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Modeling Health Insurance Choice
Using the Heterogeneous Logit Model

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I. Introduction

Over the last 15 years, the field of discrete choice modeling has made major technical advances. Back in the mid-1980s, it was not computationally feasible to estimate choice models in which consumers faced more than two or three alternatives, unless one was willing to impose very strong homogeneity assumptions on consumer tastes. But recent advances in “simulation based inference” have made it feasible to estimate discrete choice models with several alternatives and rich patterns of consumer taste heterogeneity. A recent general survey of these new estimation methods is provided in Geweke and Keane (2001).

The new methods for estimating choice models with several alternatives and rich patterns of taste heterogeneity have important potential application in health economics. One important application, which I will emphasize, is the analysis of consumer choice behavior in insurance markets characterized by competition among several competing insurance plans.

Unfortunately, these new econometric advances have not yet been widely used in the health economics literature, which continues to rely heavily on the workhouse multinomial logit (MNL) developed by McFadden in the 1970s. It is simple to estimate MNL models with many alternatives, but MNL relies on the restrictive assumption that consumers have homogenous tastes for the “common” attributes of alternatives. As an example, suppose that consumers are choosing among a set of health insurance plans, which differ on attributes like premiums, co-pays, provider choice and prescription drug coverage. The MNL model assumes that all consumers value these attributes equally, precluding the possibility that consumers may differ in their willingness to pay for such health plan features.\footnote{The MNL model assumes all tastes heterogeneity is over the “unique” attributes of alternatives. The common vs. unique distinction can be understood as follows: A “common” attribute is one on which all alternatives can be rated. For example, each alternative health plan can be rated on its quality level, on whether or not it provides drug coverage, etc.. In contrast, a “unique” attribute is specific to a particular plan. Unique attributes are by their nature somewhat amorphous. For example, if we consider soft drinks, the unique attribute of Coca-cola is its “Coca-cola-ness.” Heterogeneous tastes for unique attributes generate additive person specific shocks to the utility derived from each alternative, which are independent across alternatives. The MNL assumes that these errors are independent type I extreme value distributed. Given these assumptions, the MNL model implies the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) property, which implies strong restrictions on patterns of substitution across alternatives. The assumption that all taste heterogeneity is over unique attributes is the key assumption that drives the IIA property.}

The strong homogeneity assumptions underlying the MNL model preclude the study of many interesting questions in health economics. A prime example is the debate over the value of consumer choice in health insurance markets. All OECD countries have some form of government provided health insurance, although the comprehensiveness and universality of...
public insurance differs greatly by country. In some countries, private insurers may offer alternatives to public insurance, and there has been considerable interest in whether allowing private competition increases consumer welfare by appealing to heterogeneous consumer tastes.

For instance, in the U.S., the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program provides coverage primarily for senior citizens. But Medicare coverage is limited. The plan has substantial cost-sharing requirements, and fails to cover preventive care or, until recently, prescription drugs. However, private insurers can offer alternatives to Medicare. Consumers can opt into private “Medicare HMO” plans, which typically offer more comprehensive coverage but less provider choice. For each consumer enrolled, the private insurers receive a subsidy (or “capitation payment”) from the government. Conservatives have strongly advocated this “Medicare +Choice” program on the grounds that it enhances consumer welfare, since consumers with heterogeneous tastes benefit from having choice among health plans with varied attributes.

However, the question of whether or to what extent consumer welfare has been enhanced by a program like Medicare+Choice cannot be addressed sensibly using the MNL framework, since it fails to capture consumer heterogeneity in willingness to pay for common plan attributes like drug coverage and provider choice. In this paper I will describe recent advances in choice modeling that enable one to evaluate the extent of consumer taste heterogeneity in situations like these, where choice sets include several choices that differ on multiple common attributes.

In a recent issue of this journal, Contoyannis, Jones and Leon-Gonzalez (2004) described how simulation based inference may be useful for many panel data discrete choice applications in health economics. Practical simulation methods for panel data were first developed in Keane (1993, 1994), although Contoyannis et al. survey many more recent developments as well. The characteristic of panel data applications is that choice sets are typically small (often binary) and econometric problems arise because of complex serial correlation patterns in the error terms. Leading examples are predicting adverse health shocks, the use of acute care services, or the advent of ADL limitations. In these contexts the discrete outcome is 1/0 (e.g., the consumer either has a health shock or not). And we expect to see complex patterns of serial correlation in the errors because the latent health state of the consumer - which drives acute episodes or service use or ADL limitations – will typically exhibit a complex pattern of persistence over time.

The simulation methods that I will discuss in this paper are more applicable to cross-sectional applications. Leading examples include modeling consumer choice among several
insurance plans, or modeling consumer choice among treatment options, when several options are available. In these applications, difficult econometric problems arise because heterogeneous consumer tastes for common attributes of alternatives generate complex cross-sectional correlations in the error terms across alternatives. In my view, the methods most useful for such health economics applications were developed in Harris and Keane (1999), who showed how to use the “extended heterogeneous logit” model to study health plan choice.

Analysis of consumer choice behavior in insurance markets is of great interest in health economics for a number of reasons. For example, understanding consumer taste heterogeneity is crucial for the optimal design of insurance markets. The longstanding interest in optimal design of insurance markets stems from the inefficiency of competitive equilibrium in these markets.

We typically think health insurance markets are subject to “asymmetric information” (i.e., consumers know more about their health state than do insurers) which leads to “adverse selection” (i.e., more comprehensive insurance plans tend to attract unhealthy, high cost, consumers). In an important series of papers, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977) and Spence (1978) studied the nature of competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Basically, these papers show that one tends to get segregation of consumers: the unhealthy, who have greater willingness to pay for coverage, buy comprehensive insurance at high premiums, while the healthy, who have lower willingness to pay, buy limited insurance at low premiums.

This situation creates both equity and efficiency problems. Obviously, the unhealthy end up paying high premiums. More subtly, the equilibrium is inefficient because the healthy are led to underinsure, since that is the only way they can get low premiums. If the inexpensive health plans aimed at the healthy were to cover too much, then at some point the unhealthy would find them attractive, and they couldn’t remain inexpensive.

But, as Wilson (1977) and Spence (1978) pointed out, equity and efficiency gains are often possible in such a market if the government can engineer a premium subsidy from the healthy to the unhealthy. If the plans that appeal to the healthy cross-subsidize the plans that appeal to the unhealthy, it becomes possible for the healthy to get more comprehensive insurance. Since the subsidy lowers the premium in the comprehensive plan, the unhealthy are better off. Furthermore, the limited plan aimed at the healthy can expand its coverage without attracting the unhealthy. As long as the subsidy that the healthy must pay to the unhealthy is less than their willingness to pay for this expanded coverage, they are made better off too.
Of course, private insurers won’t voluntarily cross-subsidize loss making policies for the unhealthy. Government regulation or intervention is necessary, and this raises the issue of how to design insurance markets. Several welfare enhancing designs are possible. As Wilson (1977) showed, government can implement a cross-subsidy by requiring all consumers to purchase a “Basic” insurance policy, and allowing private insurers to offer supplemental policies. Wilson (1977) and Spence (1978) pointed out that an equivalent way to implement a cross-subsidy is for a single payer, the government, to offer two insurance options: a comprehensive policy aimed at the unhealthy, and a more limited policy with a lower premium aimed at the healthy. Unlike private insurers, the government is willing to use the later plan to subsidize the former. Diamond (1992) advocated that government design a menu of insurance options, and require insurance companies to bid on the right to offer the whole menu. Since a private insurer must offer the whole menu, it must tolerate offering some lose making plans.

Now, all this is fine in theory, but, as Spence (1978) noted, actual design of a menu of insurance options to increase equity and efficiency requires knowing a great deal about consumer taste heterogeneity. As Spence said, “Publicly provided insurance can improve on the private market. … Neither goal, improving efficiency, or redistributing benefits, is inconsistent with maintaining a reasonable array of consumer options. It might be objected that the informational problems make it difficult to calculate exactly what the second best menu would look like. That is certainly true. But that hardly seems a reason to ignore the problem… by pretending that individuals … are … sufficiently similar to make a differentiated menu unnecessary. That judgment should be empirically based. Perhaps the easiest way to make it is to offer a portfolio of options and observe the choices that are made.”

Of course, implementing Spence’s suggestion is not easy. First, one needs data where a range of insurance plans, with a range of different attributes, are available to consumers. Given that, one needs econometric methods that can estimate the distribution of consumer taste heterogeneity, or willingness to pay, for those attributes. As I’ve indicated, the MNL model, which was the only feasible framework for studying multinomial choice at the time Spence wrote, simply could not be used to address this question, because the framework assumes that consumers have homogenous tastes for common attributes.

However, the necessary econometric techniques to pursue the strategy suggested by Spence (1978) are now available. For instance, using heterogeneous logit models, like those
developed in Harris and Keane (1999), we can estimate the distribution of consumer tastes for various health plan features. Then, given any hypothetical menu of insurance options that one might offer to consumers, the model can be used to predict the market shares of each plan, and to calculate the level of consumer surplus under the hypothetical menu.

This is the first step in implementing Spence’s idea, but it is not enough. In order to evaluate the cost of offering any hypothetical menu, and the cross-subsidy pattern under that menu, we also have to predict the composition of people who choose each plan. Next, we must also develop models of health service utilization, and predict the cost of offering each plan as a function of the type of consumers who select into it. Of course, for this to be possible, we need data that include good predictors of utilization, like health status and prior health care utilization.

In this paper I will focus on how the heterogeneous logit model can be used to implement the first stage of this process: estimating the distribution of consumer tastes for health plan features. The problem of merging choice models with models of utilization in order fully implement Spence’s idea remains a very important avenue for future research.

Of course, the analysis of consumer choice behavior in insurance markets is important even if one has more modest goals in mind than optimal market design. A prime example is the issue of whether to let private firms compete with government provided health insurance. In the U.S., conservatives have long advocated letting private insurers compete with Medicare and this hybrid model has been in place since the mid-1980s. The notion that private competition is a good idea rests on two key notions (see, e.g., Stockman (1983)): (i) Choice is good. Public insurance is “one size fits all,” while private firms can provide plans better tailored to individual preferences. (ii) Competition among alternative plans will promote market efficiency; because plans will have to keep expenses down to survive in a competitive market place.

However, allowing private insurers to offer insurance in competition with government raises several interesting issues, all of which can only be addressed properly with the aid of choice models that accommodate consumer taste heterogeneity. The first problem to note is that, if private firms are allowed to enter the market, then the consumers who opt out of the public insurance will not, in general, be a random sample of the population. This raises the potential problem of adverse selection: If relatively low risk clients opt out of the public program, then average costs of the remaining participants may increase, ultimately leading to increased premiums and co-pays, or reduced benefits, under public insurance.
Suppose, then, we had data from before and after the introduction of a private insurance plan. To analyze whether consumer surplus increased overall, we would need to ask whether any loss to consumers due to higher premiums under the public plan are outweighed by the benefits stemming from the enhanced choice set. This can only be done in a framework that allows for heterogeneous consumer tastes over plan attributes, such as the heterogeneous logit model.

Another interesting set of issues arises when government subsidizes private insurers. Under schemes where government provides a per enrollee subsidy (i.e., capitation payment), private firms have an incentive to “cherry pick” – i.e., to attract people who are good risks (i.e., who will be profitable because they are unlikely to need services). In general, this raises average costs, and hence premiums, among those who stay with public insurance. In light of this cherry picking problem, health economists have paid a great deal of attention to the problem of “risk adjustment” – the adjustment of capitation payments to reflect expected service utilization of the consumers who enroll in a plan (see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000)). A change in risk adjustment methodology will, in general, change the market equilibrium, since it alters the incentives of the private firms to offer plans with particular features, as well as costs facing the public plan.

Suppose, then, we had data from before and after a change in risk adjustment and/or capitation payment rules. To analyze whether consumer surplus increased overall, we would again require a framework, like the heterogeneous logit, that allows for heterogeneous consumer tastes over plan attributes. The same point applies in markets with no public insurance, but only a set of competing private firms who are all subsidized by government or by employers. These are both common forms of market design (see, e.g., the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan in the U.S., or the health plan options offered by many large U.S. employers).

The issue of how government capitation payments affect market equilibrium is of more than academic interest. In fact, capitation payments to private Medicare HMO plans in the U.S. have generated considerable controversy. Many studies find strong favorable selection of healthy senior citizens into Medicare HMOs, implying their capitation payments are well above what their enrollees would have cost under the public program. According to GAO (2000), “… we estimate that aggregate payments to Medicare +Choice plans in 1998 were about $5.2 billion (21 percent) … more than if the plans’ enrollees had received care in the traditional FFS program.” Thus, Medicare+Choice may be inducing multi-billion dollar Medicare cost increases. This problem has recently attracted Congressional attention (see New York Times (2004)).
In general, there appears to be a wide consensus that Medicare HMOs in the U.S. have achieved their cost reductions primarily via cherry picking rather than successful cost control. For example, see Glied (2000), Greenwald, Levy and Ingber (2000), Brown et al (1993). Indeed, many argue that Medicare costs are lower than can be achieved by private HMO plans, because the large size of the program makes its administrative costs relatively low, and enables it to use its monopsony power to negotiate rate discounts from providers (see, e.g., Berenson (2001) and Foster (2000)). Thus, the evidence seems to undermine the cost efficiency argument for allowing private competition, suggesting that enhancing choice by permitting private competition with Medicare is actually a cost increasing proposition. Whether the increased cost can be justified by increases in consumer surplus stemming from enhanced choice sets is another issue that can only be addressed using choice models that allow for heterogeneity in consumer preferences.

Yet another set of issues revolves around the design of the insurance plan or plans to be provided by government, whether in a system that admits private competition or a single payer system. There is no necessary reason that government provided insurance has to be “one size fits all.” Many private firms use sophisticated market research techniques, including the type of choice modeling techniques I will describe here, to help design product offerings that will appeal to consumer tastes. But these techniques are not proprietary. There is no necessary reason that government could not use sophisticated market research to help design public insurance plans.

Unfortunately, this has not typically been the case. For example, President Clinton’s Health Security Plan required the U.S. States to create health care “alliances,” which, in turn, were required to offer consumers menus of insurance options. The Plan required that the menu include options with certain features. But, to my knowledge, there was no attempt to use choice modeling techniques to help design menus that would appeal to consumer tastes. Similarly, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2004 requires Medicare to add a (rather limited) prescription drug benefit in 2006. But, to my knowledge, there was no attempt to use choice modeling techniques to estimate the distribution of consumer willingness to pay for such a benefit. Echoing Spence (1978), we should remember that effective policy making in the health insurance area requires a great deal of information on consumer tastes. Thus, to make policy without guidance from state-of-the-art market research techniques strikes me as quite unwise. Perhaps a wider dissemination of recent advances in choice modeling techniques among health economists will lead to greater use of these methods to help design health policy.
II. Application of the Heterogeneous Logit Model to the Health Insurance Market

II. A. The Data

To illustrate the potential usefulness of the heterogeneous logit model in health economics, I will draw heavily on Harris and Keane (1999). In that paper, we developed a new type of multinomial logit model that: (i) allows for rich patterns of consumer taste heterogeneity, (ii) combines revealed preference and attitudinal data to learn more about preferences than is possible using revealed preference data alone, and (iii) allows one to infer consumer preferences for unmeasured common attributes of alternatives. We call this the “extended heterogeneous logit,” since a heterogeneous logit alone would only accommodate (i). However, to conserve of space, I will refer to the framework simply as “heterogeneous logit” through out this paper.

As an application of heterogeneous logit, Harris and Keane (1999) modeled how senior citizens living in a particular region of the U.S. choose among insurance options. The data were from the “Twin Cities” of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, and were collected by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now known as the Center for Medicare Services (CMS), in 1988. The sample size was N = 1274, and the mean age of the respondents was 74.

In order to understand the choice problem faced by consumers in these data, it is important to understand two things about this market. First, the basic Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program, which provides insurance coverage to those 65 and over, requires significant cost sharing (especially for hospital stays) and leaves a number of services, such as preventive care and, until recently, prescription drugs, uncovered. Thus, many senior citizens buy supplemental insurance, known as “medigap” plans. These plans may cover Medicare deductibles and co-pays, as well as additional services and/or prescriptions. There were many such plans offered by private insurance companies in the Twin Cities in 1988, but we found they could be fairly accurately categorized into those that provided drug coverage and those that did not, with other plan features (like premiums) fairly comparable within each of those types.

Second, two basic types of “managed care” options were available. Both were offered by private health maintenance organizations (HMOs). These “Medicare HMOs” received a per enrollee government subsidy (i.e., capitation payment) set at 95% of the cost of serving a typical enrollee in the public Medicare FFS program. As I noted earlier, these capitation payments are controversial, because many studies suggest that Medicare HMO enrollees are relatively healthy, with average expenses less than 95% of a typical Medicare recipient. But, for our purposes here,
it is only necessary to understand that there are two basic types of HMOs. The first is called an independent practice association (IPA), while the second is called a group or network HMO.

In an IPA, consumers can choose any provider. However, the private insurer negotiates favorable reimbursement rates with a set of “preferred” providers. If an enrollee chooses one of these providers, then he/she faces lower co-pays than if he/she goes outside of the network. In contrast, in a group or network HMO, the private insurer employs a staff of providers, or contracts with an exclusive set of providers, and enrollees have no coverage outside this network.

Thus, the consumer choice set contains five insurance options:

1) Basic Medicare (fee-for-service)
2) Medicare + a “medigap” insurance plan without drug coverage
3) Medicare + a “medigap” insurance plan with drug coverage
4) An HMO of the independent practice association (IPA) type
5) A Network or Group HMO

The key attributes of plans that we observe in the data are described in Table 1. These are: the premium, whether the plan covers drugs, covers preventive care, and allows provider choice, and whether an enrollee must submit claims for reimbursement after using medical services.

Crucially, two important attributes of health insurance plans are not measured in the data: quality of care and cost sharing requirements. This isn’t a specific failure of these data, because these attributes are intrinsically difficult to measure. First, there is a large literature on quality measures in health care, and it doesn’t come to a clear consensus on how such measurement should be done. Second, cost sharing rules of insurance plans are quite complex. There tend to be many different cost-sharing requirements for different types of services under different circumstances. Thus, it is very difficult to come up with any overall measure of “cost sharing.”

The lack of quality and cost-sharing measures is an important problem for two reasons. First, a choice model that ignores these two attributes may give very misleading estimates of how consumers value the other attributes. Second, these two attributes are a critical aspect of any insurance plan, so, unless we know how consumers value them, we can’t measure the welfare implications of adding new plans. However, a key aspect of the Twin Cities Medicare data is that it contained attitudinal data in which consumers were asked how much they valued various attributes of a health insurance plan. A key contribution of Harris and Keane (1999) was to show how this type of attitudinal data can be combined with consumers observed health plan choices.
to measure both: 1) how consumers value the unobserved attributes, and 2) the levels of the unobserved attributes possessed by each plan in the market (as perceived by consumers).

The attitudinal data were obtained from questions in which respondents were asked whether, in order to consider an insurance plan, it would “have to have” a certain attribute, or whether they would just “like to have” the attribute, or whether the attribute “doesn’t matter” in deciding if a plan is considered. The questions and response frequencies are described in Table 2.

Economists typically eschew such data, because there is no obvious way to convert responses to attitudinal questions into monetary measures of willingness to pay for attributes. However, in the framework of Harris and Keane (1999), responses to attitudinal questions are treated as “noisy” indicators of consumer preferences when estimating a model of consumer choice behavior. This enables one to construct better estimates of willingness to pay for observed and unobserved attributes. To describe the approach, we must lay out the choice model in detail.

II. B. The Choice Model

The insurance choice model in Harris and Keane (1999) is laid out as follows: Let $X_j$ denote the vector of the observed common attributes of insurance option $j$, where $j = 1,\ldots,5$ indexes the five options listed in Table 1. $X_j$ includes:

(i) Premium (in $ per month)
(ii) Drug coverage (a 0/1 indicator)
(iii) Preventive Care (a 0/1 indicator)
(iv) Provider Choice (a 0/1 indicator)
(v) Must Submit Claims (a 0/1 indicator)

Let $A_j$ denote the vector of un-observed common attributes of insurance option $j$. $A_j$ includes:

(i) Cost Sharing
(ii) Quality

Then, letting $U_{ij}$ denote expected utility to person $i$ if he/she chooses insurance option $j$, where $j = 1,\ldots,5$ indexes the five options listed in Table 1, we have:

(1) $U_{ij} = X_j \beta_i + A_j W_i + \epsilon_{ij}$

where:

$\beta_i$ = the vector of weights that person $i$ attaches to the observed common attributes
$W_i$ = the vector of weights that person $i$ attaches to the un-observed common attributes
$\epsilon_{ij}$ = an idiosyncratic component of preferences, specific to how person $i$ evaluates the unique attribute of alternative $j$. 
If we assume $\beta_i$ and $W_i$ are homogenous across consumers $i$, implying homogenous tastes for observed and unobserved common attributes, then we may let $\bar{\beta}$ and $\bar{W}$ denote their common values, and let $\alpha_j = A_j \bar{W}$ denote the alternative specific intercept for plan $j$ that arises as a result of its unobserved attributes. Then, if we assume the unobserved idiosyncratic preference terms $\epsilon_{ij}$ are independent type I extreme value distributed (see McFadden (1973)), we obtain the conventional MNL model, in which the choice probability for alternative $j$ is:

$$P(j | \bar{\alpha}, \bar{\beta}) = \exp(\alpha_j + X_j \bar{\beta}) / \sum_{k=1}^{5} \exp(\alpha_j + X_k \bar{\beta})$$

If, instead, we allow preference weights $\beta_i$ and/or $W_i$ to differ across consumers $i$, we obtain the “heterogeneous logit model.” For early marketing applications of heterogeneous logit, see Elrod (1988) and Erdem (1996). An unfortunate aspect of this model from the perspective of applications in health economics is that, for all practical purposes, the model cannot be estimated unless one has access to panel data (see Harris and Keane (1999) for a discussion). Intuitively, one needs to observe the same consumer making choices on multiple occasions in order to identify person specific preference weights. Such a model is not especially useful in health economics, because we rarely have panel data on insurance or treatment choices.

A key innovation in Harris and Keane (1999) is to show how stated attribute importance measures, like those described in Table 2, can give us important additional information on how consumers value attributes, enabling us to learn about preference heterogeneity even when we don’t have access to panel data. We call this the “extended heterogeneous logit” model.

Harris and Keane use the attitudinal questions to obtain information about the attribute importance weights as follows: First, we code the responses to the attribute importance questions as 1 for “doesn’t matter,” 2 for “like to have” and 3 for “have to have.” Then, letting:

- $S_{ik} =$ the importance (1, 2 or 3) that person $i$ says he/she assigns to attribute $k$,
- $\beta_{ik} =$ the weight that person $i$ truly attaches to observed attribute $k$,

we assume that:

$$\beta_{ik} = \beta_{0k} + \beta_{1k} S_{ik} + \mu_{ik}$$

where $\beta_{0k}$ and $\beta_{1k}$ map the 1, 2, 3 scale into utility units, and $\mu_{ik}$ is “measurement error.” Thus, we are allowing for the possibility that respondents who say they value an attribute more actually act as if they value the attribute more. If that is true, then we should obtain $\beta_{1k} > 0$ if an attribute is a “good,” and $\beta_{1k} < 0$ if the attribute is a “bad.”
For example, we have that:

\[ k = 1 \text{ corresponds to the Premium } (X_{ij}). \]

\[ \beta_{ij} = \text{ the weight person } i \text{ puts on premiums (presumably this is negative).} \]

\[ S_{ij} = \text{ the stated importance of low premiums (on a scale of 1 to 3).} \]

If the stated attribute importance measures are indicative of actual preferences, then a person who says he/she would “have to have” the lowest premium \((S_{ij}=3)\) will tend to put a bigger (negative) weight on premiums in his/her utility function than one who says the premium “doesn’t matter” \((S_{ij}=1)\). This means that in the equation:

\[
\beta_{ij} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i} S_{ij} + \mu_{ij}
\]

we expect the slope parameter \(\beta_{1i}\) to be negative.

The “measurement error” term \(\mu_{ik}\) in (2) captures the fact that:

(i) People may not respond carefully to the questions (e.g., someone who says the premium “doesn’t matter” might actually care quite a bit about premiums).

(ii) Different people may mean different things by the same answer (e.g., If two people say they would “Like to Have” low premiums, one may actually care quite a bit more about premiums than the other).

Problems like these are part of why economists have traditionally eschewed attitudinal data. It is important to stress, however, that the approach in Harris and Keane (1999) does not assume \textit{a priori} that the stated attribute importance data is a good predictor of individual level preferences. Rather, we let the choice data to tell us whether the attitudinal data is informative.

Intuitively, if people who say they care a lot about a particular attribute tend to choose alternatives with a high level of that attribute, then our estimates will indicate that the slope coefficients in equation (2) are significant.\(^2\) In other words, if the stated attribute importance data helps to predict individual level choices, then our estimates will imply that it helps to predict individual level preferences. On the other hand, if the stated preference data is not useful for predicting behavior, then the variance of the measurement error terms in (2) will tend to be large, and estimates of the slope parameters in (2) will tend to be insignificant and close to zero.

\(^2\) Interestingly, the stated attribute importance data could also predict behavior because people who say they care a lot about an attribute tend to choose alternatives with low levels of that attribute. That is, the slope coefficients in (2) could be significant but with the wrong sign. This would mean that people care about the attribute, and that the attitudinal data helps measure how much they care about the attribute, but that their perceptions are inaccurate. That is, they think the health plans with high levels of the attribute actually have low levels of the attribute.
If the attitudinal data are uninformative, so that the slopes in (2) are zero, then the intercept terms in (2) would tell us the average importance that people place on each attribute. This can be inferred from observed choice behavior alone, as in any simple choice model. Clearly, we can’t learn more than the average preference weights (across all consumers in the population) if the individual level stated importance measures are uninformative.

As the final component of the model, we specify that the preference weights on the unobserved attributes are given by the equation:

$$W_{ip} = W_{1p} S_{ip}^* + \nu_{ip} \quad p=1 \text{ (cost share), } 2 \text{ (quality).}$$

This is like equation (2), except that $S_{ip}^*$ denotes the person’s stated importance for un-observed attribute $p$, the slope coefficient that maps the stated attribute importance into true attribute importance is now denoted $W_{1p}$, and the measurement error term is now denoted $\nu_{ip}$.

Unlike (2), equation (3) has no intercept. An intercept is theoretically identified in (3), but Harris and Keane (1999) found that the likelihood is extremely flat in this parameter, making it impossible to estimate in practice. The reason is as follows: the model generates an implied intercept for option $j$ of $\alpha_j = (W_0 + W_1 S_{ip}^*) A_j$. If $W_1 > 0$, consumers with higher levels of $S_{ip}^*$ have larger intercept differences among alternatives. This effect can be magnified either by reducing $W_0$ and increasing $W_1$ while holding the $A_j$ fixed, or by scaling up $A_j$ while holding $W_0$ and $W_1$ fixed. Both types of parameter changes can be rigged to lead to almost indistinguishable changes in model fit. By fixing $W_0=0$, we break the near equivalence of these two types of changes.\(^3\)

It is simple to estimate the model given by (1)-(3) using simulated maximum likelihood (SML). If the attribute importance weights $\beta_i$ and $W_i$ were known, the choice probability for a person would have a simple multinomial logit form. Since $\beta_i$ and $W_i$ are unobserved (we are estimating the parameters of their distributions), the simulated probability that person $i$ chooses plan $j$ is just the average over draws for $\beta_i$ and $W_i$ of multinomial logit choice probabilities:

$$P(j \mid \theta, S_i, S_i^*) = D^{-1} \sum_{d=1}^{D} \left( \frac{\exp(X_j \beta_i^d + A_j W_i^d)}{\sum_{k=1}^{S} \exp(X_k \beta_i^d + A_k W_i^d)} \right)$$

Here $\theta$ is the vector of all model parameters and $S_i$ and $S_i^*$ are attitudinal measures for person $i$.

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\(^3\) Another way to think about the problem is to imagine a situation where choice probabilities differ little between consumers who have high and low values of $S_{ip}^*$. This could happen either because $W_1$ is small or because the $A_j$ differ little across alternatives. On the other hand, if choice probabilities differ greatly, it could be because $W_1$ is very large while the $A_j$ differences are small. In either case, the $A_j$ differences could be small. If the $A_j$ differences are small, then $W_0$ has little impact on choice behavior.
Note that, since the stochastic parts of $\beta_i$ and $W_i$ are entirely due to the measurement error terms that appear in (2) and (3), the summation in (4) could have been written equivalently in terms of a summation over draws $\mu_i^d$ and $v_i^d$ from the distributions of $\mu_i$ and $v_i$. To proceed, it is necessary to specify a parametric distribution for these stochastic terms. Harris and Keane (1999) specify that the $\mu_{ik}$ and $v_{ip}$ in (2) and (3) have independent normal distributions with zero means. The variances of these distributions are additional parameters that must be estimated. Denote the vector of variances by $\sigma^2$. The complete set of model parameters is then $\theta \equiv (\beta_0, \beta_1, W_1, A, \sigma^2)$.

The parameters of the heterogeneous logit model can be estimated by using gradient based methods to search for the maximum of the simulated log-likelihood function, which is obtained simply by taking the logs of the simulated probabilities in (4) for each respondent $i$, and then summing over respondents $i=1,\ldots,N$. When we seek to evaluate the simulated likelihood function at a particular trial parameter value $\hat{\theta}$, we are working with a particular estimate of the variance vector $\sigma^2$. Thus, we know the distribution from which the draws $\mu_i^d$ and $v_i^d$ should be obtained. The easiest way to obtain such draws is to use a standard normal random generator to obtain draws from a $N(0,1)$ distribution, and then to scale by $\sigma$ to obtain draws with the desired variance. A key aspect of simulation is that the random variables used in the simulation must be held fixed as one iterates in search of the parameter vector that maximizes the simulated log likelihood. [Otherwise, the simulated likelihood will vary randomly from iteration to iteration]. In the present case, this means one should draw the standard normal random variables only once, at the start of the process, and hold them fixed as one iterates. Then, the draws $\mu_i^d$ and $v_i^d$ will vary through the search process only because the $\sigma$ vector changes.

Of course, different parametric distributions (besides the normal) could have been adopted for $\mu_i$ and $v_i$. Then, results could have been compared across models that assume different distributions. Allowing for non-normal distributions is not difficult. What is important for simulation procedures is that the assumed parametric distribution be relatively easy to draw from. Another way we could have extended the model is by allowing for cross-correlations among the measurement error terms. Cross-correlations would capture the notion that a person who places a relatively high weight on, say, provider choice, also tends to place a high weight on, say, drug coverage. In this application we felt that cross-correlations were of secondary importance, because the stated attribute importance data already generate such patterns.
II. C. The Parameter Estimates

Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2), which describes how people value the observed attributes of the insurance plan options. The estimates imply that the stated attribute importance data is highly predictive of individual level preferences, so that using such data does indeed enable us to get a better predictive model. For each of the five observed attributes included in the choice model, the slope coefficient that maps the stated attribute importance measures into true attribute importance weights is significant and has the expected sign.

For example, Table 4 details how the model’s prediction of the importance weight that a person puts on drug coverage differs, depending on whether the person says this is an attribute that he/she would “have to have,” or would “like to have,” or that “doesn’t matter.” Notice that the utility weight ranges from a low value of 0.441 if the person says the attribute “doesn’t matter,” to a high value of 1.209 if the person says it is an attribute that he/she would “have to have.” Thus, consumers who say they “have to have” drug coverage act as if they place nearly 3 times as much value on that attribute as the consumers who say this attribute “doesn’t matter.” But does a coefficient estimate of 1.209 mean that these consumers care a lot about drug coverage? In a choice model, the best way to interpret the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates is to look at what they imply about how changes in plan attributes would affect market shares, an exercise I’ll turn to in section II. D.

It is interesting that even consumers who say drug coverage is an attribute that “doesn’t matter” act as if they place a significant positive value on drug coverage (according to our model estimates). This might seem inconsistent, but it is important to remember exactly how the stated attribute importance questions are phrased. Consumers were asked whether a plan had to have a particular attribute in order for them to consider the plan. It is perfectly consistent to answer that an attribute “doesn’t matter” when deciding which plans to consider, but that the attribute would matter for which option one actually chooses.

Pursuant to this point, one might observe that the attitudinal questions in the Twin Cities data are actually phrased rather oddly if they are intended to measure preference weights. One might also question why we choose to code the responses as 1, 2 and 3. Is there any reason to think that the preference weight for a person who responds they “have to have” an attribute exceeds that of a person who responds “like to have” by the same amount that the weight for a person who responds “like to have” exceeds that of a person who responds “doesn’t matter”?

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But, despite these problems, it turns out that responses to these rather imperfectly phrased attitudinal questions, coded in our admittedly rather coarse way,⁴ are very predictive of actual choice behavior. In fact, the improvement in the log-likelihood function when we included the stated attribute importance measures in the model was over 100 points (from –1956 to –1834), a very dramatic improvement.⁵ This was beyond our wildest expectations of how useful such data might be in predicting behavior. It is possible that more refined questions, or a more refined coding of responses, might yield a predictive model that is better yet. But the key point is that our exercise revealed the predictive power of even rather crude attitudinal measures.

Finally, Table 5 presents our estimates of equation (3) and of the unobserved attribute levels (A_i) for each insurance plan. Let’s first consider the second unobserved attribute, quality of care. It is worth noting that we can only measure the quality of each plan relative to some base or reference alternative, since only differences in quality affect choices in our model. In Table 5, we set the quality of Basic Medicare to zero (i.e., it is the base alternative) and then estimate the quality of the other plans relative to Basic Medicare.⁶ Thus, the positive estimates of A_2 for options 2 and 3 imply that consumers perceive these plans as providing higher quality than Basic Medicare. This is as we would expect, since options 2 and 3 are Basic Medicare plus medigap insurance that covers additional services. Thus, care under these options should be at least as good as under Basic Medicare alone.

The estimates of the perceived quality levels for the HMO plans are quite interesting. The negative value of A_2 for the IPA plan (A_{42}) implies that consumers perceived the care provided

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⁴ It is worth noting that we are not really committing the sin of coding ordinal variables as cardinal variables, because we are not interested in using the model to predict how changes in consumers’ stated attribute importance levels would affect choice probabilities. We are only interested in how changes in the attributes of the insurance plans affect market shares for each plan. As far as the stated importance weight measures are concerned, the only issue is whether our coding generates a variable that is a good predictor of individual importance weights (or whether some other coding might have provided a better predictor), not whether our coding is consistent with the scale of the attitudinal data (which would seem to be a rather amorphous concept anyway).

⁵ One does not need to estimate a complicated heterogeneous coefficients model like the one we laid out in equations (1) through (3) to see the predictive power of the attitudinal data. If one estimates a simple multinomial logit model with the five observed attributes in Table 1 as predictors of behavior, and then compare this to a simple multinomial logit model that also includes interactions between the observed attributes and the stated attribute importance measures (thus letting the logit coefficients on each observed attribute differ depending on the stated attribute importance weight) the improvement in the log likelihood function is again roughly 100 points.

⁶ Another technical point, explained at some length in Harris and Keane (1999), is that it is difficult to estimate both the scale of W_p in equation (3) and the scale of the unobserved attribute levels A for each plan. To deal with this problem, Harris and Keane restricted W_p to equal the inverse of the estimated standard deviation of the measurement error in equation (3), which, in turn, was restricted to be the same as the standard deviation of the measurement error in equation (2). Intuitively, these restrictions imply that the stated attribute importance measures are equally good at predicting peoples’ preference weights on the observed and unobserved attributes.
under this plan as being low quality. In contrast, consumers felt that the care provided under the group HMO plan was higher quality than under Basic Medicare. Still, the quality of care under the group HMO was perceived as lower than under Basic Medicare plus either medigap plan. Of course, we can’t readily judge if respondents’ quality perceptions are accurate, because quality is so difficult to measure. But none of the perceived quality estimates seems unreasonable.

The results for the first unobserved attribute, cost sharing requirements, are rather surprising. As we see in Table 5, the estimates of $A_{21}$ through $A_{51}$ are all negative. Since the preference weight that multiplies this attribute is a preference for “low cost sharing,” a negative attribute level means that the plan requires more cost sharing than the base alternative (Basic Medicare). Thus, these estimates imply that the survey respondents perceive every alternative health insurance plan as having greater cost share requirements than Basic Medicare. In fact, Basic Medicare has the highest cost share requirements of any option.

At this point, it’s worth recalling the intuition for how we can estimate the levels of plan attributes that are not observed in the data, such as quality and cost sharing. Basically, if people who say they care a lot about low cost sharing tend (ceteris paribus) to choose a plan, it implies the plan is perceived as having low cost sharing. Since the people who say they care most about low co-pays are also the most likely to choose Basic Medicare, our estimates imply that people perceive Basic Medicare as having low co-pays.

While it is difficult to form an overall objective measure of co-pay requirements, we do know qualitatively that Basic Medicare has the highest co-pays of any plan. Thus, we can tell that respondents have rather fundamental mis-perceptions about cost sharing, even though we can’t easily form an objective ranking of all five plans on the cost-sharing dimension.

There is a literature suggesting that senior citizens have mis-perceptions about Medicare and the supplemental insurance market. Examples are Cafferata (1984), McCall et al. (1986) and Davidson et al. (1992). This is also a literature showing that consumers have difficulty understanding health insurance plans more generally. See, e.g., Cunningham et al. (2001), Gibbs et al. (1996), Isaacs (1996) and Tumlinson et al. (1997). Given this, it does not seem surprising to find that senior citizens have mis-perceptions about cost sharing requirements.

Interestingly, however, our estimates do not imply consumer misperceptions about the five observed plan attributes in our model. That is, consumers who say they care a lot about premiums do act as if they place a relatively high weight on low premiums (in the sense that they
tend to choose plans with low premiums), consumers who say they care a lot about drug coverage do act as if they place a high weight on drug coverage (in the sense that they tend to choose plans with drug coverage), etc.. Why should mis-perceptions be more important for cost-sharing requirements than for these other attributes? 

My hypothesis is that cost-sharing requirements are very hard for consumers to understand for the same reason they are hard for a researcher to measure/quantify. Health plans tend to specify a wide range of different co-pays that differ across treatments and the circumstances under which those treatments are obtained. Patients’ out-of-pocket costs may also vary depending on how physician billing for a procedure compares to the reimbursement rate under Medicare or under the other plans, and according to whether particular procedures are covered at all. Given uncertainty about what services one will require, how one will be billed, and what any insurance plan will cover, it is very difficult for a trained statistician, let alone a typical consumer, to predict future out of pocket costs conditional on enrollment in a particular health care plan. In contrast, a plan attribute like provider choice is more evident “up front,” since, for example, one either chooses a doctor or not when one joins a plan.

The finding of consumer misperceptions has important implications for the design of health insurance markets. As Hall (2004) notes: “to choose rationally across insurers [consumers] must be well informed about … the plans offered. … It is worth noting that many consumers … have not had substantial experience in obtaining health care until they face … illness.” Thus, our finding that consumers have important misperceptions about their insurance options undermines a key tenet of argument for why more choice would enhance welfare.

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7 It is worth emphasizing that our method could have also implied consumer misperceptions about observed attributes. I discussed this in footnote 2. For example, if consumers thought the plans that allow provider choice actually did not allow choice (and vice-versa), then consumers who said they care a lot about provider choice would act as if they placed relatively small utility weights on provider choice. On the other hand, our results should not be taken as implying that consumer perceptions of the observed attributes (premiums, drug coverage, etc.) are completely accurate. They simply mean that perceptions of these attributes are sufficiently accurate to generate the correlation that those who say they care more about an attribute are also more likely to choose a plan that has that attribute. This is consistent with some inaccuracy of information. For example, even if consumers did not know the premiums for each plan exactly, but only knew the ranking of plans by premium, one would get the pattern that consumers who care more about premiums tend to choose plans with lower premiums. Perceived attributes would have to be negatively correlated with objective attributes to completely flip the sign of the slope coefficients in (2).

8 An alternative hypothesis is that people with low incomes place a great weight on low co-pays, but that they simply cannot afford supplemental insurance or the extra cost of joining an HMO. We find this story implausible for two reasons. First, we dropped respondents who used Medicaid, the medical insurance program for the poor, or who has SSI benefits (which are disability benefits), or who couldn’t pay the Medicare Part B premium of $28 per month. Thus, the poorest respondents are not represented in the data. Second, the HMO options only cost a little more than Basic Medicare, so it seems implausible that liquidity constraints would preclude those options.
II. D. Simulations of the Model

Given an estimated choice model, one can use it to simulate the impact of a change in plan attributes (like premiums or drug coverage) on the market shares of the various plans. One can also use the model to predict whether there would be substantial demand for new plans with particular attributes. Experiments like these help shed light on the meaning of the coefficient estimates. Some examples of these type of simulations are provided in Table 6.

The first row of Table 6 reports a “baseline” simulation of the model, which simply gives the model’s predictions regarding the market shares of the various plans. These predictions line up reasonably closely with the actual market shares observed in the data, although the model somewhat overstates enrollment in the IPA plan (25.6% predicted vs. only 21.7% in the data) and in the group HMO (43.6% predicted vs. only 36.4% in the data) and correspondingly underpredicts actual enrollment in the Medicare and medigap options. A notable aspect of the Twin Cities health insurance market is the very high penetration rate of the Medicare HMOs. Nationwide, participation in such plans is quite a bit lower.

The second row of Table 6 reports our model’s predictions of what would happen to market shares of each plan if Basic Medicare were to add prescription drug coverage. The model predicts that the market share of Basic Medicare would increase substantially, from 9.1% to 17.7%. This suggests that many consumers find prescription drug coverage to be a very attractive feature of a health plan. This impression is reinforced in the third row of Table 6, which shows the model’s prediction of what would happen if the IPA plan were to introduce drug coverage. The model predicts that its market share would increase substantially, from 22.2% to 41.7%.

Similarly, the fourth row of Table 6 presents the model’s prediction of what would happen if the IPA plan were to remove provider choice. The model predicts that its market share would dwindle to almost zero (2.3%). This is not surprising, as in this case the IPA plan would be completely dominated by the Group HMO. That is, it would have a slightly higher premium, it would not cover drugs while the group HMO does, and it would have worse perceived quality and higher perceived cost-sharing (see Table 5). Other simulations (not reported here) implied that shares of the medigap plans would drop substantially if they were to restrict provider choice.

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9 Our choice model could be made to fit the overall market shares of the five plans just about perfectly by including plan specific intercepts. But this would make it impossible to predict market share for a new plan with a particular set of common attributes, because we wouldn’t know how to set its intercept. As Elrod and Keane (1995) discuss, an intercept captures average consumer tastes for the unobserved attributes of an alternative.
In other simulations reported in Harris and Keane (1999), we found that moderate changes in premiums (i.e., $20 per month increases) would have very small effects on plan enrollments. Thus, our estimates imply that consumers care quite a lot about provider choice and prescription drug coverage, but that they aren’t very sensitive to premiums (at least not within the rather limited range of premiums exhibited in these data).

In the bottom row of Table 6, we use the model to predict what would happen if a new insurance plan were introduced. The “New Plan” is designed to fill a gap that existed in the Twin Cities market. Consider a segment of consumers who place a high value on provider choice and preventive care, but little value on prescription drug coverage. Given the structure of the Twin Cities market in 1988, the plan best tailored to these tastes was the IPA plan. However, the IPA was perceived as being very low quality (and having very high cost sharing), thus leaving these consumers without a very appealing option. The fact that so many people choose the IPA plan anyway (21.7%) suggests that this configuration of preferences is rather common. The “New Plan” was designed to be like the IPA on observed attributes, but to have the same perceived quality as the group HMO ($A_{62}=.161$) and to have less perceived cost sharing ($A_{61}=-.150$).

Our model predicts that the “New Plan” would be very popular, with a market share of 25.8%. This implies a substantial welfare improvement from its introduction (holding other plan attributes fixed), since every consumer who chooses the “New Plan” is better off than they were before, while consumers who stay with the existing plans are made no worse off. Note that the “New Plan” differs from the group HMO primarily in that it allows provider choice but doesn’t cover drugs. Our estimates imply that a substantial segment of the population likes that option, provided it is also of reasonably high quality.

One could use the model to formally calculate the increase in consumer surplus that arises from introducing the “New Plan,” holding existing plan features fixed. Since Harris and Keane (1999) did not report the calculation, I can’t report it here. However, the fact that the new plan would be quite popular suggests informally that that the welfare gains would be large.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Consumer surplus is the sum over all consumers of the difference between what they would be willing to pay for the insurance plan and what they actually have to pay (i.e., the premium). The calculation is actually quite simple in the heterogeneous logit model. However, such welfare calculations can sometimes be rather sensitive to the shape of the demand curve implied by the model at very high price levels. The logit model, because of the extreme value error assumption, implies that a small number of people would want to buy a new product even at a very high price. It therefore predicts large welfare gains for this small group when a new product is introduced. This may (or may not) have a big impact on the overall welfare calculation. To see if this is a problem, sensitivity tests, such as truncating consumer willingness to pay at some maximum value to see how results change, should be done.
II. E. The Importance of Controlling for Unobserved Attributes

A key finding in Harris and Keane (1999) was that failure to control for the unobserved attributes of cost-sharing and quality leads to severe bias in estimates of consumer preferences for the observed attributes of insurance plans. Most notably, when we estimated models that ignored the unobserved attributes, the estimates implied the completely implausible outcome that consumers dislike provider choice.

The reason for this odd outcome is as follows: Only the group HMO restricts provider choice, but this plan has a very high market share. Thus, a model that ignores quality as a determinant of insurance plan choice has to assume that consumers don’t care about provider choice in order to explain the high market share of the group HMO. In contrast, our model estimates imply that the group HMO has high perceived quality, which we infer because consumers who say they care a lot about quality are very likely to choose the group HMO. Because of this, our model can explain the high market share of the group HMO on the basis of perceived quality, rather than by assuming consumers don’t care about provider choice.

More formally, this argument can be stated as follows: Observed plan attributes are endogenous in the statistical sense that they are correlated with the error terms (i.e., unobserved plan attributes). But we use the attitudinal data to control for unobserved plan attributes and obtain consistent estimates of preference parameters. This is an alternative to the conventional econometric approach of using instrumental variables. But, unlike instrumental variables, this approach works in non-linear models, like the heterogeneous logit model considered here. This observation is a key part of the methodological contribution in Harris and Keane (1999).

III. Related Work

To my knowledge, the “extended” heterogeneous logit model developed in Harris and Keane (1999) has not yet been applied in subsequent work in health economics. However, two subsequent papers have confirmed the value of using attitudinal data to learn more about consumer taste heterogeneity within the simple MNL framework. First, Harris, Feldman and Schultz (2002) – henceforth HFS – analyzed insurance plan choices of employed workers who were under 65, and hence not yet eligible for Medicare. HFS used data from the Buyers Health Care Action Group (BHCAG) - a coalition of two-dozen employers in the Twin Cities area that

11 These models included both simple logit and heterogeneous logit models that use only observed plan attributes to predict choices, but that do not accommodate unobserved common attributes. These models set the A parameters equal to zero in the model described in section II.B.
contracts directly with health care providers (rather than negotiating plans with insurance companies). Employees of BHCAG member companies have a choice among several alternative health insurance plan options. Employees were surveyed about their plan choices in 1998, and they were also asked a series of questions about how much they valued various plan options.

Like Harris and Keane, HFS used questions about how consumers valued various aspects of quality, along with choice data, to infer perceived quality levels of the various plans. The HFS study differed from Harris and Keane in several ways: (1) they attempted to uncover different dimensions of perceived quality, (2) the plans offered by the BHCAG had identical cost sharing requirements, so HFS did not attempt to estimate the effect of perceived cost-sharing on choices, (3) HFS pretended they did not observe premiums, in order to ascertain if the Harris and Keane methodology could successfully uncover the premium differences across plans by using data on survey respondents’ stated importance of premiums, and (4) HFS did not allow for unobserved taste heterogeneity, meaning they set $\sigma^2=0$ for the measurement error terms in (2) and (3).

Like Harris and Keane, HFS found that use of attitudinal data led to dramatic improvements in model fit, and also led to more sensible coefficient estimates for observed attributes. They found that premium differences across plans were accurately uncovered by the methodology. Their estimates imply that perceived quality differs greatly across plans. When quality is decomposed into different components, what appears to have the biggest impact on choice is service quality (i.e., access to specialists, convenience of clinic locations, wait time for specialist appointments) rather than provider quality. This result is consistent with a literature suggesting that consumers tend to pay relatively little attention to measures of provider quality.\footnote{Harris (2002) uses stated preference (SP) choice experiments to analyze how giving consumers more information about health plan quality would affect their choices. She finds that the availability of quality information (either in the form of expert or consumer assessments) causes the impact of HMO network features on choice to fall substantially. This suggests that consumers use features like a large network or the ability to self-refer to specialists as a signal of high quality, or perhaps as insurance against low average physician quality. This type of question would be very difficult to examine using revealed preference data, given the difficulty in finding the right variability in information regimes.}

Parente, Feldman and Christianson (2004) used the same approach as HFS to study health plan choices of University of Minnesota employees. I will not describe this work in detail, but simply note that they again find that attitudinal data is very predictive of consumer choices. This body of work strongly suggests that, in any effort to collect data on health plan choices, it would behoove investigators to also collect data on attitudes toward health plan attributes.
IV. Discussion

A key limitation of the insurance choice modeling exercise I described in section II is that no attempt was made to predict the characteristics of consumers who choose each option. As I discussed in the introduction, to fully exploit the potential for choice modeling techniques to contribute to our understanding of insurance markets, it is important to predict not only the market shares that arise when a menu of insurance plans is offered, but the service utilization of the type of consumers who choose each plan as well. Unfortunately, the Twin Cities Medicare data does not contain information on health status and/or retrospective service use that would be critical for forecasting medical expenses of each respondent.

Predicting utilization is important whether we are analyzing markets where private insurers offer plans in competition with government, or analyzing the situation of a single payer (i.e., government) who offers a menu of insurance options. In either case, we need to predict not only market shares but also utilization in order to determine the total costs to the government, the level of consumer surplus, and the pattern of cross-subsidies across the set of plans. For example, if we sought to design a menu of options under a single payer system, as suggested by Spence (1978), we would need to calculate consumer surplus under any hypothetical menu that the single payer might offer, subject to the constraint that the menu as a whole must break even (i.e., the plans that make losses must be subsidized by plans that make profits).

However, finding the data necessary to model both health plan choice and health service utilization is challenging. I know of no single data set that contains all the data necessary for both tasks. In order to model choice, one needs to know the insurance plan options that each person in a data set faced. In order to predict utilization, one needs information on personal demographics, health status and prior utilization. One also needs data on the characteristics of the insurance plan in which a person is actually enrolled (since a person with given characteristics would generally have different utilization of services under plans with different coverage).

Unfortunately, data sets like the Twin Cities Medicare data, which can be used to model choice, don’t have the information needed to model utilization. And data sets like the household component of the U.S. National Medical Expenditure Survey of 1987 (NMES), or its successor, the household component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) begun in 1996, that enable us to model utilization, don’t detail consumers’ insurance choice sets. They only describe the plan in which a person was enrolled. So these data sets cannot be used to model choice.
The NMES and MEPS also contain establishment surveys in which employers are asked about the insurance options they offer to employees. Cardon and Hendel (2001), Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin (2001) and Vistnes and Banthin (1997) have linked the household and employer components of these data sets in order to model insurance choice. As Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin discuss, the success rate in linking is only about 30%, so there is a serious issue of whether the linked sample is representative. Of greater concern, in my view, is that the linked samples only contain about one to two thousand people. This is far too small a sample size to reliably model utilization, given that a small fraction of people account for most medical costs.

One possible strategy is to use different data sets to estimate different parts of the model. For instance, one might use the Twin Cities data to model choice, and then use the NMES or MEPS household surveys to model utilization. In this strategy, one would use the NMES or MEPS to predict utilization based only on characteristics of respondents that were also collected in the Twin Cities data (i.e., age, gender, income). Then, given predictions from our choice model of the demographics of respondents who would choose a particular plan, we could predict utilization based on those same demographics using the NMES or MEPS data.

A problem with this multiple data set strategy is that the demographic information in data sets available for choice modeling is not sufficiently rich to construct good predictive models of utilization. A promising alternative strategy is to collect new insurance choice data from stated preference (SP) choice experiments and, in this new data collection effort, to also obtain from the respondents rich information about health status and medical history. One could then use the SP choice model to predict the characteristics of respondents who chose each insurance option based not only on simple demographics like age, gender and income, but also in terms of health and medical history. All these variables could then be used to predict utilization, based on NMES and MEPS type data. In my view, this is a critical avenue for future research.

In the choice modeling part of this exercise, market choice and SP choice data could be combined to create a better predictive model. Specifically, choice models based on market and SP data should predict similar market shares for insurance plans, both unconditionally (i.e., for the population as a whole) and conditional on the demographic information that is common to the data sets used to estimate each model. See Hall, Viney, Haas and Louviere (2004) for discussion.

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13 A more subtle problem arises if unobserved determinants of expenditures among those who chose a particular plan will differ depending on the original choice set. To deal with such a selection on unobservables problem, utilization and plan choice would have to be modeled jointly.
of health applications of SP choice modeling, and Hensher, Louviere and Swait (1999) or Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000) for discussions of merging market and SP choice data.

V. Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed how simulation methods can be used to estimate the “extended heterogeneous logit” model. This model allows us to analyze discrete choice data where there are several alternatives, and where consumers have heterogeneous tastes over the common attributes of the alternatives. I have argued that this model has important, and largely untapped, application in health economics. As an illustration, I have focused on how the heterogeneous logit can be used to (i) analyze consumer preferences for attributes of health insurance plans, (ii) predict demand for new health insurance products (with particular attributes), and (iii) predict consumer welfare effects of adding new insurance products.

The particular illustrative application that I discussed was to modeling the health insurance choices of Medicare eligible senior citizens in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, using data collected by HCFA in 1988. The main findings of this empirical choice modeling exercise can be summarized as follows:

1) Consumers are not very sensitive to premiums when choosing health insurance plans (at least not within the limited range of premiums in the Twin Cities data).

2) There is a great deal of heterogeneity in consumer tastes for plan attributes like provider choice, drug coverage, quality and cost-sharing.

3) Many people care a lot about drug coverage and provider choice when choosing a health insurance plan (i.e., plans’ market shares are quite sensitive to these attributes, and large segments of consumers are willing to pay a lot for them).

4) Senior citizens have important misperceptions about the cost sharing requirements of Basic Medicare vs. the medigap and HMO options.

A broader methodological point brought out by the study is that attitudinal data on the importance that consumers say they assign to health plan options is actually highly predictive of choice behavior. Thus, such data can be very useful in producing better predictive models and learning more about consumer taste heterogeneity.

One empirical result I would like to put in a broader context is the finding that consumers place a great deal of value on provider choice. This obviously creates problems for the strategy of using HMO plans to hold down medical costs. The original idea behind HMOs was that they
could deliver health care more efficiently by organizing providers into competing groups, thus driving down provider prices. As discussed by Nichols et al. (2004), this idea has floundered because consumers place so much value on provider choice. Providers have been able to exploit this to gain market power. Instead of HMOs threatening providers with loss of patients if they are unwilling to accept discounted fees, we have provider groups able to “dictate terms to health plans on the premise that their absence from a network would make [it] unattractive to consumers.”

In contrast, recent history shows that a large single payer like Medicare does have the countervailing power to dictate terms to providers.

Recently, Enthoven (2004) has argued that to make the managed care idea work we need to use antitrust laws to break up provider monopolies. But, whether breaking up provider networks would enhance welfare seems unclear, given the strong consumer preference for large networks. This is a clear example of where understanding consumer preferences is essential for effective policy making.

All of this suggests that the strategy, adopted in the U.S. in recent years, of letting private firms, known as “Medicare HMOs,” offer plans in competition with government, is not likely to be successful as a cost containment strategy for Medicare. Indeed, there is now a large body of literature suggesting that Medicare HMOs have not been successful at cost containment, but, rather, have achieved profits largely through “cherry picking” behavior – i.e., attracting enrollees whose costs are low relative to Medicare capitation payments.

I have argued that an alternative way to provide for consumer choice in health insurance is to have a single payer offer a menu of insurance options. The state-of-the-art choice modeling techniques that I have described here provide a technology that enables us, at least in principle, to design a menu of insurance options that would appeal to consumer tastes and, at the same time, enhance equity and efficiency. As I’ve pointed out, the main obstacle to pursuing this important agenda is the availability of data that would enable us to model health plan choices and service utilization simultaneously. To do this, we will need to combine data from a number of sources, including data on consumer insurance choice in actual markets, stated preference and attitudinal data, and data of health status and medical service utilization.

On this point, it is interesting to look back at the classic article by Stockman (1983). He said “The fourth premise on which any kind of plan ought to be centered is the notion of healthy provider competition and marketing of health care plans on a retail basis .... Once we establish a retail market among the consumers, we will automatically and perforce get fierce competition among various provider units.” (emphasis added).
References


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Hall, Jane (2004). Can we design a market for competitive health insurance? CHERE discussion paper #53 (February).


Table 1: Health Plan Attributes (Twin Cities 1988 Market)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basic Medicare</th>
<th>Medicare +medigap w/o drugs</th>
<th>Medicare +medigap w/drugs</th>
<th>IPA</th>
<th>HMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly premium</td>
<td>$28</td>
<td>$71 to $82 (based on age)</td>
<td>$95 to $109 (based on age)</td>
<td>$53</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Coverage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Care</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider Choice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must Submit Claims</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2: Stated Attribute Importance Measures
(“Tell me if you would …. to consider a plan”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Have to Have”</th>
<th>“Like to Have”</th>
<th>“Doesn’t Matter”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed Attributes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Premium</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Coverage</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Care</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provider Choice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of Physician</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of Hospital</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Paperwork</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unobserved Attributes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Cost Sharing</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Quality</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral to Specialists</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Rushed from Hospital</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each attitude scale was coded: 1=”Doesn’t Matter,” 2=”Like to have,” 3=”Have to Have.”

The importance of quality measure was created by summing the three quality related questions and dividing by 3. The importance of provider choice measure was created by summing the two provider choice questions and dividing by 2.
### Table 3: Parameter Estimates, Observed Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Attribute:</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Slope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premium</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Coverage</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.384**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.912)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Care and No Claims</td>
<td>1.887**</td>
<td>.766**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.498)</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider Choice</td>
<td>-.395</td>
<td>1.430**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.081)</td>
<td>(.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must Submit Claims</td>
<td>Collinear with Preventive Care (Plans with preventive care do not have claims)</td>
<td>-.274**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.130)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The “slope” coefficient must be multiplied by the stated importance weight $S_i = 1, 2, \text{ or } 3$, and the result then added to the intercept to obtain the predicted importance weight for person $i$. Standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimates. A “**” indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 4: Predicted Utility Weight on “Drug Coverage” for Different Levels of Stated Importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S=1</th>
<th>S=2</th>
<th>S=3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Doesn’t Matter”</td>
<td>(0.057 + (1)(0.384))</td>
<td>(0.057 + (2)(0.384))</td>
<td>(0.057 + (3)(0.384))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= 0.441</td>
<td>= 0.825</td>
<td>= 1.209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Parameter Estimates, Unobserved Attributes

Un-Observed Attribute Importance:

Estimates of Equation (3):

\[ W_{ip} = 2.688 \cdot S_{ip}^* + \nu_{ip} \quad p=1 \text{ (cost share), } 2 \text{ (quality)} \]

Estimates of the Un-observed attribute levels for each insurance plan

Un-observed (or “Latent”) attribute 1:
Cost Sharing Relative to Basic Medicare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>( A_{11} )</th>
<th>( 0 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Medicare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medigap without Drug Coverage</td>
<td>( A_{21} )</td>
<td>-.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medigap with Drug Coverage</td>
<td>( A_{31} )</td>
<td>-.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA type HMO</td>
<td>( A_{41} )</td>
<td>-.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group HMO</td>
<td>( A_{51} )</td>
<td>-.271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Un-observed (or “Latent”) attribute 2:
Quality of Care Relative to Basic Medicare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>( A_{12} )</th>
<th>( 0 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Medicare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medigap without Drug Coverage</td>
<td>( A_{22} )</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medigap with Drug Coverage</td>
<td>( A_{32} )</td>
<td>.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA type HMO</td>
<td>( A_{42} )</td>
<td>-.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group HMO</td>
<td>( A_{52} )</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The unobserved attribute levels for Basic Medicare are normalized to 0 since it is the base alternative. Attribute levels for the other plans are measured relative to Basic Medicare. In equation (3), \( S_{ip}^* \) is the weight (from 1 to 3) that person i says he/she puts on attribute p, and \( \nu_{ip} \) is “measurement error.”
Table 6: Some Illustrative Experiments Using the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basic Medicare</th>
<th>Medigap w/o Drugs</th>
<th>Medigap w/ Drugs</th>
<th>IPA</th>
<th>Group HMO</th>
<th>“New Plan”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare adds Drug</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA adds Drug Coverage</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA plan removes Provider Choice</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add “New Plan”</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>