755	6.794	32.453	9.239	44.022
	What to do when felt ill (1= self care, 2=saw the local health worker, 3=saw a doctor, 1= none)	2.433	0.988	2.363	1.035	2.055	0.977	2.111	1.019
<b>Number of sub-sample</b>		766		691		311		297	

Source: Authors' survey.

Note: "Sd." denotes the Standard deviation.