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Exploring the optimality of cyclical emission rates

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Abstract

In this paper, the basic assumption is that the environment provides two different kinds of services. First, the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods. For example, the exploitation of an oil source from which one firm extracts the oil which in turn is used as a fossil fuel for an industry. In the worst case, the use of the environment for industrial purposes will negatively affect the environment, e.g. the water quality of a paper mill along a river. Nevertheless, the possibility to pollute, i.e., to save abatement costs, lowers production costs. Hence, firms and consumers evaluate this service positively. Second, the environment itself-clean air, natural creeks and rivers instead of paper mills, hydro power plants, etc.- provides amenities and thus a second service that is different, because enjoying this service does not degrade environmental quality. As it is intuitively clear, the environment provides consumptive and non-consumptive uses. In renewable resources means, the environmental stock may be harvested and used as an input for conventional goods' production but provides simultaneously a positive externality. The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of pollution and the possibility of cycles and instability, while the major finding of this paper is the following: Taking the simplest pollution model with one state and one control variables and extending it into two state variables, equilibrium may change from the fixed point into a limit cycle equilibrium, i.e. the optimal emissions rate may be cyclical.

Keywords: Renewable resources; environmental economics; pollution management.

JEL Classification Codes: C61; C62; D43; H21; Q50; Q52; Q53.

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1. Introduction

Analyzing pollution control issues for developed and developing countries has become an important multi–disciplinary topic. Since the design of efficient action against pollution has to take into consideration the intertemporal response of victims, dynamic modeling can be used as an appropriate tool. In this paper we make two basic assumptions. The first is that the environment provides two different kinds of services. i.e., the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods and second, the environment itself provides amenities. In the second assumption the damage function is depending on the intensity of emissions and on the intensity of abatement as well. We use both optimal control and differential game approaches to study the intertemporal strategic interactions between the polluters and the social planer.

The pollutants accumulation is a major problem in our world and finding a way to effectively reduce, while maintaining the standards of the production process, is a great challenge facing capitalistic societies. The clean environment is obviously a public good. Conversely, all the "dirty" production process that creates pollutants accumulation, e.g. emissions caused by uncontrolled production, constitutes a public bad. But which of the factors of production process generates pollutants? Clearly uncontrolled, with respect to the environment, production involves antiquated equipment that emits more than permissible and therefore constitutes a polluters' "bad weapon". It is a usual phenomenon the old production equipment - which used to be the main production equipment for the Western developed countries - to change hands moving to the Southern or Eastern developing countries at a low acquisition cost. Similarly, all the extracted depletable resources which are used as inputs in the production are sources of pollution. The power of such a "dirty" production process

rests upon the accumulation of a stock of resources, consequently depending on the financial capital for these resources that emits more and therefore accumulates pollutants.

On the other hand, in early days of applications of dynamic systems to economic problems, it was recognized that the optimal solution of infinite time problems may be characterized by multiple equilibrium points. Finding multiple equilibrium points in economic models is not an attractive solution for the policy makers. But the recognition of multiple optimal stable equilibria may be crucial in order to locate the thresholds separating the basins of attraction surrounding these different equilibria. Starting at a threshold, a rational economic agent is indifferent between moving toward one or the other equilibrium, but a small movement away from the threshold can "destroy" this indifference, leading in a unique optimal course of action.

Since the introductory one sector, with a convex – concave production function, optimal growth model of Skiba (Skiba, 1978), there has been a lot of progress towards the cyclical solution strategies generated in intertemporal dynamic economic models. Wirl (1995) exploring the optimality of cyclical exploitation of renewable resources stocks, reconsidering a model of Clark *et al* (1979), concludes that equilibrium that falls below the maximum sustainable yield but that exceeds the intertemporal harvest rule due to the positive spillovers allows for optimal, long run, cyclical harvest strategies.

Limit cycles, according to Poincare–Bendixson condition (Hartman, 1982) which also restricted in planar systems, has the intuitive explanation which says that if a trajectory of a continuous dynamical system stays in a bounded region forever, it has to approach "something". This "something" is either a point or a cycle. So if it is

not a point, then it must be a cycle. This gives rise to cyclical policies in economic models, e.g. if a policy trajectory, say an abatement pollution policy, is restricted in a bounded planar space then this policy sooner or later will retrace its previous steps.

The Poincare–Andronov–Hopf theorem (Kuznetsov, 2004), which applies in a higher than the two dimensional systems, gives sufficient conditions for the existence of limit cycles of nonlinear dynamical systems. Informally, one can think of this theorem as requiring that equilibrium must suddenly change from a sink to a source with variation of a parameter. Arithmetically this requires that a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues exists for a particular value of the bifurcation parameter and that the real part of this pair of eigenvalues changes smoothly its sign as the parameter is altered from below its actual value to above.

Hence, analogously to equilibrium, the stability of limit cycles is of great importance for the long run behavior of a dynamical system. But since the existence and therefore stability of a limit cycle is highly dependent on an arbitrarily chosen bifurcation parameter we have to deal with the qualitative analysis of such a problem. Economic mechanisms that may be a source of limit cycles, as mentioned by Dockner and Feichtinger (1995) are: (i) complementarity over time, (ii) dominated cross effects with respect to capital stocks, and (iii) positive growth of equilibrium.

The main contribution of the paper is twofold: First, it considers the environment as a renewable resource for which the environmental quality grows with the pollutants abatement but reduces with the damages stemming from pollutants accumulation which in turn are treated as a stock. Having the two states, i.e. the environmental quality as a stock and the stock of pollutants the benevolent social planer has to steer the control variable, i.e. the emissions, in an optimal way between the two states, and this setting gives rise for complex polices especially for limit

cycles. Second, it considers the pollution problem, as a differential game in which two players involved. The first player is the polluting representative producer which maximizes his own utility stemming from emissions while the second player is every enjoyer of the environmental services, maximizing his own utility derived from the clean environment and from the pollutants abatement as well.

In both cases, we explore the Nash equilibrium and especially we investigate the existence of limit cycles and consequently the existence of cyclical strategies of the instrument variables. Moreover, in a state separable game model setup we found the analytical expressions of the strategies which are time consistent. The environmental pollution control game takes place between the government, acting as the social planer, and polluters for which the resources used in production accumulate pollutants. Such pollutants accumulation and regulation control models can be found, among others, in Forster (1980) concerning optimal energy use model; in Xepapadeas (1992) regarding environmental policy design and non-point source pollution; in Mäler et al (2007) in the shallow lake game; in F.Wirl (1995) and so on.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the social planer's optimal control model and gives a necessary condition for cyclical strategies. Section 3 investigates the differential game between the government and the polluter and calculates the Nash equilibrium strategies and the players' value functions. Section 4 explores the limit cycle equilibrium of the management model, while section 5 introduces and solves analytically the proposed differential game. The last section concludes the paper.

2. The pollution management model

As it is known the production process accumulates pollutants and therefore all the owners of the productive assets, called the polluters, are always to some degree subject to emissions constraints such that too low levels of pollutants will topple the regime. Of course, the precise magnitude depends on several international treaties e.g. the Kyoto or Montreal protocols, as well as on the inshore's institutions. However, even in development industrial countries a level below 50% mark is beneficial because of two things: first, the low level of pollutants per se provides fringe benefits, in the sense of a good reputation, and second discretionary power increases if the pollutants are abated, therefore the consumers will trust the abating firms. In the model below we introduce the function $V(X)$ which captures all kinds of benefits of a good environmental state such that $V(X)$ may become very negative if pollutants exceed a certain threshold.

Given the pollutants generating nature of production and the benefits accrued form a clean environment, the social planer of an economy has to steer very carefully in the Bosporus narrow passage and this trade off may involve complex patterns over time, in particular, limit cycles. Formally, the social planer maximize the intertemporal benefits (and the implicit trade off) from a good as possible environmental state, by X we denote the environmental state, and from emissions, E denotes emissions in the production process. These two types of benefits are separable, $U(E(t))+V(X(t))$, in order to simplify the analysis and both utility functions are increasing and concave: $U'>0$, $U''<0$; $V'>0$, $V''\leq 0$. The emissions can be abated, i.e. its rate becomes negative such that the central planer, in order to maintain a clean environment, engages in a crusade against pollution. This modeling of a soft

constraint through the function of V instead of considering hard constraints $X(t) \geq \tilde{X}$ [1] is chosen for three reasons. First, a hard constraint imposes a lexicographic preference ordering upon the environment which seems implausible. Second, the state of environment over and above the required threshold offers further and different kinds of benefits: a good state of the environment itself may be desirable, i.e. a consumption good; a high state offers to the central planer considerable discretion and so on. Third, this formulation guarantees smoothness of the solution and thus simplifies the analysis. Moreover, sufficient smoothness is a requisite to apply Hopf bifurcation theorem.

After all, the social planer faces the following problem:

$$\max_{E(t)} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left[U\left(E(t)\right) + V\left(X(t)\right) \right] dt \qquad (1)$$

subject to $\dot{X} = A(X) - D(S)$ (2)

$$\dot{S} = E - \delta S \qquad (3)$$

E are emissions

S is the stock of pollutants

X is the state or quality of the environment

$A(X)$ is the growth of environmental quality, the natural replenishment or abatement

$D(S)$ are the loses or damages in environmental amenities depending on the pollution stock. In another way the same function should be the amount of input used by the industry.

Maximization of (1) is subject to two dynamic constraints. First, the state of environment is a dynamic process, here is a diffusion process according to (2) –

[1] Where $\tilde{X}$ identifies the minimal state of the environment

which is negatively affected by damages of environmental state, e.g. by the stock of pollutants S. However, environmental state is affected, by the large, not only from the isolated emissions but from the cumulative pollutants. The accumulated pollutants, according to differential equation (3), obey to the natural purification law, i.e. they have the exponential declining factor $\delta \geq 0$.

The function $A(X)$ may represent an arbitrary, but concave $(A'' < 0)$ process $A(X) = X(1-X)$. In the present model $A(X)$ rather represents the abatement. This specification is chosen because of its wide use in the literature, its plausibility and its convenience, but is not crucial for the model. Logistic growth, first proposed by Verhulst (1845), arising from the more general equation $\dot{x} = rx|1-x/K|^a \operatorname{sign}(1-x/K)$, where r the intrinsic growth, K the carrying capacity and a a positive constant playing the role of the penalty in a population model. Gatto *et al*. (1988) prove the optimality of the logistic growth function in both linear ($a = 1$) and nonlinear ($a \neq 1$) cases, and draw the optimal trajectories in both cases. Following population growth models it can be shown (Gatto et al, 1988), in absence of pollution, the optimal growth of environmental state is logistic. That is, since the abatement must be equivalent to the optimal growth, this function could be the logistic, i.e. abatement could be in the form: $A(X) = X(1-X)$

The function $D(S)$ measures the environmental degradation depending on the pollutants accumulation S. Thus, $D' > 0$ and we assume additionally, and quite plausibly, $D'' > 0$. Equation (3) is the standard equation of pollutants motion used in environmental models (see for example Dockner and Long, 1993).

In the solution process, we define the Hamiltonian (omitting arguments)

$$H = U + V + \lambda(A - D) + \mu(E - \delta S) \qquad (4)$$

λ, μ are the costate variables of the states X and S respectively.

The Hamiltonian is concave in states and control, because the objective, as well as the state transition equations are concave, and the costate variable λ must be positive. The Hamiltonian maximizing condition w.r.t. the control $E(t)$, i.e. w.r.t. the emissions, is the following:

$$H_E = U' + \mu = 0 \qquad (5)$$

and it is assumed that an interior solution exists, which is already the general case owing to the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to E, i.e. $H_{EE} = U''(E) < 0$.

We record the above result in a proposition.

Proposition 1: In the two states pollution management model (1)–(3) the equilibrium conditions are unaffected compared with the one state model, i.e., the intertemporal optimality requires the marginal utility from emissions equals to the negative of the shadow price of the pollutants stock.

Proof

Follows immediately from the optimality condition (5)

Now, the following two equations determine the evolution of adjoints λ, μ.

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho - A')\lambda - V' \qquad (6)$$

$$\dot{\mu} = (\rho + \delta) + \lambda D' \qquad (7)$$

The optimality conditions $(5) - (7)$ are valid only if additionally the limiting transversality conditions are satisfied:

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-\rho t}\lambda(t)X(t)=0 \tag{8}$$

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-\rho t}\mu(t)S(t)=0 \tag{9}$$

3. Stability analysis

For interior solutions the Hamiltonian maximizing condition allow to replace the control variable $E(t)$ by a function h, $E=h(\mu)$, $h'=(-1/U'')>0$, and the optimality conditions (5) – (9) lead to the following system of canonical equations in state (X,S) and costate (λ,μ) variables:

$$\dot{X}=A(X)-D(S) \tag{10.1}$$

$$\dot{S}=h(\mu)-\delta S \tag{10.2}$$

$$\dot{\lambda}=(\rho-A'(X))\lambda-V'(X) \tag{10.3}$$

$$\dot{\mu}=(\rho+\delta)+\lambda D'(S) \tag{10.4}$$

The Jacobian of the system $(10.1)-(10.4)$ evaluated at the equilibrium is given by the following matrix:

$$J=\begin{bmatrix} \partial\dot{X}/\partial X & \partial\dot{X}/\partial S & \partial\dot{X}/\partial\lambda & \partial\dot{X}/\partial\mu \\ \partial\dot{S}/\partial X & \partial\dot{S}/\partial S & \partial\dot{S}/\partial\lambda & \partial\dot{S}/\partial\mu \\ \partial\dot{\lambda}/\partial X & \partial\dot{\lambda}/\partial S & \partial\dot{\lambda}/\partial\lambda & \partial\dot{\lambda}/\partial\mu \\ \partial\dot{\mu}/\partial X & \partial\dot{\mu}/\partial S & \partial\dot{\mu}/\partial\lambda & \partial\dot{\mu}/\partial\mu \end{bmatrix} =$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} A' & -D' & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -\delta & 0 & -1/U'' \\ -V''-A''V'/(\rho-A') & 0 & (\rho-A') & 0 \\ 0 & V'D''/(\rho-A') & D' & \rho+\delta \end{bmatrix} \tag{11}$$

The following Dockner's formula (Dockner, 1985) computes the four eigenvalues ξ_i, $i=1,2,3,4$ of the Jacobian (11) which are crucial to characterize the local dynamics of the canonical system (10)

$$\xi_{1,2,3,4} = (\rho/2) \pm \sqrt{(\rho/2)^2 - (\Psi/2) \pm \tfrac{1}{2}\sqrt{\Psi^2 - 4\det J}} \qquad (12)$$

coefficient Ψ is the following sum

$$\Psi = \begin{Vmatrix} \dfrac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial X} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial \lambda} \\ \dfrac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial X} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda} \end{Vmatrix} + \begin{Vmatrix} \dfrac{\partial \dot{S}}{\partial S} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{S}}{\partial \mu} \\ \dfrac{\partial \dot{\mu}}{\partial S} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{\mu}}{\partial \mu} \end{Vmatrix} + 2 \begin{Vmatrix} \dfrac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial S} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial \mu} \\ \dfrac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial S} & \dfrac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial \mu} \end{Vmatrix} \qquad (13)$$

and the determinant is:

$$\det\ J = \delta A'(A' - \rho)(\delta + \rho) + \frac{A'' V' D'^2}{U''(\rho - A')} + \frac{D'^2 V''}{U''} + \frac{D'' A' V'}{U''} \qquad (14)$$

$$\Psi = A'(\rho - A') - \delta(\delta + \rho) + D'' V' \big/ \big(U''(\rho - A')\big) \qquad (15)$$

Following Dockner (1985), for the saddle point stability it suffice $\det J > 0$ and $\Psi < 0$ conditions which satisfied, only if the abatement function is decreasing, i.e. $A' < 0$. The above result is recorded as follows.

Proposition 2. In the pollution management model (1)–(3), the saddle point stability is ensured only if the abatement function is a decreasing one, $A' < 0$.

Proof

Follows immediately from (14) and (15) for $A' < 0$ and also taking the concavity assumptions of the utility functions.

More complex results are possible in the case of increasing abatement $A'(X) > 0$. If $0 < A'(\hat{X}) < \rho$, then there occurs a transition from a domain of stable to locally unstable spirals and this transition give birth to limit cycles. Precisely condition $A' = 0$ (or equivalently the point $\hat{X}$), separates the domain of stable policies from the domain where possible complexities arise. In fact, the supposition of

growth, $A'(X)>0$ for $X<\hat{X}$, is crucial. Supposing that abatement follows the diffusion process for the environmental state with one and only one point $\hat{X}$, such that $A'(\hat{X})=0$, the implication is that the time path of the environmental state consists of a convex segment (if $X<\hat{X}$) and a concave segment (if $X>\hat{X}$), with respect to time.



Figure 1: Properties of equilibrium depending on environmental state.

This in turn implies that the domain of low quality environmental state $X<\hat{X}$ exhibits increasing returns and the domain of high environmental state quality exhibits diminishing returns. While diminishing returns (i.e. a point lying inside the concave segment) it is plausible to lead to stable equilibrium, increasing returns to environmental state lead to cycles. This is because a low quality environmental state may increase to certain threshold so it may be rational for the polluters to lower

production and therefore the pollutants accumulation. The following figure shows the segments for which the two different kinds of equilibrium taking place.

4. Exploring the limit cycle equilibrium

We specify quadratic benefits from the high environmental state, the same quadratic form for the utility arising from emissions and a linear function for the damages stemming from pollutants accumulation, i.e.:

$$U(E) = a_1 E - \tfrac{1}{2} a_2 E^2 \qquad (16.1)$$

$$V(X) = \beta_1 X - \tfrac{1}{2} \beta_2 X^2 \qquad (16.2)$$

$$A(X) = X(1-X) \qquad (16.3)$$

$$D(S) = \gamma S \qquad (16.4)$$

Equations (16.1) and (16.2) represent the fact that a high quality level of environment exists toward which environmental quality, X, grows in the absence of pollution, while the decline in environmental quality is proportional to the accumulated level of pollutants S.

Assuming that the natural purification rate of the accumulated stock of pollutants is equal to zero, i.e., $\delta = 0$, yielding $\hat{E}^* = 0$ in the long run equilibrium. Additionally we assume $V'' = -\beta_2 = 0$ in order to ease the analysis that follows.

Thus, in determinant (14) the only term that remains is the second, which remains and in coefficient (15) as well. Then, the final expressions for the Jacobian and coefficient respectively, are:

$$\det\ J = \frac{A'' V' D'^2}{U''(\rho - A')} = \frac{2\beta_1 \gamma^2}{a_2(\rho - A')} \qquad (14)'$$

$$\Psi = A'(\rho - A') \qquad (15)'$$

For any equilibrium satisfying $0 < A'\left(\hat{X}\right) < \rho$, $(14)'$ as well as $(15)'$ is positive. According to Grass et al (2008) the condition for limit cycle equilibrium, i.e., the existence of purely imaginary roots, requires the following relation

$$\det J - \left(\frac{\Psi}{2}\right)^2 - \rho^2 \frac{\Psi}{2} = 0 \qquad (17)$$

Given the parameter values as in the following table

a_1	a_2	γ	ρ	δ
1	1	0.071	1	0

and choosing the parameter β_1 as the bifurcation parameter, there exist a unique equilibrium at:

$$\left(\hat{X}, \hat{S}, \hat{\lambda}, \hat{\mu}\right) = \left(\frac{7}{200}\beta_1, \frac{1}{2}\beta_1 - \frac{7}{400}\beta_1^2, \frac{100}{7}, -1\right)$$

Now relation (17) becomes the following quartic equation in β_1

$$\frac{7}{50} - \frac{7}{20}\beta_1 + \frac{49}{40000}\beta_1^2 + \frac{343}{2000000}\beta_1^3 - \frac{2401}{400000000}\beta_1^4 = 0$$

for which the solution is:

$$(\beta_1)_{1,2,3,4} = 6.6910;\ \ 7.5947;\ \ -15.4403;\ \ 29.7260 \qquad (18)$$

and only the two first values for β_1 are acceptable, since β_1 is positive and $\hat{X} \in (0,1)$. Moreover, at these critical parameters both $\det J$ and Ψ are positive, i.e., one pair of purely imaginary roots exists. The final result is, for the intermediate values of the bifurcation parameter $\beta_1 \in (6.6910\ ,\ 7.5947)$, the existence of complex eigenvalues all with positive real part.

Again following Grass et al (2008) one can draw the limit cycle with above values of the parameter β_1. Moreover, it can be proved numerically the existence of a two dimensional stable manifold of a limit cycle and the existence of a "strong" unstable manifold explaining some inaccurate results of the IVP approach.

5. The differential game model

In the second part of the paper we make the assumption that the damage function of environmental quality is a function of the intensity of emissions and as well as a function of the intensity of the abatement process.

Let us denote by $X(t)$ the instantaneous state of environment at time t. Without any damages caused by pollution and also without any actions undertaken by the polluters the stock of environmental quality grows according to the function $G(X)$. This function is considered as growth function, obviously dependent on the state of environment, satisfying the conditions $G(0)=0, G(X)>0$ for all $X\in(0,K)$, $G(X)<0$ for all $X\in(K,\infty)$, $G''(X)\leq 0$. Carrying out emissions is costly for the polluters, e.g. compliance costs and damages in their equipment which reduces their capital available to the production process. This clearly affects negatively the utility of the polluters.

However, the reduction of the growth of the environmental quality stock, does not only depend on the intensity of emissions $u(t)$, but is also influenced by the counter pollution measures $v(t)$ undertaken by the government or by any group of agents e.g. volunteers they fight against pollution. We set as instrument variables for both sides the intensity of emissions $u(t)$ and abatement effort $v(t)$, which are assumed non-negatives $u(t)\geq 0,\ \ \nu(t)\geq 0$.

We denote by $\phi(u,\nu)$ the function that affects the growth of environmental quality. Combining the growth $G(X)$ with the function $\phi(u,\nu)$ the state dynamics can be written as

$$\dot{X} = G(X) - \phi(u,\nu), \quad X(0) = X_0 > 0 \tag{19}$$

Along a trajectory the non negativity constraint is imposed, i.e.

$$X(t) \geq 0 \quad \forall t \geq 0 \tag{20}$$

With the assumption that a higher intensity of emissions leads to stronger reduction of the environmental quality and therefore we assume the partial derivative w.r.t emissions of the damage function $\phi(u,\nu)$ to be positive, i.e. $\phi_u > 0$. Moreover the law of diminishing returns is applied only for the emission realizations, i.e. $\phi_{uu} < 0$, while the higher rate of abatement induces a higher level of environmental services and therefore $\phi_{\nu\nu} > 0$. Moreover the two policy tools reinforce each other, i.e. $\phi_{u\nu} > 0$, and this positive interaction means that the marginal efficiency of emissions realizations increases with the intensity of the undertaken abatement as a high quality environment can be more easily damaged than the low quality. Additionally, we assume that the Inada conditions, which guarantee that the optimal strategies are nonnegative, holds true, i.e.

$$\begin{aligned} &\lim_{u\to 0}\phi_u(u,\nu) = \infty, \qquad \lim_{u\to\infty}\phi_u(u,\nu) = 0 \\ &\lim_{\nu\to 0}\phi_\nu(u,\nu) = 0, \qquad \lim_{\nu\to\infty}\phi_\nu(u,\nu) = \infty \end{aligned} \tag{20a}$$

The utility functions the two players want to maximize defined as follows:

Player 1, the polluter, derive instantaneous utility, on one hand from their emissions which gives rise to increasing and convex costs $C(u)$. On the other hand, a high stock of good environmental quality incur compliance costs and the induced disutility is

described by the increasing function $D(X)$. With the above assumptions, player's 1 present value of utility is described by the following functional

$$J_1 = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho_1 t}\left[\phi(u,\nu) - D(X) - C(u)\right]dt \qquad (21)$$

Player 2, the group of a high quality environmental services enjoyers, derive utility $v(X)$ from the quality of environmental state $X(t)$, but also from their abatement at intensity ν, which is described by the function $A(\nu)$. For the utilities $v(X)$ and $A(\nu)$ we assume that are monotonically increasing functions with decreasing marginal returns, i.e., $v'(X) > 0,\ A'(\nu) > 0$ and $v''(X) < 0,\ A''(\nu) < 0$. So, player's 2 utility function is defined, in its additively separable form, as:

$$J_2 = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho_2 t}\left[v(X) + A(\nu)\right]dt \qquad (22)$$

5.1 Nash Equilibrium

In this section we calculate the Nash equilibrium of the pollution differential game. The concept of open loop Nash equilibrium is based on the fact that every player's strategy is the best reply to the opponent's exogenously given strategy. Obviously, equilibrium holds if both strategies are simultaneously best replies.

Following Dockner *et al* (2000), we formulate the current value Hamiltonians for both players, as follows

$$H_1 = \phi(u,\nu) - D(X) - C(u) + \lambda\left(G(X) - \phi(u,\nu)\right)$$

$$H_2 = v(X) + A(\nu) + \mu\left(G(X) - \phi(u,\nu)\right)$$

The first order conditions, for the maximization problem, are the following system of differential equations for both players:

First, the maximized Hamiltonians are

$$\frac{\partial H_1}{\partial u} = (1-\lambda)\phi_u(u,\nu) - C'(u) = 0 \tag{23}$$

$$\frac{\partial H_2}{\partial \nu} = A'(\nu) - \mu\phi_\nu(u,\nu) = 0 \tag{24}$$

and second, the costate variables are defined by the equations

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho_1\lambda - \frac{\partial H_1}{\partial X} = \lambda\left[\rho_1 - G'(X)\right] + D'(X) \tag{25}$$

$$\dot{\mu} = \rho_2\mu - \frac{\partial H_2}{\partial X} = \mu\left[\rho_2 - G'(X)\right] - \upsilon'(X) \tag{26}$$

The Hamiltonian of the player 1, H_1, is concave in the control u as far as long $\lambda < 1$ and is guaranteed by the assumptions on the signs of the derivatives, i.e. $\phi_{uu} < 0,\ \phi_{\nu\nu} > 0$ and from the decreasing marginal returns on the polluters' utilities, i.e. $\upsilon''(X) < 0,\ A''(\nu) < 0$. Optimality condition (23) implies that the adjoint variable λ is positive, only in the case for which the polluter's marginal utility ϕ_u exceeds the marginal costs, since (23) implies that:

$$\lambda = \left(\phi_u(u,\nu) - C'(u)\right)\Big/\phi_u(u,\nu)\ .$$

Proposition 3. The shadow price of the environmental state is positive only if the marginal utility exceeds the marginal costs stemming from emissions realizations. The player's 1 Hamiltonian is concave in the control as the shadow price is less than one, $\lambda < 1$.

In the next subsection we explore the possibility of the limit cycle equilibrium.

5.2. Periodic solutions

In this subsection we explore whether periodic solutions are possible, starting with steady state and stability analysis of necessary conditions. As it is clear the differential game analysed here becomes with two controls, (u,ν) and one state variable X.

Therefore the Jacobian matrix is the following 3×3 matrix

$$J=\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial X} & \frac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial \lambda} & \frac{\partial \dot{X}}{\partial \mu} \\ \frac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial X} & \frac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda} & \frac{\partial \dot{\lambda}}{\partial \mu} \\ \frac{\partial \dot{\mu}}{\partial X} & \frac{\partial \dot{\mu}}{\partial \lambda} & \frac{\partial \dot{\mu}}{\partial \mu} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} G'(X) & -\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \lambda} & -\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \mu} \\ -\lambda G''(X)-D''(X) & \rho_1-G'(X) & 0 \\ -\mu G''(X)-\upsilon''(X) & 0 & \rho_2-G'(X) \end{pmatrix}$$

which also gives: $\text{tr}\,(J)=\ \rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X)$ and

$$\det(J)=G'(X)\big(\rho_1-G'(X)\big)\big(\rho_2-G'(X)\big)-\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \lambda}\big(\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\big)\big(\rho_2-G'(X)\big)-$$
$$-\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \mu}\big(\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\big)\big(\rho_1-G'(X)\big)$$

According to Feichtinger and Novak (1994) (Lemma 4.1) and Wirl (1997) (Proposition 4) the existence of a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues requires that the following conditions are satisfied:

$$\text{tr}\,(J)>0,\ \ \det(J)>0,\ \ w>0,\ \ \det(J)=w\ \text{tr}\,(J)$$

where coefficient w is the result of the sum of the following determinants

$$w=\begin{vmatrix} G'(X) & -\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \lambda} \\ -\lambda G''(X)-D''(X) & \rho_1-G'(X) \end{vmatrix}+\begin{vmatrix} \rho_1-G'(X) & 0 \\ 0 & \rho_2-G'(X) \end{vmatrix}+$$

$$+\begin{vmatrix} G'(X) & -\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \mu} \\ -\mu G''(X)-\upsilon''(X) & \rho_2-G'(X) \end{vmatrix}\ =$$

$$=\rho_1\rho_2-\big[G'(X)\big]^2-\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\big]-\frac{\partial \phi(u,\nu)}{\partial \mu}\big[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\big]$$

From now on the crucial condition for cyclical strategies (precisely for Hopf bifurcations to occur) is that

$$w > 0, \quad w = \frac{\det(J)}{\mathrm{tr}(J)}$$

which after simple algebraic calculations (see in the appendix B) reduces to

$$\rho_1\rho_2\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-2G'(X)\right]=$$
$$=\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right]\rho_1+\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right]\rho_2$$

We specify the functions of the game as follows: a diffusion process for the renewable resource growth function, that is $G(X)=RX(1-X)$, a Cobb–Douglas type function for the function that affects the environmental state, $\phi(u,\nu)=u^{\gamma}\nu$, and the utility function stemming from the abatement effort on behalf player's 2 in the form $A(\nu)=\Gamma-\nu^{(\xi-1)}/(1-\xi)$. Note that the utility function $A(\nu)$ with $\Gamma>0$ and $\xi\in(0,1)$ exhibits constant relative risk aversion in the sense of Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion. The cost functions are simply linear costs, i.e. the polluter's compliance costs is $D(x)=Dx$, while the player's 1 emissions' realization cost in the linear fashion $C(u)=Cu$, as well. Moreover, the utility the second player enjoys from the existing environmental quality as $\upsilon(X)=\upsilon X$, Note that all the involved coefficients, i.e. the intrinsic growth rate R and the slopes D, υ and C are positive real numbers, but $\gamma\in(0,1)$ and $\Gamma>0$ and $\xi\in(0,1)$, as already mentioned.

With the above specifications the following result holds true.

Proposition 4

A necessary condition for cyclical strategies in the game between the polluters and the high quality environment enjoyers, as described above, is the high environmental state enjoyers to be more impatient than the polluters.

Proof: See in Appendix A.

5.3. The linear example

In this subsection we assume linearity of the model, but this assumption makes economically sense. Linear state games, as it is showed by Dockner et al (2000), have the important property that an open loop Nash equilibrium is Markov perfect and the optimal value functions are linear with respect to the state variables.

We specify the following functions of the game to be in the form:

i. the environmental growth function is exponential i.e., in the form $G(X)=\omega\cdot X$, where ω is the growth rate,

ii. the polluter's disutility function, $D(X)$, stemming from the compliance costs, in the form $D(X)=D\cdot X$ and finally

iii. the polluter's cost stemming from emission's realizations in the form $C(u)=C\cdot u$

All the constants involved are positive numbers, that is $\omega, D, C>0$. From the environmental quality enjoyers side, the functions that maximized are specified linear, i.e. the utilities arising from the high quality environmental stock and abatement are written as $\upsilon(X)=\upsilon\cdot X(t)$ and $A(\nu)=A\cdot\nu(t)$ respectively.

After the above simplified specifications the canonical system of equations (23) - (26) can be rewritten as follows:

$$\frac{\partial H_1}{\partial u} = (1-\lambda)\phi_u(u,\nu) - C = 0 \tag{27}$$

$$\frac{\partial H_2}{\partial \nu} = A - \mu\phi_\nu(u,\nu) = 0 \tag{28}$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho_1\lambda - \frac{\partial H_1}{\partial X} = \lambda[\rho_1 - \omega] + D \tag{29}$$

$$\dot{\mu} = \rho_2\mu - \frac{\partial H_2}{\partial X} = \mu[\rho_2 - \omega] - \upsilon \tag{30}$$

and the limiting transversality conditions has to hold

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-\rho_1 t} X(t)\lambda(t) = 0, \quad \lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-\rho_2 t} X(t)\mu(t) = 0 \tag{31}$$

The analytical expressions of the adjoint variables (λ, μ), solving equations (29)-(30), are respectively:

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{D}{-\rho_1 + \omega} + e^{(\rho_1-\omega)t}\Omega_1 \tag{32}$$

$$\mu(t) = -\frac{\upsilon}{-\rho_2 + \omega} + e^{(\rho_2-\omega)t}\Omega_2 \tag{33}$$

In order the transversality conditions to satisfied it is convenient to choose the constant steady state values, and therefore the adjoint variables collapses to the following constants

$$\lambda = \frac{-D}{\rho_1 - \omega}, \quad \mu = \frac{\upsilon}{\rho_2 - \omega} \tag{34}$$

To ensure certain signs for the adjoints (34) we impose another condition on the discount rates, which claim that discount rates are greater than the resource's growth, i.e. we impose the condition

$$\rho_i > \omega, \quad i = 1,2$$

thus, the constant adjoint variables has the negative and positive signs respectively,i.e,

$$\lambda = \frac{-D}{\rho_1 - \omega} < 0, \quad \mu = \frac{\upsilon}{\rho_2 - \omega} > 0$$

The above condition seems to be restrictive but can be justified as otherwise optimal solutions do not exist. Indeed, choosing $\rho_2 < \omega$, the government's discount rate to be lower than the environmental growth rate, their objective functional becomes unbounded in the case they choose to send out no emissions. Similarly, choosing the government's discount rate lower than the growth rate the associated adjoint variable λ becomes a positive quantity in the long run. As a shadow price is implausible to be positive for optimal solutions, the above reasoning is sufficient for the assumption $\rho_i > \omega, \quad i = 1,2$.

Once the concavity of the Hamiltonians, with respect to the strategies, for both players is satisfied the first order conditions guarantee its maximization. Now, we choose the function's $\phi(u,\nu)$ specification, i.e. the specification of the damage function. This function is depending on the intensity of emissions and also depending on the abatement actions undertaken by the social planner. We choose a similar to Cobb – Douglas production function specification, which characterized by constant elasticities, and is in the following form

$$\phi(u,\nu) = u^{\sigma}\nu^{\zeta} \qquad 0 < \sigma < 1 < \zeta$$

The rest of the paper is devoted to the calculations of the explicit formulas at the Nash equilibrium.

5.2. Optimal Nash Strategies

Applying first order conditions for the chosen specification function

$$\phi_u(u,\nu) = \frac{C}{1-\lambda} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \sigma u^{\sigma-1}\nu^{\zeta} = \frac{C}{1-\lambda} \tag{35}$$

$$\phi_{\nu}(u,\nu)=\frac{A}{\mu} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \zeta u^{\sigma}\nu^{\zeta-1}=\frac{A}{\mu} \tag{36}$$

The combination of (35) and (36), using the Cobb–Douglas type of specification, reveals an existing interrelationship between the strategies, i.e.

$$\phi\left(u^{*},\nu^{*}\right)=\left(u^{*}\right)^{\sigma}\left(\nu^{*}\right)^{\zeta} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{Cu^{*}}{\sigma(1-\lambda)}=\frac{A\nu^{*}}{\zeta\mu} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \nu^{*}=u^{*}\frac{C\zeta\mu}{\sigma(1-\lambda)A} \tag{37}$$

Expression (37) now predicts the interrelationship between the player's Nash strategies, for which the result of comparison between them is dependent on the constant parameters and on the constant adjoint variables, as well.

Substituting back (37) into (36) we are able to find the analytical expressions of the strategies, after the following algebraic calculations. Expression (36) now becomes:

$$\left(u^{*}\right)^{\sigma+\zeta-1}=\left[\frac{C}{\sigma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{1-\zeta}\left(\frac{\zeta\mu}{A}\right)^{1-\zeta}\left(\frac{\mu\zeta}{A}\right)^{-1}=\left[\frac{C}{\sigma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{1-\zeta}\left(\frac{\mu\zeta}{A}\right)^{-\zeta}$$

and from the latter the analytical expressions for the equilibrium strategies is derived in a more comparable form now:

$$u^{*}=\left[\frac{C}{\sigma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\frac{1-\zeta}{\sigma+\zeta-1}}\left(\frac{\mu\zeta}{A}\right)^{\frac{-\zeta}{\sigma+\zeta-1}} \tag{38}$$

$$\nu^{*}=\left[\frac{C}{\sigma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma+\zeta-1}}\left(\frac{\zeta\mu}{A}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma+\zeta-1}} \tag{39}$$

Further substitutions in the equation of the resources accumulation, $\dot{X}=\omega X-u^{\sigma}\nu^{\zeta}$, yield the following steady state value of the environmental quality stock

$$X^{ss}=\frac{1}{\omega}\left[\frac{C}{(1-\lambda)\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma+\zeta-1}}\left(\frac{\zeta\mu}{A}\right)^{\frac{-\zeta}{\sigma+\zeta-1}} \tag{40}$$

We summarize the above discussion in a proposition.

Proposition 5:

Assuming the function which damages the environmental quality to exhibit constant elasticity and all the other functions to be linear, then the pollution game yields constant optimal Nash strategies. The analytical expressions of the strategies are given by (38) and (39) for the enjoyer and the polluters respectively. The steady state value of the environmental quality stock is given by the expression (40).

5.3. The Value Functions

In this section we compute the analytical expressions for the values of objective functions of the players. For this purpose we make use the constancy of the strategies (38), (39) computed above. We denote the pair of the constant strategies as $(\bar{u},\bar{v})$. Note that constant strategies, leads to a constant function $\bar{\phi}=\phi(\bar{u},\bar{v})$ which is the aforementioned damage function that reduces the environmental quality. The equation of the environmental quality state, now can be solved explicitly with the following analytical solution

$$X(t)=\left(X_0-\frac{\bar{\phi}}{\omega}\right)e^{\omega t}+\frac{\bar{\phi}}{\omega} \tag{41}$$

X_0 is the initial stock of the environmental quality. Note that expression (41) leads us to assume a sufficiently high initial stock of resources, specifically $X_0 \geq \bar{\phi}/\omega$, in order to satisfy the non-negativity condition $X(t)>0$.

The earlier computed constant strategies and the linearity assumption of the value functionals for both government and polluters, gives us the advantage to calculate a linear integral. Thus, for the value function of player 1, we have:

$$J_1 = \frac{1}{\rho_1}\left(\bar{\phi} - C\cdot\bar{u}\right) - D\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho_1 t} X(t)\,dt \tag{42}$$

The value of the integral in (42) can be computed, giving

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho_1 t} X(t)\,dt = \frac{\rho_1 X_0 - \bar{\phi}}{\rho_1(\rho_1 - \omega)}$$

The polluters' value function (42) now takes the following form:

$$J_1 = \frac{\bar{\phi}}{\rho_1}\left(1 + \frac{D}{\rho_1 - \omega}\right) - \frac{C\bar{u}}{\rho_1} - \frac{DX_0}{\rho_1 - \omega} \tag{43}$$

which is again a constant.

Similarly, thanks to the model's linearity, the government's value function can be calculated analytically yielding the following constant expression:

$$J_2 = \frac{1}{\rho_2}\left(A\bar{\nu} + \frac{\upsilon\left(\rho_2 X_0 - \bar{\phi}\right)}{\rho_2 - \omega}\right), \quad J_2 = -\frac{\upsilon\bar{\phi}}{\rho_2(\rho_2 - \omega)} + \frac{A\bar{\nu}}{\rho_2} + \frac{\upsilon X_0}{\rho_2 - \omega} \tag{44}$$

6. Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the dynamics of pollution together with the actions undertaken for counter pollution. For this purpose we setup firstly a model of environmental pollution management and secondly a game between the polluters and the enjoyers of environmental services. For the first model of high quality environmental services management we make as basic assumption, that the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods and also the environment itself may provide services enjoyed by the people.

In the management model setup the state variables are the environmental quality and the stock of pollutants, as well. In the analysis of the solution we explore not only the restricted case of the saddle point equilibrium, but we enrich the equilibrium space with the wider class of the limit cycles, applying the Hopf's

bifurcation theorem. We found, in the case of the saddle point the necessary condition is the decreasing abatement, while in the case of increasing abatement the result is the richer limit cycle equilibrium. Moreover, following numerical analysis, we found numerically the region for which the two dimensional stable manifold of the limit cycle exists.

In the second model, the crucial assumption made is not the traditional one in which the environment is damaged only from the pollutants accumulation. Instead, we claim the function which damages the environmental services is not only affected positively by the pollutants accumulation but is affected negatively by the abatement effort undertaken by the second group of players. The two players, involved in the differential game, maximize their own utilities subject to a common equation of motion of the environmental state. Player 1 is the group of polluters which damage the environmental quality emitting pollutants at an instant intensity $u(t)$, but they suffer from the compliance costs as well as from the costs of emission realizations. Player 2 is every group of pollutants wipers which they derive utility form the clean environment but also utility from their abatement effort $A(\nu(t))$.

Considering the environment's equation of motion we assume that the environmental quality grows at an exponential rate as well as with the diffusion process and also we assume the damage function is in the form of a Cobb–Douglas with constant elasticities. Finally, in the game, we set as instrument variables the intensity of emissions on behalf the player 1 and the abatement effort on behalf the group that abates.

The game analyzed here has the important property of the state separability. Like linear quadratic games state separable differential games exhibit a special structure which allows an analytical characterization of Nash solutions. Moreover,

state separable games have the important property that the Nash equilibrium is Markov perfect solutions.

In the solution process and under some simplifications we found the analytical expressions of the induced strategies for both players. The equilibrium analysis reveals an important interrelationship between the strategies which are presented here in a comparable form. Finally, for the game model we found the value functions for both players which are, as the strategies, dependent only on the model parameters, hence time consistent.

Appendix A

Proof of proposition 4.1.

With the specifications, given in subsection 5.2, one can compute

$G'(X)=R(1-2X),\ \ G''(X)=-2R,\ \ \phi_u(u,\nu)=\gamma u^{\gamma-1},\ \ \phi_\nu(u,\nu)=u^\gamma,\ \ C'(u)=C,$

$A'(\nu)=\nu^{\xi-2},\ D'(X)=D,\ \upsilon'(X)=\upsilon$

$$\frac{\partial H_1}{\partial u}=0\ \Leftrightarrow\ (1-\lambda)\phi_u(u,\nu)=C'(u)\ \Leftrightarrow\ (1-\lambda)\gamma u^{\gamma-1}\nu=C \qquad (A.1)$$

$$\frac{\partial H_2}{\partial \nu}=0\ \Leftrightarrow\ A'(\nu)=\mu\phi_\nu(u,\nu)\ \Leftrightarrow\ \mu u^\gamma=\nu^{\xi-2} \qquad (A.2)$$

Combining $(A.1)$ and $(A.2)$ the optimal strategies take the following forms

$$u^*=\mu^{-1/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}\left[\frac{C}{\gamma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{(\xi-2)/[1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)]} \qquad (A.3),$$

$$\nu^*=\mu^{(\gamma-1)/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}\left[\frac{C}{\gamma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\gamma/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]} \qquad (A.4)$$

and the optimal harvesting becomes

$$\phi(u^*,\nu^*)=\mu^{-1/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}\left[\frac{C}{\gamma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\gamma(\xi-1)/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]} \qquad (A.5)$$

with the following partial derivatives

$$\frac{\partial\phi}{\partial\lambda}=\frac{\mu^{-1/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}\left[\frac{C}{\gamma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\gamma(\xi-1)/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}}{(1-\lambda)}\frac{\gamma(\xi-1)}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}= \qquad (A.6)$$

$$=\frac{\phi(u^*,\nu^*)}{(1-\lambda)}\frac{\gamma(\xi-1)}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}$$

$$\frac{\partial\phi}{\partial\mu}=\frac{\mu^{-1/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}\left[\frac{C}{\gamma(1-\lambda)}\right]^{\gamma(\xi-1)/[1+(1-\gamma)(1-\xi)]}}{\lambda_2}\frac{-1}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}= \qquad (A.7)$$

$$=\frac{\phi(u^*,\nu^*)}{\mu}\frac{-1}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}$$

Both derivatives $(A.6)$, $(A.7)$ are negatives due to the assumptions on the parameters $\gamma,\ \xi\in(0,1)$ and on the signs of derivates, that is

$\phi_u > 0,\ \phi_\nu > 0,\ v'(x) > 0,\ D'(x) > 0$, which ensures the positive sign of the adjoints $\lambda,\ \mu$.

Condition $w = \dfrac{\det(J)}{\text{tr}(J)}$ now becomes

$\rho_1\rho_2\left[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - 2G'(X)\right] = \lambda\rho_1 G''(X)\dfrac{\partial\phi}{\partial\lambda} + \mu\rho_2 G''(X)\dfrac{\partial\phi}{\partial\mu}$, which after substituting the values from $(\text{A.6}),\ (\text{A.7})$ and making the rest of algebraic manipulations, finally yields (at the steady states)

$$\frac{\phi(u_\infty,\nu_\infty)G''(X)}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}\left[\rho_1\gamma(1-\xi)\frac{D}{D+G'(X)-\rho_1} - \rho_2\right] - \rho_1\rho_2\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-2G'(X)\right] = 0 \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Where we have set $\dfrac{\lambda}{1-\lambda} = \dfrac{D}{\rho_1 - G'(X) - D}$ stemming from the adjoint equation $\dot{\lambda} = \lambda\left(\rho_1 - G'(X)\right) - D'(X)$, which at the steady states reduces into $\lambda = D'(X)\big/\left(\rho_1 - G'(X)\right)$.

Condition $w > 0$ after substitution of the values from $(\text{A.6}),\ (\text{A.7})$ becomes

$$w = \rho_1\rho_2 - \left[G'(X)\right]^2 + \frac{\phi(u,\nu)G''(X)}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}\left[\gamma(1-\xi)\frac{-D}{G'(X)+D-\rho_1} + 1\right] > 0 \quad (\text{A.9})$$

The division of (A.8) by ρ_1 yields

$$\frac{\phi(u_\infty,\nu_\infty)G''(X)}{1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)}\left[\gamma(1-\xi)\frac{D}{D+G'(X)-\rho_1} - \frac{\rho_2}{\rho_1}\right] - \rho_2\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-2G'(X)\right] = 0 \quad (\text{A.10})$$

The sum $(\text{A.9})+(\text{A.10})$ must be positive, thus after simplifications and taking into account, at the steady state, that $\phi(u_\infty,\nu_\infty) = G(X)$, we have:

$G(X)G''(X)\dfrac{\rho_1-\rho_2}{\rho_1\left[1+(1-\xi)(1-\gamma)\right]} > \left[\rho_2 - G'(X)\right]^2$ and the result $\rho_2 > \rho_1$ follows from the strict concavity of the logistic growth $G'' < 0$.

Appendix B

Proof that the bifurcation condition $w = \dfrac{\det(J)}{\mathrm{tr}(J)}$ $(B.1)$ can be written as:

$$\rho_1\rho_2\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-2G'(X)\right]= \\ =\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right]\rho_1+\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right]\rho_2 \qquad (B.1)$$

Until now we have:

$$\mathrm{tr}(J)= \rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X) \qquad (B.2)$$

$$\det(J)=G'(X)\left(\rho_1-G'(X)\right)\left(\rho_2-G'(X)\right)-\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left(\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right)\left(\rho_2-G'(X)\right)- \\ -\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left(\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right)\left(\rho_1-G'(X)\right) \qquad (B.3)$$

$$w=\rho_1\rho_2-\left[G'(X)\right]^2-\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right]-\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right] \qquad (B.4)$$

First we multiply $(B.2)$ by $(B.4)$, and

$$\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X)\right]\cdot \\ \left[\rho_1\rho_2-\left[G'(X)\right]^2-\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right]-\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right]\right]= \\ =\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X)\right]\left[\rho_1\rho_2-\left[G'(X)\right]^2\right]- \\ -\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X)\right]\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\left[\lambda G''(X)+D''(X)\right]- \\ -\left[\rho_1+\rho_2-G'(X)\right]\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\left[\mu G''(X)+\upsilon''(X)\right] \qquad (B.5)$$

Equating $(B.3)=(B.5)$

$$G'(X)\big(\rho_1 - G'(X)\big)\big(\rho_2 - G'(X)\big) - \frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big(\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big)\big(\rho_2 - G'(X)\big) -$$

$$- \frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big(\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big)\big(\rho_1 - G'(X)\big) =$$

$$= \big[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - G'(X)\big]\Big[\rho_1\rho_2 - \big[G'(X)\big]^2\Big] -$$

$$-\big[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - G'(X)\big]\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big] -$$

$$-\big[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - G'(X)\big]\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big[\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big] \quad \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow G'(X)\big[\rho_1 - G'(X)\big]\big[\rho_2 - G'(X)\big] =$$

$$= \big[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - G'(X)\big]\Big[\rho_1\rho_2 - \big[G'(X)\big]^2\Big] -$$

$$-\rho_1\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big] -$$

$$-\rho_2\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big[\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big] \qquad \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \big[\rho_1 + \rho_2 - G'(X)\big]\Big[\rho_1\rho_2 - \big[G'(X)\big]^2\Big] - G'(X)\big[\rho_1 - G'(X)\big]\big[\rho_2 - G'(X)\big] =$$

$$= \rho_1\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big] + \rho_2\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big[\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big] \quad \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (\rho_1 + \rho_2)\rho_1\rho_2 - (\rho_1 + \rho_2)\big[G'(X)\big]^2 - \rho_1\rho_2 G'(X) + \big[G'(X)\big]^3 -$$

$$-\rho_1\rho_2 G'(X) + \rho_1\big[G'(X)\big]^2 + \rho_2\big[G'(X)\big]^2 - \big[G'(X)\big]^3 =$$

$$= \rho_1\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big] + \rho_2\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big[\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big] \quad \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \rho_1\rho_2\big(\rho_1 + \rho_2 - 2G'(X)\big) =$$

$$= \rho_1\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\lambda}\big[\lambda G''(X) + D''(X)\big] + \rho_2\frac{\partial\phi(u,\nu)}{\partial\mu}\big[\mu G''(X) + \upsilon''(X)\big]$$

which is the condition for cyclical strategies as in the main text.

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