Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences

Flanders, Sam (2013): Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences.

Abstract

This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided matching model where agents have single peaked preferences and face no costs or restrictions to matching. These algorithms allow matches to be computed as an explicit function of the parameters of the model, making them convenient for use in theoretical matching market models, such as dating markets. One such theoretical model is solved and analyzed. Finally, several possible extensions and topics for further study are explored, such as adding noise to observed types and allowing misreporting of type.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Matching Theory, Dating, Marriage, Mathematical Economics
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D10 - General

References

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Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities Author(s): Patrick Legros and Andrew F. Newman Reviewed work(s): Source: Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Jul., 2007), pp. 1073-1102

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