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Preface

When this chapter was originally written for the *Handbook of Globalisation* (Michie, 2003) the burning issue regarding labour standards was the attempt by advanced country governments and unions, particularly the US, to establish multilateral rules in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enforce labour standards globally. This initiative did not succeed and the issues raised remain as relevant as ever, though they no longer command as much attention at the top of the international policy agenda. This slightly revised version therefore retains the basic structure of the arguments presented on labour standards in a developmental context. However, in view of the subsequent rise of China and India as major producers and exporters and the perception in the US that this presents a threat to its workers and industries alike, even the principal cause of its industrial and labour woes, this issue is briefly introduced here in an Addendum.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

At the turn of the century the US and other advanced country governments, as well as their unions and some parts of the business sector, pressed proposals to establish multilateral rules through the World Trade Organization (WTO) permitting punitive trade measures to be taken against countries deemed to be failing to uphold core labour standards. Their stated objective was to provide a ‘social floor’ to an integrating world economy. Developing countries, the supposed culprits, firmly rebutted these initiatives, which they maintained were thinly veiled protectionist devices. The initiative failed. Nevertheless, international controversy over labour standards continues.
This policy study seeks to shift the debate onto a more constructive plane. Whilst closely examining the economic arguments in this controversy, it is also concerned with the broader political and moral dimension. The authors suggest that developing countries are indeed committed to improving core and other labour standards; the reason why, in general, they are unable to implement many of these forthwith and much more widely is not because of the wickedness or perversity of their governments or employers but essentially because of their economic circumstances, the structure of their economies, and the manner in which developing country producers are linked into the global production system through global production chains.¹ It is emphasized that developing countries should continue to adhere fully to these commitments both for intrinsic developmental reasons and also, importantly, so as not to lose the moral argument.

The topics examined below include the effect of developing country trade on labour market conditions in the North; the complex relationship between labour standards and economic development; the distinction between core and other labour standards and whether the core standards may be regarded as basic human rights; the evolution of labour standards in the South in response to development and structural changes in these economies; the sub-optimality for workers both in the North and South of the use of sanctions or other punitive measures to make labour standards compulsory in the South.²
It is important to appreciate that the following sections have not been thoroughly revised in the sense of updating the bibliography. Rather, only those aspects that are new to the debate, including those that reflect changes in the nature of globalisation and policy implications, are taken further.

II. THE NORTH’S CASE FOR A SOCIAL CLAUSE

The pressure for adopting measures to compel developing countries to adhere to labour standards came in part from workers in the North, particularly those in the US, whose perceptions and fears inspired a powerful union campaign spearheaded internationally by various international trade union federations. They complain that competition from ‘cheap labour’, resulting from low labour standards in the South, is unfair. They also complain that, unless labour standards are observed in all nations, there will be a ‘race to the bottom’ with respect to the terms and conditions of work. (ICFTU, 1999.) Their perception is that the generally lower labour standards in the South pose direct threats to their own employment, wage levels and bargaining position.  

A more specific complaint is that “Unfair competition does not lie simply in the fact that labour costs (pay, health and safety requirements, social spending, etc.), are extremely low in the South compared with those prevailing in most of Europe; it is also that the state often acts to keep wages low by denying workers the rights necessary to improve their conditions and by failing to enforce even such legislation as may be on their statute books.” (Morris, 1994.) Particular targets for criticism have been those “countries with development models based on manufacturing for export (and
specifically Export Processing Zones) – underpinned by cheap labour, often comprising young female workers, and frequent lack of union rights. (ICFTU, 1996.)

It is indeed true that during the 1980s and 1990s labour markets in advanced economies displayed unfavourable tendencies, especially compared with the previous two decades of the Golden Age. These manifest themselves in three important areas: de-industrialisation; increased inequality of wages and incomes; and mass unemployment. The following examples suffice to indicate the nature of these deficits in the U.S. and in European Union countries.

- During the 100 years before 1973, real average hourly earnings of American workers rose by nearly 2 per cent a year. At that rate real earnings doubled every 36 years. In other words, the standard of living of each generation of workers was double that of the previous one. This longstanding rise in the standard of living came to an abrupt end in 1973.\(^5\) However, over the two decades between 1979 and 1998, instead of increasing, the average real wage fell.\(^6\)

- At the same time, there was a reversal of the long-term trend towards reduced wage and income inequality which had been experienced in the couple of decades following the second world war and some say goes back as far as the 1920s. (Last sentence not clear) To illustrate, in 1979 male workers who had received a college education earned on average 30 per cent more than those who only had high-school education. By 1995, the college
Rising inequality was also manifest not just in terms of education, but also in terms of experience and other indicators of skill, as indeed in the wage structure as a whole. As mentioned above, the real average hourly wage of the average US worker declined continuously between 1979 and 1998; that of those workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, that is the lowest 10 per cent, declined over an even longer period, namely between 1973 and 1998. Real hourly wages stagnated for all other groups except those in the top 10 per cent of the distribution. Even for this top decile, real wages rose by a mere 6.6 per cent over the 25 years between 1973 and 1998. (McCall, 2000.)

Further, the erosion of trade union power represented another important deterioration of labour standards in the US in the 1980s and 1990s. While the US claims that its Constitutional guarantees of worker rights and freedoms absolves it from signing ILO Conventions, there was widespread failure to comply with some of the ILO’s core labour standards. Indeed, a number of independent studies and government reports indicate that American labour law no longer protected workers’ fundamental right to join
a union. Instead “unions are involved in a battle in which workers risk losing their jobs to realize their rights.” (Kochan, 2000). A number of states passed anti-union legislation asserting the “right to work” which has made it more difficult to organize a union and for unions to go on strikes. In addition to this encouragement given to non-union plants, the right to organize continued to be denied in the agricultural sector, which is among the lowest paid. By the early 1990s, only 15 per cent of American workers were organized in unions, whose role in protecting and improving the terms and conditions of work through collective bargaining became much diminished. While the tightening of the labour market in the latter few years of last century resulted in a halt to the decline in union membership, at the end of the century the United States was still considered to have a relatively unregulated regime with regard to labour market issues and what was referred to as a “union-avoidance culture.” (Brown, 2000.)

- European workers have had both similar and also different concerns compared with US labour. The European welfare state system, despite serious attempts by governments and employers to erode the scope of the benefits, still provides a floor for the lowest paid workers. However, unlike the US, in the 1990s leading West European countries were afflicted by mass unemployment. In the popular perception, this was attributed to outsourcing by multinationals and, among other important factors, to unfair competition from developing countries.
• Since the early 1970s, European countries have experienced a high rate of increase in unemployment, such that the average level of unemployment rose from an average of 2.7 per cent in the period 1964-1973 to 10.3 per cent between 1990-1999. In 1995, in France, Italy and the UK the rate was 10 per cent of the labour force, and in Spain and Finland over 15 per cent. Even in Sweden, which previously had maintained a high level of employment, the unemployment rate rose rapidly from 1.5 per cent in 1990 to over 10 per cent in 1995. (Singh and Zammit, 1995.)

• While the freedom to associate largely remained intact in Europe, the actual strength of trades unions in terms of membership diminished significantly and their role in collective bargaining became considerably eroded over the final two decades of the century. These changes were an integral part of the post-1980 economic order that was rooted in new social norms and which involved the unravelling of the social pact between government, employers and labour and a weakening of the welfare state. (Singh, 1990.)

• During the period 1980 to 1988, trade union membership declined in all countries except Sweden and Finland. In France, trade union membership dropped from 19 to 12 per cent, in Italy from 50 to 39 per cent and in the Netherlands from 40 to 26 per cent. In the UK, trade union membership fell from over 50 per cent to about 33 per cent, covering only one in three employees. (Milbank, 1993)
The above data regarding trends in the wages and employment of workers in the North over the four final decades of the twentieth century provides clear evidence that workers’ concerns regarding their worsening position were genuine. A key issue here is whether these detrimental developments were due to competition from developing countries. As the analysis below suggests, this was not the case.

Between 2000 and 2007, however, the world economy (including that of the US) expanded rapidly, resulting in a fall in the US unemployment rate. In Europe too the unemployment rate fell. Subsequently there was a further significant change, this time for the worse, as a consequence of the onset of the acute financial and economic crisis in 2008 when all economic indicators moved in a negative direction. For reasons of space and time this chapter does not provide a detailed analysis of labour issues during the initial crisis years. Suffice it to say that unemployment levels rose appreciably in both the US and Europe.

III. COMPETITION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: AN ASSESSMENT

The labour market difficulties in the advanced countries outlined above are extremely important and deserve full consideration. If it were true that trade in manufactures with low-wage developing countries was the main cause of increasing inequality in the US or of mass unemployment in Europe, this would not bode at all well for constructive international co-operation particularly in the economic sphere. In the event, however, research, particularly the most recent contributions, indicated that this widespread
perception had very little basis.\textsuperscript{11} The important insights of this research may be summarized as follows.\textsuperscript{12}

- An elementary but extremely important point is that most manufacturing trade of the advanced countries takes place between these countries themselves. Even at the end of the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century only a small part is with developing countries. It is indeed true that, starting from a very low level, the volume of manufactured exports from developing countries to advanced countries expanded at a very fast rate of 12 per cent a year between 1970 and 1990. Similarly, their share of world exports of manufactures increased from just 12 per cent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 1996.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, despite this impressive increase in manufactured exports from developing countries, the total imports by advanced countries of manufactured goods from developing countries (excluding China) amounted to only about 1.5 per cent of the combined GDP of OECD countries. It will therefore be difficult to argue that the huge shifts in income inequality and phenomena such as mass unemployment in the North are being caused largely by this rather marginal amount of trade with the South.\textsuperscript{14}

- Another simple but significant fact is that advanced countries, despite their increased manufactured imports from developing countries, have generally maintained a surplus in manufacturing trade with developing countries as a whole. UNCTAD (1995) carried out a comprehensive
analysis of North-South trade over two decades – from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. This indicated that in 1993 the total OECD manufacturing imports from developing countries amounted to approximately US$ 150 billion (in 1985 prices). However, the corresponding exports from the OECD to developing countries totalled nearly US$ 250 billion, yielding a net OECD surplus of nearly US$ 100 billion. As a proportion of GDP, the OECD surplus was about 1 per cent, approximately the same as two decades earlier in 1974. Disaggregation of the OECD figures suggests important intercountry and interregional differences. The European Union’s manufacturing trade balance with developing countries followed much the same pattern as that for the OECD as a whole. The situation, however, has been rather different with respect to the US and Japan: Japan’s trade balance with developing countries increased appreciably between 1974 and 1993, while that for the US fell over this period, becoming negative by the mid 1980s.

The industrial countries’ surplus in manufacturing trade with developing countries has fluctuated in response to world economic events: it rose in the 1970s as developing countries borrowed petro-dollars and greatly increased their imports of capital goods from advanced countries. With the debt crisis engulfing many developing countries in the 1980s, the surplus fell. Importantly, this was due to reduced exports to the developing countries rather than to increasing imports from them. In the first half of the 1990s, as economic growth in developing countries
revived, the surplus again rose as a result of increased Southern imports from the North.

- Research indicates that neither mass unemployment nor the extent of de-industrialization, that is, the fall in employment in manufacturing in G7 advanced countries, are associated with fluctuations in this surplus but rather with cyclical and conjunctural movements in economic activity in these countries themselves.\(^{16}\) Thus, for example, the US was among those G7 industrial countries losing the least number of manufacturing jobs during this period whilst experiencing a trade deficit with developing countries.

- The experience of the 1950s and 1960s on these issues is illuminating. Just as there had been a sharp increase in the import penetration of leading advanced country markets by manufactured imports from the South in the period 1974 to 1993, there was a similar fast increase in imports in the 1950s and 1960s into the US and the original six EEC member states from Japan and Italy (which could be regarded as developing countries in that period, much like the newly industrializing countries today)\(^{17}\). However, this earlier acceleration in the North’s imports did not lead to mass unemployment, reduced real wages, or increased income inequality. Rather, European countries had full employment and, in the US, real wages grew at a rate of nearly 2 per cent a year and inequality decreased. The main difference between then and
the more recent period under discussion is that in the 1950s and 1960s advanced economies were growing at about 5 per cent a year compared with half that long-term rate since 1973.

- Most economists recognize that the unfavourable labour market characteristics in advanced countries detailed in the last section (de-industrialization, mass unemployment, and increased wage dispersion) are far-reaching economic and social phenomena that do not arise from a single cause. Although trade with developing countries may be one of the factors, there are additional interrelated factors that may be equally plausible and more important. These include trade imbalances between developed countries themselves, cyclical movements in economic activity and slow long-term growth in advanced countries, technical change, and changes in economic and social policy in these countries. In practice it is difficult for economists to isolate and measure the influence of each of these possible causal factors and the considerable controversy over this matter is not surprising. ¹⁸

- There is, however, agreement among mainstream economists that the proximate cause for these developments has been the diminished demand for unskilled labour. This is deemed to have caused increased wage inequality in the US because labour markets there are flexible, whilst in Europe, because of the welfare state and more rigid labour markets, the effect is in terms of increased unemployment. Incorporating the decline
in the demand for unskilled labour, mass unemployment in Europe, and
the increased wage dispersion in the US into a unified explanatory
framework is referred to as the “transatlantic consensus”. (Atkinson,
1999.)

- The extent of the consensus is limited, however, to agreeing on the
  supposed fall in the demand for unskilled labour. As to what causes this
  fall in demand is subject to much debate. A large majority of mainstream
  specialists in this area attribute it mostly to technological progress that is
  biased in favour of those with more skills, rather than to trade with
  developing countries. (See footnote 14).

- Some important research, however, criticizes the simple theoretical
  framework (the Hecksher-Ohlin two factor, two sector, two country
  model) normally used in mainstream approaches as being too limited or
  unreal. This two-by-two-by-two model for North-South trade, with the
  North specialising in skill intensive industries according to its
  comparative advantage and the South producing and exporting low-skill
  products, predicts that there will be a fall in the demand for unskilled
  labour leading to increased wage dispersion in the US and unemployment
  in Europe. However, a somewhat more realistic formal model within the
  same paradigm involving trade between three groups of countries (the
  US, Europe and the NICs) does not yield such predictions at all.19

  Furthermore, other economists put greater emphasis on the lack of reality
of the assumptions of the traditional trade models, namely the assumption of constant returns to scale, perfect competition and full employment, giving no consideration to demand side factors or to the accumulation of capital and therefore to growth.

- Significantly, recent research also questions the underlying empirical generalisation on which the ‘transatlantic consensus’ is based, namely that there was a fall in the demand for unskilled labour in advanced economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter was inferred in the US, for example, from the fact that the relative wages of the unskilled workers fell relatively to those of skilled workers. The evidence for 1977 to 1987 is broadly compatible with this proposition: the earnings of the bottom decile (assuming these to be unskilled workers), fell with respect to the median. However, importantly, the corresponding data for the US economy for the period 1987 to 1997 suggests an opposite trend, that is, the ratio of the bottom decile rose in relation to the median. Similarly, wage differentials in the UK fell in the 1990s, in contrast to the 1980s when these rose substantially.

In short, research suggests that traditional trade models are not applicable and that the basic premise regarding a decline in the demand for unskilled labour cannot empirically be sustained for the 1990s. It also suggests that the principle explanations put forward for the ostensible fall in aggregate demand, namely technological change and trade, are not sufficient to account for the broader observed facts regarding increased inequality in
incomes in general. Indeed, Atkinson (1999) pointed out that what was observed in many countries in the 1990s was not a decline in wages at the bottom end of the scale but rather a rise at the very top. This suggests the need to look to wider explanations. Indeed, the trend in the 1990s can be considered in part the result of new economic policies that reflected changing public perceptions of what is socially acceptable, rather than being entirely the result of economic factors, such as technological change or trade. In recent decades economists have tended to overlook the fact that labour markets are unlike product markets. In the real world, even the most flexible labour markets require social agreement on the fairness of wage and income differentials. How these norms are arrived at is a complex social and political process.

The limitations of the theoretical framework of mainstream models on the subject are further highlighted by considering the effects of the 1990s Asian economic crisis on unemployment levels in advanced countries. In the late 1990s it was widely thought that the considerable fall in the price of manufactured exports from the Asian crisis countries consequent on devaluation would lead to a further net loss in US jobs. This, however, did not occur, as indicated by rising levels of employment, particularly among the unskilled. In fact it can be argued that these exports from crisis-affected Asian countries helped increase rather than decrease employment to the extent that they exerted downward pressure on wages and prices and hence lessened inflationary pressure. This enabled the Federal Reserve to allow the US economy to operate at a higher level of economic activity and employment than would otherwise have been possible. Thus, while the direct effect of reduced wages in the crisis-affected Asian countries on US
employment may have been expected to be negative, once indirect effects are taken into account, the result was very different.

To sum up, analysis and evidence indicate that trade with developing countries does not necessarily lead either to unemployment or low real wages for workers in advanced countries. Between 1950 and 1970, despite the rapid increase in imports from the then NICs (newly industrializing countries), European countries enjoyed full employment and rising real wages. In the US, real wages grew rather than remaining stagnant as they were later. Income inequality and wage dispersion became less in both Europe and the US, unlike in the following period. Although there are many factors that could explain the differences, a very important cause was the much faster economic growth in Northern economies in the earlier period. Even those economists who believe that there is a tendency for the trade between rich and poor countries to be detrimental to unskilled workers will recognize that this tendency can be overwhelmed by the “lift all boats” effects of faster economic growth. (Bhagwati, 1994.)

Considered in these terms, even if there were some significant adverse labour market outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s of trade with the South, these could have been overridden by faster economic growth. However, the slower economic growth observed in advanced economies in these decades resulted from their own policy decisions and social and political dynamics. (Glyn et. al., 1990; Crafts and Toniolo, 1996.) It did not result from manufacturing trade with developing countries.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the empirical evidence for the 1990s, contradicts the key theoretical expectation of those mainstream economists who believe that trade with the South necessarily leads to a fall in the demand for unskilled labour.
IV. LABOUR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The previous section considered the North’s apprehensions that unemployment and increasing inequality in advanced countries were due to competition from developing country imports. The discussion concluded that this was neither a necessary outcome nor did the analysis of recent developments prove these apprehensions to be well founded.

This section considers the implications of imposing compulsory labour standards on developing countries. This is a complex question, with many layers of argument, which requires a careful and extensive analysis. However, the analysis of these issues here will be necessarily brief.

In advocating a social clause or other mechanisms to enforce labour standards advanced countries suggest that they are only asking developing countries to adopt core labour standards, and not measures such as minimum wages. The former relate to the core conventions concerning freedom of association and collective bargaining, freedom from forced labour, non-discrimination and the abolition of child labour. This is justified on the grounds that they are basic human rights and hence no other considerations enter the picture. It is argued, further, that the enforcement of core labour standards will not, in any case, alter developing countries’ comparative advantage in production and trade. There is, of course, a whole host of ‘other’ labour standards, but in the context of fierce international competition and developing countries the most likely ones at issue would include minimum wages, employment guarantees and health and safety measures.
This perspective raises two issues that need to be addressed here in view of their importance for developing countries. The first concerns the suggestion that the implementation of core standards has no impact on wage levels and other labour costs. The second concerns the primacy of core labour standards, and whether their classification as human rights completely rules out any discussion of the best way to proceed to implement them.

**IV. 1 Economic costs and benefits of core labour standards**

While the implementation of core labour standards in developing countries will not necessarily affect the costs and pattern of production directly, a little reflection will show that the indirect effects may be quite important, and these could involve not just economic costs but also economic benefits. Further, the costs and benefits of implementing core labour standards are likely to be different for each of the various labour standards. It is also important to appreciate that the costs and benefits would be different if some or all of these core standards were to be implemented simultaneously. For example, the costs to producers of introducing equality of remuneration or non-discrimination in employment are likely to be higher if workers also have the right to organize and bargain collectively.

To illustrate and clarify the main issues involved, the focus in the following discussion will first be on freedom of association and on free collective bargaining. Subsequently other labour standards, particularly that of the elimination of child labour, will be briefly considered.

The contention that the implementation of the two core standards under discussion here (freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining -- Conventions No. 87 and 98), will have no economic consequences for producers or to the economy as a whole is
not generally valid. At an elementary level, the mainstream textbook model of perfect competition would posit that the introduction of these standards would be distortionary as this will lead to monopsony in the labour market and thus to a misallocation of resources. This is, of course, a static analysis based on a rather restricted set of assumptions and one can envisage a dynamic model of the economy in which labour standards reduce conflict by providing an institutionalized way of minimizing disruption, improving co-operation between the employees and employers and thereby encouraging the latter to invest more. This would generate greater growth in the national economy.²¹

While theoretically possible, such a model with positive effects on economic development does not correspond to the economic conditions of most developing countries. In the longer term, however, when a higher level of development and a more advanced economic and institutional structure has been attained, the economic impact of employers’ and workers’ associations is more likely to be favourable.

There are a number of reasons for expecting negative effects in the short to medium term for developing countries resulting from the compulsory introduction of freedom of association and collective bargaining, according to the terms of ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. The most important of these are outlined below.

**IV 1a The structure of the economy**

Most developing countries are not only poor but have a sharply dualistic economic structure, extreme segmentation of the labour market, and surplus labour. In the mid-1990’s, on average, only a small proportion of developing countries’ labour force (15 per cent) had employment in industry and services in which they had a formal wage contract.
For this segment of the labour force it is feasible to consider applying core ILO labour standards. In contrast, however, 61 per cent of the labour force works in agriculture and another 22 per cent in rural non-farm and urban informal employment. (World Bank, 1995.) Even for the urban sector alone, UNDP (2000) reports that, in the 1990s, informal work accounted for 57 per cent of urban employment in Bolivia, 56 per cent in Tanzania and 48 per cent in Thailand.

In general, improvements in labour standards, core or otherwise, of this often considerable portion of the labour force in agriculture and the informal sector in developing countries depends on significant changes being made in economic structure. Labour standards improve as the proportion of the labour force in these two sectors declines while that in organized industry and the formal service sector, where labour standards are more likely to be observed or enforced, rise.\textsuperscript{22} Fast economic growth may speed up the process of structural change but can also be associated with jobless growth in the industrial sector. (For a further discussion, see Section V below).

It is difficult to introduce and almost impossible to enforce ILO Conventions on this large part of the labour force. The vast majority of labour in these sectors gains a living in micro-enterprises including subsistence agriculture, which creates obvious problems of organizing labour and monitoring standards. Further, in the more populous developing countries, there invariably exists a large reserve army of unskilled low-productivity labour that has to make ends meet by any means. In effect there is a large reserve of labour in search of work at any price. The possibilities for unionization and collective bargaining of the sort traditionally associated with the advanced industrial economies are limited. With
deindustrialization and the rise of the service economy, even the advanced industrial countries are now confronted with this problem once again.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{1b Autocratic employers and immature trade unions}

As will be explained in the following section, freedom of association and collective bargaining in advanced countries has developed through an evolutionary process over a period of well over a century. In the course of this evolution the unions and employers developed responsible institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution. Employers themselves came to appreciate the advantages of trade unions and collective representation for the workers. On the union side wasteful and damaging inter-union rivalry and other dysfunctional features of early trade unions were curbed, and in many industrial countries centralized wage bargaining or other similar pay co-ordinating structures were put in place.

However, if in accordance with the advanced countries’ proposals, the two labour conventions under discussion are imposed in a “big bang” manner in a developing economy (through, for example, international trade sanctions), it is more than likely that this would lead not to conflict resolution, but rather to strikes and consequent economic disruption. Many developing country employers, including the largest ones, often have a feudal or paternalistic outlook and do not see any need for trade unions. It is not unusual for them to use violent methods to stop the formation of unions and their activities, much like the historical experience of advanced countries such as the US. On the side of the employees, in the early stages of unionization there is also likely to be considerable inter-union competition for members, leading to populist positions being taken by union leaders. Further, attempts at violent suppression of trade union activity by employers invariably leads to counter violence by unions. The consequent economic and social disruption
discourages investment, both foreign and domestic, and therefore does not help the cause of economic development.

Moreover, free collective bargaining between employers and unions, if it takes place at all, will only be concerned with the wages and employment of those who are already working in the formal sector. The interests of the vast majority of workers in agriculture and in the informal sector who are not unionized would be ignored. Further, to the extent that formal sector unions succeed in getting higher wages and employment guarantees for their members, this is likely to reduce, other things being equal, the demand for labour in that sector, forcing the unemployed to seek work in the informal sector. So the paradoxical result of efforts to impose compulsory labour standards is that it would harm economic development, reduce structural change, and thereby increase the numbers in the informal sector where labour standards hardly apply.

Thus, the compulsory introduction of free collective bargaining, if successfully implemented, is likely to widen the already considerable wage and income gap between workers in different parts of the economy. Instead of promoting equality and solidarity, the unintended result of unionization of formal sector employees may well be the development of an aristocracy of labour based on extraction of rents by union members, particularly in more productive firms. In these circumstances a concern for broad social justice, especially with respect to the informal sector and small rural producers, may require government intervention and regulation of bargaining between unions and employers in the formal sector (see, for example, Stiglitz 2000). Such intervention may also be necessary to cope with the adverse economic and social consequences of bargaining between autocratic management and immature unions as outlined above. However, many developed country
governments lack the institutional and administrative capacity for adequate remedial intervention with unfavourable consequences for economic development.\textsuperscript{24}

The paradoxical results of the enforcement of compulsory labour standards go further. Such enforcement would not only be counter-productive for developing countries, it is also unlikely to help the interests of those seeking protection in the advanced countries. To see this, assume that the imposition of labour standards leads, via trade union action, to higher wages and costs in the developing country’s export sector – the most favourable assumption from the protectionist perspective in the advanced countries. Under this assumption, the competitiveness of developing country exports is likely to diminish, but this may provide only a brief respite for the advanced country producers.

In analysing this issue, it is useful to remember that most developing country exports to advanced countries are produced by a relatively small though growing number of NICs, whilst the vast majority of developing countries export only a very small fraction of the total. Although, in the short run, all countries are likely to be disadvantaged to a greater or lesser extent in terms of their competitiveness if core labour standards are made compulsory, the NICs are unlikely to be handicapped for long. As they have higher rates of investment, technological change and superior production and export dynamics, they will, in the medium term, be able to re-establish their competitiveness. The outstanding examples of this phenomenon are countries like Korea and indeed before then the example of Japan that started with Asian wage levels and has continued to be competitive in spite of continuing increases in real wages, as well as more and more stringent environmental standards imposed on their exports by importing countries. Higher labour costs in firms already competing in world markets are likely to stimulate investment in more productive
techniques in order to maintain their competitive edge. China and India are current examples of this process.

However, turning from the NICs to the great majority of developing countries, although accounting for only a small proportion of total developing country manufactured exports to advanced countries, these exports are, nevertheless, crucial to their well being. A rise in their export costs as a result of the compulsory introduction of labour standards would, under plausible assumptions, lead to a lower rate of economic growth of exports in both the short and medium term, worsening their balance of payments, such that the growth rate has to be lower to be compatible with current account equilibrium. This will reduce the pace of structural change and the improvement of labour standards.

It will be appreciated, however, that both for the NICs and other developing countries the costs of adjustment, whether in the short or long term will be lower, the faster the rate of economic growth of production and exports in the domestic and in the world economy.²⁵

V LABOUR STANDARDS: THE EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

It is interesting in this respect to reflect on the actual experience of East Asian and Latin American countries during the course of economic development. Taking East Asia first, notwithstanding the recent Asian crisis, these ‘miracle’ countries experienced very fast long-term growth (near double-digit rates for two decades or more). The result has been fast absorption of surplus labour resulting in labour shortages; very high rates of growth of real wages by comparative international standards; speedy structural change, resulting in the displacement of the informal sector activities by the formal sector. Real wages in the fast growing East Asian and South East Asian economies rose at a rate of over 5 per cent a
year between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s. In Taiwan, employment in the agricultural sector fell from 56.1 per cent in 1953 to 36.7 per cent in 1970 and was only 12.1 per cent in 1993. Industrial employment reached more than 40 per cent in 1990. In Korea in 1992, only about 15 per cent of the labour force were still in the agricultural sector and more than 25 per cent in the industrial sector. (Lee and Park, 1995.)

It is a matter of historical record that many of these countries repressed trade unions during the early phases of their developmental spurt. This was the case for example in Korea during the 1960s and 1970s. However, with the fast expansion of the formal economy and particularly the shrinking of the informal sector, not only labour standards in terms of employment and wages greatly improved, there was also a very considerable expansion of unionization. By the end of the 1980s, 40 per cent of the labour force in Taiwan and 17.2 per cent in Korea were unionized, compared to only 15 per cent in the US. (Lee and Park, 1995.) These huge improvements in core as well as other labour standards took place in these countries through the process of economic development itself, without any international coercion.

A comparison of East Asian countries with those elsewhere (for example, in South Asia or Latin America) suggests that fast economic growth may not be a sufficient, but is certainly a necessary, condition for the speedy establishment and improvement of labour standards. To illustrate, a democratic country like India in the 1950s had much better core labour standards in the formal sector than say, Korea; but the situation is now quite the reverse. The proportion of the workforce in unions is much smaller than that in Korea, and workers’ wages in India have grown much more slowly. Similarly, in Latin America, despite its long history of trade unionism compared with East Asia, its much slower long-
term rate of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to further ‘informalization’ of the economy. Tokman (1997) reported that eight out of every 10 new jobs in Latin America in the 1990s have been created in the informal sector with consequent unfavourable prospects for the workers involved to be able to exercise the rights given to them by the ILO conventions. A small proportion of the increase in informal sector work could be due to labour saving technical progress in the formal sector, rather than to slower growth. However, it is too early to tell whether the long-term relationship between economic growth and formal jobs has become worse over time.

There are a number of reasons why improved core and other labour standards are associated with structural change and particularly with industrialization. In the first instance, in contrast with the small-scale agricultural sector and the informal sector, work in industry is usually organized in a way that facilitates trade union organization and activities. The relatively higher rate of growth of productivity in industry also provides scope for improvements in substantive labour standards. Employers in the industrial sector who have invested substantial capital in the enterprise are also interested in promoting core and other labour standards such as health and safety standards since these tend to increase the level of commitment of the workforce and to increase the productivity of workers. (See further Piore (1990).

**V.1 Core Labour Standards and Human Rights**

The subsections above considered some of the most important costs and benefits of implementing the core labour standards relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining, and the appropriateness of such standards in the circumstances in which most developing countries find themselves.
This sub-section addresses the other central issue introduced at the beginning of the section, namely that concerning the primacy given to core labour standards, which have been accorded the status of human rights.

The unanimous adoption by ILO members in 1998 of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, embodying the seven core labour standards, is regarded as evidence of the widespread acceptance of the notion that certain labour standards have precedence. The rationale given for the primacy of the seven core standards is that they are universal human rights. Of these the freedom of association and trade union rights are given particular emphasis in that they give workers the freedom to pressure for improvements in other aspects of labour standards. Having the status of human rights purportedly pre-empts any economic cost-benefit analysis. These contentions are contested below.

**Historical evolution of labour standards in advanced countries**

Historically, labour standards evolved in a rather different manner. In Europe, early efforts to improve labour standards focused on gaining legislation to eliminate the worst forms of child and female labour, and with initiatives to improve health and safety at work. It took many decades before workers’ efforts to associate and bargain with their employers gained legal recognition. In many countries, it was only after many decades of struggle and political debate that trade unions were recognized and constituted a regulated institutional framework facilitating conflict resolution between employers and workers. Thus, broadly speaking, core and substantive labour standards evolved during the course of economic development, and legislation legitimizing labour standards was introduced as a result of
struggle by working people, and not through some *deus ex machina*. Labour standards have been both the cause and effect of democratization in the advanced countries. In the light of this evolution, the unions became increasingly responsible and both economic growth and labour standards improved.

*A Hierarchy of labour rights?*

Although these two core standards concerning the freedom of association and collective bargaining are indeed extremely important and should be given high status, the primacy of those over non-core standards needs to be questioned. For example, should health and safety at work be accorded lower priority than the right to free association and collective bargaining? It is indeed true that ‘deficits’ in the latter have often resulted in the imprisonment and even murder of trade unionists. On the other hand, the disregard for the health and lives of workers manifested by the widespread lack of health and safety regulations has resulted in appalling tragedies such as those in the Bangkok factory and the Bhopal chemicals plant in which fires and fumes cost the lives of thousands of workers. Less dramatically but more insidiously, tens of thousands of unprotected agricultural workers worldwide suffer slow poisoning by the chemicals used to produce agricultural exports.

Equally importantly, there is international recognition of the fact that absolute poverty blights the lives of over one billion people in developing countries. In 1995, 117 Heads of State or Government attending the Copenhagen Social Summit endorsed the Copenhagen Declaration, which put primary emphasis on the promotion of full employment and poverty reduction. Should not the right to a decent living also be regarded as a basic labour right?
V. 2 Terms of Conventions 87 and 98 and the role of the government

There are also serious difficulties from the point of view of developing countries with the precise formulations of Conventions 87 and 98 concerning freedom of association, the right to organize and to engage in free collective bargaining. The texts of these Conventions reflect the needs and institutions of advanced countries at a particular moment in time. The conventions do not take into account the fact that untramelled collective bargaining may not only lead to social disruption as noted above, but also to serious macro-economic disequilibria, all of which require government intervention in the bargaining process. Governments also need to intervene to ensure that the interests of the unemployed, low productivity sector workers or those in the informal sector or small-scale agriculture are taken into account. These concerns were recognized in European countries themselves during the so-called “Golden Age” (1950-1973) when many governments entered into social pacts with unions and employers to institutionalize the social market economy, which tried to achieve a broadly acceptable distribution of income and wealth.29 (Glynn, et al. (1990), Eichengreen (1996), Flanagan (1999)).

Moreover, the orthodox approach to trade unions implied in the terms of the two Conventions is hardly relevant to peasant and small-scale farming in developing countries. These require different policies and institutions in which the government often plays a role, as for example, through price support programmes, technical assistance and promoting co-operatives. Some of these measures may be achieved through individual and collective initiatives and organizations, but in practice the government has to play a leading role. In developing country agriculture, one of the main issues is land reform, since the size of land
holding is a crucial factor in determining the capacity to earn a decent living and escape poverty.

It would appear that human rights defined and interpreted in terms of these two core Conventions are destined only for a small part of the working population, benefiting mainly those who are already relatively privileged. Furthermore, the untrammeled exercise of these rights by the minority may well prejudice the chance for others to have a decent living or to be able to exercise their rights to freedom of association and to collective bargaining.

VI SHOULD CORE CONVENTIONS BE MADE COMPULSORY?

To sum up, from the perspective of developing countries, there are three significant policy conclusions with respect to the core Conventions:

- The number of core Conventions should be expanded to make them inclusive and relevant to the needs of the whole working population worldwide;
- Conventions No. 87 and 98 require fundamental revision to make them relevant to the developing world.
- There are trade-offs between certain core conventions and therefore economic and social costs and benefits must be part of the moral equation.

These conclusions also have important implications for the question whether core labour standards should be made mandatory by means of international trade sanctions or other punitive measures; these implications are examined below.
In the case of Conventions 87 and 98, the answer suggested by the above analysis is unambiguous. These conventions are deeply flawed, particularly from a developing country perspective, and it would be a mistake for developing countries to implement them in the fashion envisaged in the conventions. The argument here is not against workers’ organizations as such, but the process of raising labour standards should ensure the inclusion of the mass of the working population. If these conventions were revised to make them more inclusive, developing countries would find them easier and more useful to implement. However, their mandatory application in developing countries under international coercion would still be unwise. This is because, although the acceptance of the role of the government in the collective bargaining process may help ameliorate some of the difficulties outlined earlier, there are still likely to be significant costs for the non-NIC majority of developing countries. Consequently, compulsory standards such as these will be resisted by these countries. However, encouragement to these countries through non-coercive means and technical assistance by agencies such as the ILO to implement the standards are more likely to lead to positive results. (Bhagwati, 1994).

The arguments for compulsory implementation of labour standards in developing countries are sometimes based on advanced country allegations of the former’s unfair advantages in trade that give rise to social dumping and race to the bottom. These issues will be examined in the next section where it will be seen that these considerations also do not in any way justify compulsion.

Although we argue here against compulsory imposition of Conventions 87 and 98, we do not take the same view for all other core conventions. For example, granting slave and bonded labour their freedom in recognition of their human rights should be implemented
forthwith. In view of the limited numbers of people involved, compulsion cannot be rejected on grounds of costs to developing countries. However, in the case of the Conventions on child labour, which we discuss briefly below, again compulsion will not be appropriate.

**Child labour**

Child labour (covered by a core ILO Convention (No. 138 on Minimum Age) and the Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, which amplifies the former) raises other kinds of problems, which merit careful consideration. The latter Convention commits countries to working with the ILO to fix time-bound policies to eliminate the worst forms of child labour. As is increasingly recognized, the phenomenon of child labour is rooted in a number of fundamental factors, not least domestic and global policies that lead to income concentration, poverty, exclusion, under-employment and unemployment. The World Confederation of Labour (WCL) notes that, to abolish child labour, to prevent such situations arising, and to reintegrate children into society “requires a broad-based strategy. …. Free compulsory and high-quality education is a pre-requisite for concrete results of such a strategy … and has to include curricula for vocational training, which is now lacking in many countries.” (WCL, 1997.)

The essential point is that parents and governments in developing countries would like their children to be in school rather than at work, but in many poor countries they are unable to afford it. Detailed empirical studies from several countries confirm this view. (See, for example, Grootaert, 1998 and Addison et. al., 1997. For a recent review of these and other studies see Basu, 1999.)
Empirical evidence further suggests that, where parents have been compensated for the loss of children’s earnings and schools, children do not work but go to school. A prominent and highly successful example is the government’s massive Bolsa Familia programme in Brazil. However, without such compensations for the parents, the imposition of the standard of child labour will simply lead to the children resorting to other often illegal or unsavoury activities, where they will be worse off than if they were working and earning some income for the family. Thus, without supporting measures, the enforcement of the child labour Conventions in developing countries will hinder rather than help the realisation of the objective of promoting the welfare of children.31

VII CONCLUSION:
An extremely important point that emerges from the discussion of core and other labour standards in this section is that substantial improvements in these standards, as well as significant growth of real wages and other substantive standards, can be rapidly achieved voluntarily through the process of economic development itself. As indicated, the fast growing East Asian countries were able to accomplish these objectives without any international enforcement measures.

Efforts to enforce core labour standards will not help to raise standards in much of the informal sector and could well lead to further informalization. If punitive trade measures were used to enforce such standards, a reduction in trade through the application of trade sanctions could result in cuts in employment precisely in the industries where labour standards have generally been seen to grow fastest. This is likely to throw more workers into the informal sector, worsening the already low levels of remuneration and conditions of work. The net result will be the opposite of what is allegedly intended.
This is not to say that leaving it to the market or to the natural forces of economic development will always be adequate to improve labour standards at a fast enough rate. The promotion of labour standards on a voluntary basis, backed up with technical and financial assistance for both the monitoring and implementing of the standards by the countries themselves, will be helpful in hastening the process. As explained before, developing countries have continually demonstrated their commitment to raising their labour standards, as manifested by various national and multilateral actions, including their recent acceptance of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Their Follow-Up. (For the text, see ILO, 2000a, and for the Follow-Up, see ILO 2000b). In addition to the economic and practical arguments outlined above, they strongly object, however, on political grounds, to labour standards being made compulsory, whether the compulsion is enforced through the WTO or through joint ILO/WTO initiatives. Such measures would introduce yet a further layer of conditionalities to those already imposed on them by the international financial institutions and through the Uruguay Round trade and trade-related agreements in the WTO, all of which circumscribe developing countries’ policy options in one way or another. (South Centre, 1998a and 1998b.)

The current ILO approach to labour standards seems to be more promising for the purpose of establishing a universal social floor for the globalizing economy. It focuses on the notion of ‘decent work’ as a means of capturing and realizing the aspirations of people throughout the world and seeking radically new solutions to the global problems of poverty and the working poor. At the opening session of the 88th ILO Conference in June 2000, ILO’s Director General declared that decent work “… is not a straitjacket, a one-size-fits-all solution”. On the contrary, it is a way of treating in a coherent and dynamic way the
aspirations and goals of different individuals, different cultures, different societies. The
question is how to make it real. We all understand that the possibilities for decent work
evolve with social and economic progress, and goals can and should rise over time.”
(Somavia, 2000)

An important conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that the
economic interests of informal sector low-productivity labour and those of the small-scale
farming families must be promoted by other methods, including the development of
popular organizations. The above analysis would also suggest that there is a clear need to
redraft Conventions 87 and 98 so that they lead to more democratic outcomes in the sense
of taking into account the conditions and economic structures of developing countries. The
core standards could also be extended to include one focusing on the right to a decent
living.

Addendum

Since the earlier version of this work was published the process of globalisation has
advanced significantly and is acknowledged to be having both a positive and negative
impact on most countries and regions. There are both winners and losers. Until the start of
the current acute economic crisis that began with the demise of Lehman Brothers, the
world economy was expanding rapidly: the rate of expansion was over 5 per cent per
annum between 2003 and 2007. While the US among developed countries, and China and
India among developing countries, were the most successful in terms of economic growth
they were not so successful in improving income distribution. (However, there is no
evidence that slower growing economies were better in this respect.) In this brief
addendum we provide an overview of the evolution of labour markets and labour standards

36
in these three countries and examine the implications of North-South interactions during this period of fast economic growth for workers in the North and South.

Taking first the case of the US, its economy enjoyed near full employment in the 2000s. The burst of the dot.com bubble at the beginning of 2000 was followed by fast economic recovery and with the achievement of near full employment and public concern over labour standards in developing countries waned. It has however resurfaced with the current acute economic crisis and the resultant mass unemployment. The Obama administration, to its credit, has not accepted labour unions’ demands for protection but instead has outlined a positive programme of the doubling of US exports over the next 5 years. In the context of the current downturn in the world economy it remains to be seen how realistic this plan is likely to be.

Among developing countries, current fast growth of over 10 per cent in China and 9 per cent in India has led to considerable reductions in poverty in both countries and to substantial improvements in levels of employment and to improvements in labour standards, without coercive multilateral pressures. Nevertheless, the Obama administration is subject to pressure from trade unions to strengthen the labour standard dimensions of bilateral trade and development agreements between the US and developing countries.

Recent evidence suggests that labour standards in both China and India have improved as a result of labour pressures, as well as the structural change brought about by government policies promoting fast economic growth. Hundreds of millions of rural workers in both countries have found work in the cities. Their labour standards may be expected to improve, as in the case of East Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s, when labour
standards improved rapidly in tandem with the increasing demand for non-agricultural labour. At the same time, economic growth in China and India has, inter alia, increased demand for imports from the US and elsewhere and hence reduced US financial deficits.

However, as Izurieta and Singh (2010) point out, fast growth in India and China is not an unalloyed good for the US economy and its workers. These countries’ growth entails increased demand for imported energy and other raw materials, pushing world commodity prices sky high. Their simulation analysis based on an econometric model of the world economy suggests that fast Indian growth at 9 per cent per annum and Chinese growth at 10 per cent per annum is not compatible with a full employment level of growth of 3 per cent a year in the US. Were the US to have full employment growth, India and China could only grow at less than their desired rates of growth. The Izurieta and Singh analysis indicates that this conflict of interest can only be resolved by means of close cooperation between the three countries in energy conservation and environmental measures. Such a scenario will inevitably benefit labour markets and standards in both rich and poor countries particularly in the medium and long term. Moreover, in an increasingly integrated world economy, international economic and technical cooperation is essential if continued recession is to be averted. Further, the full potential of globalization in terms of improved labour standards and greater equality can only be achieved if there is greater policy coordination between nation states. Globalization left only to market forces cannot deliver worldwide full employment or decent livelihoods for the entire workforce.
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Notes

1 The pressure on large northern companies at the top of value chains to keep their final prices low, and their substantial power to keep down the prices of their suppliers, makes them complicit in the continuation of low labour standards in developing countries. (Zammit, 2010.)

2 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see Singh and Zammit (2000)

3 A particular complaint is that the employment of forced labour and child labour facilitates the payment of extremely low wages, if any, thereby putting pressure on other segments of the labour market to accept low wages.

4 The necessary rights are those specified in ILO Conventions 87 and 98, granting workers the right to organize and to engage in free collective bargaining.

5 The basic source for the data in the following paragraphs is the US Council of Economic Advisers (1998) and Economic Policy Institute (1999).

6 For an analysis of the evolution of the world economy between 1973 and 1979 (the so-called “inter-shock period” see Glyn et al. (1990).

7 On the issue of forced labour, the requirement that prisoners and youths in detention work for derisory pay is standard practice in the US and in Europe. In the US, the prison population numbers over 1 million while half a million in local county jails. There is a disproportionate number of black and latino persons, often detained for minor offences and arguably as a form of social control (See, for example, Freeman 1995). Prisoners are forced to work in factories, including clothing factories that have located their operations to prison sites, where they have a captive pool of cheap labour. It is estimated that in 1998 prison labour produced over 280 products worth over US$ 9 billion and replaced 400,000 jobs otherwise done by the normal workforce. Prison labour is paid the minimum wage but, after deductions for taxes, room and board, victims compensation etc. the pay may be only US$ 60 a month for nine-hour days. A number of harsh disciplinary measures and other penalties are imposed if prisoners refuse to work. Federal law prohibits the domestic sale of prison-made goods unless prisoners are paid the going wage, so prison industries export the output, often to Asian countries. (WINDS.)

8 Unionization becomes particularly difficult when a considerable part of the workforce consists of illegal migrant labour, as is the case in parts of the USA. Employers are, of course, keen to employ such workers, since these are willing to work on almost any terms and in the worst of all possible jobs. However, the fear of being arraigned and deported as illegal migrants constrains them from joining efforts to unionize and
improve their terms and conditions of work. Inflows of migrant labour, legal or otherwise, are unlikely to dry up, until growth and development has improved the standard of living in the South.

9 The lower rate of unemployment in the US is partly explained by the fact that welfare provision for the unemployed is not as extensive as that in Europe, so that many people are obliged to seek work however unremunerative the wage. The higher level of unemployment in the EU compared with that in the US is the source of a vigorous academic and policy debate on labour market flexibility.

10 Since then unemployment levels have declined. The April 2000 figure for Sweden was 4.7 per cent and the average for the Euro-11, that is the members of the European single currency union, was 9.2 per cent. (The Economist, 2000.)

11 For research suggesting that trade with the South has a detrimental impact on employment and wages in the North, see in particular Wood (1994) and Wood (1995). However, Wood’s estimates of the extent of the impact far exceed those of other economists.

12 The analysis in this section is based on Singh and Dhumale (2000). For detailed empirical evidence underlying the arguments in paragraphs i-iv the reader is referred to UNCTAD (1995).

13 The bulk of developing country manufactured exports is accounted for by only thirteen developing countries, mainly in Asia, the percentage reaching 87.9 in 1996.13 (Ghose, 2000.)

14 Strictly speaking, under the rarified assumptions of general equilibrium trade models, it can be shown that small changes in quantities can cause large shifts in prices. For the intense academic controversy on this subject, see Krugman (2000), Leamer (2000). For earlier contributions, see Bhagwati (1994).

15 It is also important to bear in mind a related point with respect to the effects of trade on jobs. Once a country starts trading there will normally be a gross loss of jobs, but not necessarily a net loss. Other things being equal, employment will contract in importing and expand in exporting industries. The magnitude of the net change in jobs will be determined by the relative growth rates of imports and exports, as well as by the capital intensity of production in the importing and exporting industries. For the individuals concerned, the gross loss of jobs is extremely important as many of them may not have the skills or the capacity to move to jobs created elsewhere in the economy. Thus governments often need to provide special assistance to displaced workers. The US government, for example, provides trade adjustment grants to workers proven to have been displaced because of imports.

Between 1958 and 1997, import penetration by Italy and Japan of the market for manufactures for the original six EEC countries, excluding Italy, rose from 0.5 per cent to 3.7 per cent of apparent consumption (gross output minus net exports); the corresponding figures for the US were 0.3 to 1.8. This acceleration in the North’s imports is coincidentally similar to that experienced by these countries between 1975 and 1992. Over the latter period, the European Union’s manufactured imports from developing countries rose from 0.9 to 2.8 per cent of apparent consumption. The analogous figures for the US for this later period were 0.8 and 4.3.


See Atkinson (1999); Atkinson (2000); Davis (1998a) and Davis (1998b).

See, for example, the statement of US Secretary of Trade Barshefsky’s statement on this matter at the Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting.

The central question here is whether labour standards would help or hinder economic development, through their impact on the rate of growth of output, employment and labour costs. The general answer, as suggested by the analysis in the text, is that this depends on a number of complex factors and interrelationships, in particular the assumptions which are made with respect to a) the range of labour standards being introduced and the speed with which they are implemented; b) the level of development of the country and degree of export orientation; c) the dynamics of the production structure and production and export capabilities, including the ability to absorb modern technology; d) the rate of savings and investment among others. It may also be useful to note that this analysis of the relationship between labour standards and economic development is somewhat different to the examination of the effects of labour standards on economic welfare in terms of the conventional theories of welfare economics and international trade. For an example of the latter perspective see Brown et al., 1996.

Employment in the formal sector increases until a very high level of per capita income is reached. At that point, the share of employment in industry declines and that of services, particularly informal services (informal in the sense that many labour laws become difficult to apply due to the small size of the enterprise) begins to rise, as is indicated in the previous footnote.

The acquisition of labour rights and standards is not necessarily a permanent achievement. For example, the number of people employed in Indian restaurants in the United Kingdom now totals more than those in
coal mining, steel making and shipbuilding put together. These once dominant industries were noted for their strong unions with substantial collective bargaining capacity, which brought continual improvements in substantive labour standards. In contrast, work in the restaurant business, which has low productivity, is typified by its informal, part-time nature, and the level of union organization is low, as are labour standards. This needs to be distinguished from the growing phenomenon of ‘informalization’ of the work contract, whereby the nature of the ‘contract’ is such as to turn the ‘employee’ into a virtually self-employed person, with few if any labour rights.

Contrary to popular prejudice in advanced countries, most developing country governments are neither perverse nor wicked or worse. Some in East and Southeast Asia have been recognized to be “developmental states” with an outstandingly successful record of close government involvement in the economy (see for example Amsden 1989, Singh 1995a, Wade 1990) Others, such as India, have been equally interventionist but have not been as successful. The large majority of Third World governments are less effective with considerably lower levels of institutional and administrative capacity. These governments may not always be multiparty democracies but it is important to recognize that they tend to be relatively ‘inclusive’, i.e. they cannot simply be regarded as representing the interest of employers. There are, of course, a small number of southern countries, which are totally corrupt, ineffective and non-inclusive, as was the case with Mobutu’s Congo, for example. For such countries, neither compulsory nor voluntary labour standards would help.

For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh, 1990.

For further details, see Singh (2000).

The trend rate of growth of Latin American economies during the last 20 years has been only three per cent a year, compared with almost six per cent a year in the period 1950-1980 (Singh, 2000).

In the words of E. P. Thompson, studying the making of the English working class, “The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making.” See Thompson (1963) and Hobsbawm (1964).

The European Agricultural Policy (CAP) was originally intended to improve the livelihoods of small-scale farmers and agricultural workers.

According to the ILO (www.ilo.org/public/english/ipec) there are 250 million child labourers in the world including child domestic workers. Of these, “60-80 million at least … work in conditions which cripple their bodies, minds and souls, stunt their growth and shorten their lives.” Less than 5 per cent of these child labourers work in export industries. It is estimated that during the 1990s 300,000 were soldiers.
Recent theoretical research suggests that, under certain special circumstances, particularly where children constitute a significant proportion of the work force, the banning of child labour could lead to a rise in adult wages, enabling poor households to do without the income from child labour. The author of this theoretical result himself observes that “This is unlikely to be true for very poor economies but maybe valid for better-off countries. Even so, one would need to do detailed empirical work to decide whether such a total ban is worthwhile. The interesting insight the theory gives us here is to tell us that it may be so and to give hints as to the type of economy where this is likely.” (Basu, 1999.)

For an analysis of the causes of the current financial and economic crisis see Aiginger (2009), Solow (2010) and Singh and Zammit (2010).