Yönetişim ve Kurumlar Terimlerinin İktisat Literatüründeki Yükselişi

Aysan, Ahmet Faruk (2006): Yönetişim ve Kurumlar Terimlerinin İktisat Literatüründeki Yükselişi.

Abstract

This paper investigates the rising and trendy research on institutions and governance. First, the governance and institution concepts are defined and their differences are illustrated. When one considers the existing research on the governance and institutions, the governance as a concept is mostly used in reference to the outcomes. However, the institution concept usually refers to the underlying reasons for the outcome of governance. After dwelling on the conceptual framework to categorize the governance and institutions, this paper analyzes how the existing studies on governance and institutions categorize various different forms of governance and institutions. The agency based and structural reasons for the resurgence of the governance and institutional research are also explored in this study. The studies of Daron Acemoğlu et al. are specially denoted as an agency based reasons for the recent interest in the governance and institution studies. Structural reasons, on the other hand, are associated with the recent adoption of Post Washington Consensus. Finally, in this paper, the reasons to achieve better governance and more quality institutions are classified under three broad categories as the economic, political and cultural reasons. With this conceptual framework, the research on the governance and institutions literature will be approached more analytically.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: An Investigation on the Rise of Governance and Institution Concepts in Economics Literature
• Language: Turkish
• Keywords: Governance; Institutions; Growth; Development; Institutional Economics; Post Washington Consensus
• Subjects: P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925 > B15 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary; F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation” American Economic Review 91(5): 1369–401.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002), “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in The Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 4, 1231–1294.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2005), “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 95, 3, 546–579.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (2000), “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 4, 1167–1200.

Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2003), “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of Political Economy, 113,5, 949–994.

Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, James Robinson and Yunyong Taicharoen (2003), “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms, Volatility, Crises and Growth” Journal of Monetary Economics, 89 (September): 49-123.

Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik (1994), “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(May):465–90.

Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti (1996), “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment”, European Economic Review, 40: 1203–28.

Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel (1996), “Political Instability and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 189–211.

Aysan, Ahmet (2005), “Inequality, Institutions and Redistribution”, University of Maryland College Park, mimeo.

Aysan, Ahmet, M.K. Nabli and M-A Veganzones-Varoudakis (2005), “Institutions, Governance and Private Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Evidence with New Private Investment Data”, The World Bank, February 2005.

Azariadis, Costas and Amartya Lahiri (2002), "Do Rich Countries Choose Better Governments?", Contributions to Macroeconomics, 2(1), Article 4.

Bates, Robert H. (1989), Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Rural Kenya. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Borner, S., A. Brunetti, And B. Weder (1995), Political Credibility and Economic Development, Macmillan, London.

Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1999), “ Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance,” Journal of Economic Growth 4, 2, 185–211.

Collier, Paul, and Jan Gunning (1999), “Explaining African Economic Performance.” Journal of Economic Literature 37(1):64–111.

Easterly, William, and Ross Levine (2003), “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Affect Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (January): 3-39.

Easterly, William (2001), “The Lost Decades: Developing Countries’,” Journal of Economic Growth 6, 2, 135–157.

Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. (1997), “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4, November):1203–50.

Evans, Peter and James Rauch (2000), “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in the Less Developed Countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 75 (1): 49-71.

Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. NY: Free Press.

Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004), “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” NBER Working Paper #10568.

Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1995), “Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance.”

Islam, Roumeen and Claudio Montenegro (2002), “What Determines the Quality of Institutions”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2764 (January), The World Bank, Washington , D.C..

Kaufmann, Dani, Aart Kraay, and Maximo Mastruzzi (2003), “Governance Matters III, Governance Indicators for 1996–2002”, World Bank, Washington, D.C. Processed.

Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures”, Economics and Politics 7(3): 207–27.

Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer (1997), “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4, November):1251–88.

La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, R., F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1999), ‘Quality of Government’, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, 222-279.

Landes, David (1998), The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Mauro, Paolo (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 681–712.

North, Douglas C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton.

North, Douglas C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Olson, Mancur, Naveen Sarna, Anand V. Swamy (2000), “Governance and Growth: A Simple Hypothesis Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Productivity Growth”, Public Choice, 102(3-4), 341 -364.

Olson, Mancur (1996), “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 3-24.

Olson, M. (1965), ‘The logic of collective Action’, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A.

Öniş, Ziya, and Fikret Şenses, (2005), "Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus: A Critical Appraisal" Development and Change. Vol. 36, No.2.

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, (1994), “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review 84(3, June):600–21.

Putnam, Robert D. (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rodrik, Dani (2000), "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them" Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 35, no.3, Fall 2000.

Rodrik, Dani (1999), “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them”, paper presented at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, Washington, November 8-9.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (2002), “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, NBER Working Paper, 9305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Sachs, Jeffrey (2003), “Institutions Don’t Rule: A Refutation of Institutional Fundamentalism”, NBER Working Paper.9490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Snowdon, Brian (2004), “Explaining the ‘Great Divergence’ Daron Acemoglu on how growth theorists rediscovered history and the importance of institutions”, World Economics, Volume 5, issue 1.

Weber, Max (1958), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

World Bank (2002), World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Market, Oxford University Press, New York. .

World Bank (2004), Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability, MENA Development Report. The World Bank, Washington , D.C.