More than Words and Good Intentions: The Political Agenda-Setting Power Behind Foreign Aid Mechanisms

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26 March 2014

More than Words and Good Intentions: The Political Agenda-Setting Power Behind Foreign Aid Mechanisms[*]

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In this paper, international aid is examined as a tool for political agenda-setting. A theoretical model is constructed for the analysis, incorporating the incentives created by foreign aid, on the political benefits of recipient governments. The model also incorporates the compensating benefits provided by these governments through the legitimization of the donor country's political agenda. The main results of this model indicate that governments which offer international assistance can influence the political agenda of recipient countries through two channels: 1) By reducing the political costs of official intervention in issues that receive aid, and 2) By generating incentives for additional political rent-seeking. The results are studied in the case of aid provided by the USA to Colombia during the period 1998-2012, which shows the power of US presidents to establish part of the Colombian political agenda related to drugs and terrorism. The results are obtained through a novel content analysis of presidential speeches in both countries and from a set of estimates corrected by possible problems of endogeneity in foreign aid allocation.

JEL: *F35, F54, F59*

Keywords: *Agenda-Setting, Foreign Aid, Content Analysis, International-Politics*

Más que Palabras y Buenas Intenciones: El poder de Establecimiento de Agenda Política detrás de los Mecanismos de Ayuda Exterior[*]

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En este documento se estudia la ayuda internacional como una herramienta de establecimiento de agenda política. Para el análisis, se construye un modelo teórico que incorpora los incentivos que genera la ayuda exterior sobre los beneficios políticos de los gobiernos receptores de la misma; así como también, la contraprestación de éstos gobiernos a través de la legitimación de la agenda política de los países donantes. Los principales resultados del modelo señalan que gobiernos que ofrecen asistencia internacional pueden influenciar la agenda política de los gobiernos receptores, a través de dos canales: 1) La reducción de los costos políticos de la intervención oficial sobre los temas financiados y 2) La generación de incentivos para buscar rentas políticas adicionales. Dichos resultados se estudian para el caso de la ayuda brindada por EE.UU a Colombia durante el periodo 1998-2012, donde se evidencia el poder que tuvieron los presidentes norteamericanos para establecer parte de la agenda política colombiana en lo relacionado con las drogas y el terrorismo. Los resultados se obtienen a partir de un análisis de contenido original de los discursos presidenciales de ambos países y un conjunto de estimaciones corregidas por los posibles problemas de endogeneidad en la asignación de la ayuda exterior.

JEL: *F35, F54, F59*

Keywords: *Establecimiento de Agenda, Ayuda Exterior, Análisis de Contenido, Política Internacional*

Esta versión: Marzo de 2014

Última versión: Enlace Aquí

1. Introduction

The power to set agendas - defined most broadly as the ability of an agent who possesses information to filter, emphasize and determine what types of issues are important for another agent or public - has been widely studied in Political Science and Media Economics as one of the key determinants in the distribution of political power (Edwards and Wood, 1999; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Its importance is a consequence of the influence that this power has in the selection and implementation of public policies (Baumgartner, 2001; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Edwards, Mitchell and Welch, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009); as well as the impact that it has on the accountability of some groups in the justice system and the media (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).

Academic literature has shown the relevance of this phenomenon in explaining the amount of attention given to different economic problems (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005) and to various elements of foreign policy (Milner and Tingley, 2010; Peake, 2001; Wood and Peake, 1998). This is the case equally for the leading actors of executive power and for representatives of the legislative branch (Ghanem, 1997; Zhang and Meadows III, 2012). However, this type of information manipulation hypothesis has focused on the behavior of the media and the different political power structures *within* a country (Cohen, 1995; Edwards and Wood, 1999), and not on effects *outside* its borders.

Except for the works of Livingston (1992), Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) and Joachim (2003), the literature related to international political agenda-setting is lacking, particularly in terms of finding quantitative evidence that the phenomenon exists. Similarly, the channels through which it is possible to exercise this power of agenda setting are not clear and, despite efforts to understand the direct influence of one country over another (*see for example:* Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009)), the few theoretical approaches tend to operate in terms of qualitative models that do not allow analysis of comparative statics, fundamental in understanding more complex dynamics.

Consequently, the aim of this study is to develop an initial theoretical and empirical approach to this kind of agenda-setting, from a political incentives perspective and between agents different to those currently studied in the literature. Specifically, *it seeks to understand the ability of one country to set the political agenda of another through the influence of international assistance, taking into account the diplomacy and discourse of the said countries' presidents.*

With respect to studies on foreign aid, the research landscape is completely different to that on international agenda-setting. There is an abundance of theoretical models on the influence of foreign aid, and the empirical evidence of its effects are undoubted (Svensson, 2000a,b; Cheng, Zhang and Zou, 2008; Bueno-de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Dube and Naidu, 2010, to cite a few). Nevertheless, this paper seeks to combine the best of both approaches in its focus. Firstly, it models the incentives behind public policy proposed by agenda-setting research using the concept of cost-benefit commonly found in mathematical modeling of foreign aid. Secondly, it incorporates the amount of attention that governments pay to different problems as an additional control variable in deciding on the amount of aid. The latter, as per the tradeoff posed in the literature on local agenda-setting, is based on the time assigned to different issues. Finally, the quantitative analysis makes equal use of computer-assisted content analysis (common in agenda studies at the end of the '90s) and aid data reported in research on international politics.

I show that governments, which offer foreign aid, can set the political agenda of recipient governments through two channels. Firstly, the aid reduces the political costs of official intervention as a result of increased international relevance for the problems receiving assistance. This increases the political benefit of making statements on such issues and encourages the aid recipient to modify its agenda. Secondly, international aid creates incentives for political rent-seeking when the recipient government may benefit directly or indirectly from a positive fraction of the funds.

These channels are studied in the case of aid supplied to Colombia by the USA during the period 1998-2002, where I show the power that US presidents had to set part of the Colombian political agenda related to drugs and terrorism. It was found that military aid, rather than economic aid, is responsible for linking the agendas of both countries.

The results mentioned above are obtained using a novel computerized content analysis of presidential speeches and an instrumental variable estimation that captures the exogenous variation of aid supplied to Colombia. These results are robust to controlling for different temporary characteristics and variables associated with terrorist and drug-related activity, in Colombia and worldwide.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theoretical model of International Agenda-Setting. Section 3 provides an overview of the history of US aid in Colombia and the relevance to study this history through the theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the data of Aid and how the agendas studied are constructed through a content analysis of both countries' presidential speeches. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy while Section 6 describes the quantitative data. Section 7 uses that data to test the main implications of the model and provides some robustness exercises. Finally, section 8 concludes, while some details on data collection are contained in the Appendices.

2.   Theoretical Framework

This section formalizes the channels through which foreign aid may be used as a political agenda-setting mechanism. Specifically, it develops a simple model where political rent-seeking and the importance that citizens place on different issues determine the amount of attention that the government pays to matters that receive foreign aid.

2.1.   An Agenda-setting Model

Consider the insight behind the qualitative model of agenda-setting proposed by Cohen (1995) in which a president has the ability to set the public agenda of a country through his official statements. Furthermore, suppose that this president affects not only the national agenda but also the international political agenda through a mechanism of economic incentives. This mechanism may consist of military or economic aid, or logistic support to other countries. In this sense, the external effect of a presidential statement is equally dependent on the amount of resources involved at the moment of intervention and the amount of attention given to the topic, which attracted aid.

To put this interaction formally, suppose a world with two democratically elected governments, A and B. These governments obtain benefits from being in power, but

they obtain them to a greater degree when the electorate approves of the policies they implement. These additional benefits may be in the form of direct income from a private sector that is satisfied with the performance of the executive authorities, or from the ease of governing a country with little opposition.

Furthermore, suppose that the government's policies are accompanied by a media campaign in which the heads of state announce the results and the relevance of their policies. This campaign is responsible for realizing the political benefits of executing the government's programs, given that by communicating the government's progress they indirectly gain new supporters.

Following on from the above, the political benefits in countries A and B of focusing attention on a specific issue k is defined as:

$$(1) \qquad \Pi_A^k = \lambda_A^k a_A^k - C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_B^k = \lambda_B^k a_B^k - C_B^k(a_B^k, \lambda_B^k)$$

Where $\lambda_A^k a_A^k$ and $\lambda_B^k a_B^k$ represent the political benefit of focusing attention on an issue k, where λ_A^k and λ_B^k are the level of importance that each country's citizens attach to the topic. Equally, $C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k)$ and $C_B^k(a_B^k, \lambda_B^k)$ are the political costs of making public statements about k[1]. A similar qualitative perspective is presented by Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) who examines the existence of a presidential dilemma between the costs and benefits of making statements on different issues.

Assumption 1: *C_A^k and C_B^k are continuous functions, twice differentiable in their first arguments and governed by: $C_1' > 0$, $C_2' < 0$.*

That is, the political costs increase with the amount of attention given to a specific topic and decrease with the citizens' degree of interest in the topic. This allows us to model the restriction for a government that seeks to deal with multiple problems without the capacity to do so comprehensively, either because of high economic costs or because of the obvious restriction of term of office. For example, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) show how leaders trying to resolve the problem of time allocation face a variety of rising costs, such as those associated with the definitive consolidation of their programs or the difficulty associated with promoting policies with extreme ideologies. In this sense, there is a governmental incentive to give priority to topics that greatly interest the population over others that have less importance for the electorate. Nevertheless, the following is established:

Assumption 2: *For all issues k relevant to the population it holds that: $C_A^k(0, \cdot) = \bar{c}_A > 0$ and $C_B^k(0, \cdot) = \bar{c}_B > 0$. Furthermore, it is given that $C_1'' > 0$*

That is, it is not desirable to neglect themes of public interest, as it is far more costly for a government to publicly exclude relevant topics with λ_A and $\lambda_B > 0$, than to marginally attend to each of them. Intuitively, this assumption establishes that very biased governments, which are strongly inclined to under- or over-attend certain issues, assume greater political costs than governments that decide to show a balanced interest in each of the problems that face them.

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[1] For simplicity's sake, the government's capacity for *local* agenda-setting has been omitted from the mathematical modeling. That is, the second-round effects of government attention on citizens' interest (λ_A^k and λ_B^k) have been omitted.

Now suppose that for government B, the process of obtaining benefits is more complicated than for government A, and its citizens evaluate the suitability of its policies depending on its performance inside and outside its borders. Specifically, the benefit to B of attending to a particular issue k will be directly related to the actions that the government promotes nationally and abroad. That is, suppose that the degree of importance λ_B^k is made up of two elements: 1) The local relevance of problem k, denoted by $\bar{\alpha}^k$, and 2) How important it is to the people that the president's actions are consistent with his words[2], denoted by pw^k. This last element incorporates the significance of foreign aid w^k on the benefits of the donor country.

There is, therefore, a simple dynamic in which government B decides on the amount of attention a_B^k, and also establishes a monetary quantity w^k of foreign aid, related to issue k, in the country which A governs. These resources may represent any type of aid aimed at issues that B considers pertinent because of the political benefit it can derive from them[3]. Thus, p represents the political benefit for B of *"putting its money where its mouth is"*.

Including this final element is vital for the analysis. Powlick and Katz (1998) conduct a wide-ranging analysis of the literature that studies citizens' interest as a conditional element of foreign aid for different US governments. To incorporate this final point, we assume the following:

Assumption 3: *The political return for government B of focusing its attention on issue k is defined by: $\lambda_B^k a_B^k = \left(\bar{\alpha}^k + pw^k\right) \times a_B^k$, where $\bar{\alpha}^k$ is the benefit of domestic approval and pw^k is the benefit of demonstrating consistency between the president's attention and actions in international politics.*

Another component to take into account when defining political costs is issue k's relevance in the context of international politics. For example, initiatives on a world scale, such as fighting AIDS or eradicating malaria, lower the political costs of addressing such topics. On an international level it allays reservations about dealing with certain problems (Laurence, 2006) and facilitates dialog between countries with common goals (Haas, 1980; Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). To incorporate this added factor in the model, we assume the following:

Assumption 4: *The costs of making statements on a particular issue k are reduced by the amount of attention given to the issue internationally, specifically: $C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k + \sum_{j \neq A} a_j^k l_j) = C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k + (\Psi + a_B^k l_B))$ and $C_B^k(a_B^k, \lambda_B^k + \sum_{j \neq B} a_j^k l_j) = C_B^k(a_B^k, \lambda_B^k + (\Psi + a_A^k l_A))$. Where Ψ is the level of international attention independent of governments A and B, and l_B is the relative importance of government B in international politics, with $l_B \gg l_A$.*

Note that this assumption incorporates the fact that governments which receive aid do not carry great weight in the international political scene, and accordingly have relatively less "important" than the donor country ($l_A \ll l_B$). Finally, the benefit

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[2]Although there are issues for which foreign intervention is not applicable, this model gives special attention to issues that can be seen as problems of an international nature.

[3]Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi (2005) show three qualitative models, which can be used to present this resource transferring behavior. In this particular case, the mechanism that corresponds to the work of Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi (2005) is the desire to exert international influence in order to gain public approval.

functions, including the new incentives for A and B are redefined as:

$$(2) \qquad \Pi_A^k = \lambda_A^k a_A^k + \delta^k a_A^k w^k - C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k + (\Psi + a_B^k l_B))$$

$$(3) \qquad \Pi_B^k = (\bar{\alpha}^k + p w^k) a_B^k - C_B^k(a_B^k, \bar{\alpha}^k + p w^k + (\Psi + a_A^k l_A)) - \frac{s}{2}(w^k)^2$$

Where $\delta^k a_A^k w^k$ is the political benefit for A of focusing on issue k, for which it has received foreign aid. The parameter δ^k indicates the possibility of perceiving some political benefit, either direct or indirect, through the deployment of these resources. Thus, when $\delta^k = 0$ there is perfect exogeneity in aid giving, while if $\delta^k \in (0, 1]$ there is a positive fraction of benefit perceived by government A when it focuses more attention on the issues for which B provides aid.

In this manner, the aid offers A an incentive for political rent-seeking if $\delta^k > 0$. Consequently, w^k operates as a positive externality produced by B on A. The appearance of such externalities is studied in detail by Svensson (2000a) who finds that these types of incentives cause low effectiveness in the deployment of international aid and create perverse incentives within governments and different groups of society (Busse and Groning, 2009; Sullivan, Tessman and Li, 2011; Karlan and Appel, 2011).

Finally, notice that the resources transferred to A represent an additional political cost for B, as this government must not only finance the attention paid to the issue, but also justify the deviation of local resources abroad. This political cost, represented by $\frac{s}{2}$, may be seen as the legislative cost of approving a unit of aid in congress, or simply the opportunity cost of public funds w^k.

2.2. Timing of Events

The sequence of events for each issue k, which for simplicity's sake we will assume to be independent of each other, is as follows:

- At $t = 1$, government B decides on the level of attention a_B^k and an aid level w^k that maximizes its political benefits, taking into account the costs of processing the foreign aid $s/2$ and the level of domestic approval for the policy $\bar{\alpha}^k$.

- At $t = 2$, government A observes the level of aid planned for its country and determines, given the possibilities of benefitting δ^k and the level of local approval λ_A^k, a level of attention a_A^k that maximizes its benefits.

- At $t = 3$, governments A and B make their payments according to the levels of attention and aid amounts previously determined.

2.3. Theoretical Results

The different stages of the model can be seen as a sequential game of three periods and two players (See Figure 1), which is decided by backwards induction. Specifically, note that the problem government A faces at $t = 2$ is as follows:

$$(4) \qquad \max_{a_A^k} \left\{ a_A^k(\lambda_A^k + \delta^k w^{k,\star}) - C_A^k(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k + (\Psi + a_B^{k,\star} l_B)) \right\}$$

Where $w^{k,\star}$ and $a_B^{k,\star}$ represent the optimum decisions of government B at $t = 1$. Nevertheless, we know that B anticipates the behavior of A at $t = 2$ and therefore makes a strategic decision regarding w^k and a_B^k, taking into account the level of attention chosen by A. Thus, government B solves the following problem:

$$(5) \qquad \max_{a_B^k, w^k} \left\{ (\bar{\alpha}^k + pw^k)a_B^k - C_B^k(a_B^k, \bar{\alpha}^k + pw^k + (\Psi + a_A^{k,\star}l_A)) - \frac{s}{2}(w^k)^2 \right\}$$

From which it is possible to deduce the following results:

Proposition 1: *For government B, w^k is a* **sufficient** *political agenda-setting mechanism if there are opportunities for government A to obtain political benefits, either direct or indirect, from the deployment of aid. Formally, B can set the political agenda of A with an amount of aid w^k if $\delta^k > 0$. In other words, if $\delta^k > 0$ it holds that $\frac{\partial a_A^k}{\partial w^k} > 0$.*

Proof of Proposition 1 *(See appendix)*

Proposition 2: *If government B carries significant weight in international politics ($l_B > 0$), then it is possible for government B to set A's political agenda by reducing the costs of addressing certain issues. That is, if $l_B > 0$, then $\frac{\partial a_A^k}{\partial a_B^k} > 0$ and this change is due to a reduction the costs of official intervention.*

Proof of Proposition 2 *(See appendix)*

3. Background to the Colombian-US Case

This section discusses the case of US aid in Colombia in order to study its implications using the theoretical model developed in the previous section. Specifically, US aid policies against drugs and terrorism in Colombia are briefly described, and we see why it is interesting to study this aid with the help of the theoretical model.

3.1. US Aid in Colombia

Providing military and economic aid to developing countries is a fundamental component of US foreign policy. These programs began formally with the reconstruction of Europe through the Marhsall Plan, after the Second World War, and they


FIGURE 1. THE AGENDA-SETTING MODEL AS A SEQUENTIAL GAME

evolved afterwards to support America's markedly anti-communist stance during the Cold War. Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, US foreign aid focused on preventing the dissemination of communist ideas, mainly in Latin America, South-East Asia and Africa (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009). In the 1990s, faced with the absence of a clearly defined enemy, the foreign aid budget decreased considerably, and it was not until after September 11, 2001, that the US government once again increased this budget as an antiterrorist tool in response to the violent acts that occurred in the country on that date.

As well as the anticommunist and antiterrorist goals mentioned above, the US has justified its foreign aid with commercial and humanitarian arguments. These include: promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving access to basic healthcare and education, protecting the environment, promoting stability in regions of conflict, protecting human rights, the non-proliferation of arms and the fight against the production and traffic of drugs (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009).

US foreign aid can be described through five strategic goals that cover the main sectors financed. The first of these is Peace and Security, which consists of six programs including the fight against terrorism, the fight against weapons of mass destruction and the fight against drugs. The second goal is Investing in People, which comprises three programs coordinated through health, education, and social services and protection of vulnerable populations. The third goal, Governing Justly and Democratically, brings together issues related to the rule of law, human rights, good government practices, political competition and inclusion of civil society. The fourth goal, Economic Growth, includes programs designed for developing economies and are related to agriculture, infrastructure, environment and the environment. Finally, the fifth goal is called Humanitarian Assistance and seeks to help with problems caused by natural disasters or internal conflicts (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009).

In Latin America and the Caribbean, foreign aid has been one of the USA's tools for furthering its interests in the region. The programs financed have been diverse and tailored to the needs of each country. Since 1946, the US has consolidated itself as the largest contributor of foreign aid to countries in the region, disbursing more than USD$148 billion since that year until the present day (Meyer and Sullivan, 2012).

In recent years, the main beneficiaries of US-financed aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean have been Haiti, Mexico and Colombia. For Haiti, aid has focused on the country's recovery after the earthquake in 2010, and for Mexico, on fighting the drug trafficking that has spread over recent years (Meyer and Sullivan, 2012). In the case of Colombia, its position as the world?s largest producer of cocaine has, over the past two decades, converted the country into the largest beneficiary of US military aid (Dube and Naidu, 2010).

The US programs have been designed to assist the Colombian government in maintaining control of lands once dominated by drug trafficking and illegal armed groups. Additional goals include: creating jobs and alternative legal economies; increased security and State presence; and the intensification of prohibition programs and eradication of illicit crops. These programs are centralized in Colombia through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is responsible for implementing the programs through various mechanisms such as contracts and cooperative agreements with non-government organizations, the private sector and contract companies.

Colombia began to receive aid aimed at eradicating drugs during the period known as the War on Drugs in the 1980s (Dube and Naidu, 2010). In 1990, through the Andean Initiative, the US granted USD$200 million in an aid package designed to combat drug trafficking, providing specialized training and equipment for Colombia?s armed forces. In 1994, aid decreased markedly owing to deteriorating relations between the US government and the recently elected Colombian president Ernesto Samper. It was not until Adrés Pastrana came to power in 1998 that the US implemented Plan Colombia with a package of USD$1,200 million in 2000, and as it had for the Andean Initiative, allocated a large proportion of resources to providing specialized training and equipment for anti-narcotics operations.

In the period 2000-2001, Plan Colombia was proposed as a strategy of bilateral cooperation to combat illicit drugs and organized crime (DANE and DJS, 2006), reassigning US aid, which had previously been focused on the National Police to the army. This was done in order to ensure military support of Colombia's armed forces in such a way that the fight against drugs became highly military (Tickner, 2004).

With the breakdown of peace talks with the FARC in February 2002, and after the attacks on September 11, 2001, there was a change in rhetoric in US foreign policy regarding the problems in Colombia. America began to advocate the fight against terrorism, including the threats of drugs and arms trafficking in its agenda. For the first time since the end of the Cold War the US agreed to fund military activities that were not related to the fight against drugs, allowing the military units provided by Plan Colombia to be used for the fight against terrorism (Tickner, 2004).

After Plan Colombia was implemented, the military strategy was modified through the creation of mobile brigades consisting of anti-guerrilla units. From 2004, military aid has been used primarily to increase the effectiveness of military training, including different types of centers and schools such as infantry, air force and police. This period coincides with major increases in disbursements allocated to combating drugs and illegal armed groups (U.S. Office on Colombia and FOR, 2010).

Between 2002 and 2006, US military aid grew considerably, reaching its peak in 2004 when it increased by approximately 46% compared to the aid provided in 2002, partly in support of the security policies implemented by Álvaro Uribe Vélez's government. The average aid for this budget item surpassed USD$197 million[4] - more than a third of the total aid given from the US to Colombia. From 2008, however, the amount disbursed has gradually decreased and in 2012 it dropped to USD$145 million, its lowest level in 12 years[5], due in part to budget cuts after the economic crisis of 2008. Figure 3 shows the pattern of aid directed to Colombia and non-Latin American counties, where the observations above are summarized[6].

Taking the above into account, the Colombian-US case is interesting to analyze using the theoretical model developed here for many reasons. Firstly, the recent concentration of aid on the military budget demands a detailed study of the incentives that the deployment of these resources may create in the country. Secondly, we must determine if Colombia, as a major recipient of US aid in South America, has really

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[4]Value at 2010 constant prices calculated based on the official price index published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

[5]Expected figures based on information from foreignassistance.gov

[6]It is worth clarifying that the aid totals determined by the US congress are approved from the beginning of the US fiscal year and not the Colombian calendar year. Consequently, due to the time adjustment necessary, some of the peaks in the figure (5) showing changes in resources do not exactly coincide with the peaks reported by USAID.

been politically influenced by the US, and if it has, if this effect is independent of the ideological alignment of both countries' governments. Finally, knowing that Colombia continually questions the strong influence the US government's position has on the country's political and economic decisions, it becomes relevant to study the relationship of their agendas through an analysis of incentives that covers the problem of assigning presidential attention and the strategic distribution of foreign aid.

4.   Information Used and Forming of Agendas

To analyze the main implications of the model presented in section 2, we must create a replicable measure of the governments' political agendas. Although in general terms the political agenda is the set of issues given priority by the administration and which forms the basis for their political actions, it is not difficult to find discrepancies between the agenda proposed during a campaign and what really occurs over a term of office. For this reason it is desirable to use a methodology that helps us determine which elements actually make up a government's political agenda over time.

Previous studies for other countries have used different approaches to achieve this. For example, Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood (1999) derive the presidential agenda on different issues from the number of paragraphs dedicated to them in transcriptions of presidential speeches. Authors such as Quinn et al. (2010) and Cohen (1995), on the other hand, use a methodology based on the use of words or sentences throughout different official texts to determine the composition of political agenda.

However, the three methodologies mentioned above (paragraphs, sentences and words) omit important elements: 1) They do not take into account peak periods of official communication associated with specific moments when the presidents must speak more for reasons exogenous to the forming of agenda; and 2) They assume that the presidents are comparable in absolute terms throughout time, that is, in terms of number of paragraphs, sentences or words spoken, and not in relative terms, such as the number of such structures related to an issue as a percentage of total expression.

Considering the above, this section has three aims: 1) Define a repeatable and comparable measure of political agenda for the governments studied; 2) List the different sources of information used in constructing these agendas; and 3) Describe the complementary sources of information used in the subsequent sections' econometric specifications.

4.1.   Primary Information Sources

Two types of information were used for the empirical approach. The first, corresponding to the composition of the political agenda, was made up of the set of high priority issues for Colombian and US governments during the period August 7, 1998, to March 31, 2012. This set was created based on the classic definitions of political agenda proposed by Baumgartner (2001) and Jones and Baumgartner (2005) using presidential discourse as a reflection of the interest a government has in different problems. The justification of this focus follows the work of Cohen (1995) and Eshbaugh-Soha (2010) who argued that presidential discourse is an excellent source of information for determining the value that a president places on different issues.

The starting point for deriving the different levels of attention, therefore, was the

strategic behavior that the leaders displayed when using their words in public appearances (Riker, 1996; Van Dijk, 2004, 2009). The elements of the political agenda were defined based on the most frequently used words within their discourse. Specifically, $a_t^{k,g} = f_t^{k,g}/F_t^g$ was established as the level of attention that a government g pays to a specific issue k at one point in time, where F_t^g is the total number of words used by the president in his official appearances at time t, and $f_t^{k,g}$ is the number of references to issue k in these speeches. The political agenda of government g was thus defined as:

$$(6) \qquad A_t^g = \left(a_t^{1,g}, a_t^{2,g}, \ldots, a_t^{k,g} \right) \text{ con } a_t^{1,g} > a_t^{2,g} > \ldots > a_t^{k,g} \text{ y } \sum_k a_t^{k,g} = 1$$

Equally, $\breve{a}$ was defined as the minimum level of interest for a topic to become part of the political agenda; that is, the agenda "of interest" $\hat{A}_t^g$ was redefined as:

$$(7) \qquad \hat{A}_t^g = \left\{ a_t^{k,g} : a_t^{k,g} \in A_t^g \text{ y } a_t^k > \breve{a} \right\}$$

Some details had to be adjusted later in the formalization. For example, not all words in the speeches were relevant for analyzing the importance of issues within the speeches, such as proper nouns, diminutives and some acronyms. Likewise, there are some expressions that do not add information relevant to the analysis, such as articles, prepositions and words that are repeated often in spoken language. For this reason, one of the interim processes consisted of filtering these types of expressions out of the speeches. Tables B1 and B2 show the set of words that were excluded in each language following the standard content analysis process proposed by Kippendorff (2004).

Hence, in a more detailed manner, the steps for constructing the agendas described in (7) were as follows. Firstly, all available transcripts of official speeches given by each Colombian and US president from 1998 to 2012 were downloaded, excluding in all cases, statements that did not make reference to public intervention of heads of state[7]. Secondly, the speeches were put into chronological order, identifying in the process the exact day and the length of the speech in words.

Afterwards, each expression used by the presidents in these public appearances was counted with the help of computational tools, using the algorithms developed by Feinerer, Hornik and Meyer (2008), custom programming and specialized content-analysis software. Finally, a time-series database was constructed, consisting of the weekly frequency of each word extracted. Specifically, the series were calculated from the following expressions:

$$(8) \qquad f_t^{k,g} = \phi_t^{k,g} \times \ln\left(\frac{N}{n^k}\right) \qquad \text{y} \qquad F_t^g = \sum_k f_t^{k,g}$$

Where $\phi_t^{k,g}$ is the number times word k appears in week t, N the number of speeches that government g made during its term of office, and n^k the total number of times that the word k appeared in this time period. The formulation of this expression follows the recommendations of Aas and Eikvil (1999) and Berry and Castellanos (2007) who

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[7]See Appendix C: for detailed information about the sources of discursive information.

suggested considering the frequency of each word by length of text, and the behavior of these factors between speakers. The final step was to calculate the different $a_t^{k,g}$ defining the minimum level of weekly attention $\breve{a}$ based on the expressions that appear in at least 80% of speeches[8]. This limit permits extraction of only those issues that were really repeated and important for each president studied.

The second type of information used was on US aid, obtained from annual reports published by USAID in its Greenbook until 2010, and the most recent estimates published at foreignassistance.gov for 2011 and 2012. The aid totals were recalculated at 2010 constant prices and broken into quarters through a Spline-type interpolation. The reason for this transformation is that, from a methodological point of view, the quarterly calculation allows us to obtain an estimate of the amounts executed at different times of the year. This information, which is not published in its totality by USAID, is vital for the agenda analysis proposed in this paper as the process of deploying these resources throughout the year may influence the governments' political agendas[9].

4.2. Agenda for Terror and Drugs

Following on from the process described above, it is possible to study the behavior of different elements within the political agenda. In fact, definitions (6) and (7) allow the study of different levels of agenda aggregation. For example, if we establish that an issue $\bar{k}$ is composed of a set N of keywords, it is simple to construct a new base level for $\bar{k}$, as $a_t^{\bar{k},g} = \sum_{k \in N} a_t^{k,g}$.

Taking into account the above, and that the empirical strategy will focus on the analysis of only two issues, drugs and terrorism, we define the Colombian agenda to be studied as:

$$(9) \qquad \hat{A}_t^{col} = \left\{ \sum_i a_t^{col,i}, \sum_j a_t^{col,j} \right\} \text{ con } \left\{ \begin{array}{lll} i & \in & \{\text{Terrorismo, Terrorista, Terroristas, Terror}\} \\ j & \in & \{\text{Drogas, Droga, Narcotráfico, Coca}\} \end{array} \right.$$

While in the case of the USA it is defined as:

$$(10) \qquad \hat{A}_t^{usa} = \left\{ \sum_i a_t^{usa,i}, \sum_j a_t^{usa,j} \right\} \text{ con } \left\{ \begin{array}{lll} i & \in & \{\text{Terrorism, Terrorist, Terrorists, Terror}\} \\ j & \in & \{\text{Drugs, Drug, Narcotics, Cocaine}\} \end{array} \right.$$

To determine the expressions above the following exercise was conducted. A search was undertaken for words directly related to the expressions "Terrorismo", "Terrorism", "Drogas", and "Drugs" that also had a high concurrence with each of the study topics over time and whose meaning was unequivocal within each speech.

4.3. Additional Information

Finally, to study the behavior of the agendas above it was necessary to use an analysis that incorporated a series of variables that could help to explain variations

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[8]In general this threshold corresponded to $a_t^{k,g} = 0.75\%$ of average attention per week.
[9]All USAID projects without exception must make quarterly progress reports both execution and results. However, as discussed, this quarterly information is not published in full by USAID.

on this behavior over time. General information about international terrorist attacks was obtained from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database[10]. Similarly, information was taken from the Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (ODC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) on the different variables associated with the problem of drug trafficking inside and outside the country. The variables used are listed in the different econometric estimates proposed in the next section.

5. Empirical Strategy

The purpose of this section is to quantitatively study the results of the theoretical model developed in Section II. The econometric models are described as well as the specific uses of the variables constructed in the previous section.

5.1. Baseline Model

The identification strategies proposed in this section take advantage of the variation over time in the level of attention given by Colombian and US presidents to drugs and terrorism. This variation, along with the evolution of US aid in recent years, allows us to estimate the impact of the deployment of aid resources and the US rhetoric on the proportion of Colombian discourse that covers these problems. Specifically, the empirical strategy has the following regression model as its baseline estimation:

$$(11) \qquad a_t^{k,col} = c + m_j + \alpha_i + t\alpha_i + \beta_0 \text{AidCol}_t^k + \beta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{k,usa} + \epsilon_t$$

Where $a_t^{k,col}$ represents the Colombian presidential attention[11] in week t on issue k (Drugs or Terrorism), while $a_{[s,t]}^{k,usa}$ represents the level of attention paid by US leaders to the same topic over the past s weeks. Similarly, AidCol_t^k is defined as the value of aid (economic or military) provided by the US to Colombia with respect to the issues studied. Consequently, the parameters of interest are β_0 and β_1 , which respectively describe the effect of US aid and attention on the composition of the Colombian political agenda.

The estimates also consider fixed effects of month m_j since official appearances, discourse and, in turn, our measure of presidential attention, depend to a great degree on the time of year observed. For example, in December and January, presidential activity tends to decrease because of the relatively long official recess, while in July and August, discourse increases considerably as a result of the most important national celebrations in both countries and the inauguration of the Colombian congress every 4 years. Furthermore, as patterns of attention differ between leaders, the model includes fixed effects of the president α_i and different tendencies for each Colombian leader represented by $t\alpha_i$. These control flexibly for possible changes in presidential rhetoric over time.

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[10]Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu
[11]Here $a_t^{k,col} = \sum_n a_t^{col,n}$ and $a_t^{k,usa} = \sum_n a_t^{usa,n}$ with n defined according to (9) and (10)

5.2. Effect of Other Observables

Aside from the variables proposed in the base model, there are many others that may determine whether a president makes statements about drugs or terrorism. Some of these, even when observable, are difficult to measure and depend on the point in time when they are analyzed. However, it is desirable to control the results of our model for short-term factors that may skew the estimates of β_0 and β_1. The factors may be diverse, but in this particular case it is interesting to analyze whether the results obtained in (11) are robust to controlling for short-term variables in the drug market or the security situation nationally and internationally.

The composition of the set of observables included in the base model depends on the issue being analyzed. Nevertheless, in general terms the regression model can be rewritten as:

$$(12) \qquad a_t^{k,col} = c + m_j + \alpha_i + t\alpha_i + \beta_0 \text{AidCol}_t^k + \beta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{k,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k}\Theta^k + \epsilon_t$$

Where $\mathbf{\Theta^k}$ is the vector of coefficients for each of the variables of $\mathbf{X_t^k}$ that are defined in detail below:

Controls for the Topic of Terror: Here, the vector $\mathbf{X_t^k}$ consists of four variables: 1) The number of terrorist attacks per week in Colombia[12]; 2) The number of deaths resulting from these attacks; 3) The number of terrorist incidents worldwide, excluding Colombia; and 4) The interaction between the number of terrorist incidents and the number of deaths as a result of these incidents in Colombia. All these variables control for possible changes in attention as a result of situations directly related to terrorist activity that force leaders to talk about the topic in some way, whether this is simply due to the fact that the events occurred or because they have worsened.

Controls for the Topic of Drugs: In this case $\mathbf{X_t^k}$ includes: 1) The number of hectares of coca grown annually in Colombia; 2) The average price per kilogram of cocaine in the international market; 3) The number of hectares eradicated per year in the country; and 4) The average price per kilogram of cocaine nationally. All these variables provide control for the president's changing response to the drug problem.

5.3. Presidential Relationships and Ideological Coincidences

It is possible that influence on the agenda is differentiated not only between Colombian presidents, but also by the different relationships that they have had with US presidents. In fact, the influence on political agendas may depend on an "accidental" political alignment between the leaders of both countries, and not on a consistent relationship between US aid and Colombian presidential attention over time. In order to control for these possible ideological coincidences and specific characteristics of Colombian leaders, the following regression model was also estimated:

$$(13) \qquad a_t^{k,col} = c + m_j + v_\ell + tv_\ell + \beta_0 \text{AidCol}_t^k + \beta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{k,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k}\Theta^k + \epsilon_t$$

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[12] According to START: a terrorist attack is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. For details of specific coding of these events see: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/

Where v_ℓ represents the fixed effects of presidential relationships, allowing control for possible coincidences mentioned above and for specific tendencies in each period. Figure 2 shows a schema for identifying the fixed effects of a president and presidential relationships.

5.4. Unobservable Factors and Foreign Aid Selection Bias

One element that has not been discussed until this point is the unobserved ability of governments that receive foreign aid to encourage the allocation of these resources to the country. Consequently, the efforts or lobbying of local governments to secure this type of resource abroad have not been taken into account. It is essential to incorporate this element into the analysis, and it has immediate consequences for the estimates of the models.

Until now, we have assumed that the distribution of US aid is not affected by the level of attention that Colombian presidents assigned to different issues and, thus, the parameters of interest (β_0 and β_1) are unbiased if estimated under a model by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, it can be argued that the variation in aid amounts seen in the diagram (3) are not linked to behavior independent of US foreign policy, and are rather a natural response to the constant lobbying of Colombian presidents in their efforts to secure military and economic assistance for different problems.

In fact, studies such as those of Borda (2010) argue that this may have been exactly the case during Álvaro Uribe Vélez's administration when, according to the author, Colombia was able to "internationalize" the armed conflict thanks to the foreign affairs dealings of its diplomatic corps and the highly propitious circumstances presented by the international situation after September 11, 2001.

Considering the above, and the problem that this possible endogeneity of aid represents for the identification of interest coefficients, the exogenous variation of US aid will be determined using an estimation by instrumental variables. The two following subsections focus on detailing the process realized in order to produce an unbiased estimate of the coefficients β_0 and β_1. This is done using a more complete model that includes all controls, fixed effects of the month, tendencies that differ depending on presidential relationships, and the fixed effects of each presidential relationship.

Specification for "Terrorism": In the agenda that corresponds to terror, the problem of endogeneity was dealt with through a model in two stages, using *the value of US assistance directed at non-Latin American countries as an instrument for aid.*

This instrument has been successfully used in studies such as Dube and Naidu (2010), which evaluated the effects of US military aid on the armed conflict in Colombia. Furthermore it is particularly interesting to implement in this context, given the exogeneity of the dynamic of US foreign policy with respect to the influence that Colombian presidents can have over the management of resources aimed at other countries outside the region. In this way the equation estimated as the first stage of the model is:

$$(14) \qquad \text{AidCol}_t^{terr} = c + m_j + v_\ell + tv_\ell + \eta_0 \text{AidNoLat}_t + \eta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{terr,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k \Phi^k} + e_t$$

Where AidNoLat_t refers to total aid, military or economic, directed towards non-Latin American countries, and AidCol_t^{terr} represents the aid directed towards Colombia[13], excluding all resources allocated specifically to the fight against drugs. The second stage of the model is estimated as follows:

$$(15) \qquad a_t^{terr,col} = c + m_j + v_\ell + tv_\ell + \beta_0 \widehat{\text{AidCol}_t^{terr}} + \beta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{terr,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k \Theta^k} + \epsilon_t$$

Where $\widehat{\text{AidCol}_t^{terr}}$ predicts the aid obtained from the model estimated in (14)

Specification for "Drugs": The procedure for handling the endogeneity in drug-related topics is similar to that used for terrorism. The first stage is given by:

$$(16) \qquad \text{AidCol}_t^{drug} = c + m_j + v_\ell + tv_\ell + \eta_0 \text{AidNoLat}_t + \eta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{drug,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k \Phi^k} + e_t$$

Where AidNoLat_t represents, as in the previous instance, the total aid, military or economic, directed towards non-Latin American countries, and AidCol_t^{drug} consists of assistance directed towards Colombia, including resources solely allocated to the fight against drugs. The second stage is therefore:

$$(17) \qquad a_t^{terr,drug} = c + m_j + v_\ell + tv_\ell + \beta_0 \widehat{\text{AidCol}_t^{drug}} + \beta_1 a_{[s,t]}^{drug,usa} + \mathbf{X_t^k \Theta^k} + \epsilon_t$$

Where $\widehat{\text{AidCol}_t^{drug}}$ predicts the aid obtained from the model estimated in (16).

5.5.   Interpretation of Coefficients According to the Theoretical Model

According to the results obtained in the previous estimates, the interpretation of the interest parameters (β_0 and β_1) is as follows: Firstly, if β_0 is positive and significant while β_1 is not, it holds that agenda-setting is only possible through the first mechanism proposed by the theoretical model, that is, through an increase in incentives for the recipient government to benefit from aid deployed. Secondly, in the situation where β_1 is positive while β_0 is not, it is taken that agenda-setting occurs through reducing the costs of publicly addressing an issue (or legitimizing the agenda) and not through the implementation of the aid itself. Finally, when β_0 and β_1 are positive, this is taken as evidence in favor of the existence of both channels for relations between Colombia and the US.

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[13]It is worth taking into account that as of 2002 the US congress approved a new economic aid category called "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related". Previously, all military and economic aid was associated with drug-related issues as can be seen in Figure 3.

6. Descriptive Statistics

6.1. Agenda Formation

Tables 1, 2 and 3 for Colombia and 4, 5 and 6 for the US show a summary of the 200 most important elements of the political agenda for each government studied, using the methodology presented in section IV.

The results for Colombia are interesting and consistent with the actual make-up of the agendas. The importance of each issue, measured by the relative size of the expressions in each word cloud, shows the patterns expected. For example, the Pastrana administration included an important platform component dedicated to peace and another dedicated to economic problems stemming from the crisis in 1999, as well as a clear emphasis on issues of security, corruption, violence and drugs. In the case of the two Uribe governments, characterized by the fight against illegal armed groups and the legitimizing of these actions through a government program based on national security (Seguridad Democrática), the results of the methodology are also satisfactory. The most relevant elements highlighted by the process indicate that issues of Security, Investor Confidence and attention to terrorism take precedence[14].

In the case of the USA, the pattern is similar, revealing a structural difference between Democrat and Republican administrations, the former giving more weight to social issues and the latter emphasizing issues of foreign policy and security.

Finally, all tables show the importance of the two topics analyzed throughout this paper (Drugs and Terrorism), either because they appear explicitly (high frequency) or because of implicit reference in speeches (high frequency of expressions strongly linked with these topics).

6.2. Selected Agendas and Characteristics of Short-term Circumstances

Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the data used in the estimates for Colombia and the USA. In general terms it is worth highlighting the following: 1) The relative weight of problems in the agenda is greater for US governments than for Colombian governments. 2) The average aid against drugs in Colombia is grater than the average aid for all non-Latin American countries. And 3) The number of terrorist attacks in Colombia corresponds to 6% of the total attacks that occurred worldwide[15].

7. Results

This section reports the estimates of the models proposed in the empirical strategy. The results were analyzed in the framework of the theoretical model put forward in section 2, explaining the arguments that allow us to reconcile the findings of both approaches.

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[14]Although this government claimed that it emphasized security, investor confidence and social cohesion, the last element does not appear to form part of the actual presidential agenda in these periods, at least under the methodological focus proposed here.

[15]Based on the descriptive statistics table: $\frac{e^{0.7270}}{e^{3.5307}} = 0.06$

7.1. Graphical Analysis

The three graphs shown below summarize the main findings of this research. Figure 4 shows the correspondence between the military aid logarithm and the percentage of Colombian presidential discourse dedicated to terrorism and drugs (fig. 4a and fig. 4b respectively), suggesting a positive relationship between the amount of military aid deployed in the country and the government's interest in attending to this type of problem. Although in the case of drugs the relationship is not as clear, the econometric results presented below show that this relationship is significant. Figures 5a and 5b divide this correspondence into different presidential periods, showing the type of dynamics that explain the effect of aid indicated in figure 4. Finally, figure 6 describes the comovement of the series of presidential attention in both countries for the issues mentioned, revealing a time lag of approximately 4 weeks.

In light of the above, the aim henceforth will be to argue how the relationships observed in the graphs shown are consistent with the direction expected by the theoretical model, once a set of possible alternative hypotheses are discounted.

7.2. Baseline Model, Presidential Relationships and Other Observables

The estimates by ordinary least squares of the baseline model can be observed in tables 8 and 9, which are divided into groups according to the specification proposed in (13). Specifically, the first group of estimates, composed of columns 1 to 5, allows us to analyze the impact of US military aid and attention, considering the average effect of these variables within each presidential term. The second group, composed of columns 6 to 10, allows us to study the magnitude of this effect within the six presidential relationships of figure 2.

For the "terror" agenda, the coefficients of interest are as expected. In columns 2 to 5 of table 8, both military aid and US attention on terrorism are shown equally to have a positive and significant effect on the proportion of the Colombian agenda dedicated to terror. This relationship is consistent between specifications, even controlling for possible deviations of presidential attention caused by local terrorist attacks (Col 2), international terrorist activity (Col 3), deaths in national attacks (Col 4) and the intensity of terrorist activity in Colombia (Col 5). This final measure is the interaction between the number of local attacks and the number of deaths they cause.

Specifically, the estimates show that with a 1% increase in US military aid, there is a 1.17% increase in Colombian presidential attention on "terror". Likewise, it can be observed that an increase of one standard deviation[16] in US attention on this issue represents an increase of 0.1 standard deviations in the proportion of the Colombian agenda dedicated to terrorism.

With respect to the coefficients reported for "drugs" in table 9, similar results are found. Columns (2)-(5) show how anti-narcotics military aid and US attention on related issues raised the interest of Colombian leadership on the drug topic. For example, a 1% increase in military aid totals allocated to the fight against drugs represented an average growth of 0.76% in the interest towards these issues for the period 1998-2012. Meanwhile, an increase of 1 standard deviation in US attention corresponded to an increase of 0.15 standard deviations[17] in the proportion of the presidential agenda

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[16]Standard Deviation of US attention on terrorism = 0.1301 thus $0.1301 \times 0.0052/0.0075 \approx 0.1$

[17]Standard Deviation of US attention on drugs = 0.0375 thus $0.0375 \times 0.0166/0.0042 \approx 0.15$

dedicated to this problem. These effects are shown to be consistent in all columns of the first group of estimates, even when controlled for different determinants from the fight against drugs, such as prices per kilogram in national and international markets (Col 2 to 4) and coca planting and eradication activities in the country (Col 3 to 5).

The reason for including the previous control variables, apart from those mentioned in the empirical strategy, is that attention to drugs may increase precisely at those moments when drug trafficking is most profitable and, consequently, more problematic for the government. In all the specifications stated above the price of cocaine and the number of hectares eradicated, as proxies of the profitability of the business at a local level, are relevant variables for explaining the proportion of the agenda focused on drugs. The total area of crops, in contrast, does not appear to be a consistent factor throughout the regression models.

With respect to the second group of estimates in tables 8 and 9 (Columns 6 to 10), it must be noted that the effect of military aid is significantly greater if there are controls in place for possible ideological coincidences between presidents. In particular, in the case of table 8, a 1% increase in military aid corresponds to an increase of 1.5% in terrorism awareness, while in the case of drugs; a 1% increase in military aid gives rise to a 0.97% increase in attention paid to this issue.

7.3. Foreign Aid Selection Bias

As mentioned in the empirical strategy, there are concerns over the endogeneity of foreign aid with respect to the agenda-forming process, whether through the channel of internationalizing the conflict or through presidential lobbying in foreign aid institutions. However, the coefficients reported in tables 8 and 9 offer some reassurance with respect to this problem. Given the results of the exercise it is highly unlikely that variables have been omitted which explain part of the effects found. In fact, the behavior of the parameters of interest is very stable between specifications and do not change significantly when including the controls directly related to the issues studied.

Nevertheless, to completely discount the problem of endogeneity and be sure of the results, two estimates were created using the instrumental variables reported in tables 10 and 11, where the main results of this empirical approach are found. The coefficients reported confirm the power that US governments had to intervene in the formation of the Colombian political agenda, even when this power is studied based on the exogenous variation of resources transferred from the US towards Colombia.

After estimating through the instrumental variables and taking into account the average internal effect of each presidential relationship, a 1% increase in military aid was linked to an average increase of 2.32% in the percentage of Colombian presidential discourse focused on terrorism. Meanwhile, a 1% increase in the levels of military aid in the fight against drugs was linked to an average increase of 1.73% in the levels of attention to this problem.

Similarly, the proportion of US discourse dedicated to drugs and terror displayed a significant positive impact over the focus of the Colombian agenda in these areas. An increase of 1 standard deviation in the attention given to terrorism and drugs saw increases of 0.17 and 0.16 standard deviations[18] respectively in the Colombian presidential attention related to these issues.

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[18]Following the previous process: $0.1301 \times 0.0101/0.0075 \approx 0.17$ and $0.0375 \times 0.0186/0.0042 \approx 0.16$

Note that column 6 of tables 10 and 11 also shows the effect without controlling for presidential relations in order to compare differences between mandates and between the different presidential interactions proposed in the empirical strategy. The effects of the most stringent estimates are slightly smaller in all models, but equally significant for military and US attention.

7.4.   Robustness and Additional Exercises

Falsification Test using Economic Aid: According to proposition 1, political agenda-setting through foreign aid is only possible if there are opportunities for the recipient government to benefit from the deployment of those resources. In the case of military aid this possibility more apparent since the process that the receiving government uses to obtain benefits is simpler. The government as legitimate owner of the country's armed forces can claim any military result within its borders regardless of the resources that made that result possible. In the case of economic aid, however, the context is different. Given the restrictions that USAID places on its projects, the deployment of economic aid involves a series of intermediaries such as NGOs and multilateral organizations, making rent-extraction a difficult task. This is due to the fact that in this type of aid the organizations involved can directly claim the results of the projects.

Consequently, it is expected that for this type of aid, unlike military aid, the agenda-setting effects of deploying these funds tend towards zero. To prove this in the case of Colombia, the exercise developed in the previous is repeated, studying the effect of economic (and not military) aid on the Colombian agenda. Tables 12, 13 and 14 describe this exercise.

As expected, no significant results were obtained in any specification. This allows us to conclude that the agenda-setting mechanism operates based on military influence and not economic aid. The result is consistent with the findings of Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi (2005) who, upon evaluating the effect of economic aid on the political agenda of different recipient countries, did not obtain significant results regarding the influence of this type of aid.

Domestic Policy Effort: A concern with respect to the results of the base model is the lack of a measure of policy effort on the part of the Colombian government. It could be argued that the effect of agenda-setting does not depend on the sums received but on how they relate to the resources allocated domestically to combat each problem. It is possible that during the years when the US subsidized a large part of the total fight against terrorism and drugs, agenda-setting was stronger. Figure 8 shows the evolution of Colombian spending on the two topics studied here. Using these figures, the base model was modified in such a way that the aid received would be weighted for the actual spending of the Colombian government. The results of this modification are shown in Tables 17,18,19 and 20. A fall in the value of coefficients can be seen, as expected, but in any case they report a positive and significant effect of US aid on both attention to terrorism and attention to drugs. Thus, after estimating the regressions with the aid weighted, there is still evidence in favor of agenda-setting power through US aid.

It is worth highlighting that the estimates given by instrumental variables are not completely robust to this new change given that the instrument only helps explain exogenous variation of the numerator of the new independent variable. Furthermore a

new problem of endogeneity could exist given that local policies tend to be accompanied by domestic changes to attention. However, the exercise is helpful in showing the important role domestic policy plays in these results and also prompts the following exercise.

The Influence of Spending: Based on anecdotal evidence in US congressional debates, we know that the aid approved is often accompanied by particular recommendations and political commitments for the receiving country. During the Uribe Vélez administration in Colombia, it was necessary to create a wealth tax that would demonstrate the serious intentions of the local government to jointly support the US policies against terrorism and drugs. Part of agenda-setting may therefore owe itself to corresponding efforts by the local government not only through focusing attention on these issues but also by increasing spending in areas that receive US support. Table 22 displays an exercise where this kind of corresponding effort can be seen. We can observe that, controlling for different ideological coincidences and short-term trends, a 1% increase in US aid results in an increase of 4.2% and 8.2% in public spending against terrorism and drugs respectively. This result allows us to make a preliminary conclusion about the existence of a direct effect on public spending as a consequence of receiving foreign aid.

Test for Instrument Orthogonality: : A required test for validating the instruments used in the estimates is the proof of the joint independence of the instruments. That is, we do not expect that the instrument used to capture the exogenous variation of aid against drugs to have any predictive power regarding the amount of anti-terrorism aid allocated to Colombia. Furthermore, the instrument used to capture the exogenous variation of aid against terrorism must not have any power to predict the amount of anti-drug aid allocated to Colombia. Table 21 shows that swapping the instruments does not produce any predictive ability and therefore is evidence of the instruments' orthogonality.

7.5. Regarding different estimation methods

It is worth taking into account that there are some differences between Two-stage least squares (2SLS) and Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. Given that the bias by endogeneity that was argued had to be positive (more government attention locally implied more foreign aid), it was expected that the estimates by instrumental variables would show adjusted coefficients lower than those reported by OLS. Despite this, it is not surprising that the coefficients by 2SLS are greater than those of OLS given that the aid variable may be subject to the classic problem of measurement error, which in this case is more apparent given the quarterly approach to aid deployment. For this reason, it is possible we are facing a case of endogeneity by measurement error (attenuation bias) rather than a problem of bias by inverse causality between the variables of aid and government attention.

7.6. Comments About the First Stages

The estimates made in Panel B of tables 10 and 11 are vital to understanding the dynamic of US aid. Through these specifications we can observe a "substitution" effect between military aid granted to non-Latin American countries and the assistance of this sort directed towards Colombia. Note that regardless of the formulation or the issue studied, Colombian military aid has a negative relationship with respect to the

aid directed to other non-Latin American countries. This can be understood as a result of the US government's budget restrictions where, given a maximum amount of resources approved by congress, it must redistribute the aid between the possible recipient governments based on its foreign policy.

Perhaps more interesting than the aid substitution mechanism is the irrelevance shown by the terrorist dynamic when explaining the sums of military aid given to Colombia. For example, in table 10, no model shows evidence that terrorist attacks or their intensity has an effect on the military aid given to the country. In the case of aid to help fight drugs, on the other hand, table 11 shows a clear link between the number of hectares cultivated and the quantity or resources sent to combat the potential consequences of these crops growing.

Finally, it is worth noting that throughout all of the estimates, total military aid directed to non-Latin American countries appears to be a strong instrument of the aid directed to Colombia. For all specifications the first stages exceed the standard condition of statistics F greater than 10. Similarly, identification tests showed satisfactory results even in more restrictive models given by columns 5 and 6 in both tables.

7.7.   Mechanisms and Some Comments about the Theoretical Model

As shown by the model developed in section 2, the empirical results can be interpreted as evidence in favor of agenda influence through the two mechanisms proposed by propositions 1 and 2. Particularly in the case of military aid, the Colombian government was able to benefit from the results of the aid resources being deployed. In the two problems analyzed, increases in military aid imply more troops to face these problems, which improves the chances of securing positive results against these two serious problems and ultimately providing access to the political benefits of claiming operational success for these issues.

For example, during the peaks of military aid that occurred in 2000-2001 and 2003-2004, the governments of presidents Álvaro Uribe and Andrés Pastrana reported attention indexes greater than the average for other years of their term of office. Table 15 displays the results of a simple mean difference between these periods and others within each presidential term. What is shown is the behavior described by the theoretical model: the higher the level of aid secured, the higher the level of attention on the issues receiving aid. However, is this increased attention the only consequence of such rent-seeking? To answer this question it is worth analyzing the dynamic of presidential interest for those issues in the context where they originated. For example, selecting two representative speeches from these years (2000 and 2004) we find the following:

> *President Andrés Pastrana Arango: July 22, 2000, during the awarding of the Order of Naval Merit "Almirante Padilla" a few days after the visit of Bill Clinton to the country:*
>
> "...The results obtained in the framework of the Maritime Agreement are extremely satisfying: this year they have inspected 148 vessels and seized almost 19 tons of cocaine that, if it had reached US streets, would have left the drug traffickers with an income of close to five hundred million dollars"..."These boats are part of the Cooperation Program between the Colombian and United States governments that seeks to unite our efforts in the fight against the trafficking of illegal drugs. A few days ago, President Clinton himself said the same thing on approving the aid for Plan Colombia: **"As Colombians fight to build their democracy and block the illegal drug trade, they are fighting for all of us"**. These words have great value for Colombians, as they are the essence of the joint work our two nations are doing in the name of better social justice and a world free of the international drug problem. I would like to especially thank the joint work of Ambassador Curtis Kamman and Admiral James Loy,

The type of discourse that accompanied the US aid after the approval of Plan Colombia can be seen here. Talking about results against drugs seemed to improve the president's image among the national and international communities. Similarly, the following was seen in the case of president Álvaro Uribe:

President Álvaro Uribe Vélez: November 22, 2004, during the visit of President George W. Bush to the country:

"...While the Colombian people fight for democracy, terrorism has assassinated democratic fighters."... "While the Colombian army destroys anti-personnel mines and gives the world an example of facing the terrorist challenge while observing human rights, terrorism has affected 600 Colombians in the past year, especially members of the security forces, with anti-personnel mines. The drugs that finance terrorism threaten to destroy the Amazon rainforest. It already attempted to do so by eliminating one million seven hundred thousand hectares of tropical forest in Colombia" ... **US aid has gone beyond mere words to become an effective support. We trust that the United States and President Bush will continue to help until Colombia is free of the plague of terrorism and drugs.** We cannot leave the job half done, we are going to win but we haven't won yet. We have advanced but the snake is still alive" ... "The role of the United States in the battle against terrorism, and in the respect and tolerant debate of opposing ideas, is essential for governability in this continent".

It is even clearer that attention towards terrorism was directly linked to the sums of aid organized by the US, and that based on these they could obtain political benefits from their deployment. It is evident that it was not only rent-seeking that caused this behavior, but also the context in which it presented itself. As can be observed in these small extracts, it is not a coincidence that the most important sums of aid and the highest levels of attention coincided with the US presidents' visits to the country, when it is easier to show people the importance of focusing attention on this type of problem.

These small samples of speeches also show the benefits for the US of *"putting its money where its mouth is"*, not only in a domestic context but also for the international community which, as shown in the model, is a key factor in agenda-setting mechanisms.

If it is true that the agenda-setting process is stronger when the possibility of benefiting is greater for the receiving government (In the model $\delta^k \to 1$), then faced with an increase in these possibilities we should also expect an increase in the effect studied. To explore this mechanism the following exercise was conducted. The base model was estimated without fixed effects for each year from 1998 until 2012 and the effects (β_0 and β_1) were taken for each year as a dependent variable on the annual change in the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International.

The index ranges from 0 to 10 (where 0 is a totally corrupt country and 10 is a country with no corruption), and its changing value works as an estimate of the parameter δ^k. In years when perceived corruption increases it is to be expected that the possibility for additional political rent-seeking δ^k is greater and the estimated effects of political agenda-setting should be larger.

The exercise mentioned above is shown in Figure 7. The relation obtained is as expected: at higher levels of growth in the perception of corruption, the effects found in the regressions are larger, and this relationship is consistently positive for the two issues studied. This suggests that the power to set the agenda is stronger when there is an increased possibility of the recipient governments obtaining additional political

rents. Table 16 shows the numerical correlations reported in Figure 7 through the solid line.

Finally, the fact that the US attention is consistently important for explaining variations in Colombian attention can be interpreted in light of the model as the effective existence of a channel for agenda-setting through reducing the costs of making public statements. In the case of terrorism and drugs, US intervention has enabled these topics to be discussed in an international political context, and provided incentives for Colombia to address these problems. (For more detailed developments see Easterly (2002); Haas (1980); Karlan and Appel (2011); Riker (1996))

8. Conclusions

In this paper, international aid is examined as a tool for political agenda-setting. For this analysis, a theoretical model is constructed that incorporates the positive externalities generated by foreign aid on the political benefits of the governments that receive the aid, as well as the compensation provided by these governments through the legitimization of the donor countries' political agendas.

The main results of the model show that government that offer international assistance can influence the political agenda of the recipient governments through two channels: First, by reducing the political costs of official intervention in financed issues (as a consequence of the increase in international relevance of the issues receiving aid); and second, by creating incentives for additional political rent-seeking, when there is a positive fraction of resources that the government can benefit from directly or indirectly.

These results are studied for the case of the aid provided by the USA to Colombia during the period 1998-2012, and this shows the power US presidents had to influence the Colombian political agenda in matters related to drugs and terrorism. It is found that military aid, and not economic aid, is responsible for linking the two countries' agendas. The results are obtained using an estimation by instrumental variables that capture the exogenous variation of the aid directed to Colombia based on the aid provided to non-Latin American countries.

The conclusions are robust to controlling for different short-term characteristics and variables associated with terrorist and drug-related activities, in Colombia and the world.

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FIGURE 3. US AID AGAINST DRUGS AND TERRORISM, COLOMBIA AND NON LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Colombia

Non Latinamerican Countries

Military Assistance, Total (Left)

Military Assistance, Counter-Drug Activities (Right)

Econ Assistance Anti Terrorism (Left)   Econ Assistance Anti Drugs (Right)

Economic Assistance, Total (Right)

Source: USAID - Obligations and loan authorizations: Aid in Constant 2010 dollars (Millions), year corresponds to US. fiscal year.

FIGURE 4. MILITARY AID AND PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC ON TERRORISM AND DRUGS

Note: Figure 4a (Top), Figure 4b (Bottom). The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance. Likewise, The Drugs agenda consists of the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each moment. See Section 4 for details.

Note: Figure 5a (Top), Figure 5b (Bottom). The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance. Likewise, The Drugs agenda consists of the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each moment. See Section 4 for details.

FIGURE 6. PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION ON TERRORISM AND DRUGS: COLOMBIA AND US, 1998-2012

Note: Time in Weeks. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance. Likewise, The Drugs agenda consists of the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each moment. See Section 4 for details.

FIGURE 7. MECHANISMS: COEFFICIENTS OF INTEREST AND CHANGE IN CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX

Note: The reported coefficients are obtained from equation (11) estimated for labeled years. The changes in the corruption index are calculated as the annual change in CPI index from Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. Positive Changes are improvements in the perception of corruption.

Table 1—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Pastrana

Word Correlations with "Drogas"

ilícitas	0.81	cultivos	0.40	conferencia	0.31	cooperación	0.24
tráfico	0.76	erradicación	0.38	daño	0.31	creado	0.24
problema	0.66	toneladas	0.38	colombia	0.29	naciones	0.24
químicos	0.66	estados	0.37	objetivos	0.29	reiterar	0.24
consumo	0.61	sufrido	0.37	derrotar	0.28	comunidad	0.23
flagelo	0.60	prevención	0.36	laboratorios	0.28	cultivo	0.23
droga	0.57	combatir	0.35	amenaza	0.27	duradera	0.23
lucha	0.53	unidos	0.35	internacional	0.27	enemigo	0.23
mundial	0.49	áreas	0.35	compartida	0.25	plan	0.23
narcotráfico	0.49	alternativo	0.33	estrategia	0.25	territorio	0.23
ilícitos	0.48	fortalecimiento	0.33	negocio	0.25	activos	0.22
coca	0.44	mundo	0.32	reducción	0.25	continente	0.22

Note: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drogas" are shown in the table.

Table 2—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Uribe

Word Correlations with "Terrorismo"

terroristas	0.66	pueblo	0.39	policías	0.34	acciones	0.31
derrotar	0.56	seguridad	0.38	respeto	0.34	cárcel	0.31
terrorista	0.48	determinación	0.37	farc	0.33	defensa	0.31
democracia	0.45	colombia	0.36	humanitario	0.33	guerrilla	0.31
grupos	0.44	pública	0.36	nombre	0.33	policía	0.31
democrática	0.43	soldados	0.36	armas	0.32	toda	0.31
paz	0.43	lucha	0.35	democrático	0.32	grupo	0.30
amenaza	0.42	narcotráfico	0.35	firmeza	0.32	guerrillas	0.30
derrota	0.42	desafío	0.34	fuerzas	0.32	oposición	0.30
fuerza	0.42	guerrilleros	0.34	garantías	0.32	política	0.30
integrantes	0.41	libertades	0.34	militares	0.32	violentos	0.30
militar	0.41	patria	0.34	secuestro	0.32	voluntad	0.30

Word Correlations with "Drogas"

ilícitas	0.78	colombia	0.25	mundo	0.21	preservar	0.17
droga	0.50	guardabosques	0.25	narcotráfico	0.21	riqueza	0.17
consumo	0.45	hectáreas	0.25	territorio	0.21	terrorismo	0.17
tráfico	0.39	personal	0.25	criminal	0.20	tristeza	0.17
erradicación	0.33	criminalidad	0.24	consumidores	0.19	áreas	0.17
libre	0.31	países	0.24	destrucción	0.19	daño	0.16
selva	0.31	bosque	0.23	internacional	0.19	dominio	0.16
libres	0.30	cultivos	0.23	milenio	0.19	erradicar	0.16
naciones	0.30	europa	0.23	disminuido	0.18	familias	0.16
negocio	0.30	lucha	0.23	global	0.18	terroristas	0.16
dosis	0.29	legislativo	0.22	europea	0.17	ciudadanos	0.15
unidas	0.27	hermanos	0.21	policía	0.17	coca	0.15

Note: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drogas" and "Terrorismo" are shown in the table.

Table 3—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Santos

Word Correlations with "Terrorismo"

actos	0,48	militar	0,28	seguiremos	0,24	alias	0,21
terroristas	0,48	conjunto	0,27	ceremonia	0,23	bandas	0,21
fuerzas	0,44	determinación	0,27	consolidación	0,23	ejército	0,21
terrorista	0,44	comandante	0,26	farc	0,23	golpes	0,21
armadas	0,39	contundencia	0,26	seguir	0,23	guerra	0,21
civiles	0,33	defensa	0,26	sentirse	0,23	intervención	0,21
comandantes	0,32	seguridad	0,26	colaboración	0,22	narcotráfico	0,21
militares	0,31	efectividad	0,24	combatir	0,22	resultados	0,21
oficial	0,3	general	0,24	guerrilla	0,22	criminales	0,2
patria	0,3	inteligencia	0,24	soldados	0,22	fuerza	0,2
oficiales	0,29	policía	0,24	único	0,22	lucha	0,2
dado	0,28	policías	0,24	aire	0,21	mar	0,2

Word Correlations with "Drogas"

global	0.38	humanidad	0.24	región	0.21	latinoamericanos	0.19
luchando	0.31	soldados	0.24	crimen	0.20	llegado	0.19
planeta	0.31	autoridad	0.23	enfoque	0.20	profunda	0.19
droga	0.30	ciudades	0.22	estados	0.20	tiempos	0.19
narcotráfico	0.30	convicción	0.22	guerrilleros	0.20	dignidad	0.18
tráfico	0.30	cooperación	0.22	latina	0.20	militares	0.18
armas	0.27	mundo	0.22	organizado	0.20	oficiales	0.18
ejército	0.25	combatiendo	0.21	policías	0.20	países	0.18
miembros	0.25	comprometidos	0.21	américa	0.19	preocupa	0.18
naciones	0.25	generales	0.21	asamblea	0.19	puertas	0.18
centroamérica	0.24	libertades	0.21	debemos	0.19	voz	0.18
dispuestos	0.24	lucha	0.21	estabilidad	0.19	aire	0.17

Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drogas" and "Terrorismo" are shown in the table.

TABLE 4—SUMMARY: AGENDA AND WORD CORRELATIONS - PRESIDENT CLINTON

Word Correlations with "Terrorism"

pursue	0.32	ability	0.23	respond	0.22	seek	0.21
destruction	0.29	answer	0.23	speech	0.22	strengthening	0.21
additional	0.27	complete	0.23	weapons	0.22	threats	0.21
mass	0.27	effect	0.23	biological	0.21	understanding	0.21
process	0.26	information	0.23	common	0.21	agreed	0.20
efforts	0.25	related	0.23	continue	0.21	chemical	0.20
international	0.25	relationship	0.23	encourage	0.21	continued	0.20
response	0.25	address	0.22	fight	0.21	directly	0.20
commitment	0.24	agenda	0.22	global	0.21	including	0.20
cooperation	0.24	meeting	0.22	joint	0.21	mutual	0.20
east	0.24	parties	0.22	middle	0.21	outside	0.20
threat	0.24	reforms	0.22	promoting	0.21	particular	0.20

Word Correlations with "Drugs"

drug	0.58	expand	0.21	strengthen	0.17	children	0.14
strategy	0.36	local	0.20	levels	0.16	committed	0.14
treatment	0.34	overall	0.20	nearly	0.16	crimes	0.14
crime	0.31	percent	0.20	progress	0.16	develop	0.14
streets	0.31	study	0.20	reduce	0.16	effective	0.14
cities	0.29	test	0.20	single	0.16	mexico	0.14
communities	0.28	criminal	0.18	expanded	0.15	radio	0.14
population	0.28	level	0.18	help	0.15	significant	0.14
positive	0.27	dramatically	0.17	police	0.15	trouble	0.14
fight	0.24	nation	0.17	powerful	0.15	basis	0.13
justice	0.23	rates	0.17	similar	0.15	borders	0.13
enforcement	0.21	safe	0.17	tools	0.15	community	0.13

Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drugs" and "Terrorism" are shown in the table.

Table 5—Summary: Agenda and Word Correlations - President Bush

(word cloud image)

Word Correlations with "Terrorism"

terrorist	0.37	united	0.23	prime	0.20	governments	0.18
sharing	0.36	bush	0.22	relationship	0.20	joint	0.18
information	0.31	homeland	0.22	world	0.20	qaeda	0.18
fight	0.29	president	0.22	allies	0.19	september	0.18
terror	0.25	war	0.22	common	0.19	taliban	0.18
terrorists	0.25	minister	0.21	efforts	0.19	threats	0.18
agencies	0.24	attack	0.20	including	0.19	acts	0.17
attacks	0.24	coalition	0.20	peace	0.19	agreed	0.17
cooperation	0.24	countries	0.20	progress	0.19	bring	0.17
international	0.24	discussions	0.20	responsibilities	0.19	continue	0.17
security	0.24	fighting	0.20	threat	0.19	destruction	0.17
support	0.23	nations	0.20	afghanistan	0.18	east	0.17

Word Correlations with "Drugs"

drug	0.72	modern	0.26	affordable	0.18	percent	0.16
narcotics	0.53	plans	0.26	centers	0.18	system	0.16
cocaine	0.49	save	0.24	demand	0.18	america	0.15
seniors	0.49	choose	0.23	doctors	0.18	benefits	0.15
choices	0.33	help	0.23	plan	0.18	called	0.15
medicine	0.31	treatment	0.22	reduce	0.18	change	0.15
cost	0.30	choice	0.21	afford	0.17	giving	0.15
benefit	0.29	lives	0.19	citizens	0.17	options	0.15
care	0.29	lower	0.19	patients	0.17	people	0.15
costs	0.28	program	0.19	pay	0.17	reason	0.15
available	0.27	provide	0.19	savings	0.17	senior	0.15
health	0.27	receive	0.19	medical	0.16	talk	0.15

Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drugs" and "Terrorism" are shown in the table.

TABLE 6—SUMMARY: AGENDA AND WORD CORRELATIONS - PRESIDENT OBAMA

Word Correlations with "Terrorism"

terrorist	0.55	defeat	0.36	partnership	0.30	actions	0.27
terrorists	0.51	effective	0.34	range	0.30	issues	0.27
violent	0.50	efforts	0.34	threats	0.30	partners	0.27
threat	0.45	preventing	0.34	nuclear	0.29	secure	0.27
qaeda	0.44	indeed	0.32	protect	0.29	unique	0.27
attacks	0.43	international	0.32	common	0.28	allies	0.26
security	0.42	prevent	0.32	framework	0.28	cooperation	0.26
homeland	0.37	resolve	0.32	including	0.28	individuals	0.26
partnerships	0.37	world	0.32	relationship	0.28	presidents	0.26
united	0.37	principles	0.31	respect	0.28	strong	0.26
violence	0.37	approach	0.30	rule	0.28	afghanistan	0.25
attack	0.36	countries	0.30	strategic	0.28	conflict	0.25

Word Correlations with "Drugs"

drug	0.77	enforcement	0.34	hospitals	0.31	hall	0.29
controls	0.58	paying	0.34	insurance	0.31	money	0.29
cocaine	0.45	system	0.34	pay	0.31	office	0.29
hole	0.44	benefits	0.33	reduce	0.31	people	0.29
seniors	0.44	cost	0.33	reducing	0.31	program	0.29
treatment	0.41	dollars	0.33	reform	0.31	amount	0.28
care	0.39	savings	0.33	chief	0.30	provide	0.28
doctor	0.39	condition	0.32	essentially	0.30	actually	0.27
medical	0.39	covered	0.32	getting	0.30	affordable	0.27
health	0.37	advantage	0.31	legitimate	0.30	called	0.27
costs	0.34	billion	0.31	premiums	0.30	control	0.27
doctors	0.34	cover	0.31	criminal	0.29	deal	0.27

Notes: The word cloud shows the two hundred most frequent expressions used by the president throughout his term in office. Font size of words is proportional to its frequency in the speech. The first 48 correlations with "drugs" and "Terrorism" are shown in the table.

Table 7—Summary Statistics: Weekly Data 1998-2012

VARIABLES	Mean	Median	Sd	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Agenda: Presidential Attention						
Presidential Attention to Terrorism - Colombia	0,0075	0,0059	0,0075	0,0000	0,0343	711
Presidential Attention to Terrorism - EE.UU	0,0255	0,0160	0,0265	0,0000	0,1594	711
Presidential Attention to Terrorism - EE.UU$_{[4,t]}$ (Last Four Weeks)	0,1273	.08225	0,1301	0,0000	0,7315	711
Presidential Attention to Drugs - Colombia	0,0062	0,0057	0,0042	0,0000	0,0230	711
Presidential Attention to Drugs - EE.UU	0,0095	0,0072	0,0085	0,0000	0,0452	711
Presidential Attention to Drugs - EE.UU$_{[4,t]}$ (Last Four Weeks)	0,0478	0,0408	0,0375	0,0000	0,2005	711
Panel B: US Aid against Drugs and Terrorism						
log (Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia, U.S\$ M)	5,3094	5,2463	0,2420	4,9481	5,7860	702
log (Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia, U.S\$ M)	5,0017	4,9572	0,2480	4,4334	5,4536	702
log (Economic Assistance Against Terror - Colombia, U.S\$ M)	0,9819	1,3314	0,8026	0,0000	1,9805	702
log (Economic Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia, U.S\$ M)	6,0883	6,1751	0,6707	3,0787	7,0729	702
log (Total Economic Assistance - Cololmbia, U.S\$ M)	6,3250	6,3887	0,6296	3,3893	7,1695	702
log (Military Assistance Without Drugs - Non Latin-American Countries, U.S\$ M)	9,1814	9,4050	0,4447	8,2876	9,7055	702
log (Military Assistance Against Drugs - Non Latin-American Countries, U.S\$ M)	4,6394	5,3931	1,4466	1,7647	6,0844	702
log (Economic Assistance Against Terror - Non Latin-American Countries, U.S\$ M)	4,9688	5,4021	0,8259	3,6291	6,0419	702
log (Economic Assistance Against Drugs - Non Latin-American Countries, U.S\$ M)	5,3642	5,3777	1,5651	1,8567	7,4183	702
log (Total Economic Assistance - Non Latin-American Countries, U.S\$ M)	9,8004	9,9613	0,3370	9,2055	10,1317	702
Panel C: Covariates, specifications with "Terrorism"						
log (Terrorist Attacks - Colombia)	0,7270	0,6931	0,6977	0,0000	3,0910	645
log (Terrorist Attacks - Worldwide excluding Colombia)	3,5307	3,4965	0,7859	1,3863	5,5013	645
log (Deaths due to Terrorist Attacks - Colombia)	0,6526	0,0000	0,9946	0,0000	4,8903	645
log (Terrorist Attacks × Deaths due to Terrorist Attacks - Colombia)	0,9340	0,0000	1,4123	0,0000	6,6758	645
Panel D: Covariates, specifications with "Drugs"						
log (International Price of Cocaine, \$USD/Kg)	7,5252	7,4748	0,1850	7,2951	7,8104	697
log (Cultivated Hectares of Coca - Colombia)	11,4474	11,3592	0,3088	11,0319	12,0033	697
log (Domestic Price of Cocaine \$Thousands COP/Kg)	8,3067	8,4121	0,1952	7,6506	8,4390	697
log (Eradicated Hectares of Coca - Colombia)	11,7835	11,8691	0,4739	10,6955	12,3425	697

TABLE 8—OLS ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO TERRORISM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1998-2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Military Aid - Terror[†]	0.0114***	0.0114***	0.0117***	0.0117***	0.0117***	0.0145***	0.0145***	0.0151***	0.0151***	0.0150***
	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)
US Attention - Terror	0.0039	0.0044*	0.0052**	0.0052**	0.0052**	0.0042*	0.0048*	0.0056**	0.0056**	0.0056**
	(0.0025)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0024)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)
Terrorist Attacks - Colombia[a]		0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0000		0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0001
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Terrorist Attacks - Worldwide[b]			0.0010**	0.0010**	0.0010**			0.0011***	0.0011***	0.0011***
			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				0.0001	0.0005				0.0000	0.0006
				(0.0002)	(0.0008)				(0.0002)	(0.0008)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0004					-0.0005
					(0.0006)					(0.0006)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	637	637	637	637	702	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.5412	0.5746	0.5780	0.5781	0.5783	0.5496	0.5829	0.5874	0.5874	0.5878

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Military Aid - Drugs[†]	0.0085***	0.0083***	0.0089***	0.0087***	0.0076***	0.0087***	0.0090***	0.0102***	0.0100***	0.0097***
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0193***	0.0189***	0.0186***	0.0152***	0.0166***	0.0224***	0.0231***	0.0227***	0.0192***	0.0190***
	(0.0047)	(0.0048)	(0.0047)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0050)	(0.0050)
Intl. Price of Cocaine.[a]		-0.0031	-0.0017	-0.0075*	-0.0050		0.0078	0.0116*	0.0051	0.0037
		(0.0038)	(0.0045)	(0.0045)	(0.0048)		(0.0053)	(0.0064)	(0.0064)	(0.0063)
Cultivated Hectares of Coca[b]			-0.0013	-0.0024	-0.0040*			-0.0027	-0.0037*	-0.0042*
			(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0023)			(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0023)
Domestic Price of Cocaine[c]				0.0266***	0.0234***				0.0259***	0.0245***
				(0.0052)	(0.0055)				(0.0052)	(0.0057)
Eradicated Hectares of Coca[d]					-0.0045***					-0.0021
					(0.0017)					(0.0021)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	702	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.2490	0.2449	0.2453	0.2777	0.2852	0.2615	0.2594	0.2612	0.2919	0.2929

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.

TABLE 10—IV ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO TERRORISM ON MILITARY AID 1998-2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Terrorism						
Military Aid - Terror[†]	0.0218***	0.0225***	0.0232***	0.0232***	0.0232***	0.0262***
	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0052)
US Attention - Terror	0.0080*	0.0091**	0.0101**	0.0101**	0.0101**	0.0147***
	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0053)
Attacks-Colombia[a]		0.0004	0.0001	0.0000	0.0002	0.0001
		(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Attacks-Worldwide[b]			0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0013**
			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				0.0001	0.0005	0.0003
				(0.0002)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0004	-0.0001
					(0.0006)	(0.0007)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs						
Military Aid NonLat[‡]	-0.4086***	-0.4063***	-0.4037***	-0.4037***	-0.4038***	-0.3447***
	(0.0196)	(0.0201)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0243)
US Attention - Terror	-0.3481***	-0.3554***	-0.3620***	-0.3620***	-0.3622***	-0.5304***
	(0.0465)	(0.0475)	(0.0474)	(0.0474)	(0.0474)	(0.0558)
Attacks-Colombia[a]		-0.0082	-0.0055	-0.0055	-0.0013	0.0032
		(0.0050)	(0.0050)	(0.0057)	(0.0064)	(0.0094)
Attacks-Worldwide[b]			-0.0117	-0.0117	-0.0115	-0.0049
			(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0071)	(0.0103)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				-0.0001	0.0102	0.0192
				(0.0032)	(0.0109)	(0.0182)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0087	-0.0204
					(0.0086)	(0.0139)
President Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Observations	702	637	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.9230	0.9121	0.9126	0.9126	0.9128	0.8394
F	1178	751.3	724.3	694.1	669.2	459.6

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively. ‡ It is the log of Military Assistance to Non-Latin-American Countries without the assistance against drugs).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs						
Military Aid - Drugs[†]	0.0163***	0.0159***	0.0174***	0.0173***	0.0173***	0.0219***
	(0.0049)	(0.0047)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0054)	(0.0078)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0219***	0.0231***	0.0220***	0.0186***	0.0186***	0.0137*
	(0.0072)	(0.0074)	(0.0069)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0070)
Intl.Price[a]		0.0109	0.0200*	0.0138	0.0138	0.0108
		(0.0086)	(0.0120)	(0.0118)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)
Cultivated Hectares[b]			-0.0073	-0.0084*	-0.0084*	-0.0137**
			(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0068)
Domestic Price[c]				0.0255***	0.0255***	0.0255***
				(0.0081)	(0.0088)	(0.0095)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					0.0000	-0.0004
					(0.0035)	(0.0033)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Military Assistance Against Drugs						
Military Aid NonLat[‡]	-0.3164***	-0.3225***	-0.2856***	-0.2855***	-0.2760***	-0.1794***
	(0.0246)	(0.0244)	(0.0177)	(0.0177)	(0.0200)	(0.0213)
US Attention - Drugs	-0.1142	-0.1971	-0.0931	-0.0997	-0.1024	0.0879
	(0.1297)	(0.1338)	(0.1122)	(0.1120)	(0.1130)	(0.1333)
Intl.Price[a]		-0.5400***	-1.1960***	-1.2077***	-1.2384***	-1.1583***
		(0.0920)	(0.1053)	(0.1122)	(0.1129)	(0.1026)
Cultivated Hectares[b]			0.5723***	0.5702***	0.5487***	0.7011***
			(0.0408)	(0.0414)	(0.0434)	(0.0424)
Domestic Price[c]				0.0486	0.0013	-0.1030
				(0.1122)	(0.1278)	(0.1748)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					-0.0712	-0.2085***
					(0.0525)	(0.0440)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
President Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.8586	0.8577	0.9026	0.9026	0.9030	0.8388
F	659.2	470.6	697.7	723.2	917.3	843.8

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Military Assistance Against Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.

TABLE 12—OLS ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO TERRORISM ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 1998-2012 - FALSIFICATION TEST

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Economic Aid - Terror[†]	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0011
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
US Attention - Terror	-0.0030*	-0.0027	-0.0023	-0.0023	-0.0023	-0.0031*	-0.0029	-0.0025	-0.0025	-0.0025
	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)
Ataques Colombia[a]		-0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0000		-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0000
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Terrorist Attacks - Worldwide[b]			0.0007	0.0007	0.0007			0.0007	0.0007	0.0008
			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				-0.0000	0.0007				-0.0000	0.0007
				(0.0002)	(0.0008)				(0.0002)	(0.0008)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0006					-0.0006
					(0.0006)					(0.0006)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	637	637	637	637	702	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.5132	0.5465	0.5483	0.5483	0.5488	0.5135	0.5467	0.5487	0.5487	0.5493

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Economic Assistance Against Terror - Colombia) while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively.

TABLE 13—OLS Estimation: Presidential Attention to Drugs On Economic Assistance Against Drugs 1998-2012 - Falsification Test

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Economic Aid - Drugs†	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0000	-0.0003	-0.0005**	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0005*	-0.0006**
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0181***	0.0179***	0.0197***	0.0162***	0.0183***	0.0230***	0.0233***	0.0238***	0.0201***	0.0194***
	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0053)	(0.0055)	(0.0053)	(0.0052)	(0.0053)	(0.0054)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)
Intl. Price of Cocaine^a		-0.0086**	-0.0137***	-0.0189***	-0.0124***		0.0044	-0.0002	-0.0057	-0.0078
		(0.0037)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0047)		(0.0054)	(0.0061)	(0.0060)	(0.0058)
Cultivated Hectares of Coca^b			0.0061***	0.0046***	0.0006			0.0037*	0.0021	0.0003
			(0.0018)	(0.0017)	(0.0021)			(0.0020)	(0.0019)	(0.0022)
Domestic Price of Cocaine^c				0.0284***	0.0239***				0.0284***	0.0252***
				(0.0054)	(0.0056)				(0.0054)	(0.0057)
Eradicated Hectares of Coca^d					-0.0072***					-0.0052**
					(0.0018)					(0.0021)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	702	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.1923	0.1927	0.2078	0.2428	0.2626	0.2243	0.2197	0.2244	0.2594	0.2659

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Economic Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs						
Economic Aid - Drugs[†]	0.0026	0.0027	0.0063**	0.0052	0.0049	0.0042
	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0032)	(0.0068)	(0.0078)	(0.0055)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0220**	0.0212**	0.0202*	0.0199*	0.0197*	0.0177*
	(0.0090)	(0.0095)	(0.0121)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)	(0.0102)
Intl. Price[a]		-0.0015	-0.0211	-0.0190	-0.0189	-0.0221*
		(0.0052)	(0.0087)	(0.0113)	(0.0068)
Cultivated Hectares[b]			0.0105**	0.0090	0.0083	0.0064
			(0.0059)	(0.0067)	(0.0077)	(0.0104)
Domestic Price[c]				0.0068	0.0071	0.0087
				(0.0281)	(0.0285)	(0.0209)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					-0.0012	-0.0029
					(0.0064)	(0.0053)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable: Economic Assistance Against Drugs						
Economic Aid NonLat[‡]	2.0324***	1.9363***	1.7711***	0.9465*	0.8031*	1.1080**
	(0.3265)	(0.3435)	(0.3770)	(0.5367)	(0.4646)	(0.4441)
US Attention - Drugs	0.2083	0.3590	0.3539	0.0670	-0.0193	0.2042
	(0.6315)	(0.6641)	(0.6617)	(0.6856)	(0.6766)	(0.6907)
Intl. Price [a]		0.8074	1.1998	1.4830*	1.3273	1.2477**
		(0.5804)	(0.8739)	(0.8991)	(0.9085)	(0.5216)
Cultivated Hectares[b]			-0.2475	-0.7428*	-1.0350***	-0.6418**
			(0.3613)	(0.4066)	(0.3130)	(0.2830)
Domestic Price[c]				2.7952***	2.5098**	2.1201**
				(1.0379)	(1.1138)	(1.0328)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					-0.6558	-0.7167**
					(0.4007)	(0.2873)
President Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.3430	0.3416	0.3424	0.3554	0.3608	0.3421
F	49.95	40.64	39.09	34.93	33.86	34.58

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to Log(Economic Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia) while (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Economic Assistance Against Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Andrés Pastrana	2000	1998-2002	Difference	p-value
Mean Attention to Drugs	0,0084	0,0038	0,0046	0.00056
Standard Deviation of Attention to Drugs	0,0033	0,0039		
Observations	53	209		
Álvaro Uribe I	2004	2002-2006	Difference	p-value
Mean Attention to Terrorism	0,0157	0,0098	0,0060	0.0010
Standard Deviation of Attention to Terrorism	0,0081	0,0068		
Observations	53	417		

Notes: Column 2 shows the average presidential attention, during the period 1998-2002, omitting 2000 attention for Andrés Pastrana. Similarly, column 2 shows the average presidential attention, during the period 2002-2006, omitting 2004 attention for Álvaro Uribe in his first term in office.

TABLE 16—MECHANISMS: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS OF INTEREST AND CHANGE IN CPI

Set of Coefficients	CPI Anual Change
Coefficients: Attention to Terrorism on Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs	-0,4717
Coefficients: Attention to Terrorism on US Attention to Terrorism	-0,5473
Coefficients: Attention to Drugs On Military Aid Against Drugs	-0,186
Coefficients: Attention to Drugs On US Attention to Drugs	-0,1615

Notes: CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index from International Transparency. Positive changes in CPI are associated with improvements in the perception of transparency. The set of coefficients are obtained from the estimation of equation (11) in each year (during 1998-2012) omitting president fixed effects.

FIGURE 8. DOMESTIC SPENDING ON JUSTICE, SECURITY AND WAR ON DRUGS IN COLOMBIA

Source: (Rocha 2011) Data expressed as percent of 2005 GDP
Black - Security and Justice, Green - Security, Blue - Justice, Red - War on Drugs (Right Axis)

TABLE 17—OLS ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO TERRORISM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1998-2012 - ROBUSTNESS CHECK - DOMESTIC SPENDING: SECURITY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Military Aid (Adjusted) - Terror[†]	0.0094***	0.0096***	0.0100***	0.0100***	0.0099***	0.0186***	0.0199***	0.0205***	0.0205***	0.0205***
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0019)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)
US Attention - Terror	0.0024	0.0032	0.0040*	0.0040*	0.0040*	0.0006	0.0018	0.0024	0.0024	0.0023
	(0.0022)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0025)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)
Terrorist Attacks - Colombia[a]		0.0002	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0001		0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0000
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Terrorist Attacks - Worldwide[b]			0.0010**	0.0010**	0.0010**			0.0011***	0.0012***	0.0012***
			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				0.0000	0.0004				-0.0000	0.0004
				(0.0002)	(0.0008)				(0.0002)	(0.0008)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0004					-0.0004
					(0.0006)					(0.0006)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	637	637	637	637	702	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.5362	0.5699	0.5733	0.5733	0.5735	0.5668	0.5999	0.6046	0.6046	0.6049

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to $\log\left(\frac{\text{Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia}}{\text{Domestic Military Spending in Security}}\right)$ while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Terrorism						
MilitaryAidTerror (Adj)[†]	0.1534*	0.1514*	0.1649*	0.1648*	0.1643*	0.2384
	(0.0827)	(0.0836)	(0.0997)	(0.0995)	(0.0986)	(0.2328)
US Attention - Terror	0.0705	0.0754	0.0851	0.0851	0.0848	0.1519
	(0.0459)	(0.0487)	(0.0586)	(0.0585)	(0.0580)	(0.1559)
Attacks Colombia[a]		0.0044	0.0035	0.0034	0.0029	0.0033
		(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0027)	(0.0049)
Attacks Worldwide[b]			0.0058	0.0058	0.0057	0.0070
			(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0036)	(0.0072)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				0.0000	-0.0011	-0.0046
				(0.0008)	(0.0026)	(0.0068)
Attacks×Deaths					0.0010	0.0047
					(0.0022)	(0.0064)
Panel B: First Stage, Dep. Var: Military Aid without Assistance Against Drugs / Domestic Spending						
Military Aid NonLat[‡]	0.1953***	0.1948***	0.1820**	0.1822**	0.1833**	0.1228
	(0.0684)	(0.0702)	(0.0715)	(0.0716)	(0.0717)	(0.0759)
US Attention - Terror	-0.5138***	-0.5518***	-0.5626***	-0.5626***	-0.5630***	-0.6662***
	(0.0591)	(0.0587)	(0.0585)	(0.0585)	(0.0586)	(0.0657)
Attacks-Colombia[a]		-0.0294***	-0.0229***	-0.0222***	-0.0171	-0.0136
		(0.0067)	(0.0072)	(0.0083)	(0.0109)	(0.0133)
Attacks-Worldwide[b]			-0.0282***	-0.0280***	-0.0277***	-0.0248**
			(0.0095)	(0.0095)	(0.0095)	(0.0118)
Deaths due to Attacks[c]				-0.0008	0.0117	0.0229
				(0.0050)	(0.0151)	(0.0195)
Attacks×Deaths					-0.0107	-0.0229
					(0.0127)	(0.0162)
President Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Observations	702	637	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.9640	0.9531	0.9538	0.9538	0.9539	0.9349
F	2173	1227	1260	1216	1145	905.1

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The terror agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: terrorismo + terrorista + terroristas + terror over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Terrorism + Terrorist + Terrorists + Terror said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to $\log\left(\frac{\text{Military Assistance Without Drugs - Colombia}}{\text{Domestic Military Spending in Security}}\right)$ while (a), (b) y (c) are the log of terrorist attacks in Colombia, the log of worldwide terrorist attacks excluding Colombia and the log of the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Colombia, respectively. ‡ It is the log of Military Assistance to Non-Latin-American Countries without the assistance against drugs).

TABLE 19—OLS ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO DRUGS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGAINST DRUGS 1998-2012 - ROBUSTNESS CHECK - DOMESTIC SPENDING WAR ON DRUGS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Military Aid (Adjusted) - Drugs[†]	0.0062*** (0.0010)	0.0068*** (0.0011)	0.0059*** (0.0013)	0.0052*** (0.0013)	0.0035** (0.0014)	0.0045*** (0.0012)	0.0065*** (0.0013)	0.0061*** (0.0014)	0.0053*** (0.0015)	0.0045*** (0.0016)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0179*** (0.0050)	0.0172*** (0.0050)	0.0180*** (0.0051)	0.0150*** (0.0053)	0.0169*** (0.0054)	0.0212*** (0.0052)	0.0221*** (0.0052)	0.0223*** (0.0052)	0.0191*** (0.0055)	0.0189*** (0.0054)
Intl. Price of Cocaine[a]		0.0031 (0.0043)	-0.0004 (0.0051)	-0.0074 (0.0051)	-0.0065 (0.0053)		0.0146** (0.0059)	0.0131* (0.0071)	0.0052 (0.0071)	0.0024 (0.0071)
Cultivated Hectares of Coca[b]			0.0024 (0.0019)	0.0016 (0.0019)	-0.0002 (0.0021)			0.0009 (0.0020)	0.0002 (0.0020)	-0.0002 (0.0021)
Domestic Price of Cocaine[c]				0.0256*** (0.0052)	0.0221*** (0.0055)				0.0249*** (0.0053)	0.0235*** (0.0056)
Eradicated Hectares of Coca[d]					-0.0054*** (0.0018)					-0.0025 (0.0022)
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	702	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.2270	0.2229	0.2246	0.2543	0.2644	0.2361	0.2391	0.2394	0.2673	0.2686

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to $\log\left(\frac{\text{Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia}}{\text{Domestic Military Spending in War on Drugs}}\right)$ while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.

Table 20—IV Estimation: Presidential Attention to Drugs On Military Aid Against Drugs - Robustness Check - Domestic Spending: War on Drugs

TABLE 20—IV ESTIMATION: PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION TO DRUGS ON MILITARY AID AGAINST DRUGS - ROBUSTNESS CHECK - DOMESTIC SPENDING: WAR ON DRUGS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Second Stage, Dependent Variable: Presidential Attention to Drugs						
MilitaryAid(Adj)-Drugs[†]	-0.0126	-0.0216	0.0943	0.1166	-0.0555	0.3800
	(0.0104)	(0.0221)	(0.1116)	(0.4631)	(0.1317)	(4.5928)
US Attention - Drugs	0.0279**	0.0265**	0.0026	-0.0012	0.0261	-0.1196
	(0.0109)	(0.0124)	(0.0261)	(0.0806)	(0.0254)	(1.6430)
Intl. Price[a]		-0.0318	0.2089	0.2607	-0.1486	0.7393
		(0.0373)	(0.2479)	(1.0635)	(0.3306)	(9.1103)
Cultivated Hectares[b]			-0.0419	-0.0523	0.0178	-0.1588
			(0.0554)	(0.2201)	(0.0380)	(1.9455)
Domestic Price[c]				-0.0090	0.0213	0.0144
				(0.1401)	(0.0174)	(0.1471)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					-0.0330	0.1365
					(0.0701)	(1.7158)
Panel B: First Stage, Dependent Variable Military Assistance Against Drugs						
Military Aid NonLat[‡]	-0.4142***	-0.2411***	0.1184	0.0419	-0.0710	0.0122
	(0.0848)	(0.0849)	(0.0815)	(0.0994)	(0.0890)	(0.0881)
US Attention - Drugs	0.4214***	0.1991	0.2102	0.1836	0.1157	0.3636**
	(0.1493)	(0.1371)	(0.1301)	(0.1339)	(0.1360)	(0.1413)
Int. Price[a]		-1.5041***	-2.3583***	-2.3320***	-2.4545***	-1.9898***
		(0.1189)	(0.1577)	(0.1551)	(0.1974)	(0.1026)
Cultivated Hecatres[b]			0.5388***	0.4929***	0.2628***	0.4275***
			(0.0633)	(0.0668)	(0.0531)	(0.0483)
Domestic Price[c]				0.2592	0.0345	0.0088
				(0.1618)	(0.1848)	(0.1963)
Eradicated Hectares[d]					-0.5164***	-0.3749***
					(0.0691)	(0.0422)
President Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Specific Trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Observations	702	689	689	689	689	689
R^2	0.9743	0.9778	0.9812	0.9813	0.9842	0.9797
F	3595	5111	4589	5084	4371	4151

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The Drugs agenda consists of the fraction of speech dedicated to the following expressions: Droga + Drogas + Narcotráfico + Coca over the total words that were said by the Colombian president in each instance omitting the set of words in tables B1 and B2. The US Attention consist of the expressions Drug + Drugs + Cocaine + Narcotics said in the last four weeks by US presidents. † It Corresponds to $\log\left(\frac{\text{Military Assistance Against Drugs - Colombia}}{\text{Domestic Military Spending in War on Drugs}}\right)$ while (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the log of International Price of Cocaine, log of Cultivated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, log of the domestic price of cocaine, and the log of Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Colombia, respectively.‡ It is the log of Military Assistance Against Drugs to Non-Latin-American Countries.

TABLE 21—INSTRUMENTS' ORTHOGONALITY

	(1) AidColTerror[†]	(2) AidColDrugs[‡]
Military Aid Against Drugs Non Latin-American Countries	-0.0403 (0.0436)	-0.291*** (0.0170)
Military Aid Against Terror Non Latin-American Countries	-0.480*** (0.0346)	-0.0163 (0.0280)
Terrorism Covariates	✓	-
Drugs Covariates	-	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Specific Trends	✓	✓
Presidential Relationship Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	637	689
R^2	0.900	0.903

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia, ‡ log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia.

TABLE 22—DOMESTIC SPENDING AND US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ln(Domestic Spending Against Terror)			ln(Domestic Spending Against Drugs)		
AidColTerror[†]	-0.1721** (0.0690)	0.0394*** (0.0150)	0.0421*** (0.0131)	-	-	-
AidColDrugs[‡]	-	-	-	-1.2514*** (0.0987)	-0.1587*** (0.0229)	0.0806*** (0.0161)
Constant	3.1462*** (0.3787)	1.0773*** (0.0788)	1.0954*** (0.0666)	10.8799*** (0.5058)	4.3553*** (0.1099)	3.2676*** (0.0707)
Specific Trend	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Pres. Relationship FE	-	-	✓	-	-	✓
Observations	702	702	702	702	702	702
R^2	0.0081	0.9869	0.9896	0.3108	0.9669	0.9834

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia, ‡ log Military Aid Against Terror to Colombia.

A. Appendix: Proofs

Proof Proposition 1:

Suppose that A does not have possibilities of benefiting from the Aid given by B, this is $\delta^k = 0$. In this case, from the first order condition of (4) we have:

$$
(A1) \qquad \frac{\partial \Pi_A^k}{\partial a_A^k} : \quad \lambda_A^k + \delta^k w^k - C_1'(a_A^k, \lambda_A^k + (\Psi + a_B^k l_B)) = 0
$$

$$
: \quad \lambda_A^k - C_1'(a^{k,A,\star}, \lambda_A^k + (\Psi + a_B^k l^B)) = 0
$$

Thus, the attention level $a^{k,A,\star}$ in equilibrium will only depend on local acceptance λ_A^k and the attention level of B, then, $\partial a_A^k / \partial w^k = 0$. Therefore, for B is sufficient that $\delta^k > 0$ in order to set the agenda. This mechanism is sufficient but not necessary because $\partial a_A^k / \partial a_B^k$ could be not equal to zero $\square$.

Proof Proposition 2:

From (A1) we know that $a_A^{k,\star} \equiv f(\lambda_A^k, \Psi + a_B^k l_B)$ thus, we also know that while $l_B > 0$ we have that $\partial a_A^k / \partial a_B^k > 0$. Note that this expression is true because $f_2' > 0$ due to $\frac{\partial (C_1')^{-1}}{\partial a_B^k} < 0$ $\square$

C. Sources of Rhetoric Information

The information for Colombian presidents was obtained using the web tool: http://archive.org and archives from the official web page http://www.presidencia.gov.co. The information for US presidents was obtained from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov, http://clinton.archives.gov and http://www.whitehouse.gov.

Total number of speeches processed: 14.865

- Colombia: 3.529 speeches that consist of :
    - 703 speeches for Andrés Pastrana Arango
    - 2.115 speeches for Álvaro Uribe Vélez
    - 711 speeches forJuan Manuel Santos Calderón
- United States: 11.336 speeches that consist of:
    - 1.217 speeches for William J. Clinton
    - 8.298 speeches for George W. Bush
    - 1.821 speeches for Barack H. Obama

Table B1—Most Frequent Words in Spanish Language

a	desde	estadas	estuviesen	habréis	hubo	nuestro	sean	te	trabaja	usas
al	donde	estais	estuvieses	habremos	incluso	nuestros	seas	tendrá	trabajais	uso
algo	dos	estáis	estuvimos	habría	intenta	o	sentid	tendrán	trabajamos	va
algún	durante	estamos	estuviste	habríais	intentais	os	sentida	tendrás	trabajan	vais
alguna	e	estan	estuvisteis	habríamos	intentamos	otra	sentidas	tendré	trabajas	valor
algunas	el	están	estuvo	habrían	intentan	otras	sentido	tendréis	tras	vamos
alguno	él	estando	fin	habrías	intentar	otro	sentidos	tendremos	tu	van
algunos	ella	estar	fue	hace	intentas	otros	ser	tendría	tú	vaya
ambos	ellas	estará	fuera	haceis	intento	para	será	tendríais	tus	verdad
ampleamos	ellos	estarán	fuerais	hacemos	ir	pero	serán	tendríamos	tuve	verdadera
ante	empleais	estarás	fuéramos	hacen	la	poco	serás	tendrían	tuviera	verdadero
antes	emplean	estaré	fueran	hacer	largo	podeis	seré	tendrías	tuvierais	vosostras
aquel	emplear	estaréis	fueras	haces	las	podemos	seréis	tened	tuviéramos	vosostros
aquellas	empleas	estaremos	fueron	hago	le	poder	seremos	teneis	tuvieran	vosotras
aquellos	en	estaría	fuese	han	les	podria	sería	tenéis	tuvieras	vosotros
aqui	encima	estaríais	fueseis	has	lo	podriais	seríais	tenemos	tuvieron	voy
arriba	entonces	estaríamos	fuésemos	hasta	los	podriamos	seríamos	tener	tuviese	vuestra
atras	entre	estarían	fuesen	hay	más	podrian	serían	tenga	tuvieseis	vuestras
bajo	era	estarías	fueses	haya	me	podrias	serías	tengáis	tuviésemos	vuestro
bastante	erais	estas	fui	hayáis	mi	por	si	tengamos	tuviesen	vuestros
bien	eramos	estás	fuimos	hayamos	mí	porque	sí	tengan	tuvieses	y
cada	éramos	este	fuiste	hayan	mía	por qué	siendo	tengas	tuvimos	ya
cierta	eran	esté	fuisteis	hayas	mías	primero	siente	tengo	tuviste	yo
ciertas	eras	estéis	gueno	he	mientras	puede	sin	tenía	tuvisteis	mil
cierto	eres	estemos	ha	hemos	mio	pueden	sintiendo	teníais	tuvo	ciento
ciertos	es	estén	habéis	hube	mío	puedo	sobre	teníamos	tuya	millones
como	esa	estés	había	hubiera	míos	que	sois	tenían	tuyas	año
con	esas	esto	habíais	hubierais	mis	qué	solamente	tenías	tuyo	tema
conseguimos	ese	estos	habíamos	hubiéramos	modo	quien	solo	tenida	tuyos	creo
conseguir	eso	estoy	habían	hubieran	mucho	quienes	somos	tenidas	ultimo	años
consigo	esos	estuve	habías	hubieras	muchos	sabe	son	tenido	un	usted
consigue	esta	estuviera	habida	hubieron	muy	sabeis	soy	tenidos	una	millón
consiguen	está	estuvierais	habidas	hubiese	nada	sabemos	su	teniendo	unas	billones
consigues	estaba	estuviéramos	habido	hubieseis	ni	saben	sus	ti	uno	señor
contra	estabais	estuvieran	habidos	hubiésemos	no	saber	suya	tiempo	unos	ustedes
cual	estábamos	estuvieras	habiendo	hubiesen	nos	sabes	suyas	tiene	usa	ahí
cuando	estaban	estuvieron	habrá	hubieses	nosotras	se	suyo	tienen	usais	ahora
de	estabas	estuviese	habrán	hubimos	nosotros	sea	suyos	tienes	usamos	san
del	estad	estuvieseis	habrás	hubiste	nuestra	seáis	también	todo	usan	cómo
dentro	estada	estuviésemos	habré	hubisteis	nuestras	seamos	tanto	todos	usar	allá

Source: Feinerer, Hornik and Meyer (2008) tm package, default list of words in R

a	backing	differently	for	he'll	kind	mustn't	or	really	someone	thus	weren't
about	backs	do	four	her	knew	my	order	right	something	to	we've
above	be	does	from	here	know	myself	ordered	room	somewhere	today	what
across	became	doesn't	full	here's	known	n	ordering	rooms	state	together	what's
after	because	doing	fully	hers	knows	necessary	orders	s	states	too	when
again	become	done	further	herself	l	need	other	said	still	took	when's
against	becomes	don't	furthered	he's	large	needed	others	same	such	toward	where
all	been	down	furthering	high	largely	needing	ought	saw	sure	turn	where's
almost	before	downed	furthers	higher	last	needs	our	say	t	turned	whether
alone	began	downing	g	highest	later	never	ours	says	take	turning	which
along	behind	downs	gave	him	latest	new	ourselves	second	taken	turns	while
already	being	during	general	himself	least	newer	out	seconds	than	two	who
also	beings	e	generally	his	less	newest	over	see	that	u	whole
although	below	each	get	how	let	next	own	seem	that's	under	whom
always	best	early	gets	however	lets	no	p	seemed	the	until	who's
am	better	either	give	how's	let's	nobody	part	seeming	their	up	whose
among	between	end	given	i	like	non	parted	seems	theirs	upon	why
an	big	ended	gives	i'd	likely	noone	parting	sees	them	us	why's
and	both	ending	go	if	long	nor	parts	several	themselves	use	will
another	but	ends	going	i'll	longer	not	per	shall	then	used	with
any	by	enough	good	i'm	longest	nothing	perhaps	shan't	there	uses	within
anybody	c	even	goods	important	m	now	place	she	therefore	v	without
anyone	came	evenly	got	in	made	nowhere	places	she'd	there's	very	won't
anything	can	ever	great	interest	make	number	point	she'll	these	w	work
anywhere	cannot	every	greater	interested	making	numbers	pointed	she's	they	want	worked
are	can't	everybody	greatest	interesting	man	o	pointing	should	they'd	wanted	working
area	case	everyone	group	interests	many	of	points	shouldn't	they'll	wanting	works
areas	cases	everything	grouped	into	may	off	possible	show	they're	wants	would
aren't	certain	everywhere	grouping	is	me	often	present	showed	they've	was	wouldn't
around	certainly	f	groups	isn't	member	old	presented	showing	thing	wasn't	x
as	clear	face	h	it	members	older	presenting	shows	things	way	y
ask	clearly	faces	had	its	men	oldest	presents	side	think	ways	year
asked	come	fact	hadn't	it's	might	on	problem	sides	thinks	we	years
asking	could	facts	has	itself	more	once	problems	since	this	we'd	yes
asks	couldn't	far	hasn't	i've	most	one	put	small	those	well	yet
at	d	felt	have	j	mostly	only	puts	smaller	though	we'll	you
away	did	few	haven't	just	mr	open	q	smallest	thought	wells	you'd
b	didn't	find	having	k	mrs	opened	quite	so	thoughts	went	you'll
back	differ	finds	he	keep	much	opening	r	some	three	were	young
backed	different	first	he'd	keeps	must	opens	rather	somebody	through	we're	younger
youngest	your	you're	yours	yourself	yourselves	you've	z	applause	thats	laughter	thank
weve	youre	lot	theres	dont	hes	theyre	coming	ive	able	youve	cant